Compromise Infrastructure: Network Devices

Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not Initial Access to that environment -- instead leveraging these devices to support additional targeting.

Once an adversary has control, compromised network devices can be used to launch additional operations, such as hosting payloads for Phishing campaigns (i.e., Link Target) or enabling the required access to execute Content Injection operations. Adversaries may also be able to harvest reusable credentials (i.e., Valid Accounts) from compromised network devices.

Adversaries often target Internet-facing edge devices and related network appliances that specifically do not support robust host-based defenses.[1][2]

Compromised network devices may be used to support subsequent Command and Control activity, such as Hide Infrastructure through an established Proxy and/or Botnet network.[3]

ID: T1584.008
Sub-technique of:  T1584
Platforms: PRE
Contributors: Gavin Knapp
Version: 1.0
Created: 28 March 2024
Last Modified: 19 April 2024

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0007 APT28

APT28 compromised Ubiquiti network devices to act as collection devices for credentials compromised via phishing webpages.[4]

C0029 Cutting Edge

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used compromised and out-of-support Cyberoam VPN appliances for C2.[5][6]

G1017 Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has compromised small office and home office (SOHO) network edge devices, many of which were located in the same geographic area as the victim, to proxy network traffic.[7][8]


ID Mitigation Description
M1056 Pre-compromise

This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.


ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0035 Internet Scan Response Content

Once adversaries leverage compromised network devices as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.[9] Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle.