Indicator Removal on Host
Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs and potentially captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs will vary, but typical organic system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as Bash History and /var/log/* .
Actions that interfere with eventing and other notifications that can be used to detect intrusion activity may compromise the integrity of security solutions, causing events to go unreported. They may also make forensic analysis and incident response more difficult due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.
Clear Windows Event Logs
Windows event logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. Microsoft defines an event as "any significant occurrence in the system or in a program that requires users to be notified or an entry added to a log." There are three system-defined sources of Events: System, Application, and Security.
Adversaries performing actions related to account management, account logon and directory service access, etc. may choose to clear the events in order to hide their activities.
The event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands:
wevtutil cl system
wevtutil cl application
wevtutil cl security
Logs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as PowerShell.
|Encrypt Sensitive Information||Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.|
|Remote Data Storage||Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system.|
|Restrict File and Directory Permissions||Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication and limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by preventing Privilege Escalation opportunities.|
Dragonfly 2.0 cleared Windows event logs and other logs produced by tools they used, including system, security, terminal services, remote services, and audit logs. The actors also deleted specific Registry keys.
File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. For example, deleting Windows event logs (via native binaries , API functions , or PowerShell ) may generate an alterable event (Event ID 1102: "The audit log was cleared"). Events not stored on the file system may require different detection mechanisms.
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