Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit of a domain controller.[1]
In addition to looking for NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, adversaries may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.[2]
The following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0007 | APT28 |
APT28 has used the ntdsutil.exe utility to export the Active Directory database for credential access.[3] |
| C0051 | APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign |
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 dumped NTDS.dit through creating volume shadow copies via |
| G0096 | APT41 |
APT41 used ntdsutil to obtain a copy of the victim environment |
| G0114 | Chimera |
Chimera has gathered the SYSTEM registry and ntds.dit files from target systems.[6] Chimera specifically has used the NtdsAudit tool to dump the password hashes of domain users via |
| S0488 | CrackMapExec |
CrackMapExec can dump hashed passwords associated with Active Directory using Windows' Directory Replication Services API (DRSUAPI), or Volume Shadow Copy.[8] |
| C0029 | Cutting Edge |
During Cutting Edge, threat actors accessed and mounted virtual hard disk backups to extract |
| G0035 | Dragonfly |
Dragonfly has dropped and executed SecretsDump to dump password hashes. They also obtained ntds.dit from domain controllers.[10][11] |
| S0404 | esentutl |
esentutl can copy |
| G1016 | FIN13 |
FIN13 has harvested the NTDS.DIT file and leveraged the Impacket tool on the compromised domain controller to locally decrypt it.[14] |
| G0037 | FIN6 |
FIN6 has used Metasploit’s PsExec NTDSGRAB module to obtain a copy of the victim's Active Directory database.[15][16] |
| G0117 | Fox Kitten |
Fox Kitten has used Volume Shadow Copy to access credential information from NTDS.[17] |
| G0125 | HAFNIUM |
HAFNIUM has stolen copies of the Active Directory database (NTDS.DIT).[18][19] |
| S0357 | Impacket |
SecretsDump and Mimikatz modules within Impacket can perform credential dumping to obtain account and password information from NTDS.dit.[20] |
| G0004 | Ke3chang |
Ke3chang has used NTDSDump and other password dumping tools to gather credentials.[21] |
| S0250 | Koadic |
Koadic can gather hashed passwords by gathering domain controller hashes from NTDS.[22] |
| G1004 | LAPSUS$ |
LAPSUS$ has used Windows built-in tool |
| G1051 | Medusa Group |
Medusa Group has accessed the ntds.dit file to engage in credential dumping.[24] |
| G0045 | menuPass | |
| G0129 | Mustang Panda |
Mustang Panda has used vssadmin to create a volume shadow copy and retrieve the NTDS.dit file. Mustang Panda has also used |
| C0048 | Operation MidnightEclipse |
During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors obtained active directory credentials via the NTDS.DIT file.[28] |
| G0034 | Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team has used |
| G1015 | Scattered Spider |
Scattered Spider has extracted the |
| G1017 | Volt Typhoon |
Volt Typhoon has used ntds.util to create domain controller installation media containing usernames and password hashes.[33][34][35][36] |
| G0102 | Wizard Spider |
Wizard Spider has gained access to credentials via exported copies of the ntds.dit Active Directory database. Wizard Spider has also created a volume shadow copy and used a batch script file to collect NTDS.dit with the use of the Windows utility, ntdsutil.[37][38] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1041 | Encrypt Sensitive Information |
Ensure Domain Controller backups are properly secured.[2] |
| M1027 | Password Policies |
Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. |
| M1026 | Privileged Account Management |
Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. |
| M1017 | User Training |
Limit credential overlap across accounts and systems by training users and administrators not to use the same password for multiple accounts. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0586 | Detection of NTDS.dit Credential Dumping from Domain Controllers | AN1611 |
Detects credential dumping attempts targeting the NTDS.dit database by monitoring shadow copy creation, suspicious file access to %SystemRoot%\NTDS\ntds.dit, and the use of tooling like ntdsutil.exe or volume management APIs. |