Loss of View

Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical processes themselves. [1] [2] [3]

ID: T0829
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
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Tactic: Impact
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Platforms: None
Version: 1.0
Created: 21 May 2020
Last Modified: 12 May 2026

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
C0063 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries wiped devices and also damaged Mikronika RTUs, Hitachi Relion Protection and Control Relays (IEDs), and HMI workstations resulting in a loss of communications and view between the facility and the distribution system operators (DSO).[4][5]

C0066 2026 U.S. Water Utilities Attacks

During the 2026 U.S. Water Utilities Attacks, the adversary changed passwords on internet-facing MicroLogix controllers, causing the affected utilities to lose monitoring of their equipment (e.g., water tower, lift station, etc.).[6][7][8][9]

G1027 CyberAv3ngers

During the 2026 Iranian Water Campaign, CyberAv3ngers manipulated process logic, HMI, and SCADA displays, which may disrupt operators view of the system.[10]

C0041 FrostyGoop Incident

During FrostyGoop Incident, the adversary initiated a firmware downgrade on victim devices to a version lacking monitoring.[11]

S1157 Fuxnet

Fuxnet impaired sensor communication to impacted devices resulting in a loss of view condition for overall system monitoring.[12]

S0604 Industroyer

Industroyer's data wiper component removes the registry image path throughout the system and overwrites all files, rendering the system unusable. [13]

S0607 KillDisk

KillDisk erases the master boot record (MBR) and system logs, leaving the system unusable. [14]

S0372 LockerGoga

Some of Norsk Hydro's production systems were impacted by a LockerGoga infection. This resulted in a loss of view which forced the company to switch to manual operations. [15] [16]

C0031 Unitronics Defacement Campaign

During the Unitronics Defacement Campaign, the CyberAv3ngers replaced the existing graphic on the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) Human-Machine Interface (HMI) with their own, thereby preventing PLC owners and operators from viewing PLC information on the HMI.[17][18]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M0953 Data Backup

Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [19], including the management of gold-copy back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.

M0810 Out-of-Band Communications Channel

Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage [20]. Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimize common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the communications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e.g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant delivery of data.

M0811 Redundancy of Service

Hot-standbys in diverse locations can ensure continued operations if the primarily system are compromised or unavailable. At the network layer, protocols such as the Parallel Redundancy Protocol can be used to simultaneously use redundant and diverse communication over a local network. [21]

Detection Strategy

ID Name Analytic ID Analytic Description
DET0763 Detection of Loss of View AN1895

No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.

References

  1. Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04
  2. Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee SANS Industrial Control System (ICS) Security; The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved 2024/11/25
  3. Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04
  4. CERT Polska. (2026, January 30). Energy Sector Incident Report – 29 December. Retrieved April 22, 2026.
  5. https://5943619.hs-sites.com/hubfs/Reports/dragos-2025-poland-attack-report.pdf. (2026, January). ELECTRUM: CYBER ATTACK ON POLAND’S ELECTRIC SYSTEM 2025. Retrieved April 22, 2026.
  6. Research Special Operations. (2026, July 28). Coordinated "cyberattack" on U.S. water utilities: What you need to know. Retrieved September 26, 2026.
  7. Sai Molige. (2026, August 5). OT Security Analysis: Exposed Devices Attacked in US Water Systems. Retrieved October 8, 2026.
  8. Michael Rothschild. (2026, August 13). Water Under Attack: A Decade of Warnings, and the Same Gaps Still Open. Retrieved October 8, 2026.
  9. FBI Press Office. (2026, July 30). Malicious Cyber Actors Targeting Water and Wastewater Sector Internet- Facing Programmable Logic Controllers, Causing Operational Disruptions. Retrieved October 8, 2026.
  10. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2026, July 22). Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 26, 2026.
  11. Mark Graham, Carolyn Ahlers, Kyle O'Meara; Dragos. (2024, July). Impact of FrostyGoop ICS Malware on Connected OT Systems. Retrieved November 20, 2024.