Data Staged: Local Data Staging

ID Name
T1074.001 Local Data Staging
T1074.002 Remote Data Staging

Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.

Adversaries may also stage collected data in various available formats/locations of a system, including local storage databases/repositories or the Windows Registry.[1]

ID: T1074.001
Sub-technique of:  T1074
Tactic: Collection
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Contributors: Massimiliano Romano, BT Security
Version: 1.1
Created: 13 March 2020
Last Modified: 21 April 2022

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description

ADVSTORESHELL stores output from command execution in a .dat file in the %TEMP% directory.[2]

S0622 AppleSeed

AppleSeed can stage files in a central location prior to exfiltration.[3]

G0007 APT28

APT28 has stored captured credential information in a file named pi.log.[4]

G0022 APT3

APT3 has been known to stage files for exfiltration in a single location.[5]

G0087 APT39

APT39 has utilized tools to aggregate data prior to exfiltration.[6]

G1023 APT5

APT5 has staged data on compromised systems prior to exfiltration often in C:\Users\Public.[7]

S0373 Astaroth

Astaroth collects data in a plaintext file named r1.log before exfiltration. [8]

S0438 Attor

Attor has staged collected data in a central upload directory prior to exfiltration.[9]

S1029 AuTo Stealer

AuTo Stealer can store collected data from an infected host to a file named Hostname_UserName.txt prior to exfiltration.[10]

G0135 BackdoorDiplomacy

BackdoorDiplomacy has copied files of interest to the main drive's recycle bin.[11]


BADNEWS copies documents under 15MB found on the victim system to is the user's %temp%\SMB\ folder. It also copies files from USB devices to a predefined directory.[12][13]

S0337 BadPatch

BadPatch stores collected data in log files before exfiltration.[14]

S0651 BoxCaon

BoxCaon has created a working folder for collected files that it sends to the C2 server.[15]

C0015 C0015

During C0015, PowerView's file share enumeration results were stored in the file c:\ProgramData\found_shares.txt.[16]

C0017 C0017

During C0017, APT41 copied the local SAM and SYSTEM Registry hives to a staging directory.[17]

C0032 C0032

During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used staging folders that are infrequently used by legitimate users or processes to store data for exfiltration and tool deployment.[18]

S0274 Calisto

Calisto uses a hidden directory named .calisto to store data from the victim’s machine before exfiltration.[19][20]

S0335 Carbon

Carbon creates a base directory that contains the files and folders that are collected.[21]

S0261 Catchamas

Catchamas stores the gathered data from the machine in .db files and .bmp files under four separate locations.[22]

S1043 ccf32

ccf32 can temporarily store files in a hidden directory on the local host.[23]

G0114 Chimera

Chimera has staged stolen data locally on compromised hosts.[24]

S0667 Chrommme

Chrommme can store captured system information locally prior to exfiltration.[25]

S0538 Crutch

Crutch has staged stolen files in the C:\AMD\Temp directory.[26]

S0673 DarkWatchman

DarkWatchman can stage local data in the Windows Registry.[1]

G0035 Dragonfly

Dragonfly has created a directory named "out" in the user's %AppData% folder and copied files to it.[27]

S0567 Dtrack

Dtrack can save collected data to disk, different file formats, and network shares.[28][29]

S0038 Duqu

Modules can be pushed to and executed by Duqu that copy data to a staging area, compress it, and XOR encrypt it.[30]

S0062 DustySky

DustySky created folders in temp directories to host collected files before exfiltration.[31]

S0024 Dyre

Dyre has the ability to create files in a TEMP folder to act as a database to store information.[32]


ECCENTRICBANDWAGON has stored keystrokes and screenshots within the %temp%\GoogleChrome, %temp%\Downloads, and %temp%\TrendMicroUpdate directories.[33]

S0081 Elise

Elise creates a file in AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer and stores all harvested data in that file.[34]

S0343 Exaramel for Windows

Exaramel for Windows specifies a path to store files scheduled for exfiltration.[35]

G1016 FIN13

FIN13 has utilized the following temporary folders on compromised Windows and Linux systems for their operations prior to exfiltration: C:\Windows\Temp and /tmp.[36][37]

