Adversaries may capture audio to collect information by leveraging standard operating system APIs of a mobile device. Examples of audio information adversaries may target include user conversations, surroundings, phone calls, or other sensitive information.
Android and iOS, by default, require that applications request device microphone access from the user.
On Android devices, applications must hold the RECORD_AUDIO permission to access the microphone or the CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT permission to access audio output. Because Android does not allow third-party applications to hold the CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT permission by default, only privileged applications, such as those distributed by Google or the device vendor, can access audio output.[1] However, adversaries may be able to gain this access after successfully elevating their privileges. With the CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT permission, adversaries may pass the MediaRecorder.AudioSource.VOICE_CALL constant to MediaRecorder.setAudioOutput, allowing capture of both voice call uplink and downlink.[2]
On iOS devices, applications must include the NSMicrophoneUsageDescription key in their Info.plist file to access the microphone.[3]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S1061 | AbstractEmu |
AbstractEmu can grant itself microphone permissions.[4] |
| S1095 | AhRat | |
| S0292 | AndroRAT | |
| S0422 | Anubis | |
| S1079 | BOULDSPY |
BOULDSPY can access a device’s microphone to record audio, as well as cell and VoIP application calls.[9] |
| S0655 | BusyGasper |
BusyGasper can record audio.[10] |
| C0033 | C0033 |
During C0033, PROMETHIUM used StrongPity to record phone calls.[11] |
| S0529 | CarbonSteal |
CarbonSteal can remotely capture device audio.[12] |
| S0425 | Corona Updates |
Corona Updates can record MP4 files and monitor calls.[13] |
| S1243 | DCHSpy |
DCHSpy has captured audio from the device by taking control of the microphone.[14] |
| S0301 | Dendroid | |
| S0505 | Desert Scorpion |
Desert Scorpion can record audio from phone calls and the device microphone.[16] |
| S9005 | DocSwap |
DocSwap has the ability to start and stop audio recording.[17][18] |
| S0550 | DoubleAgent |
DoubleAgent has captured audio and can record phone calls.[12] |
| S0320 | DroidJack | |
| S1092 | Escobar | |
| S0507 | eSurv | |
| S0405 | Exodus |
Exodus Two can record audio from the compromised device's microphone and can record call audio in 3GP format.[22] |
| S1080 | Fakecalls |
Fakecalls can turn on a device’s microphone to capture audio.[23] |
| S0182 | FinFisher |
FinFisher uses the device microphone to record phone conversations.[24] |
| S0408 | FlexiSpy |
FlexiSpy can record both incoming and outgoing phone calls, as well as microphone audio.[25] |
| S0577 | FrozenCell |
FrozenCell has recorded calls.[26] |
| S1231 | GodFather |
GodFather has requested for the |
| S0535 | Golden Cup |
Golden Cup can record audio from the microphone and phone calls.[28] |
| S0551 | GoldenEagle |
GoldenEagle has recorded calls and environment audio in .amr format.[12] |
| S0421 | GolfSpy | |
| S0544 | HenBox | |
| S1128 | HilalRAT | |
| S1077 | Hornbill | |
| S1185 | LightSpy |
LightSpy has captured environment audio, phone calls and Voice over IP (VoIP) calls.[33][34][35][36][37] |
| S0407 | Monokle |
Monokle can record audio from the device's microphone and can record phone calls, specifying the output audio quality.[38] |
| C0054 | Operation Triangulation |
During Operation Triangulation, the threat actors used a microphone-recording module.[39] |
| S0399 | Pallas | |
| S0316 | Pegasus for Android |
Pegasus for Android has the ability to record device audio.[40] |
| S0289 | Pegasus for iOS |
Pegasus for iOS has the ability to record audio.[41] |
| S1126 | Phenakite | |
| S1241 | RatMilad | |
| S0295 | RCSAndroid |
RCSAndroid can record audio using the device microphone.[44] |
| S0326 | RedDrop |
RedDrop captures live recordings of the device's surroundings.[45] |
| S0327 | Skygofree |
Skygofree can record audio via the microphone when an infected device is in a specified location.[46] |
| S1195 | SpyC23 |
SpyC23 can record phone calls and audio.[47][48][49][50][51] |
| S0324 | SpyDealer | |
| S0305 | SpyNote RAT |
SpyNote RAT can activate the victim's microphone.[53] |
| S0328 | Stealth Mango |
Stealth Mango can record audio using the device microphone.[54] |
| S1082 | Sunbird | |
| S0329 | Tangelo |
Tangelo contains functionality to record calls as well as the victim device's environment.[54] |
| S1069 | TangleBot | |
| S0558 | Tiktok Pro |
Tiktok Pro can capture audio from the device’s microphone and can record phone calls.[56] |
| S9006 | VajraSpy |
VajraSpy has recorded surrounding audio and phone calls from WhatsApp, WhatsApp Business, Signal, and Telegram by requesting |
| S0418 | ViceLeaker |
ViceLeaker can record audio from the device’s microphone and can record phone calls together with the caller ID.[59][60] |
| S0506 | ViperRAT | |
| G0112 | Windshift |
Windshift has included phone call and audio recording capabilities in the malicious apps deployed as part of Operation BULL and Operation ROCK.[62] |
| S0489 | WolfRAT | |
| S0318 | XLoader for Android |
XLoader for Android covertly records phone calls.[64] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1006 | Use Recent OS Version |
Android 9 and above restricts access to microphone, camera, and other sensors from background applications.[65] |
| M1011 | User Guidance |
Users should be wary of granting applications dangerous or privacy-intrusive permissions, such as access to microphone or audio output. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0673 | Detection of Audio Capture | AN1772 |
A defender observes an application holding microphone capture capability transitioning into active microphone resource usage through Android audio APIs (e.g., MediaRecorder or AudioRecord), followed by sustained capture while the application is backgrounded or the device is locked, and subsequent outbound network traffic suggesting potential audio exfiltration or streaming. |
| AN1773 |
A defender observes an application with declared microphone capability initiating microphone resource use through iOS audio frameworks, potentially during background execution or shortly after a silent wake event, followed by sustained audio capture and outbound encrypted traffic suggesting audio streaming or upload activity. |