Generate Content: Audio-Visual Content

ID Name
T1683.001 Written Content
T1683.002 Audio-Visual Content

Adversaries may create or manipulate audio, image, and video content to support targeting and malicious operations. Adversaries may also use synthetic voice recordings, real-time altered audio or video during live interactions, fabricated profile photos and identity documents, or video content depicting fabricated or impersonated individuals.[1]

Content may be produced manually through editing tools, generated using AI-assisted tools, or produced using third-party synthetic services.[2][3] AI-assisted tools have enabled adversaries to produce synthetic media at scale and generate content that is more difficult to identify as inauthentic.

Audio-visual content produced through these methods may be used in support of other techniques, such as Phishing, Spearphishing via Service, Phishing for Information, Internal Spearphishing, Social Engineering, Financial Theft, or Establish Accounts.

ID: T1683.002
Sub-technique of:  T1683
Platforms: PRE
Contributors: Alex Wong; Gilberto PĂ©rez; Patrick Mkhael (aka Pinguino)
Version: 1.0
Created: 25 March 2026
Last Modified: 20 April 2026

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0099 APT-C-36

APT-C-36 has used phishing pages appearing like legitimate banking login portals to compromise credentials.[4]

G1052 Contagious Interview

Contagious Interview has used AI to clone video-conferencing applications to distribute their BeaverTail malware. They have also used AI to create deepfake videos. [5]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1056 Pre-compromise

This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on designing defenses that are not reliant on atomic indicators.

Detection Strategy

ID Name Analytic ID Analytic Description
DET0918 Detection of Audio-Visual Content AN2061

Much of this takes place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.

References