Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behavior after checking for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual environment or sandbox. If the adversary detects a virtual environment, they may alter their malware’s behavior to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for virtualization artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads.
Checks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size.
Hardware checks, such as the presence of motion sensors, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S1061 | AbstractEmu |
AbstractEmu can check device system properties to potentially avoid running while under analysis.[1] |
| S0525 | Android/AdDisplay.Ashas |
Android/AdDisplay.Ashas can check that the device IP is not in the range of known Google IP addresses before triggering the payload and can delay payload deployment to avoid detection during testing and avoid association with unwanted ads.[2] |
| S0422 | Anubis |
Anubis has used motion sensor data to attempt to determine if it is running in an emulator.[3] |
| S1094 | BRATA |
BRATA can check to see if it has been installed in a virtual environment.[4] |
| S0480 | Cerberus |
Cerberus avoids being analyzed by only activating the malware after recording a certain number of steps from the accelerometer.[5] |
| S1083 | Chameleon |
Chameleon can perform system checks to verify if the device is rooted or has ADB enabled and can avoid execution if found.[6] |
| S0301 | Dendroid | |
| S0509 | FakeSpy |
FakeSpy can detect if it is running in an emulator and adjust its behavior accordingly.[8] |
| S0423 | Ginp | |
| S0544 | HenBox | |
| S0485 | Mandrake |
Mandrake can evade automated analysis environments by requiring a CAPTCHA on launch that will prevent the application from running if not passed. It also checks for indications that it is running in an emulator.[11] |
| S0411 | Rotexy |
Rotexy checks if it is running in an analysis environment.[12] |
| S0545 | TERRACOTTA |
TERRACOTTA checks whether its call stack has been modified, an indication that it is running in an analysis environment, and if so, does not decrypt its obfuscated strings[13]. |
| S0427 | TrickMo |
TrickMo can detect if it is running on a rooted device or an emulator.[14] |
| G0112 | Windshift |
Windshift has deployed anti-analysis capabilities during their Operation BULL campaign.[15] |
| S0489 | WolfRAT |
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0041 | Application Vetting | API Calls |
Application vetting services could look for applications attempting to get |