| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1059 | .006 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python |
DRYHOOK is a Python-based script that executes within the victim environment.[2][3] |
| .008 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Network Device CLI |
DRYHOOK has the ability to interact with Ivanti Connect Secure environments and to modify system components.[2][3] |
||
| Enterprise | T1074 | .001 | Data Staged: Local Data Staging |
DRYHOOK has stored stolen credentials for future use in the temp folder of a victimized Ivanti Connect Secure VPN device, specifically in the file location |
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools |
DRYHOOK has killed all instances of the |
|
| Enterprise | T1222 | .002 | File and Directory Permissions Modification: Linux and Mac Permissions |
DRYHOOK has the ability to remount the filesystem as "read-write" to make changes and then restores it to "read-only" prior to killing processes to apply the modifications.[2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1056 | .001 | Input Capture: Keylogging |
DRYHOOK has captured user credentials and passwords in plaintext and has encrypted them in a stored file on the network device.[2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1556 | Modify Authentication Process |
DRYHOOK has intercepted and logged user credentials by modifying the Perl module in Ivanti Connect Secure VPN edge-devices located within |
|
| .004 | Network Device Authentication |
DRYHOOK has patched victim appliances authentication routines to capture credentials in plaintext as users log in.[2] |
||
| Enterprise | T1601 | Modify System Image |
DRYHOOK has modified the Ivanti Connect Secure VPN authentication Perl module |
|
| Enterprise | T1027 | .013 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File |
DRYHOOK has encrypted stolen credentials strings within a file using both Base64 and RC4 with a hard-coded key.[2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1489 | Service Stop |
DRYHOOK has terminated all instances of the |
|