Adversaries may gain access to mobile devices through transfers or swaps from victims’ phone numbers to adversary-controlled SIM cards and mobile devices.[1][2]
The typical process is as follows:
Adversaries may use the intercepted SMS messages to log into online accounts that use SMS-based authentication. Specifically, adversaries may use SMS-based authentication to log into banking and/or cryptocurrency accounts, then transfer funds to adversary-controlled wallets.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G1004 | LAPSUS$ |
LAPSUS$ has used SIM swapping to gain access to victims’ mobile devices.[3][4] |
| G1015 | Scattered Spider |
Scattered Spider has used SIM swapping to bypass MFA and to maintain persistence on mobile carrier networks and SIM cards.[5][6][7][8] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1012 | Enterprise Policy |
Enterprises should monitor for SIM card changes on the Enterprise Mobility Management (EMM) or the Mobile Device Management (MDM). |
| M1011 | User Guidance |
The user should become familiar with social engineering tactics that ask for Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Additionally, the user should include the use of hardware tokens, biometrics, and other non-SMS based authentication mechanisms where possible. Finally, the user should enable SIM swapping protections offered by the mobile carrier, such as setting up a PIN or password to authorize any changes to the account. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0658 | Detection of SIM Card Swap | AN1747 |
The OS may show a notification to the user that the SIM card has been transferred to another device. |
| AN1748 |
The OS may show a notification to the user that the SIM card has been transferred to another device. |