Thanks to all of our ATT&CKcon participants. All sessions are here, and individual presentations will be posted soon.

Create Account

Adversaries with a sufficient level of access may create a local system or domain account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.

The net user commands can be used to create a local or domain account.

ID: T1136

Tactic: Persistence

Platform:  Linux, macOS, Windows

Permissions Required:  Administrator

Data Sources:  Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Authentication logs, Windows event logs

Version: 1.0

Examples

NameDescription
APT3

APT3 has been known to create or enable accounts, such as support_388945a0.[1]

Calisto

Calisto has the capability to add its own account to the victim's machine.[2]

Carbanak

Carbanak can create a Windows account.[3]

Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 created accounts on victims, including administrator accounts, some of which appeared to be tailored to each individual staging target.[4][5]

Flame

Flame can create backdoor accounts with the login "HelpAssistant" with the Limbo module.[6][7]

Leafminer

Leafminer used a tool called Imecab to set up a persistent remote access account on the victim machine.[8]

Mis-Type

Mis-Type may create a temporary user on the system named "Lost_{Unique Identifier}."[9]

Net

The net user username \password and net user username \password \domain commands in Net can be used to create a local or domain account respectively.[10]

Pupy

Pupy can user PowerView to perform "net user" commands and create local system and domain accounts.[11]

S-Type

S-Type may create a temporary user on the system named "Lost_{Unique Identifier}" with the password "pond~!@6"{Unique Identifier}."[9]

Mitigation

Use and enforce multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to Valid Accounts that may be used to create privileged accounts within an environment.

Adversaries that create local accounts on systems may have limited access within a network if access levels are properly locked down. These accounts may only be needed for persistence on individual systems and their usefulness depends on the utility of the system they reside on.

Protect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.

Detection

Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. [12] Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.

References