Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools

ID Name
T1474.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
T1474.002 Compromise Hardware Supply Chain
T1474.003 Compromise Software Supply Chain

Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.[1]

ID: T1474.001
Sub-technique of:  T1474
Tactic Type: Post-Adversary Device Access
Tactic: Initial Access
Platforms: Android, iOS
Version: 1.1
Created: 28 March 2022
Last Modified: 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0297 XcodeGhost

XcodeGhost was injected into apps by a modified version of Xcode (Apple's software development tool).[2][3]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1013 Application Developer Guidance

Application developers should be cautious when selecting third-party libraries to integrate into their application.

Detection Strategy

ID Name Analytic ID Analytic Description
DET0704 Detection of Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools AN1823

A legitimate-seeming application or update is installed through an expected or previously trusted path, but shortly after first run or update the application exhibits new runtime behavior, sensor use, file staging, or network communications inconsistent with its historical baseline, documented role, or prior version. The defender specifically looks for behaviors commonly introduced by compromised third-party libraries or manipulated build tooling, such as unexpected background service activation, first-seen framework use, new permissions exercised, novel network destinations, or dropped local artifacts not aligned to the app's expected function.

AN1824

A legitimate-seeming app or update arrives through an expected or trusted distribution path, but the delivered application begins showing new entitlement exercise, background activity, framework use, sensor access, or network behavior inconsistent with its prior baseline or documented role. Because direct inspection of compromised dependencies or developer tooling is weaker on iOS, the defender emphasizes supervised-device app inventory, post-update behavior drift, new first-run or background patterns, and downstream communications that suggest compromised embedded libraries or manipulated build outputs.

References