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Input Capture

Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for Valid Accounts and information Collection that include keylogging and user input field interception.

Keylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes, [1] but other methods exist to target information for specific purposes, such as performing a UAC prompt or wrapping the Windows default credential provider. [2]

Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises.

Adversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through External Remote Services and Valid Accounts or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service. [3]

ID: T1056

Tactic: Collection, Credential Access

Platform:  Linux, macOS, Windows

Permissions Required:  Administrator, SYSTEM

Data Sources:  Windows Registry, Kernel drivers, Process monitoring, API monitoring

CAPEC ID:  CAPEC-569

Contributors:  John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center

Version: 1.0

Examples

NameDescription
ADVSTORESHELL

ADVSTORESHELL can perform keylogging.[4][5]

APT28

APT28 has used tools to perform keylogging.[6][7]

APT3

APT3 has used a keylogging tool that records keystrokes in encrypted files.[8]

BADNEWS

When it first starts, BADNEWS spawns a new thread to log keystrokes.[9][10][11]

Bandook

Bandook contains keylogging capabilities[12]

BlackEnergy

BlackEnergy has run a keylogger plug-in on a victim.[13]

Carbanak

Carbanak logs key strokes for configured processes and sends them back to the C2 server.[14][15]

Catchamas

Catchamas collects keystrokes from the victim’s machine.[16]

CHOPSTICK

CHOPSTICK is capable of performing keylogging.[17][4][7]

Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can track key presses with a keylogger module.[18]

CosmicDuke

CosmicDuke uses a keylogger and steals clipboard contents from victims.[19]

Darkhotel

Darkhotel uses a sophisticated keylogger.[20]

Daserf

Daserf can log keystrokes.[21][22]

Derusbi

Derusbi is capable of logging keystrokes.[23]

DOGCALL

DOGCALL is capable of logging keystrokes.[24]

Duqu

Duqu can track key presses with a keylogger module.[25]

DustySky

DustySky contains a keylogger.[26]

EvilGrab

EvilGrab has the capability to capture keystrokes.[27]

FakeM

FakeM contains a keylogger module.[28]

gh0st

The gh0st RAT has a keylogger.[29]

Group5

Malware used by Group5 is capable of capturing keystrokes.[30]

Helminth

The executable version of Helminth has a module to log keystrokes.[31]

HTTPBrowser

HTTPBrowser is capable of capturing keystrokes on victims.[32]

JPIN

JPIN contains a custom keylogger.[33]

jRAT

jRAT has the capability to log keystrokes from the victim’s machine.[34]

Kasidet

Kasidet has the ability to initiate keylogging.[35]

Ke3chang

Ke3chang has used keyloggers.[36]

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group malware KiloAlfa contains keylogging functionality.[37][38]

MacSpy

MacSpy captures keystrokes.[39]

Magic Hound

Magic Hound malware is capable of keylogging.[40]

Matroyshka

Matroyshka is capable of keylogging.[41][42]

MoonWind

MoonWind has a keylogger.[43]

NavRAT

NavRAT logs the keystrokes on the targeted system.[44]

NetTraveler

NetTraveler contains a keylogger.[45]

NETWIRE

NETWIRE can perform keylogging.[46][47]

OilRig

OilRig has used a keylogging tool called KEYPUNCH.[48]

OwaAuth

OwaAuth captures and DES-encrypts credentials before writing the username and password to a log file, C:\log.txt.[32]

PLATINUM

PLATINUM has used several different keyloggers.[33]

PoisonIvy

PoisonIvy contains a keylogger.[49][50]

PowerSploit

PowerSploit's Get-Keystrokes Exfiltration module can log keystrokes.[51][52]

Prikormka

Prikormka contains a keylogger module that collects keystrokes and the titles of foreground windows.[53]

Proton

Proton uses a keylogger to capture keystrokes.[39]

Pupy

Pupy uses a keylogger to capture keystrokes it then sends back to the server after it is stopped.[54]

QuasarRAT

QuasarRAT has a built-in keylogger.[55][56]

Regin

Regin contains a keylogger.[57]

Remsec

Remsec contains a keylogger component.[58][59]

ROKRAT

ROKRAT uses a keylogger to capture keystrokes and location of where the user is typing.[60]

Rover

Rover has keylogging functionality.[61]

RTM

RTM can record keystrokes from both the keyboard and virtual keyboard.[62]

RunningRAT

RunningRAT captures keystrokes and sends them back to the C2 server.[63]

Sowbug

Sowbug has used keylogging tools.[64]

SslMM

SslMM creates a new thread implementing a keylogging facility using Windows Keyboard Accelerators.[65]

Sykipot

Sykipot contains keylogging functionality to steal passwords.[66]

Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 actors installed a credential logger on Microsoft Exchange servers. Threat Group-3390 also leveraged the reconnaissance framework, ScanBox, to capture keystrokes.[32][67][68]

TinyZBot

TinyZBot contains keylogger functionality.[69]

Unknown Logger

Unknown Logger is capable of recording keystrokes.[9]

VERMIN

VERMIN collects keystrokes from the victim machine.[70]

XAgentOSX

XAgentOSX contains keylogging functionality that will monitor for active application windows and write them to the log, it can handle special characters, and it will buffer by default 50 characters before sending them out over the C2 infrastructure.[71]

yty

yty uses a keylogger plugin to gather keystrokes.[72]

Mitigation

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire credentials or information from the user by using whitelisting [73] tools, like AppLocker, [74] [75] or Software Restriction Policies [76] where appropriate. [77]

In cases where this behavior is difficult to detect or mitigate, efforts can be made to lessen some of the impact that might result from an adversary acquiring credential information. It is also good practice to follow mitigation recommendations for adversary use of Valid Accounts.

Detection

Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include SetWindowsHook, GetKeyState, and GetAsyncKeyState. [1] Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes and detect driver installs, as well as looking for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.

Monitor the Registry for the addition of a Custom Credential Provider. [2] Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used.

References

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