Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to exfiltration.
Access to local system data, which includes information stored by the operating system, often requires escalated privileges. Examples of local system data include authentication tokens, the device keyboard cache, Wi-Fi passwords, and photos. On Android, adversaries may also attempt to access files from external storage which may require additional storage-related permissions.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S1061 | AbstractEmu |
AbstractEmu can collect files from or inspect the device’s filesystem.[1] |
| S1095 | AhRat |
AhRat can find and exfiltrate files with certain extensions, such as .jpg, .mp4, .html, .docx, and .pdf.[2] |
| S0422 | Anubis |
Anubis can exfiltrate files encrypted with the ransomware module from the device and can modify external storage.[3][4] |
| S1215 | Binary Validator |
Binary Validator has searched for and has deleted the malicious iMessage attachment used in the initial access phase in various databases.[5] |
| S1079 | BOULDSPY |
BOULDSPY can access browser history and bookmarks, and can list all files and folders on the device.[6] |
| S1094 | BRATA |
BRATA has collected account information from compromised devices.[7] |
| S0655 | BusyGasper |
BusyGasper can collect images stored on the device and browser history.[8] |
| S1083 | Chameleon | |
| S0555 | CHEMISTGAMES |
CHEMISTGAMES can collect files from the filesystem and account information from Google Chrome.[11] |
| S0426 | Concipit1248 |
Concipit1248 can collect device photos.[12] |
| S0425 | Corona Updates |
Corona Updates can collect voice notes, device accounts, and gallery images.[12] |
| S1243 | DCHSpy |
DCHSpy has collected files of interest on the device, including WhatsApp files.[13] |
| S0301 | Dendroid |
Dendroid can collect the device’s photos, browser history, bookmarks, and accounts stored on the device.[14] |
| S0505 | Desert Scorpion |
Desert Scorpion can collect attacker-specified files, including files located on external storage.[15] |
| S9005 | DocSwap |
DocSwap has checked for the |
| S0550 | DoubleAgent |
DoubleAgent has collected files from the infected device.[18] |
| S1054 | Drinik |
Drinik can request the |
| S1092 | Escobar |
Escobar can collect sensitive information, such as Google Authenticator codes.[20] |
| S0507 | eSurv | |
| S0405 | Exodus |
Exodus Two can extract information on pictures from the Gallery, Chrome and SBrowser bookmarks, and the connected WiFi network's password.[22] |
| S1080 | Fakecalls |
Fakecalls can access and exfiltrate files, such as photos or video.[23] |
| S0408 | FlexiSpy |
FlexiSpy can monitor device photos and can also access browser history and bookmarks.[24] |
| S0577 | FrozenCell |
FrozenCell has retrieved device images for exfiltration.[25] |
| S0423 | Ginp | |
| S0535 | Golden Cup |
Golden Cup can collect images, videos, and attacker-specified files.[27] |
| S0551 | GoldenEagle |
GoldenEagle has retrieved .doc, .txt, .gif, .apk, .jpg, .png, .mp3, and .db files from external storage.[18] |
| S0421 | GolfSpy |
GolfSpy can collect local accounts on the device, pictures, bookmarks/histories of the default browser, and files stored on the SD card. GolfSpy can list image, audio, video, and other files stored on the device. GolfSpy can copy arbitrary files from the device.[28] |
| S0290 | Gooligan |
Gooligan steals authentication tokens that can be used to access data from multiple Google applications.[29] |
| S0536 | GPlayed | |
| S0406 | Gustuff |
Gustuff can capture files and photos from the compromised device.[31] |
| S0544 | HenBox |
HenBox can steal data from various sources, including chat, communication, and social media apps.[32] |
| S1077 | Hornbill | |
| S0463 | INSOMNIA |
INSOMNIA can collect application database files, including Gmail, Hangouts, device photos, and container directories of third-party apps.[34] |
| S1185 | LightSpy |
LightSpy has collected and exfiltrated files from messaging applications, such as Telegram, QQ, WeChat, and Whatsapp, and browser history from Chrome and Safari.[35][36][37][38][39] |
| S0407 | Monokle |
Monokle can retrieve the salt used when storing the user’s password, aiding an adversary in computing the user’s plaintext password/PIN from the stored password hash. Monokle can also capture the user’s dictionary, user-defined shortcuts, and browser history, enabling profiling of the user and their activities.[40] |
| C0016 | Operation Dust Storm |
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used Android backdoors capable of exfiltrating specific files directly from the infected devices.[41] |
| C0054 | Operation Triangulation |
During Operation Triangulation, the threat actors stole data from SQLite databases.[5] |
| S1126 | Phenakite |
Phenakite can collect and exfiltrate WhatsApp media, photos and files with specific extensions, such as .pdf and .doc.[42] |
| S1241 | RatMilad |
RatMilad has listed files and pictures on the device starting from |
| S0295 | RCSAndroid |
RCSAndroid can collect passwords for Wi-Fi networks and online accounts, including Skype, Facebook, Twitter, Google, WhatsApp, Mail, and LinkedIn.[44] |
| S0549 | SilkBean |
SilkBean can retrieve files from external storage and can collect browser data.[18] |
| S1195 | SpyC23 |
SpyC23 can collect and exfiltrate files with specific extensions, such as .pdf, doc.[45] |
| S0305 | SpyNote RAT |
SpyNote RAT can copy files from the device to the C2 server.[46] |
| S0328 | Stealth Mango |
Stealth Mango collected and exfiltrated data from the device, including sensitive letters/documents, stored photos, and stored audio files.[47] |
| S1082 | Sunbird | |
| S0329 | Tangelo | |
| S1069 | TangleBot |
TangleBot can request permission to view files and media.[48] |
| S0558 | Tiktok Pro |
Tiktok Pro can collect device photos and credentials from other applications.[49] |
| S1216 | TriangleDB |
TriangleDB has collected and exfiltrated files.[50] |
| S0427 | TrickMo | |
| S9006 | VajraSpy |
VajraSpy has collected files with specific extensions, such as .txt, .jpg, .Om4a, .aac and .opus, before exfiltration.[52] VajraSpy has also requested for |
| S0418 | ViceLeaker |
ViceLeaker can copy arbitrary files from the device to the C2 server, can exfiltrate browsing history, can exfiltrate the SD card structure, and can exfiltrate pictures as the user takes them.[54][55] |
| S0506 | ViperRAT |
ViperRAT can collect device photos, PDF documents, Office documents, browser history, and browser bookmarks.[56] |
| G0112 | Windshift |
Windshift has exfiltrated local account data and calendar information as part of Operation ROCK.[57] |
| S0489 | WolfRAT |
WolfRAT can collect user account, photos, browser history, and arbitrary files.[58] |
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0713 | Detection of Data from Local System | AN1840 |
The defender correlates newly granted or recently exercised storage- or privilege-relevant access with burst reads of local files, local databases, or protected records from operating-system or external-storage locations, especially when the reads are inconsistent with app role, occur in background or locked-device context, or are followed by temporary data staging or network transmission. The analytic emphasizes Android-specific observables such as external storage access, app-private database reads where visible to the sensor, and repeated enumeration/read activity against local paths associated with media, tokens, caches, or exported application data. |
| AN1841 |
The defender correlates supervised-device app posture and lifecycle context with repeated local file or local-database access effects, especially when a managed app reads browser, messaging, keychain-adjacent, or application-container data outside its expected role and then stages or uploads the result. Because direct low-level local system access visibility is weaker on iOS, the primary analytic is effect-based: managed app identity, file/database access where visible to the mobile sensor, background execution context, and near-term outbound communication. |