Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. [1] Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.

Adversaries can also take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to proxy command and control traffic.

ID: T1090
Sub-techniques:  T1090.001, T1090.002, T1090.003, T1090.004
Platforms: Linux, Network, Windows, macOS
Contributors: Heather Linn; Jon Sheedy; Walker Johnson
Version: 3.1
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 30 August 2021

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0096 APT41

APT41 used a tool called CLASSFON to covertly proxy network communications.[2]

S0456 Aria-body

Aria-body has the ability to use a reverse SOCKS proxy module.[3]

S0347 AuditCred

AuditCred can utilize proxy for communications.[4]


BADCALL functions as a proxy server between the victim and C2 server.[5]


BADHATCH can use SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 proxies to connect to actor-controlled C2 servers. BADHATCH can also emulate a reverse proxy on a compromised machine to connect with actor-controlled C2 servers.[6]

S0268 Bisonal

Bisonal has supported use of a proxy server.[7]

G0108 Blue Mockingbird

Blue Mockingbird has used frp, ssf, and Venom to establish SOCKS proxy connections.[8]

C0017 C0017

During C0017, APT41 used the Cloudflare CDN to proxy C2 traffic.[9]

C0027 C0027

During C0027, Scattered Spider installed the open-source rsocx reverse proxy tool on a targeted ESXi appliance.[10]

S0348 Cardinal RAT

Cardinal RAT can act as a reverse proxy.[11]

G1021 Cinnamon Tempest

Cinnamon Tempest has used a customized version of the Iox port-forwarding and proxy tool.[12]

G0052 CopyKittens

CopyKittens has used the AirVPN service for operational activity.[13]

S0384 Dridex

Dridex contains a backconnect module for tunneling network traffic through a victim's computer. Infected computers become part of a P2P botnet that can relay C2 traffic to other infected peers.[14][15]

G1006 Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca adopted Cloudflare as a proxy for compromised servers.[16]

G0117 Fox Kitten

Fox Kitten has used the open source reverse proxy tools including FRPC and Go Proxy to establish connections from C2 to local servers.[17][18][19]

S1044 FunnyDream

FunnyDream can identify and use configured proxies in a compromised network for C2 communication.[20]

S0690 Green Lambert

Green Lambert can use proxies for C2 traffic.[21][22]


HARDRAIN uses the command cmd.exe /c netsh firewall add portopening TCP 443 "adp" and makes the victim machine function as a proxy server.[23]


HOPLIGHT has multiple proxy options that mask traffic between the malware and the remote operators.[24]


HTRAN can proxy TCP socket connections to obfuscate command and control infrastructure.[25][26]

S0283 jRAT

jRAT can serve as a SOCKS proxy server.[27]

S0487 Kessel

Kessel can use a proxy during exfiltration if set in the configuration.[28]


KEYPLUG has used Cloudflare CDN associated infrastructure to redirect C2 communications to malicious domains.[9]


KOCTOPUS has deployed a modified version of Invoke-Ngrok to expose open local ports to the Internet.[29]


LAPSUS$ has leverage NordVPN for its egress points when targeting intended victims.[30]


LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA has the ability to function as a SOCKS proxy.[31]

G0059 Magic Hound

Magic Hound has used Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) for RDP traffic.[32]

G1019 MoustachedBouncer

MoustachedBouncer has used a reverse proxy tool similar to the GitHub repository revsocks.[33]

S0108 netsh

netsh can be used to set up a proxy tunnel to allow remote host access to an infected host.[34]


NETWIRE can implement use of proxies to pivot traffic.[35]

S0508 ngrok

ngrok can be used to proxy connections to machines located behind NAT or firewalls.[36][37]

C0013 Operation Sharpshooter

For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors used the ExpressVPN service to hide their location.[38]

C0014 Operation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a custom proxy tool called "Agent" which has support for multiple hops.[39]


PLEAD has the ability to proxy network communications.[40]


POLONIUM has used the AirVPN service for operational activity.[13]

S0378 PoshC2

PoshC2 contains modules that allow for use of proxies in command and control.[41]

S0262 QuasarRAT

QuasarRAT can communicate over a reverse proxy using SOCKS5.[42][43]

S0629 RainyDay

RainyDay can use proxy tools including boost_proxy_client for reverse proxy functionality.[44]

S0332 Remcos

Remcos uses the infected hosts as SOCKS5 proxies to allow for tunneling and proxying.[45]

S1099 Samurai

Samurai has the ability to proxy connections to specified remote IPs and ports through a a proxy module.[46]

G0034 Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool can create an internal proxy server to redirect traffic from the adversary-controlled C2 to internal servers which may not be connected to the internet, but are interconnected locally.[47]

S0461 SDBbot

SDBbot has the ability to use port forwarding to establish a proxy between a target host and C2.[48]

S0273 Socksbot

Socksbot can start SOCKS proxy threads.[49]

S0615 SombRAT

SombRAT has the ability to use an embedded SOCKS proxy in C2 communications.[50]

S0436 TSCookie

TSCookie has the ability to proxy communications with command and control (C2) servers.[51]

G0010 Turla

Turla RPC backdoors have included local UPnP RPC proxies.[52]


A TYPEFRAME variant can force the compromised system to function as a proxy server.[53]

S0386 Ursnif

Ursnif has used a peer-to-peer (P2P) network for C2.[54][55]

S0207 Vasport

Vasport is capable of tunneling though a proxy.[56]

G1017 Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has used compromised devices and customized versions of open source tools such as Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP), Earthworm, and Impacket to proxy network traffic.[57][58]

S0670 WarzoneRAT

WarzoneRAT has the capability to act as a reverse proxy.[59]

G0124 Windigo

Windigo has delivered a generic Windows proxy Win32/Glubteta.M. Windigo has also used multiple reverse proxy chains as part of their C2 infrastructure.[60]

S0117 XTunnel

XTunnel relays traffic between a C2 server and a victim.[61]


ZIPLINE can create a proxy server on compromised hosts.[62][63]

S0412 ZxShell

ZxShell can set up an HTTP or SOCKS proxy.[2][64]


ID Mitigation Description
M1037 Filter Network Traffic

Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like Domain Fronting.

M1031 Network Intrusion Prevention

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. [65]

M1020 SSL/TLS Inspection

If it is possible to inspect HTTPS traffic, the captures can be analyzed for connections that appear to be domain fronting.


ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0029 Network Traffic Network Connection Creation

Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts.

Network Traffic Content

Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)).

Network Traffic Flow

Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.


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