| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1550.001 | Application Access Token |
| T1550.002 | Pass the Hash |
| T1550.003 | Pass the Ticket |
| T1550.004 | Web Session Cookie |
Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.
Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used to access resources in cloud, container-based applications, and software-as-a-service (SaaS).[1]
OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.[2]
For example, with a cloud-based email service, once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a "refresh" token enabling background access is awarded.[3] With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.[4]
Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. In AWS and GCP environments, adversaries can trigger a request for a short-lived access token with the privileges of another user account.[5][6] The adversary can then use this token to request data or perform actions the original account could not. If permissions for this feature are misconfigured – for example, by allowing all users to request a token for a particular account - an adversary may be able to gain initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate their privileges.[7]
Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary who compromises a user’s AWS API credentials may be able to use the sts:GetFederationToken API call to create a federated user session, which will have the same permissions as the original user but may persist even if the original user credentials are deactivated.[8] Additionally, access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0007 | APT28 |
APT28 has used several malicious applications that abused OAuth access tokens to gain access to target email accounts, including Gmail and Yahoo Mail.[9] |
| S9042 | CanisterWorm |
CanisterWorm has leveraged stolen npm tokens to automate compromise by enumerating all publishable packages in a namespace, bumping versions, and publishing itself across the entire scope.[10][11] |
| S1023 | CreepyDrive |
CreepyDrive can use legitimate OAuth refresh tokens to authenticate with OneDrive.[12] |
| G0125 | HAFNIUM |
HAFNIUM has abused service principals with administrative permissions for data exfiltration.[13] |
| S9044 | Kali365 |
Kali365 has utilized an Exchange Admin module that captured admin tokens to create rogue mailbox connectors and change mail-flow rules.[14] |
| S9043 | Mini Shai-Hulud |
Mini Shai-Hulud has the ability to authenticate using stolen application access tokens.[15][16][17] |
| S0683 | Peirates |
Peirates can use stolen service account tokens to perform its operations. It also enables adversaries to switch between valid service accounts.[18] |
| S9008 | Shai-Hulud |
Shai-Hulud has leveraged captured valid NPM tokens to enumerate and update packages on compromised accounts.[19][20][21] Shai-Hulud has also utilized stolen GitHub access tokens to access compromised accounts.[20][21] |
| G1057 | ShinyHunters |
ShinyHunters has used stolen OAuth keys to access cloud infrastructure and to bypass two-factor authentication.[22] |
| C0024 | SolarWinds Compromise |
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used compromised service principals to make changes to the Office 365 environment.[23] |
| G1056 | TeamPCP |
TeamPCP has used stolen access tokens to inject malicious code into CI/CD workflows and to exfiltrate sensitive data from cloud, developer, and container environments.[24][10][25] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1036 | Account Use Policies |
Where possible, consider restricting the use of access tokens outside of expected contexts. For example, in AWS environments, consider using data perimeters to prevent credential use outside of an expected network.[26] |
| M1013 | Application Developer Guidance |
Consider implementing token binding strategies, such as Azure AD token protection or OAuth Proof of Possession, that cryptographically bind a token to a secret. This may prevent the token from being used without knowledge of the secret or possession of the device the token is tied to.[27][28] |
| M1047 | Audit |
Administrators should audit all cloud and container accounts to ensure that they are necessary and that the permissions granted to them are appropriate. Where possible, the ability to request temporary account tokens on behalf of another accounts should be disabled. Additionally, administrators can leverage audit tools to monitor actions that can be conducted as a result of OAuth 2.0 access. For instance, audit reports enable admins to identify privilege escalation actions such as role creations or policy modifications, which could be actions performed after initial access. |
| M1041 | Encrypt Sensitive Information |
File encryption should be enforced across email communications containing sensitive information that may be obtained through access to email services. |
| M1021 | Restrict Web-Based Content |
Update corporate policies to restrict what types of third-party applications may be added to any online service or tool that is linked to the company's information, accounts or network (e.g., Google, Microsoft, Dropbox, Basecamp, GitHub). However, rather than providing high-level guidance on this, be extremely specific—include a list of per-approved applications and deny all others not on the list. Administrators may also block end-user consent through administrative portals, such as the Azure Portal, disabling users from authorizing third-party apps through OAuth and forcing administrative consent.[29] |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0185 | Behavioral Detection Strategy for Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token (T1550.001) | AN0526 |
Use of AWS STS or GCP IAM APIs to request temporary tokens or federation sessions inconsistent with normal account activity, including from unexpected principals or regions. |
| AN0527 |
OAuth or SAML access tokens reused across multiple sessions or clients without corresponding MFA or login activity. |
||
| AN0528 |
Application access tokens used to call APIs (e.g., Google Workspace, Salesforce) without interactive logins, often with unusual scopes or elevated permissions. |
||
| AN0529 |
OAuth token usage for Exchange Online or SharePoint API access without preceding login or from unauthorized clients. |
||
| AN0530 |
Compromised service account tokens mounted inside containers and reused for external API calls or lateral movement across services. |