Hancitor

Hancitor is a downloader that has been used by Pony and other information stealing malware.[1][2]

ID: S0499
Associated Software: Chanitor
Type: MALWARE
Platforms: Windows
Version: 1.0
Created: 12 August 2020
Last Modified: 16 October 2020

Associated Software Descriptions

Name Description
Chanitor

[2]

Techniques Used

Domain ID Name Use
Enterprise T1547 .001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Hancitor has added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[2]

Enterprise T1059 .001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

Hancitor has used PowerShell to execute commands.[2]

Enterprise T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Hancitor has decoded Base64 encoded URLs to insert a recipient’s name into the filename of the Word document. Hancitor has also extracted executables from ZIP files.[1][2]

Enterprise T1070 .004 Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion

Hancitor has deleted files using the VBA kill function.[2]

Enterprise T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Hancitor has the ability to download additional files from C2.[1]

Enterprise T1106 Native API

Hancitor has used CallWindowProc and EnumResourceTypesA to interpret and execute shellcode.[2]

Enterprise T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

Hancitor has used Base64 to encode malicious links. Hancitor has also delivered compressed payloads in ZIP files to victims.[1][2]

Enterprise T1566 .002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

Hancitor has been delivered via phishing emails which contained malicious links.[1]

.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

Hancitor has been delivered via phishing emails with malicious attachments.[2]

Enterprise T1218 .012 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Verclsid

Hancitor has used verclsid.exe to download and execute a malicious script.[3]

Enterprise T1204 .001 User Execution: Malicious Link

Hancitor has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through phishing.[1]

.002 User Execution: Malicious File

Hancitor has used malicious Microsoft Word documents, sent via email, which prompted the victim to enable macros.[2]

Enterprise T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Hancitor has used a macro to check that an ActiveDocument shape object in the lure message is present. If this object is not found, the macro will exit without downloading additional payloads.[2]

References