Thanks to all of our ATT&CKcon participants. All sessions are here, and individual presentations will be posted soon.

Standard Application Layer Protocol

Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are RPC, SSH, or RDP.

ID: T1071

Tactic: Command And Control

Platform:  Linux, macOS, Windows

Data Sources:  Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring

Requires Network:  Yes

Version: 1.0

Examples

NameDescription
3PARA RAT

3PARA RAT uses HTTP for command and control.[1]

4H RAT

4H RAT uses HTTP for command and control.[1]

ADVSTORESHELL

ADVSTORESHELL connects to port 80 of a C2 server using Wininet API.[2]

APT19

APT19 used HTTP for C2 communications. APT19 also used an HTTP malware variant to communicate over HTTP for C2.[3][4]

APT28

APT28 used SMTP as a communication channel in various implants, initially using self-registered Google Mail accounts and later compromised email servers of its victims. Later implants such as CHOPSTICK use a blend of HTTP and other legitimate channels, depending on module configuration.[5]

APT32

APT32 has used JavaScript that communicates over HTTP or HTTPS to attacker controlled domains to download additional frameworks.[6]

APT37

APT37 uses HTTPS to conceal C2 communications.[7]

BACKSPACE

BACKSPACE uses HTTP as a transport to communicate with its command server.[8]

BADNEWS

BADNEWS establishes a backdoor over HTTP.[9]

Bankshot

Bankshot uses HTTP for command and control communication.[10]

BBSRAT

BBSRAT uses GET and POST requests over HTTP or HTTPS for command and control to obtain commands and send ZLIB compressed data back to the C2 server.[11]

Bisonal

Bisonal uses HTTP for C2 communications.[12]

BlackEnergy

BlackEnergy communicates with its C2 server over HTTP.[13]

Brave Prince

Some Brave Prince variants have used South Korea's Daum email service to exfiltrate information, and later variants have posted the data to a web server via an HTTP post command.[14]

BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER malware has used HTTP for C2.[15]

BUBBLEWRAP

BUBBLEWRAP can communicate using HTTP or HTTPS.[16]

Carbanak

The Carbanak malware communicates to its command server using HTTP with an encrypted payload.[17]

ChChes

ChChes communicates to its C2 server over HTTP and embeds data within the Cookie HTTP header.[18][19]

China Chopper

China Chopper executes code using HTTP POST commands.[20]

CHOPSTICK

Various implementations of CHOPSTICK communicate with C2 over HTTP, SMTP, and POP3.[21]

CloudDuke

One variant of CloudDuke uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2.[22]

Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group has used HTTPS and DNS tunneling for C2. The group has also used the Plink utility to create SSH tunnels.[23][24][25]

Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike uses a custom command and control protocol that is encapsulated in HTTP, HTTPS, or DNS. In addition, it conducts peer-to-peer communication over Windows named pipes encapsulated in the SMB protocol. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.[26]

Comnie

Comnie uses HTTP for C2 communication.[27]

ComRAT

ComRAT has used HTTP requests for command and control.[28]

CORALDECK

CORALDECK has exfiltrated data in HTTP POST headers.[29]

CORESHELL

CORESHELL can communicate over HTTP, SMTP, and POP3 for C2.[5][30]

CosmicDuke

CosmicDuke can use HTTP or HTTPS for command and control to hard-coded C2 servers.[22][31]

CozyCar

CozyCar's main method of communicating with its C2 servers is using HTTP or HTTPS.[32]

Dark Caracal

Dark Caracal's version of Bandook communicates with their server over a TCP port using HTTP payloads Base64 encoded and suffixed with the string "&&&"[33]

Daserf

Daserf uses HTTP for C2.[15]

DealersChoice

DealersChoice uses HTTP for communication with the C2 server.[34]

Dipsind

Dipsind uses HTTP for C2.[35]

DownPaper

DownPaper communicates to its C2 server over HTTP.[36]

Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 used SMB for C2.[37]

Duqu

Duqu uses a custom command and control protocol that communicates over commonly used ports, and is frequently encapsulated by application layer protocols.[38]

DustySky

DustySky has used both HTTP and HTTPS for C2.[39]

