Scheduled Transfer

Adversaries may schedule data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.

When scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over C2 Channel or Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.

ID: T1029
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
Tactic: Exfiltration
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Requires Network:  Yes
Version: 1.1
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 28 March 2020

Procedure Examples

Name Description

ADVSTORESHELL collects, compresses, encrypts, and exfiltrates data to the C2 server every 10 minutes.[1]

Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can set its "beacon" payload to reach out to the C2 server on an arbitrary and random interval. In addition it will break large data sets into smaller chunks for exfiltration.[2]


ComRAT has been programmed to sleep outside local business hours (9 to 5, Monday to Friday).[3]


Dipsind can be configured to only run during normal working hours, which would make its communications harder to distinguish from normal traffic.[4]


jRAT can be configured to reconnect at certain intervals.[5]


Kazuar can sleep for a specific time and be set to communicate at specific intervals.[6]


LightNeuron can be configured to exfiltrate data during nighttime or working hours.[7]


Linfo creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can change the frequency at which compromised hosts contact remote C2 infrastructure.[8]


Machete sends stolen data to the C2 server every 10 minutes.[9]


POWERSTATS can sleep for a given number of seconds.[10]


ShimRat can sleep when instructed to do so by the C2.[11]


Mitigation Description
Network Intrusion Prevention

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. [12]


Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.