Drive-by Compromise

Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring Application Access Token.

Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:

  • A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting
  • Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary
  • Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers (i.e., Malvertising)
  • Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).

Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.[1]

Typical drive-by compromise process:

  1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.
  2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version.
    • The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.
  3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.
  4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.
    • In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.

Unlike Exploit Public-Facing Application, the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.

Adversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to Steal Application Access Tokens, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.[2]

ID: T1189
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
Tactic: Initial Access
Platforms: Linux, SaaS, Windows, macOS
Contributors: Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services); Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)
Version: 1.5
Created: 18 April 2018
Last Modified: 14 April 2023

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0138 Andariel

Andariel has used watering hole attacks, often with zero-day exploits, to gain initial access to victims within a specific IP range.[3][4]

G0073 APT19

APT19 performed a watering hole attack on in 2014 to compromise targets.[5]

G0007 APT28

APT28 has compromised targets via strategic web compromise utilizing custom exploit kits.[6] APT28 used reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) against government websites to redirect users to phishing webpages.[7]

G0050 APT32

APT32 has infected victims by tricking them into visiting compromised watering hole websites.[8][9]

G0067 APT37

APT37 has used strategic web compromises, particularly of South Korean websites, to distribute malware. The group has also used torrent file-sharing sites to more indiscriminately disseminate malware to victims. As part of their compromises, the group has used a Javascript based profiler called RICECURRY to profile a victim's web browser and deliver malicious code accordingly.[10][11][12]

G0082 APT38

APT38 has conducted watering holes schemes to gain initial access to victims.[13][14]

G0001 Axiom

Axiom has used watering hole attacks to gain access.[15]

S0606 Bad Rabbit

Bad Rabbit spread through watering holes on popular sites by injecting JavaScript into the HTML body or a .js file.[16][17]


BRONZE BUTLER compromised three Japanese websites using a Flash exploit to perform watering hole attacks.[18]

S0482 Bundlore

Bundlore has been spread through malicious advertisements on websites.[19]

C0010 C0010

During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely established a watering hole that was hosted on a login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company that was active until at least November 2021.[20]

G0070 Dark Caracal

Dark Caracal leveraged a watering hole to serve up malicious code.[21]

G0012 Darkhotel

Darkhotel used embedded iframes on hotel login portals to redirect selected victims to download malware.[22]

G0035 Dragonfly

Dragonfly has compromised targets via strategic web compromise (SWC) utilizing a custom exploit kit.[23][24][25]

G1006 Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca has performed watering hole attacks.[26]

G0066 Elderwood

Elderwood has delivered zero-day exploits and malware to victims by injecting malicious code into specific public Web pages visited by targets within a particular sector.[27][28][29]

S0531 Grandoreiro

Grandoreiro has used compromised websites and Google Ads to bait victims into downloading its installer.[30][31]


KARAE was distributed through torrent file-sharing websites to South Korean victims, using a YouTube video downloader application as a lure.[11]

G0032 Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group delivered RATANKBA and other malicious code to victims via a compromised legitimate website.[32][33]

G0077 Leafminer

Leafminer has infected victims using watering holes.[34]

G0065 Leviathan

Leviathan has infected victims using watering holes.[35]

S0451 LoudMiner

LoudMiner is typically bundled with pirated copies of Virtual Studio Technology (VST) for Windows and macOS.[36]

G0095 Machete

Machete has distributed Machete through a fake blog website.[37]

G0059 Magic Hound

Magic Hound has conducted watering-hole attacks through media and magazine websites.[38]

G1020 Mustard Tempest

Mustard Tempest has used drive-by downloads for initial infection, often using fake browser updates as a lure.[39][40][41][42]

C0016 Operation Dust Storm

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used a watering hole attack on a popular software reseller to exploit the then-zero-day Internet Explorer vulnerability CVE-2014-0322.[43]

G0040 Patchwork

Patchwork has used watering holes to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.[44][45]


PLATINUM has sometimes used drive-by attacks against vulnerable browser plugins.[46]


POORAIM has been delivered through compromised sites acting as watering holes.[11]


PROMETHIUM has used watering hole attacks to deliver malicious versions of legitimate installers.[47]

S0496 REvil

REvil has infected victim machines through compromised websites and exploit kits.[48][49][50][51]

G0048 RTM

RTM has distributed its malware via the RIG and SUNDOWN exploit kits, as well as online advertising network Yandex.Direct.[52][53]

S1086 Snip3

Snip3 has been delivered to targets via downloads from malicious domains.[54]

S1124 SocGholish

SocGholish has been distributed through compromised websites with malicious content often masquerading as browser updates.[39]

G0027 Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 has extensively used strategic web compromises to target victims.[55][56]

G0134 Transparent Tribe

Transparent Tribe has used websites with malicious hyperlinks and iframes to infect targeted victims with Crimson, njRAT, and other malicious tools.[57][58][59]

G0010 Turla

Turla has infected victims using watering holes.[60][61]

G0124 Windigo

Windigo has distributed Windows malware via drive-by downloads.[62]

G0112 Windshift

Windshift has used compromised websites to register custom URL schemes on a remote system.[63]


ID Mitigation Description
M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing

Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist.[64][65]

Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist for these types of systems.[65]

M1050 Exploit Protection

Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. [66] Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. [67] Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.

M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content

For malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first place.

Script blocking extensions can help prevent the execution of JavaScript that may commonly be used during the exploitation process.

M1051 Update Software

Ensure all browsers and plugins kept updated can help prevent the exploit phase of this technique. Use modern browsers with security features turned on.


ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0015 Application Log Application Log Content

Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before.

DS0022 File File Creation

Monitor for newly constructed files written to disk to gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing.

DS0029 Network Traffic Network Connection Creation

Monitor for newly constructed network connections to untrusted hosts that are used to send or receive data.

Network Traffic Content

Monitor for other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. Use network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.

DS0009 Process Process Creation

Look for behaviors on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behaviors of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution, or evidence of Discovery.


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