Adversaries may manipulate continuous integration / continuous development (CI/CD) processes by injecting malicious code into the build process. There are several mechanisms for poisoning pipelines:
gitlab-ci.yml in GitLab). They may include a command to exfiltrate credentials leveraged in the build process to a remote server, or to export them as a workflow artifact.[1][2]pull_request_target trigger allows workflows running from forked repositories to access secrets. If this trigger is combined with an explicit pull request checkout and a location for a threat actor to insert malicious code (e.g., an npm build command), a threat actor may be able to leak pipeline credentials.[1][3] Similarly, threat actors may craft pull requests with malicious inputs (such as branch names) if the build pipeline treats those inputs as trusted.[4][5][6] Finally, if a pipeline leverages a self-hosted runner, a threat actor may be able to execute arbitrary code on a host inside the organization’s network.[7]By poisoning CI/CD pipelines, threat actors may be able to gain access to credentials, laterally move to additional hosts, or input malicious components to be shipped further down the pipeline (i.e., Supply Chain Compromise).
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S9042 | CanisterWorm |
CanisterWorm has leveraged stolen tokens from Trivy users to publish itself across over 46 npm packages.[8][9] |
| S9043 | Mini Shai-Hulud |
Mini Shai-Hulud has utilized Github Actions to propagate through the use of triggered workflows.[10][11][12] |
| S9008 | Shai-Hulud |
Shai-Hulud has also leveraged GitHub actions from stolen accounts in order to create a malicious Github workflow within |
| G1056 | TeamPCP |
TeamPCP has compromised trusted CI/CD pipelines by injecting credential-stealing payloads into legitimate workflows and software packages including open-source security tools Trivy and KICS, and AI gateway LiteLLM.[17][18][18][19][20][21][8][22][22][10][23][24][11][12][25][26] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1054 | Software Configuration |
Where possible, avoid allowing pipelines to run unreviewed code. Where this is necessary, ensure that these pipelines are executed on isolated nodes without access to secrets. In GitHub, avoid using the |
| M1018 | User Account Management |
Ensure that CI/CD pipelines only have permissions they require to complete their operations. Additionally, limit the number of users who have write access to internal repositories to only those necessary. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0533 | Detection Strategy for Poisoned Pipeline Execution via SaaS CI/CD Workflows | AN1473 |
Detects anomalous CI/CD workflow execution originating from forked repositories, with pull request (PR) metadata or commit messages containing suspicious patterns (e.g., encoded payloads), coupled with the use of insecure pipeline triggers like |