G0053 FIN5

FIN5 scripts save memory dump data into a specific directory on hosts in the victim environment.[38]


FLASHFLOOD stages data it copies from the local system or removable drives in the "%WINDIR%\$NtUninstallKB885884$\" directory.[39]

S0503 FrameworkPOS

FrameworkPOS can identifiy payment card track data on the victim and copy it to a local file in a subdirectory of C:\Windows.[40]

S1044 FunnyDream

FunnyDream can stage collected information including screen captures and logged keystrokes locally.[23]


GALLIUM compressed and staged files in multi-part archives in the Recycle Bin prior to exfiltration.[41]

S0249 Gold Dragon

Gold Dragon stores information gathered from the endpoint in a file named 1.hwp.[42]

S0170 Helminth

Helminth creates folders to store output from batch scripts prior to sending the information to its C2 server.[43]

G0119 Indrik Spider

Indrik Spider has stored collected date in a .tmp file.[44]

S0260 InvisiMole

InvisiMole determines a working directory where it stores all the gathered data about the compromised machine.[45][46]

S0265 Kazuar

Kazuar stages command output and collected data in files before exfiltration.[47]


KGH_SPY can save collected system information to a file named "info" before exfiltration.[48]

G0094 Kimsuky

Kimsuky has staged collected data files under C:\Program Files\Common Files\System\Ole DB\.[49][50]


KOPILUWAK has piped the results from executed C2 commands to %TEMP%\result2.dat on the local machine.[51]

G0032 Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is saved in the %TEMP% directory, then compressed, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.[52][53]

G0065 Leviathan

Leviathan has used C:\Windows\Debug and C:\Perflogs as staging directories.[54][55]

S0395 LightNeuron

LightNeuron can store email data in files and directories specified in its configuration, such as C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\appdata\Local\Temp\.[56]

S1101 LoFiSe

LoFiSe can save files to be evaluated for further exfiltration in the C:\Programdata\Microsoft\ and C:\windows\temp\ folders. [57]

S0409 Machete

Machete stores files and logs in a folder on the local drive.[58][59]

S1016 MacMa

MacMa has stored collected files locally before exfiltration.[60]

S1060 Mafalda

Mafalda can place retrieved files into a destination directory.[61]

S0652 MarkiRAT

MarkiRAT can store collected data locally in a created .nfo file.[62]

G0045 menuPass

menuPass stages data prior to exfiltration in multi-part archives, often saved in the Recycle Bin.[63]


MESSAGETAP stored targeted SMS messages that matched its target list in CSV files on the compromised system.[64]

S1059 metaMain

metaMain has stored the collected system files in a working directory.[61][65]

S1015 Milan

Milan has saved files prior to upload from a compromised host to folders beginning with the characters a9850d2f.[66]

S0084 Mis-Type

Mis-Type has temporarily stored collected information to the files "%AppData%\{Unique Identifier}\HOSTRURKLSR" and "%AppData%\{Unique Identifier}\NEWERSSEMP".[67]

S0149 MoonWind

MoonWind saves information from its keylogging routine as a .zip file in the present working directory.[68]

G0069 MuddyWater

MuddyWater has stored a decoy PDF file within a victim's %temp% folder.[69]

G0129 Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda has stored collected credential files in c:\windows\temp prior to exfiltration. Mustang Panda has also stored documents for exfiltration in a hidden folder on USB drives.[70][71]

S0247 NavRAT

NavRAT writes multiple outputs to a TMP file using the >> method.[72]


NETWIRE has the ability to write collected data to a file created in the ./LOGS directory.[73]

S1090 NightClub

NightClub has copied captured files and keystrokes to the %TEMP% directory of compromised hosts.[74]


NOKKI can collect data from the victim and stage it in LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\uplog.tmp.[75]

S0644 ObliqueRAT

ObliqueRAT can copy specific files, webcam captures, and screenshots to local directories.[76]

S0340 Octopus

Octopus has stored collected information in the Application Data directory on a compromised host.[77][78]

S0264 OopsIE

OopsIE stages the output from command execution and collected files in specific folders before exfiltration.[79]

