Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the the remote system. 
An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
|APT18||APT18 actors used the native at Windows task scheduler tool to use scheduled tasks for execution on a victim network. |
|APT29||APT29 used named and hijacked scheduled tasks to establish persistence. |
An APT3 downloader creates persistence by creating the following scheduled task:
|APT32||APT32 has used scheduled tasks to persist on victim systems.    |
|APT33||APT33 has created a scheduled task to execute a .vbe file multiple times a day. |
|APT39||APT39 has created scheduled tasks. |
|at||at can be used to schedule a task on a system. |
|BADNEWS||BADNEWS creates a scheduled task to establish by executing a malicious payload every subsequent minute. |
|BONDUPDATER||BONDUPDATER persists using a scheduled task that executes every minute. |
|BRONZE BUTLER||BRONZE BUTLER has used at and schtasks to register a scheduled task to execute malware during lateral movement. |
|Carbon||Carbon creates several tasks for later execution to continue persistence on the victim’s machine. |
|Cobalt Group||Cobalt Group has created Windows tasks to establish persistence. |
|CosmicDuke||CosmicDuke uses scheduled tasks typically named "Watchmon Service" for persistence. |
|CozyCar||One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to register itself as a scheduled task. |
|Dragonfly 2.0||Dragonfly 2.0 used scheduled tasks to automatically log out of created accounts every 8 hours as well as to execute malicious files.  |
|Duqu||Adversaries can instruct Duqu to spread laterally by copying itself to shares it has enumerated and for which it has obtained legitimate credentials (via keylogging or other means). The remote host is then infected by using the compromised credentials to schedule a task on remote machines that executes the malware. |
|Emotet||Emotet has maintained persistence through a scheduled task. |
|Empire||Empire has modules to interact with the Windows task scheduler. |
|EvilBunny||EvilBunny has executed commands via scheduled tasks. |
|FIN10||FIN10 has established persistence by using S4U tasks as well as the Scheduled Task option in PowerShell Empire.  |
|FIN6||FIN6 has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for various malware it uses, including downloaders known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD and PoS malware known as TRINITY. |
|FIN7||FIN7 malware has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence.    |
|FIN8||FIN8 has used scheduled tasks to maintain RDP backdoors. |
|Gazer||Gazer can establish persistence by creating a scheduled task.  |
|GravityRAT||GravityRAT creates a scheduled task to ensure it is re-executed everyday. |
|Helminth||Helminth has used a scheduled task for persistence. |
|ISMInjector||ISMInjector creates scheduled tasks to establish persistence. |
|JHUHUGIT||JHUHUGIT has registered itself as a scheduled task to run each time the current user logs in.  |
|Matroyshka||Matroyshka can establish persistence by adding a Scheduled Task named "Microsoft Boost Kernel Optimization".  |
|menuPass||menuPass has used a script (atexec.py) to execute a command on a target machine via Task Scheduler. |
|MURKYTOP||MURKYTOP has the capability to schedule remote AT jobs. |
|NotPetya||NotPetya creates a task to reboot the system one hour after infection. |
|OilRig||OilRig has created scheduled tasks that run a VBScript to execute a payload on victim machines.  |
|OopsIE||OopsIE creates a scheduled task to run itself every three minutes.  |
|Patchwork||A Patchwork file stealer can run a TaskScheduler DLL to add persistence. |
POWERSTATS has established persistence through a scheduled task using the command
|POWRUNER||POWRUNER persists through a scheduled task that executes it every minute. |
|Pteranodon||Pteranodon schedules tasks to invoke its components in order to establish persistence. |
|QUADAGENT||QUADAGENT creates a scheduled task to maintain persistence on the victim’s machine. |
|QuasarRAT||QuasarRAT contains a .NET wrapper DLL for creating and managing scheduled tasks for maintaining persistence upon reboot. |
Rancor launched a scheduled task to gain persistence using the
|Remexi||Remexi utilizes scheduled tasks as a persistence mechanism. |
|RemoteCMD||RemoteCMD can execute commands remotely by creating a new schedule task on the remote system |
|Remsec||Remsec schedules the execution one of its modules by creating a new scheduler task. |
|Revenge RAT||Revenge RAT schedules tasks to run malicious scripts at different intervals. |
|RTM||RTM tries to add a scheduled task to establish persistence. |
|schtasks||schtasks is used to schedule tasks on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time. |
|ServHelper||ServHelper contains modules that will use schtasks to carry out malicious operations. |
|Shamoon||Shamoon copies an executable payload to the target system by using Windows Admin Shares and then scheduling an unnamed task to execute the malware.  |
|Silence||Silence has used scheduled tasks to stage its operation. |
|Smoke Loader||Smoke Loader launches a scheduled task. |
|Soft Cell||Soft Cell established persistence for PoisonIvy by created a scheduled task. |
SQLRat has created scheduled tasks in
|Stealth Falcon||Stealth Falcon malware creates a scheduled task entitled “IE Web Cache” to execute a malicious file hourly. |
|TEMP.Veles||TEMP.Veles has used scheduled task XML triggers. |
|Threat Group-3390||Threat Group-3390 actors use at to schedule tasks to run self-extracting RAR archives, which install HTTPBrowser or PlugX on other victims on a network. |
|TrickBot||TrickBot creates a scheduled task on the system that provides persistence.   |
yty establishes persistence by creating a scheduled task with the command
|zwShell||zwShell has used SchTasks for execution. |
|Audit||Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges. |
|Operating System Configuration||
Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at
|Privileged Account Management||Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Increase scheduling priority. |
|User Account Management||Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems.|
Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Monitor process execution from the
svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler
taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows.  If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in
%systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service.  Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: 
- Event ID 106 - Scheduled task registered
- Event ID 140 - Scheduled task updated
- Event ID 141 - Scheduled task removed
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks.  Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
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