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Data from Network Shared Drive
Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.
Procedure Examples
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S0128 | BADNEWS |
When it first starts, BADNEWS crawls the victim's mapped drives and collects documents with the following extensions: .doc, .docx, .pdf, .ppt, .pptx, and .txt.[1] |
| G0060 | BRONZE BUTLER |
BRONZE BUTLER has exfiltrated files stolen from file shares.[2] |
| G0114 | Chimera |
Chimera has collected data of interest from network shares.[3] |
| S0050 | CosmicDuke |
CosmicDuke steals user files from network shared drives with file extensions and keywords that match a predefined list.[4] |
| S0554 | Egregor |
Egregor can collect any files found in the enumerated drivers before sending it to its C2 channel.[5] |
| G0117 | Fox Kitten |
Fox Kitten has searched network shares to access sensitive documents.[6] |
| G0047 | Gamaredon Group |
Gamaredon Group malware has collected Microsoft Office documents from mapped network drives.[7] |
| G0045 | menuPass |
menuPass has collected data from remote systems by mounting network shares with |
| S0458 | Ramsay |
Ramsay can collect data from network drives and stage it for exfiltration.[9] |
| G0054 | Sowbug |
Sowbug extracted Word documents from a file server on a victim network.[10] |
Mitigations
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
Detection
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
References
- Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016.
- Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, October 12). BRONZE BUTLER Targets Japanese Enterprises. Retrieved January 4, 2018.
- Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved January 19, 2021.
- F-Secure Labs. (2014, July). COSMICDUKE Cosmu with a twist of MiniDuke. Retrieved July 3, 2014.
- NHS Digital. (2020, November 26). Egregor Ransomware The RaaS successor to Maze. Retrieved December 29, 2020.
- CISA. (2020, September 15). Iran-Based Threat Actor Exploits VPN Vulnerabilities. Retrieved December 21, 2020.
- Boutin, J. (2020, June 11). Gamaredon group grows its game. Retrieved June 16, 2020.
- PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017.
- Sanmillan, I.. (2020, May 13). Ramsay: A cyber‑espionage toolkit tailored for air‑gapped networks. Retrieved May 27, 2020.
- Symantec Security Response. (2017, November 7). Sowbug: Cyber espionage group targets South American and Southeast Asian governments. Retrieved November 16, 2017.