C0010

C0010 was a cyber espionage campaign conducted by UNC3890 that targeted Israeli shipping, government, aviation, energy, and healthcare organizations. Security researcher assess UNC3890 conducts operations in support of Iranian interests, and noted several limited technical connections to Iran, including PDB strings and Farsi language artifacts. C0010 began by at least late 2020, and was still ongoing as of mid-2022.[1]

ID: C0010
First Seen:  December 2020 [1]
Last Seen:  August 2022 [1]
Version: 1.0
Created: 21 September 2022
Last Modified: 04 October 2022

Techniques Used

Domain ID Name Use
Enterprise T1583 .001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains

For C0010, UNC3890 actors established domains that appeared to be legitimate services and entities, such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Office 365, and Pfizer.[1]

Enterprise T1584 .001 Compromise Infrastructure: Domains

During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely compromised the domain of a legitimate Israeli shipping company.[1]

Enterprise T1587 .001 Develop Capabilities: Malware

For C0010, UNC3890 actors used unique malware, including SUGARUSH and SUGARDUMP.[1]

Enterprise T1189 Drive-by Compromise

During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely established a watering hole that was hosted on a login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company that was active until at least November 2021.[1]

Enterprise T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

During C0010, UNC3890 actors downloaded tools and malware onto a compromised host.[1]

Enterprise T1588 .002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool

For C0010, UNC3890 actors obtained multiple publicly-available tools, including METASPLOIT, UNICORN, and NorthStar C2.[1]

Enterprise T1608 .001 Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware

For C0010, UNC3890 actors staged malware on their infrastructure for direct download onto a compromised system.[1]

.002 Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool

For C0010, UNC3890 actors staged tools on their infrastructure to download directly onto a compromised system.[1]

.004 Stage Capabilities: Drive-by Target

For C0010, the threat actors compromised the login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company and likely established a watering hole that collected visitor information.[1]

Software

References