Social Engineering: Impersonation

ID Name
T1684.001 Impersonation
T1684.002 Email Spoofing

Adversaries may impersonate a trusted person or organization in order to persuade and trick a target into performing some action on their behalf. For example, adversaries may communicate with victims (via Phishing for Information, Phishing, or Internal Spearphishing) while impersonating a known sender such as an executive, colleague, or third-party vendor. Established trust can then be leveraged to accomplish an adversary’s ultimate goals, possibly against multiple victims.

In many cases of business email compromise or email fraud campaigns, adversaries use impersonation to defraud victims -- deceiving them into sending money or divulging information that ultimately enables Financial Theft.

Adversaries will often also use social engineering techniques such as manipulative and persuasive language in email subject lines and body text such as payment, request, or urgent to push the victim to act quickly before malicious activity is detected. These campaigns are often specifically targeted against people who, due to job roles and/or accesses, can carry out the adversary’s goal.  

Impersonation is typically preceded by reconnaissance techniques such as Gather Victim Identity Information and Gather Victim Org Information as well as acquiring infrastructure such as email domains (i.e. Domains) to substantiate their false identity.[1]

There is the potential for multiple victims in campaigns involving impersonation. For example, an adversary may Compromise Accounts targeting one organization which can then be used to support impersonation against other entities.[2]

ID: T1684.001
Sub-technique of:  T1684
Tactic: Stealth
Platforms: Linux, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows, macOS
Contributors: Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence; Pawel Partyka, Microsoft Threat Intelligence
Version: 1.0
Created: 14 April 2026
Last Modified: 22 April 2026

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0099 APT-C-36

APT-C-36 has impersonated banks including Banco Davivienda, Bancolombia, and BBVA as well as government institutions such as Colombia’s National Directorate of Taxes and Customs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Office of the Attorney General.[3][4][5][6]

G0007 APT28

LAMEHUG has sent spearphishing emails impersonating Ukrainian government officials. [7]

G0096 APT41

APT41 impersonated an employee at a video game developer company to send phishing emails.[8]

G1044 APT42

APT42 has impersonated legitimate people in phishing emails to gain credentials.[9][10]

C0027 C0027

During C0027, Scattered Spider impersonated legitimate IT personnel in phone calls and text messages either to direct victims to a credential harvesting site or getting victims to run commercial remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools.[11]

G1052 Contagious Interview

Contagious Interview had impersonated HR hiring personnel through social media, job board notifications, and conducted interviews with victims in order to entice them to download malware disguised as legitimate applications or malicious scripts from code repositories.[12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19]

G0094 Kimsuky

Kimsuky has also impersonated legitimate people, such as a foreign advisor, an embassy employee, and a think tank employee.[20] Kimsuky has also purported to be a Japanese diplomat to communicate with the victims.[21]

G1004 LAPSUS$

LAPSUS$ has called victims' help desk and impersonated legitimate users with previously gathered information in order to gain access to privileged accounts.[22]

G1054 MirrorFace

MirrorFace has sent targeted emails purporting to be from a Japanese political party’s PR department.[23]

G0069 MuddyWater

MuddyWater has used support@microsoftonlines[.]com to send phishing emails that masqueraded as security updates from Microsoft.[21] MuddyWater has also impersonated TMCell (Altyn Asyr CJSC), the primary mobile operator in Turkmenistan, sending phishing emails with the email domain info@tmcell.[24]

S1131 NPPSPY

NPPSPY creates a network listener using the misspelled label logincontroll recorded to the Registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order.[25]

C0022 Operation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group impersonated HR hiring personnel through LinkedIn messages and conducted interviews with victims in order to deceive them into downloading malware.[26][27][28]

S9037 RustyWater

RustyWater has impersonated TMCell (Altyn Asyr CJSC), the primary mobile operator in Turkmenistan, sending phishing emails with the email domain info@tmcell.[24]

G1031 Saint Bear

Saint Bear has impersonated government and related entities in both phishing activity and developing web sites with malicious links that mimic legitimate resources.[29]

C0059 Salesforce Data Exfiltration

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors impersonated IT support personnel in voice calls with victims at times claiming to be addressing enterprise-wide connectivity issues.[30][31]

G1015 Scattered Spider

Scattered Spider utilized social engineering to compel IT help desk personnel to reset passwords and MFA tokens.[32][33] Scattered Spider has also used Microsoft Teams to pose as internal IT support or help desk personnel.[34]

G1033 Star Blizzard

Star Blizzard has registered impersonation email accounts to spoof experts in a particular field or individuals and organizations affiliated with the intended target.[35][36][37]

G1046 Storm-1811

Storm-1811 impersonates help desk and IT support personnel for phishing and social engineering purposes during initial access to victim environments.[38]

G1055 VOID MANTICORE

VOID MANTICORE has impersonated individuals familiar to the victim and technical support associated with social messaging services.[39]

G0090 WIRTE

WIRTE has used utilized look-alike domains and graphics of trusted security solution providers to entice victims to click on phishing links.[40]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1019 Threat Intelligence Program

Threat intelligence helps defenders and users be aware of and defend against common lures and active campaigns that have been used for impersonation.

M1017 User Training

Train users to be aware of impersonation tricks and how to counter them, for example confirming incoming requests through an independent platform like a phone call or in-person, to reduce risk.

Detection Strategy

ID Name Analytic ID Analytic Description
DET0286 Detection Strategy for Impersonation AN0792

Monitor for anomalous email activity originating from Windows-hosted applications (e.g., Outlook) where the sending account name or display name does not match the underlying SMTP address. Detect abnormal volume of outbound messages containing sensitive keywords (e.g., 'payment', 'wire transfer') or anomalous login locations for accounts associated with email sending activity.

AN0793

Monitor mail server logs (Postfix, Sendmail, Exim) for anomalous From headers mismatching authenticated SMTP identities. Detect abnormal relay attempts, spoofed envelope-from values, or large-scale outbound campaigns targeting internal users.

AN0794

Monitor Mail.app activity or unified logs for anomalous SMTP usage, including mismatches between display name and authenticated AppleID or Exchange credentials. Detect use of third-party mail utilities that attempt to send on behalf of corporate identities.

AN0795

Monitor SaaS mail platforms (Google Workspace, M365, Okta-integrated apps) for SendAs/SendOnBehalfOf operations where the delegated permissions are unusual or newly granted. Detect impersonation attempts where adversaries configure rules to auto-forward or auto-reply with impersonated content.

AN0796

Monitor Office Suite applications (Outlook, Word mail merge, Excel macros) for abnormal automated message sending, especially when macros or scripts trigger email delivery. Detect patterns of impersonation language (urgent, payment, executive request) combined with anomalous execution of Office macros.

References

  1. Bart Lenaerts-Bergmans. (2023, August 8). What is Business Email Compromise?. Retrieved April 15, 2026.
  2. CloudFlare. (n.d.). What is vendor email compromise (VEC)?. Retrieved September 12, 2023.
  3. Global Research & Analysis Team, Kaspersky. (2024, August 19). BlindEagle flying high in Latin America. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
  4. Melnyk, S. (2025, June 27). Tracing Blind Eagle to Proton66. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
  5. Insikt Group. (2025, August 26). TAG-144’s Persistent Grip on South American Organizations. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
  6. Pellegrino, G. (2025, December 16). BlindEagle Targets Colombian Government Agency with Caminho and DCRAT. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
  7. Simonovich, V. (2025, July 23). Cato CTRL™ Threat Research: Analyzing LAMEHUG – First Known LLM-Powered Malware with Links to APT28 (Fancy Bear) . Retrieved April 21, 2026.
  8. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION. Retrieved June 11, 2024.
  9. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT42: Crooked Charms, Cons and Compromises. Retrieved October 9, 2024.
  10. Google Threat Analysis Group. (2024, August 14). Iranian backed group steps up phishing campaigns against Israel, U.S.. Retrieved October 9, 2024.
  11. Parisi, T. (2022, December 2). Not a SIMulation: CrowdStrike Investigations Reveal Intrusion Campaign Targeting Telco and BPO Companies. Retrieved June 30, 2023.
  12. Aleksandar Milenkoski, Sreekar Madabushi, Kenneth Kinion. (2025, September 4). Contagious Interview | North Korean Threat Actors Reveal Plans and Ops by Abusing Cyber Intel Platforms. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
  13. Efstratios Lontzetidis. (2025, January 16). Lazarus APT: Techniques for Hunting Contagious Interview. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
  14. Kirill Boychenko. (2025, June 25). Another Wave: North Korean Contagious Interview Campaign Drops 35 New Malicious npm Packages. Retrieved October 19, 2025.
  15. Ryan Sherstobitoff. (2024, October 29). Inside a North Korean Phishing Operation Targeting DevOps Employees. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
  16. Securonix Threat Research, D.Iuzvyk, T. Peck, O.Kolesnikov. (2024, April 24). Analysis of DEV#POPPER: New Attack Campaign Targeting Software Developers Likely Associated With North Korean Threat Actors. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
  17. Steve Cobb. (2024, October 29). The Job Offer That Wasn’t: How We Stopped an Espionage Plot. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
  18. Unit 42. (2023, November 21). Hacking Employers and Seeking Employment: Two Job-Related Campaigns Bear Hallmarks of North Korean Threat Actors. Retrieved October 17, 2025.
  19. Unit42. (2024, October 9). Contagious Interview: DPRK Threat Actors Lure Tech Industry Job Seekers to Install New Variants of BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret Malware. Retrieved October 17, 2025.
  20. FBI. (2026, January 8). FBI Flash AC-000001-MW North Korean Kimsuky Actors Leverage Malicious QR Codes in Spearphishing Campaigns Targeting U.S. Entities. Retrieved April 18, 2026.
  1. Naumaan, S., et al. (2025, April 17). Around the World in 90 Days: State-Sponsored Actors Try ClickFix . Retrieved January 21, 2026.
  2. MSTIC, DART, M365 Defender. (2022, March 24). DEV-0537 Criminal Actor Targeting Organizations for Data Exfiltration and Destruction. Retrieved May 17, 2022.
  3. Breitenbacher, D. (2022, December 14). Unmasking MirrorFace: Operation LiberalFace targeting Japanese political entities. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
  4. Awasthi, P. (2026, January 8). Reborn in Rust: Muddy Water Evolves Tooling with RustyWater Implant. Retrieved March 19, 2026.
  5. Dray Agha. (2022, August 16). Cleartext Shenanigans: Gifting User Passwords to Adversaries With NPPSPY. Retrieved May 17, 2024.
  6. ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 13). Operation 'Dream Job' Widespread North Korean Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
  7. Breitenbacher, D and Osis, K. (2020, June 17). OPERATION IN(TER)CEPTION: Targeted Attacks Against European Aerospace and Military Companies. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
  8. Lakshmanan, R. (2022, August 17). North Korea Hackers Spotted Targeting Job Seekers with macOS Malware. Retrieved April 10, 2023.
  9. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 14). Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor. Retrieved July 10, 2023.
  10. Google Threat Intelligence Group. (2025, June 4). The Cost of a Call: From Voice Phishing to Data Extortion. Retrieved October 22, 2025.
  11. FBI Cyber Division. (2025, September 12). Cyber Criminal Groups UNC6040 and UNC6395 Compromising Salesforce Instances for Data Theft and Extortion. Retrieved October 22, 2025.
  12. CISA. (2023, November 16). Cybersecurity Advisory: Scattered Spider (AA23-320A). Retrieved March 18, 2024.
  13. Microsoft. (2023, October 25). Octo Tempest crosses boundaries to facilitate extortion, encryption, and destruction. Retrieved March 18, 2024.
  14. Mandiant Incident Response. (2025, May 6). Defending Against UNC3944: Cybercrime Hardening Guidance from the Frontlines. Retrieved October 13, 2025.
  15. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2022, August 15). Disrupting SEABORGIUM’s ongoing phishing operations. Retrieved June 13, 2024.
  16. CISA, et al. (2023, December 7). Russian FSB Cyber Actor Star Blizzard Continues Worldwide Spear-phishing Campaigns. Retrieved June 13, 2024.
  17. Shields, W. (2024, January 18). Russian threat group COLDRIVER expands its targeting of Western officials to include the use of malware. Retrieved June 13, 2024.
  18. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, May 15). Threat actors misusing Quick Assist in social engineering attacks leading to ransomware. Retrieved March 14, 2025.
  19. FBI. (2026, March 20). FBI Flash: FLASH-20260320-001:Government of Iran Cyber Actors Deploy Telegram C2 to Push Malware to Identified Targets. Retrieved April 20, 2026.
  20. Check Point. (2024, November 12). Hamas-affiliated Threat Actor WIRTE Continues its Middle East Operations and Moves to Disruptive Activity. Retrieved April 20, 2026.