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TECHNIQUES
PRE-ATT&CK
Priority Definition Planning
Priority Definition Direction
Target Selection
Technical Information Gathering
People Information Gathering
Organizational Information Gathering
Technical Weakness Identification
People Weakness Identification
Organizational Weakness Identification
Adversary OPSEC
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Persona Development
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Enterprise
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Persistence
Privilege Escalation
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  4. Develop social network persona digital footprint

Develop social network persona digital footprint

Both newly built personas and pre-compromised personas may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. [1] [2] [3]

ID: T1342
Tactic: Persona Development
Version: 1.0
Created: 14 December 2017
Last Modified: 17 October 2018
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Procedure Examples

Name Description
APT17

APT17 created biographical sections on TechNet profile pages to appear more legitimate.[4]
Cleaver

Cleaver fake personas included profile photos, details, and network connections.[5]

Detection

Detectable by Common Defenses (Yes/No/Partial): No

Explanation: Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.

Difficulty for the Adversary

Easy for the Adversary (Yes/No): Yes

Explanation: The only difference between an adversary conducting this technique and a typical user, is the adversary's intent - to target an individual for compromise.

References

  1. Mike Lennon. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
  2. Thomas Ryan. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
  3. Joan Goodchild. (2010, July 8). The Robin Sage experiment: Fake profile fools security pros. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
  1. FireEye Labs/FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, May 14). Hiding in Plain Sight: FireEye and Microsoft Expose Obfuscation Tactic. Retrieved January 22, 2016.
  2. Dell SecureWorks. (2015, October 7). Suspected Iran-Based Hacker Group Creates Network of Fake LinkedIn Profiles. Retrieved January 14, 2016.