|T1546.001||Change Default File Association|
|T1546.003||Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription|
|T1546.004||Unix Shell Configuration Modification|
|T1546.007||Netsh Helper DLL|
|T1546.012||Image File Execution Options Injection|
|T1546.015||Component Object Model Hijacking|
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies.  There are tools available to perform these changes.
Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time. 
Binaries can also be baselined for what dynamic libraries they require, and if an app requires a new dynamic library that wasn\u2019t included as part of an update, it should be investigated.
Enforce that all binaries be signed by the correct Apple Developer IDs.
Allow applications via known hashes.
|ID||Data Source||Data Component|
Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.