C0026 was a campaign identified in September 2022 that included the selective distribution of KOPILUWAK and QUIETCANARY malware to previous ANDROMEDA malware victims in Ukraine through re-registered ANDROMEDA C2 domains. Several tools and tactics used during C0026 were consistent with historic Turla operations.[1]
Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Enterprise | T1583 | .001 | Acquire Infrastructure: Domains |
For C0026, the threat actors re-registered expired C2 domains previously used for ANDROMEDA malware.[1] |
Enterprise | T1560 | .001 | Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility |
During C0026, the threat actors used WinRAR to collect documents on targeted systems. The threat actors appeared to only exfiltrate files created after January 1, 2021.[1] |
Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System |
During C0026, the threat actors collected documents from compromised hosts.[1] |
|
Enterprise | T1030 | Data Transfer Size Limits |
During C0026, the threat actors split encrypted archives containing stolen files and information into 3MB parts prior to exfiltration.[1] |
|
Enterprise | T1568 | Dynamic Resolution |
During C0026, the threat actors re-registered a ClouDNS dynamic DNS subdomain which was previously used by ANDROMEDA.[1] |
|
Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
During C0026, the threat actors downloaded malicious payloads onto select compromised hosts.[1] |
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
S1074 | ANDROMEDA |
During C0026, the threat actors re-registered expired ANDROMEDA domains to profile past victims for further targeting.[1] |
S0099 | Arp | |
S1075 | KOPILUWAK |
KOPILUWAK was used as a first-stage profiling utility for previous victims of ANDROMEDA during C0026.[1] |
S0039 | Net | |
S0104 | netstat | |
S1076 | QUIETCANARY |
During C0026, the threat actors used QUIETCANARY to gather and exfiltrate data. [1] |