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Foreground Persistence

Adversaries may abuse Android's startForeground() API method to maintain continuous sensor access. Beginning in Android 9, idle applications running in the background no longer have access to device sensors, such as the camera, microphone, and gyroscope.[1] Applications can retain sensor access by running in the foreground, using Android’s startForeground() API method. This informs the system that the user is actively interacting with the application, and it should not be killed. The only requirement to start a foreground service is showing a persistent notification to the user.[2]

Malicious applications may abuse the startForeground() API method to continue running in the foreground, while presenting a notification to the user pretending to be a genuine application. This would allow unhindered access to the device’s sensors, assuming permission has been previously granted.[3]

Malicious applications may also abuse the startForeground() API to inform the Android system that the user is actively interacting with the application, thus preventing it from being killed by the low memory killer.[4]

ID: T1541
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
Tactic Type: Post-Adversary Device Access
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Platforms: Android
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MTC ID: APP-19
Contributors: Lorin Wu, Trend Micro
Version: 2.1
Created: 19 November 2019
Last Modified: 20 March 2023
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Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S1054 Drinik

Drinik has C2 commands that can move the malware in and out of the foreground. [5]
S0485 Mandrake

Mandrake uses foreground persistence to keep a service running. It shows the user a transparent notification to evade detection.[6]
S0545 TERRACOTTA

TERRACOTTA has utilized foreground services.[7]
S0558 Tiktok Pro

Tiktok Pro has shown a persistent notification to maintain access to device sensors.[8]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1011 User Guidance

If a user sees a persistent notification they do not recognize, they should uninstall the source application and look for other unwanted applications or anomalies.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0041 Application Vetting API Calls

Applications could be vetted for their use of the startForeground() API, and could be further scrutinized if usage is found.
DS0042 User Interface System Notifications

The user can see persistent notifications in their notification drawer and can subsequently uninstall applications that do not belong.

References

  1. Google. (n.d.). Sensors Overview. Retrieved November 19, 2019.
  2. Google. (n.d.). Services overview. Retrieved November 19, 2019.
  3. Thomas Sutter. (2019, December). Simple Spyware Androids Invisible Foreground Services and How to (Ab)use Them. Retrieved December 26, 2019.
  4. Song Wang. (2019, October 18). Fake Photo Beautification Apps on Google Play can Read SMS Verification Code to Trigger Wireless Application Protocol (WAP)/Carrier Billing. Retrieved November 19, 2019.
  1. Cyble. (2022, October 27). Drinik Malware Returns With Advanced Capabilities Targeting Indian Taxpayers. Retrieved January 18, 2023.
  2. R. Gevers, M. Tivadar, R. Bleotu, A. M. Barbatei, et al.. (2020, May 14). Uprooting Mandrake: The Story of an Advanced Android Spyware Framework That Went Undetected for 4 Years. Retrieved July 15, 2020.
  3. Satori Threat Intelligence and Research Team. (2020, August). TERRACOTTA Android Malware: A Technical Study. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
  4. S. Desai. (2020, September 8). TikTok Spyware. Retrieved January 5, 2021.