C0006 Operation Honeybee

During Operation Honeybee, stolen data was copied into a text file using the format From <COMPUTER-NAME> (<Month>-<Day> <Hour>-<Minute>-<Second>).txt prior to compression, encoding, and exfiltration.[80]

C0014 Operation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors staged archived files in a temporary directory prior to exfiltration.[81]


PACEMAKER has written extracted data to tmp/dsserver-check.statementcounters.[82]

G0040 Patchwork

Patchwork copied all targeted files to a directory called index that was eventually uploaded to the C&C server.[13]

S0012 PoisonIvy

PoisonIvy stages collected data in a text file.[83]

S1012 PowerLess

PowerLess can stage stolen browser data in C:\\Windows\\Temp\\cup.tmp and keylogger data in C:\\Windows\\Temp\\Report.06E17A5A-7325-4325-8E5D-E172EBA7FC5BK.[84]

S0113 Prikormka

Prikormka creates a directory, %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\SKC\, which is used to store collected log files.[85]

S0147 Pteranodon

Pteranodon creates various subdirectories under %Temp%\reports\% and copies files to those subdirectories. It also creates a folder at C:\Users\\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\store to store screenshot JPEG files.[86]


PUNCHBUGGY has saved information to a random temp file before exfil.[87]


PUNCHTRACK aggregates collected data in a tmp file.[88]

S0650 QakBot

QakBot has stored stolen emails and other data into new folders prior to exfiltration.[89]

S0629 RainyDay

RainyDay can use a file exfiltration tool to copy files to C:\ProgramData\Adobe\temp prior to exfiltration.[90]

S0458 Ramsay

Ramsay can stage data prior to exfiltration in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSetting and %APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSetting\MediaCache.[91][92]

S0169 RawPOS

Data captured by RawPOS is placed in a temporary file under a directory named "memdump".[93]

S0090 Rover

Rover copies files from removable drives to C:\system.[94]

G0121 Sidewinder

Sidewinder has collected stolen files in a temporary folder in preparation for exfiltration.[95]


SLIGHTPULSE has piped the output from executed commands to /tmp/1.[82]


SLOWPULSE can write logged ACE credentials to /home/perl/ in append mode, using the format string %s:%s\n.[82]

S1124 SocGholish

SocGholish can send output from whoami to a local temp file using the naming convention rad<5-hex-chars>.tmp.[96]

S0615 SombRAT

SombRAT can store harvested data in a custom database under the %TEMP% directory.[97]


SPACESHIP identifies files with certain extensions and copies them to a directory in the user's profile.[39]


STARWHALE has stored collected data in a file called stari.txt.[98]


SUGARDUMP has stored collected data under %<malware_execution_folder>%\\CrashLog.txt.[99]

G0139 TeamTNT

TeamTNT has aggregated collected credentials in text files before exfiltrating.[100]

G0027 Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 has locally staged encrypted archives for later exfiltration efforts.[101]

S0094 Trojan.Karagany

Trojan.Karagany can create directories to store plugin output and stage data for exfiltration.[102][103]

S0647 Turian

Turian can store copied files in a specific directory prior to exfiltration.[11]

S0386 Ursnif

Ursnif has used tmp files to stage gathered information.[104]

S0136 USBStealer

USBStealer collects files matching certain criteria from the victim and stores them in a local directory for later exfiltration.[105][106]

G1017 Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has saved stolen files including the ntds.dit database and the SYSTEM and SECURITY Registry hives locally to the C:\Windows\Temp\ directory.[107][108]

G0102 Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has staged ZIP files in local directories such as, C:\PerfLogs\1\ and C:\User\1\ prior to exfiltration.[109]

S0251 Zebrocy

Zebrocy stores all collected information in a single file before exfiltration.[110]


This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.


ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0017 Command Command Execution

Monitor executed commands and arguments arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.

DS0022 File File Access

Monitor processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.

File Creation

Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.

DS0024 Windows Registry Windows Registry Key Modification

Consider monitoring accesses and modifications to local storage repositories (such as the Windows Registry), especially from suspicious processes that could be related to malicious data collection.


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