Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.
Many IaaS providers offer solutions for online data object storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. Similarly, SaaS enterprise platforms such as Office 365 and Google Workspace provide cloud-based document storage to users through services such as OneDrive and Google Drive, while SaaS application providers such as Slack, Confluence, Salesforce, and Dropbox may provide cloud storage solutions as a peripheral or primary use case of their platform.
In some cases, as with IaaS-based cloud storage, there exists no overarching application (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) with which to interact with the stored objects: instead, data from these solutions is retrieved directly though the Cloud API. In SaaS applications, adversaries may be able to collect this data directly from APIs or backend cloud storage objects, rather than through their front-end application or interface (i.e., Data from Information Repositories).
Adversaries may collect sensitive data from these cloud storage solutions. Providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems, though misconfigurations are a common problem.[1][2][3] There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing public access to unauthenticated users, overly-broad access by all users, or even access for any anonymous person outside the control of the Identity Access Management system without even needing basic user permissions.
This open access may expose various types of sensitive data, such as credit cards, personally identifiable information, or medical records.[4][5][6][7]
Adversaries may also obtain then abuse leaked credentials from source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S0677 | AADInternals |
AADInternals can collect files from a user’s OneDrive.[8] |
| C0027 | C0027 |
During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed victim OneDrive environments to search for VPN and MFA enrollment information, help desk instructions, and new hire guides.[9] |
| G0117 | Fox Kitten |
Fox Kitten has obtained files from the victim's cloud storage instances.[10] |
| S1091 | Pacu |
Pacu can enumerate and download files stored in AWS storage services, such as S3 buckets.[11] |
| S0683 | Peirates |
Peirates can dump the contents of AWS S3 buckets. It can also retrieve service account tokens from kOps buckets in Google Cloud Storage or S3.[12] |
| G1015 | Scattered Spider |
Scattered Spider enumerates data stored in cloud resources for collection and exfiltration purposes.[13] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1047 | Audit |
Frequently check permissions on cloud storage to ensure proper permissions are set to deny open or unprivileged access to resources.[1] |
| M1041 | Encrypt Sensitive Information |
Encrypt data stored at rest in cloud storage.[1][2] Managed encryption keys can be rotated by most providers. At a minimum, ensure an incident response plan to storage breach includes rotating the keys and test for impact on client applications.[14] |
| M1037 | Filter Network Traffic |
Cloud service providers support IP-based restrictions when accessing cloud resources. Consider using IP allowlisting along with user account management to ensure that data access is restricted not only to valid users but only from expected IP ranges to mitigate the use of stolen credentials to access data. |
| M1032 | Multi-factor Authentication |
Consider using multi-factor authentication to restrict access to resources and cloud storage APIs.[1] |
| M1022 | Restrict File and Directory Permissions |
Use access control lists on storage systems and objects. |
| M1018 | User Account Management |
Configure user permissions groups and roles for access to cloud storage.[2] Implement strict Identity and Access Management (IAM) controls to prevent access to storage solutions except for the applications, users, and services that require access.[1] Ensure that temporary access tokens are issued rather than permanent credentials, especially when access is being granted to entities outside of the internal security boundary.[15] |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0025 | Cloud Service | Cloud Service Metadata |
Monitor M365 Audit logs for TeamsSessionStarted Operations against MicrosoftTeams workloads involving suspicious ClientIPs and suspect accounts (UserId). Analytic 1 - Sessions initiated from unusual IP addresses, high volume of sessions from a single account, sessions at unusual times
|
| DS0010 | Cloud Storage | Cloud Storage Access |
Monitor for unusual queries to the cloud provider's storage service. Activity originating from unexpected sources may indicate improper permissions are set and are allowing access to data. Additionally, detecting failed attempts by a user for a certain object, followed by escalation of privileges by the same user, and access to the same object may be an indication of suspicious activity. |