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Winnti Group

Winnti Group is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting.[1][2][3] Some reporting suggests a number of other groups, including Axiom, APT17, and Ke3chang, are closely linked to Winnti Group.[4]

ID: G0044
ⓘ
Associated Groups: Blackfly
Contributors: Edward Millington
Version: 1.2
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 15 April 2022
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Associated Group Descriptions

Name Description
Blackfly

[5]
Enterprise Layer
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Techniques Used

Domain ID Name Use
Enterprise T1583 .001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains

Winnti Group has registered domains for C2 that mimicked sites of their intended targets.[1]
Enterprise T1083 File and Directory Discovery

Winnti Group has used a program named ff.exe to search for specific documents on compromised hosts.[1]
Enterprise T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Winnti Group has downloaded an auxiliary program named ff.exe to infected machines.[1]
Enterprise T1057 Process Discovery

Winnti Group looked for a specific process running on infected servers.[1]
Enterprise T1014 Rootkit

Winnti Group used a rootkit to modify typical server functionality.[1]
Enterprise T1553 .002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing

Winnti Group used stolen certificates to sign its malware.[1]

Software

ID Name References Techniques
S0501 PipeMon [6] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control, Access Token Manipulation: Parent PID Spoofing, Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Print Processors, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, Fallback Channels, Ingress Tool Transfer, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location, Modify Registry, Native API, Non-Application Layer Protocol, Obfuscated Files or Information, Process Discovery, Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection, Shared Modules, Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery, Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Time Discovery
S0013 PlugX [1] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Application Layer Protocol: DNS, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Commonly Used Port, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, File and Directory Discovery, Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories, Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking, Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading, Ingress Tool Transfer, Input Capture: Keylogging, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location, Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service, Modify Registry, Multiband Communication, Native API, Network Share Discovery, Non-Application Layer Protocol, Obfuscated Files or Information, Process Discovery, Query Registry, Screen Capture, System Network Connections Discovery, Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild, Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks, Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
S0141 Winnti for Windows [1][2] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, Execution Guardrails: Environmental Keying, File and Directory Discovery, Indicator Removal on Host: Timestomp, Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion, Ingress Tool Transfer, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location, Native API, Non-Application Layer Protocol, Obfuscated Files or Information, Process Discovery, Proxy: External Proxy, Proxy: Internal Proxy, System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32, System Information Discovery, System Services: Service Execution

References

  1. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2013, April 11). Winnti. More than just a game. Retrieved February 8, 2017.
  2. Tarakanov, D. (2015, June 22). Games are over: Winnti is now targeting pharmaceutical companies. Retrieved January 14, 2016.
  3. Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017.
  1. Hegel, T. (2018, May 3). Burning Umbrella: An Intelligence Report on the Winnti Umbrella and Associated State-Sponsored Attackers. Retrieved July 8, 2018.
  2. DiMaggio, J. (2016, March 15). Suckfly: Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
  3. Tartare, M. et al. (2020, May 21). No “Game over” for the Winnti Group. Retrieved August 24, 2020.