Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.
|Agent.btz||Agent.btz creates a file named thumb.dd on all USB flash drives connected to the victim. This file contains information about the infected system and activity logs. |
|Remsec||Remsec contains a module to move data from airgapped networks to Internet-connected systems by using a removable USB device. |
|SPACESHIP||SPACESHIP copies staged data to removable drives when they are inserted into the system. |
|USBStealer||USBStealer exfiltrates collected files via removable media from air-gapped victims. |
|Disable or Remove Feature or Program||Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.  |
Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.
- Microsoft. (n.d.). How to disable the Autorun functionality in Windows. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
- Microsoft. (2007, August 31). https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771759(v=ws.10).aspx. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
- FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved May 1, 2015.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, August 9). The ProjectSauron APT. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
- Calvet, J. (2014, November 11). Sednit Espionage Group Attacking Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved January 4, 2017.
- Gostev, A.. (2014, March 12). Agent.btz: a Source of Inspiration?. Retrieved April 8, 2016.