Thanks to all of our ATT&CKcon participants. All sessions are here, and individual presentations will be posted soon.

Remote System Discovery

Adversaries will likely attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used.

Windows

Examples of tools and commands that acquire this information include "ping" or "net view" using Net.

Mac

Specific to Mac, the bonjour protocol to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. Utilities such as "ping" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.

Linux

Utilities such as "ping" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.

ID: T1018

Tactic: Discovery

Platform:  Linux, macOS, Windows

Permissions Required:  User, Administrator, SYSTEM

Data Sources:  Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Process command-line parameters

Version: 1.0

Examples

NameDescription
APT3

APT3 has a tool that can detect the existence of remote systems.[1][2]

BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER typically use ping and Net to enumerate systems.[3]

Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike uses the native Windows Network Enumeration APIs to interrogate and discover targets in a Windows Active Directory network.[4]

Comnie

Comnie runs the net view command

Deep Panda

Deep Panda has used ping to identify other machines of interest.[5]

Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 likely obtained a list of hosts in the victim environment.[6]

FIN5

FIN5 has used the open source tool Essential NetTools to map the network and build a list of targets.[7]

FIN6

FIN6 used publicly available tools (including Microsoft's built-in SQL querying tool, osql.exe) to map the internal network and conduct reconnaissance against Active Directory, Structured Query Language (SQL) servers, and NetBIOS.[8]

FIN8

FIN8 uses dsquery and other Active Directory utilities to enumerate hosts.[9]

Ke3chang

Ke3chang has used network scanning and enumeration tools, including Ping.[10]

Kwampirs

Kwampirs collects a list of available servers with the command net view.[11]

Leafminer

Leafminer used Microsoft’s Sysinternals tools to gather detailed information about remote systems.[12]

menuPass

menuPass uses scripts to enumerate IP ranges on the victim network. menuPass has also issued the command net view /domain to a PlugX implant to gather information about remote systems on the network.[13][14]

MURKYTOP

has the capability to identify remote hosts on connected networks.[15]

Net

Commands such as net view can be used in Net to gather information about available remote systems.[16]

OSInfo

OSInfo performs a connection test to discover remote systems in the network[1]

Ping

Ping can be used to identify remote systems within a network.[17]

RATANKBA

RATANKBA runs the net view /domain and net view commands.[18]

Remsec

Remsec can ping or traceroute a remote host.[19]

Shamoon

Shamoon scans the C-class subnet of the IPs on the victim's interfaces.[20]

SHOTPUT

SHOTPUT has a command to list all servers in the domain, as well as one to locate domain controllers on a domain.[21]

Sykipot

Sykipot may use net view /domain to display hostnames of available systems on a network.[22]

Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 has used the net view command.[23]

Turla

Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover remote systems on a local network using the net view and net view /DOMAIN commands.[24]

yty

yty uses the net view command for discovery.[25]

Mitigation

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information on remotely available systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting [26] tools, like AppLocker, [27] [28] or Software Restriction Policies [29] where appropriate. [30]

Detection

System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.

References

  1. Symantec Security Response. (2016, September 6). Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong. Retrieved September 26, 2016.
  2. Chen, X., Scott, M., Caselden, D.. (2014, April 26). New Zero-Day Exploit targeting Internet Explorer Versions 9 through 11 Identified in Targeted Attacks. Retrieved January 14, 2016.
  3. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, October 12). BRONZE BUTLER Targets Japanese Enterprises. Retrieved January 4, 2018.
  4. Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
  5. Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
  6. US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.
  7. Bromiley, M. and Lewis, P. (2016, October 7). Attacking the Hospitality and Gaming Industries: Tracking an Attacker Around the World in 7 Years. Retrieved October 6, 2017.
  8. FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2016, April). Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6. Retrieved June 1, 2016.
  9. Elovitz, S. & Ahl, I. (2016, August 18). Know Your Enemy: New Financially-Motivated & Spear-Phishing Group. Retrieved February 26, 2018.
  10. Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018.
  11. Symantec Security Response Attack Investigation Team. (2018, April 23). New Orangeworm attack group targets the healthcare sector in the U.S., Europe, and Asia. Retrieved May 8, 2018.
  12. Symantec Security Response. (2018, July 25). Leafminer: New Espionage Campaigns Targeting Middle Eastern Regions. Retrieved August 28, 2018.
  13. PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.
  14. FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.
  15. FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
  1. Savill, J. (1999, March 4). Net.exe reference. Retrieved September 22, 2015.
  2. Microsoft. (n.d.). Ping. Retrieved April 8, 2016.
  3. Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.
  4. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, August 9). The ProjectSauron APT. Technical Analysis. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
  5. FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
  6. Falcone, R. and Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved January 22, 2016.
  7. Blasco, J. (2011, December 12). Another Sykipot sample likely targeting US federal agencies. Retrieved March 28, 2016.
  8. Pantazopoulos, N., Henry T. (2018, May 18). Emissary Panda – A potential new malicious tool. Retrieved June 25, 2018.
  9. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014.
  10. Schwarz, D., Sopko J. (2018, March 08). Donot Team Leverages New Modular Malware Framework in South Asia. Retrieved June 11, 2018.
  11. Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  12. Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
  13. NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
  14. Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  15. Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.