| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1453 | Abuse Accessibility Features |
After accessibility service is granted, Anubis lures the victim into changing the Accessibility settings on the device, disabling application removal, and executes screen taps and other commands without the victim’s knowledge.[2] |
|
| Mobile | T1532 | Archive Collected Data |
Anubis exfiltrates data encrypted (with RC4) by its ransomware module.[1] |
|
| Mobile | T1429 | Audio Capture | ||
| Mobile | T1616 | Call Control | ||
| Mobile | T1471 | Data Encrypted for Impact |
Anubis can use its ransomware module to encrypt device data and hold it for ransom.[1] |
|
| Mobile | T1533 | Data from Local System |
Anubis can exfiltrate files encrypted with the ransomware module from the device and can modify external storage.[1][3] |
|
| Mobile | T1407 | Download New Code at Runtime | ||
| Mobile | T1629 | .001 | Impair Defenses: Prevent Application Removal |
Anubis may prevent malware's uninstallation by abusing Android’s |
| .003 | Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools |
Anubis can modify administrator settings and disable Play Protect.[1] |
||
| Mobile | T1417 | .001 | Input Capture: Keylogging |
Anubis has a keylogger that works in every application installed on the device.[1] |
| .002 | Input Capture: GUI Input Capture |
Anubis can create overlays to capture user credentials for targeted applications.[1] |
||
| Mobile | T1430 | Location Tracking | ||
| Mobile | T1655 | .001 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
Anubis has requested accessibility service privileges while masquerading as "Google Play Protect" and has disguised additional malicious application installs as legitimate system updates.[1][3] |
| Mobile | T1424 | Process Discovery | ||
| Mobile | T1636 | .003 | Protected User Data: Contact List | |
| Mobile | T1513 | Screen Capture | ||
| Mobile | T1582 | SMS Control | ||
| Mobile | T1418 | Software Discovery |
Anubis can collect a list of installed applications to compare to a list of targeted applications.[1] |
|
| Mobile | T1426 | System Information Discovery | ||
| Mobile | T1633 | .001 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks |
Anubis has used motion sensor data to attempt to determine if it is running in an emulator.[3] |
| Mobile | T1481 | .001 | Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver |
Anubis can retrieve the C2 address from Twitter and Telegram.[1][3] |