ENTERPRISE MOBILE PRE-ATT&CK
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Data from Network Shared Drive

Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration.

Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.

ID: T1039

Tactic: Collection

Platform:  Linux, macOS, Windows

System Requirements:  Privileges to access network shared drive

Data Sources:  File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters

Version: 1.0

Examples

NameDescription
BADNEWS

When it first starts, BADNEWS crawls the victim's mapped drives and collects documents with the following extensions: .doc, .docx, .pdf, .ppt, .pptx, and .txt.[1]

BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER has exfiltrated files stolen from file shares.[2]

CosmicDuke

CosmicDuke steals user files from network shared drives with file extensions and keywords that match a predefined list.[3]

menuPass

menuPass has collected data from remote systems by mounting network shares with net use and using Robocopy to transfer data.[4]

Sowbug

Sowbug extracted Word documents from a file server on a victim network.[5]

Mitigation

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from a network share, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting [6] tools, like AppLocker, [7] [8] or Software Restriction Policies [9] where appropriate. [10]

Detection

Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.

References

  1. Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016.
  2. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, October 12). BRONZE BUTLER Targets Japanese Enterprises. Retrieved January 4, 2018.
  3. F-Secure Labs. (2014, July). COSMICDUKE Cosmu with a twist of MiniDuke. Retrieved July 3, 2014.
  4. PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017.
  5. Symantec Security Response. (2017, November 7). Sowbug: Cyber espionage group targets South American and Southeast Asian governments. Retrieved November 16, 2017.
  1. Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  2. Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
  3. NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
  4. Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  5. Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.