| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1584.001 | Domains |
| T1584.002 | DNS Server |
| T1584.003 | Virtual Private Server |
| T1584.004 | Server |
| T1584.005 | Botnet |
| T1584.006 | Web Services |
| T1584.007 | Serverless |
| T1584.008 | Network Devices |
Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: Application Layer Protocol). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations.
By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.[1][2] Additionally, adversaries may leverage such control in conjunction with Digital Certificates to redirect traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking normal trusted network communications.[2][3] Alternatively, they may be able to prove ownership of a domain to a SaaS service in order to assert control of the service or create a new administrative Cloud Account.[4] Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.[5][6]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G1004 | LAPSUS$ |
LAPSUS$ has reconfigured a victim's DNS records to actor-controlled domains and websites.[7] |
| G1041 | Sea Turtle |
Sea Turtle modified Name Server (NS) items to refer to Sea Turtle-controlled DNS servers to provide responses for all DNS lookups.[8][9] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1056 | Pre-compromise |
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0891 | Detection of DNS Server | AN2023 |
Monitor for queried domain name system (DNS) registry data that may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |