Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
Accounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.
|C0025||2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack||
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team added a login to a SQL Server with
Indrik Spider used
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts.
Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to domain controllers and systems used to create and manage accounts.
|M1028||Operating System Configuration||
Protect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers.
|M1026||Privileged Account Management||
Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.
|ID||Data Source||Data Component||Detects|
Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that are associated with account creation, such as net user or useradd
Monitor newly executed processes associated with account creation, such as net.exe
|DS0002||User Account||User Account Creation||
Monitor for newly constructed user accounts through account audits to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. Collect data on account creation within a network or Windows Event ID 4720 (for when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller).