System Network Configuration Discovery

On Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the java.net.NetworkInterface class.[1] The Android TelephonyManager class can be used to gather related information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number.[2]

On iOS, gathering network configuration information is not possible without root access.

ID: T1422
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
Tactic Type: Post-Adversary Device Access
Tactic: Discovery
Platforms: Android, iOS
Version: 2.1
Created: 25 October 2017
Last Modified: 02 June 2020

Procedure Examples

Name Description
ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A

ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A gathers the device IMEI and IMSI.[3]

Bread

Bread collects the device’s IMEI, carrier, mobile country code, and mobile network code.[4]

Corona Updates

Corona Updates can collect device network configuration information, such as Wi-Fi SSID and IMSI.[5]

DualToy

DualToy collects the connected iOS device’s information including IMEI, IMSI, ICCID, serial number and phone number.[6]

EventBot

EventBot can gather device network information.[7]

Exodus

Exodus One queries the device for its IMEI code and the phone number in order to validate the target of a new infection.[8]

FakeSpy

FakeSpy can collect device networking information, including phone number, IMEI, and IMSI.[9]

Gustuff

Gustuff gathers the device IMEI to send to the command and control server.[10]

INSOMNIA

INSOMNIA can collect the device’s phone number, ICCID, IMEI, and the currently active network interface (Wi-Fi or cellular).[11]

Monokle

Monokle checks if the device is connected via Wi-Fi or mobile data.[12]

Pegasus for Android

Pegasus for Android checks if the device is on Wi-Fi, a cellular network, and is roaming.[13]

Pegasus for iOS

Pegasus for iOS monitors the connection state and tracks which types of networks the phone is connected to, potentially to determine the bandwidth and ability to send full data across the network.[14]

PJApps

PJApps has the capability to collect and leak the victim's phone number, mobile device unique identifier (IMEI).[15]

RedDrop

RedDrop collects and exfiltrates information including IMEI, IMSI, MNC, MCC, nearby Wi-Fi networks, and other device and SIM-related info.[16]

Riltok

Riltok can query the device's IMEI.[17]

Rotexy

Rotexy collects the device's IMEI and sends it to the command and control server.[18]

RuMMS

RuMMS gathers the device phone number and IMEI and transmits them to a command and control server.[19]

SpyDealer

SpyDealer harvests the device phone number, IMEI, and IMSI.[20]

Stealth Mango

Stealth Mango collects and uploads information about changes in SIM card or phone numbers on the device.[21]

Tangelo

Tangelo contains functionality to gather cellular IDs.[21]

TrickMo

TrickMo can collect device network configuration information such as IMSI, IMEI, and Wi-Fi connection state.[22]

ViperRAT

ViperRAT can collect network configuration data from the device, including phone number, SIM operator, and network operator.[23]

WolfRAT

WolfRAT sends the device’s IMEI with each exfiltration request.[24]

XLoader for Android

XLoader for Android collects the device’s IMSI and ICCID.[25]

XLoader for iOS

XLoader for iOS can obtain the device’s IMEM, ICCID, and MEID.[25]

Mitigations

Mitigation Description
Application Vetting

Application vetting could be used to analyze applications to determine whether they access this information, including determining whether the application requests the Android ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE permission (required in order to access NetworkInterface information) or the READ_PHONE_STATE permission (required in order to access TelephonyManager information).

Use Recent OS Version

Starting in Android 6.0, applications can no longer access MAC addresses of network interfaces.[26]

References

  1. Lookout. (2016). Technical Analysis of Pegasus Spyware. Retrieved December 12, 2016.
  2. Lookout. (2016, May 25). 5 active mobile threats spoofing enterprise apps. Retrieved December 19, 2016.
  3. Nell Campbell. (2018, February 27). RedDrop: the blackmailing mobile malware family lurking in app stores. Retrieved September 18, 2018.
  4. Tatyana Shishkova. (2019, June 25). Riltok mobile Trojan: A banker with global reach. Retrieved August 7, 2019.
  5. T. Shishkova, L. Pikman. (2018, November 22). The Rotexy mobile Trojan – banker and ransomware. Retrieved September 23, 2019.
  6. Wu Zhou, Deyu Hu, Jimmy Su, Yong Kang. (2016, April 26). RUMMS: THE LATEST FAMILY OF ANDROID MALWARE ATTACKING USERS IN RUSSIA VIA SMS PHISHING. Retrieved February 6, 2017.
  7. Wenjun Hu, Cong Zheng and Zhi Xu. (2017, July 6). SpyDealer: Android Trojan Spying on More Than 40 Apps. Retrieved September 18, 2018.
  8. Lookout. (n.d.). Stealth Mango & Tangelo. Retrieved September 27, 2018.
  9. P. Asinovsky. (2020, March 24). TrickBot Pushing a 2FA Bypass App to Bank Customers in Germany. Retrieved April 24, 2020.
  10. M. Flossman. (2017, February 16). ViperRAT: The mobile APT targeting the Israeli Defense Force that should be on your radar. Retrieved September 11, 2020.
  11. W. Mercer, P. Rascagneres, V. Ventura. (2020, May 19). The wolf is back... . Retrieved July 20, 2020.
  12. Hiroaki, H., Wu, L., Wu, L.. (2019, April 2). XLoader Disguises as Android Apps, Has FakeSpy Links. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
  13. Android. (n.d.). Android 6.0 Changes. Retrieved December 21, 2016.