Dyre

Dyre uses HTTPS for C2 communications.[40]

Elise

Elise communicates over HTTP or HTTPS for C2.[41]

ELMER

ELMER uses HTTP for command and control.[42]

Emissary

Emissary uses HTTP or HTTPS for C2.[43]

Epic

Epic implements a command and control protocol over HTTP.[44]

FakeM

Some variants of FakeM use SSL to communicate with C2 servers.[45]

Felismus

Felismus uses HTTP for C2.[46]

FELIXROOT

FELIXROOT uses HTTP and HTTPS to communicate with the C2 server.[47]

FIN6

FIN6 used the Plink command-line utility to create SSH tunnels to C2 servers.[48]

FIN7

FIN7 has performed C2 using DNS via A, OPT, and TXT records.[49]

FLIPSIDE

FLIPSIDE uses RDP to tunnel traffic from a victim environment.[50]

Gamaredon Group

A Gamaredon Group file stealer can communicate over HTTP for C2.[51]

Gazer

Gazer communicates with its C2 servers over HTTP.[52]

GeminiDuke

GeminiDuke uses HTTP and HTTPS for command and control.[22]

Gold Dragon

Gold Dragon uses HTTP for communication to the control servers.[14]

GravityRAT

GravityRAT uses HTTP for C2.[53]

HAMMERTOSS

The "Uploader" variant of HAMMERTOSS visits a hard-coded server over HTTP/S to download the images HAMMERTOSS uses to receive commands.[54]

Helminth

Helminth can use HTTP or DNS for C2.[55]

Hi-Zor

Hi-Zor communicates with its C2 server over HTTPS.[56]

Honeybee

Honeybee uses FTP for command and control.[57]

HTTPBrowser

HTTPBrowser has used HTTP, HTTPS, and DNS for command and control.[58][59]

httpclient

httpclient uses HTTP for command and control.[1]

InvisiMole

InvisiMole uses HTTP for C2 communications.[60]

JHUHUGIT

JHUHUGIT variants have communicated with C2 servers over HTTP and HTTPS.[61][62][63]

JPIN

JPIN can communicate over FTP and send email over SMTP.[35]

Kazuar

Kazuar uses HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, and FTPS to communicate with the C2 server. Kazuar can also act as a webserver and listen for inbound HTTP requests through an exposed API.[64]

Ke3chang

Ke3chang malware RoyalCli and BS2005 have communicated over HTTP with the C2 server through Internet Explorer (IE) by using the COM interface IWebBrowser2. Additionally, Ke3chang malware RoyalDNS has used DNS for C2.[65]

Keydnap

Keydnap uses HTTPS for command and control.[66]

Komplex

The Komplex C2 channel uses HTTP POST requests.[67]

Lazarus Group

A Lazarus Group malware sample conducts C2 over HTTP.[68]

LOWBALL

LOWBALL command and control occurs via HTTPS over port 443.[16]

MacSpy

MacSpy uses HTTP for command and control.[69]

Magic Hound

Magic Hound malware has used HTTP and IRC for C2.[70]

Matroyshka

Matroyshka uses DNS for C2.[71][72]

MiniDuke

MiniDuke uses HTTP and HTTPS for command and control.[22]

Mis-Type

Mis-Type network traffic can communicate over HTTP.[73]

More_eggs

More_eggs uses HTTPS for C2.[23]

NanHaiShu

NanHaiShu uses DNS for the C2 communications.[74]

NavRAT

NavRAT uses the email platform, Naver, for C2 communications, leveraging SMTP.[75]

NETEAGLE

NETEAGLE will attempt to detect if the infected host is configured to a proxy. If so, NETEAGLE will send beacons via an HTTP POST request; otherwise it will send beacons via UDP/6000. NETEAGLE will also use HTTP to download resources that contain an IP address and Port Number pair to connect to for further C2. Adversaries can also use NETEAGLE to establish an RDP connection with a controller over TCP/7519.[8]

OilRig

OilRig has used HTTP and DNS for C2. The group has also used the Plink utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 servers.[63][76]

OLDBAIT

OLDBAIT can use HTTP or SMTP for C2.[5]

