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System Service Discovery

Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are "sc," "tasklist /svc" using Tasklist, and "net start" using Net, but adversaries may also use other tools as well.

ID: T1007

Tactic: Discovery

Platform:  Windows

Permissions Required:  User, Administrator, SYSTEM

Data Sources:  Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters

CAPEC ID:  CAPEC-574

Version: 1.0

Examples

NameDescription
admin@338

admin@338 actors used the following command following exploitation of a machine with LOWBALL malware to obtain information about services: net start >> %temp%\download[1]

BBSRAT

BBSRAT can query service configuration information.[2]

Comnie

Comnie runs the command: net start >> %TEMP%\info.dat on a victim.[3]

Elise

Elise executes net start after initial communication is made to the remote server.[4]

Emissary

Emissary has the capability to execute the command net start to interact with services.[5]

GeminiDuke

GeminiDuke collects information on programs and services on the victim that are configured to automatically run at startup.[6]

GravityRAT

GravityRAT has a feature to list the available services on the system.[7]

Hydraq

Hydraq creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can monitor services.[8][9]

InvisiMole

InvisiMole can obtain running services on the victim.[10]

JPIN

JPIN can list running services.[11]

Ke3chang

Ke3chang performs service discovery using net start commands.[12]

Kwampirs

Kwampirs collects a list of running services with the command tasklist /svc.[13]

Net

The net start command can be used in Net to find information about Windows services.[14]

OilRig

OilRig has used sc query on a victim to gather information about services.[15]

Poseidon Group

After compromising a victim, Poseidon Group discovers all running services.[16]

RATANKBA

RATANKBA uses tasklist /svc to display running tasks.[17]

S-Type

S-Type runs the command net start on a victim.[18]

Sykipot

Sykipot may use net start to display running services.[19]

SynAck

SynAck enumerates all running services.[20][21]

Tasklist

Tasklist can be used to discover services running on a system.[22]

TrickBot

TrickBot collects a list of install programs and services on the system’s machine.[23]

Turla

Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover running services and associated processes using the tasklist /svc command.[24]

Volgmer

Volgmer queries the system to identify existing services.[25]

WINERACK

WINERACK can enumerate services.[26]

ZLib

ZLib has the ability to discover and manipulate Windows services.[18]

Mitigation

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting [27] tools, like AppLocker, [28] [29] or Software Restriction Policies [30] where appropriate. [31]

Detection

System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.

References

  1. FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, December 1). China-based Cyber Threat Group Uses Dropbox for Malware Communications and Targets Hong Kong Media Outlets. Retrieved December 4, 2015.
  2. Lee, B. Grunzweig, J. (2015, December 22). BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger. Retrieved August 19, 2016.
  3. Grunzweig, J. (2018, January 31). Comnie Continues to Target Organizations in East Asia. Retrieved June 7, 2018.
  4. Falcone, R., et al.. (2015, June 16). Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
  5. Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J.. (2016, February 3). Emissary Trojan Changelog: Did Operation Lotus Blossom Cause It to Evolve?. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
  6. F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
  7. Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, April 26). GravityRAT - The Two-Year Evolution Of An APT Targeting India. Retrieved May 16, 2018.
  8. Symantec Security Response. (2010, January 18). The Trojan.Hydraq Incident. Retrieved February 20, 2018.
  9. Lelli, A. (2010, January 11). Trojan.Hydraq. Retrieved February 20, 2018.
  10. Hromcová, Z. (2018, June 07). InvisiMole: Surprisingly equipped spyware, undercover since 2013. Retrieved July 10, 2018.
  11. Windows Defender Advanced Threat Hunting Team. (2016, April 29). PLATINUM: Targeted attacks in South and Southeast Asia. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  12. Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
  13. Symantec Security Response Attack Investigation Team. (2018, April 23). New Orangeworm attack group targets the healthcare sector in the U.S., Europe, and Asia. Retrieved May 8, 2018.
  14. Savill, J. (1999, March 4). Net.exe reference. Retrieved September 22, 2015.
  15. Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
  16. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2016, February 9). Poseidon Group: a Targeted Attack Boutique specializing in global cyber-espionage. Retrieved March 16, 2016.
  1. Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018.
  2. Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017.
  3. Blasco, J. (2011, December 12). Another Sykipot sample likely targeting US federal agencies. Retrieved March 28, 2016.
  4. Ivanov, A. et al.. (2018, May 7). SynAck targeted ransomware uses the Doppelgänging technique. Retrieved May 22, 2018.
  5. Bettencourt, J. (2018, May 7). Kaspersky Lab finds new variant of SynAck ransomware using sophisticated Doppelgänging technique. Retrieved May 24, 2018.
  6. Microsoft. (n.d.). Tasklist. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
  7. Salinas, M., Holguin, J. (2017, June). Evolution of Trickbot. Retrieved July 31, 2018.
  8. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014.
  9. US-CERT. (2017, November 22). Alert (TA17-318B): HIDDEN COBRA – North Korean Trojan: Volgmer. Retrieved December 7, 2017.
  10. FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018.
  11. Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  12. Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
  13. NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
  14. Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  15. Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.