| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1578.001 | Create Snapshot |
| T1578.002 | Create Cloud Instance |
| T1578.003 | Delete Cloud Instance |
| T1578.004 | Revert Cloud Instance |
| T1578.005 | Modify Cloud Compute Configurations |
An adversary may delete a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in an attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. Deleting an instance or virtual machine can remove valuable forensic artifacts and other evidence of suspicious behavior if the instance is not recoverable.
An adversary may also Create Cloud Instance and later terminate the instance after achieving their objectives.[1]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G1004 | LAPSUS$ |
LAPSUS$ has deleted the target's systems and resources in the cloud to trigger the organization's incident and crisis response process.[2] |
| G1053 | Storm-0501 |
Storm-0501 has conducted mass deletion of cloud data stores and resources from Azure subscriptions.[3] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1047 | Audit |
Routinely check user permissions to ensure only the expected users have the capability to delete new instances. |
| M1018 | User Account Management |
Limit permissions for deleting new instances in accordance with least privilege. Organizations should limit the number of users within the organization with an IAM role that has administrative privileges, strive to reduce all permanent privileged role assignments, and conduct periodic entitlement reviews on IAM users, roles and policies.[1] |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0084 | Detection Strategy for Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Delete Cloud Instance | AN0234 |
Defenders can detect suspicious cloud instance deletions by correlating events across authentication, instance lifecycle, and account activity. From a defender’s perspective, behaviors of interest include instances deleted shortly after creation, deletions initiated by new or rarely used accounts, deletions following snapshot creation, and deletions originating from anomalous geolocations or access keys. These may indicate adversarial attempts to destroy forensic evidence or evade detection. |