Data Staged

Collected data is staged in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Data Compressed or Data Encrypted.

Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.

ID: T1074

Tactic: Collection

Platform:  Linux, macOS, Windows

Data Sources:  File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters

Version: 1.0

Examples

NameDescription
ADVSTORESHELL

ADVSTORESHELL stores output from command execution in a .dat file in the %TEMP% directory.[1]

APT28

APT28 has stored captured credential information in a file named pi.log.[2]

APT3

APT3 has been known to stage files for exfiltration in a single location.[3]

Astaroth

Astaroth collects data in a plaintext file named r1.log before exfiltration.[4]

BADNEWS

BADNEWS copies documents under 15MB found on the victim system to is the user's %temp%\SMB\ folder. It also copies files from USB devices to a predefined directory.[5][6]

BadPatch

BadPatch stores collected data in log files before exfiltration.[7]

Calisto

Calisto uses a hidden directory named .calisto to store data from the victim’s machine before exfiltration.[8][9]

Carbon

Carbon creates a base directory that contains the files and folders that are collected.[10]

Catchamas

Catchamas stores the gathered data from the machine in .db files and .bmp files under four separate locations.[11]

Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 created a directory named "out" in the user's %AppData% folder and copied files to it.[12]

Duqu

Modules can be pushed to and executed by Duqu that copy data to a staging area, compress it, and XOR encrypt it.[13]

Elise

Elise creates a file in AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer and stores all harvested data in that file.[14]

FIN5

FIN5 scripts save memory dump data into a specific directory on hosts in the victim environment.[15]

FIN6

TRINITY malware used by FIN6 identifies payment card track data on the victim and then copies it to a local file in a subdirectory of C:\Windows\. Once the malware collects the data, FIN6 actors compressed data and moved it to another staging system before exfiltration.[16]

FIN8

FIN8 aggregates staged data from a network into a single location.[17]

FLASHFLOOD

FLASHFLOOD stages data it copies from the local system or removable drives in the "%WINDIR%\$NtUninstallKB885884$\" directory.[18]

Gold Dragon

Gold Dragon stores information gathered from the endpoint in a file named 1.hwp.[19]

Helminth

Helminth creates folders to store output from batch scripts prior to sending the information to its C2 server.[20]

Honeybee

Honeybee adds collected files to a temp.zip file saved in the %temp% folder, then base64 encodes it and uploads it to control server.[21]

InvisiMole

InvisiMole determines a working directory where it stores all the gathered data about the compromised machine.[22]

Kazuar

Kazuar stages command output and collected data in files before exfiltration.[23]

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is saved in the %TEMP% directory, then compressed, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.[24][25]

Leviathan

Leviathan has used C:\Windows\Debug and C:\Perflogs as staging directories.[26]

menuPass

menuPass stages data prior to exfiltration in multi-part archives, often saved in the Recycle Bin.[27]

MoonWind

MoonWind saves information from its keylogging routine as a .zip file in the present working directory.[28]

NavRAT

NavRAT writes multiple outputs to a TMP file using the >> method.[29]

Night Dragon

Night Dragon has copied files to company web servers and subsequently downloaded them.[30]

NOKKI

NOKKI can collect data from the victim and stage it in LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\uplog.tmp.[31]

OopsIE

OopsIE stages the output from command execution and collected files in specific folders before exfiltration.[32]

Patchwork

Patchwork copied all targeted files to a directory called index that was eventually uploaded to the C&C server.[6]

PoisonIvy

PoisonIvy stages collected data in a text file.[33]

Prikormka

Prikormka creates a directory, %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\SKC\, which is used to store collected log files.[34]

Pteranodon

Pteranodon creates various subdirectories under %Temp%\reports\% and copies files to those subdirectories. It also creates a folder at C:\Users\\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\store to store screenshot JPEG files.[35]

PUNCHTRACK

PUNCHTRACK aggregates collected data in a tmp file.[17]

RawPOS

Data captured by RawPOS is placed in a temporary file under a directory named "memdump".[36]

Rover

Rover copies files from removable drives to C:\system.[37]

SPACESHIP

SPACESHIP identifies files with certain extensions and copies them to a directory in the user's profile.[18]

TEMP.Veles

TEMP.Veles has created staging folders in directories that were infrequently used by legitimate users or processes.[38]

Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 has staged encrypted archives for exfiltration on Internet-facing servers that had previously been compromised with China Chopper.[39]

Trojan.Karagany

Trojan.Karagany can create a directory (C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\gl) to use as a temporary directory for uploading files.[40]

USBStealer

USBStealer collects files matching certain criteria from the victim and stores them in a local directory for later exfiltration.[41][42]

Zebrocy

Zebrocy stores all collected information in a single file before exfiltration.[43]

Mitigation

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting [44] tools, like AppLocker, [45] [46] or Software Restriction Policies [47] where appropriate. [48]

Detection

Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files.

Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.

References

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