OnionDuke

OnionDuke uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2.[22]

OopsIE

OopsIE uses HTTP for C2 communications.[77][78]

Orangeworm

Orangeworm has used HTTP for C2.[79]

OwaAuth

OwaAuth uses incoming HTTP requests with a username keyword and commands and handles them as instructions to perform actions.[58]

PinchDuke

PinchDuke transfers files from the compromised host via HTTP or HTTPS to a C2 server.[22]

Pisloader

Pisloader uses DNS as its C2 protocol.[80]

PlugX

PlugX can be configured to use HTTP or DNS for command and control.[58]

pngdowner

pngdowner uses HTTP for command and control.[1]

POWERSOURCE

POWERSOURCE uses DNS TXT records for C2.[81][82]

POWRUNER

POWRUNER can use HTTP and DNS for C2 communications.[83][76]

Proxysvc

Proxysvc uses HTTP over SSL to communicate commands with the control server.[84]

Psylo

Psylo uses HTTPS for C2.[45]

Pteranodon

Pteranodon can use HTTP for C2.[51]

PUNCHBUGGY

PUNCHBUGGY enables remote interaction and can obtain additional code over HTTPS GET and POST requests.[85][86]

Pupy

Pupy can communicate over HTTP for C2.[87]

QUADAGENT

QUADAGENT uses HTTPS, HTTP, and DNS for C2 communications.[88]

Rancor

Rancor has used HTTP for C2.[89]

RARSTONE

RARSTONE uses SSL to encrypt its communication with its C2 server.[90]

RATANKBA

RATANKBA uses HTTP/HTTPS for command and control communication.[91][92]

Reaver

Some Reaver variants use HTTP for C2.[93]

RedLeaves

RedLeaves can communicate to its C2 over HTTP and HTTPS if directed.[94][95]

Regin

The Regin malware platform supports many standard protocols, including HTTP, HTTPS, and SMB.[96]

Remsec

Remsec is capable of using HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, and DNS for C2.[97][98][99]

RGDoor

RGDoor uses HTTP for C2 communications.[100]

RIPTIDE

APT12 has used RIPTIDE, a RAT that uses HTTP to communicate.[101]

ROKRAT

ROKRAT use HTTPS for all command and control communication methods.[102]

S-Type

S-Type uses HTTP for C2.[73]

Sakula

Sakula uses HTTP for C2.[103]

SeaDuke

SeaDuke uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2.[22]

Shamoon

Shamoon uses HTTP for C2.[104]

Smoke Loader

Smoke Loader uses HTTP for C2.[105]

SNUGRIDE

SNUGRIDE communicates with its C2 server over HTTP.[94]

SOUNDBITE

SOUNDBITE communicates via DNS for C2.[106]

Stealth Falcon

Stealth Falcon malware communicates with its C2 server via HTTPS.[107]

Sys10

Sys10 uses HTTP for C2.[108]

TEXTMATE

TEXTMATE uses DNS TXT records for C2.[81]

Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 malware has used HTTP for C2.[109]

TrickBot

TrickBot uses HTTPS to communicate with its C2 servers, to get malware updates, modules that perform most of the malware logic and various configuration files.[110]

Turla

Turla has used HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.[111][112]

Umbreon

Umbreon provides access to the system via SSH or any other protocol that uses PAM to authenticate.[113]

UPPERCUT

UPPERCUT has used HTTP for C2, including sending error codes in Cookie headers.[114]

Vasport

Vasport creates a backdoor by making a connection using a HTTP POST.[115]

VERMIN

VERMIN uses HTTP for C2 communications.[116]

WinMM

WinMM uses HTTP for C2.[108]

XAgentOSX

XAgentOSX contains the ftpUpload function to use the FTPManager:uploadFile method to upload files from the target system.[117]

Zebrocy

After using raw sockets to communicate with its C2 server, Zebrocy uses a decrypted string to create HTTP POST requests.[118]

ZeroT

ZeroT has used HTTP for C2.[119][120]

ZLib

ZLib communicates over HTTP for C2.[73]

Mitigation

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. [121]

Detection

Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used. [121]

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