Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. 
Data destruction may also be used to render operator interfaces unable to respond and to disrupt response functions from occurring as expected. An adversary may also destroy data backups that are vital to recovery after an incident.
Standard file deletion commands are available on most operating system and device interfaces to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Two examples are Windows Sysinternals SDelete and Active@ Killdisk.
Utilize central storage servers for critical operations where possible (e.g., historians) and keep remote backups. For outstations, use local redundant storage for event recorders. Have backup control system platforms, preferably as hot-standbys to respond immediately to data destruction events. 
|M0926||Privileged Account Management||
Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit the information that may be impacted by malicious users or software. 
|M0922||Restrict File and Directory Permissions||
Protect files stored locally with proper permissions to limit opportunities for adversaries to impact data storage. 
|ID||Data Source||Data Component||Detects|
Monitor executed commands and arguments for binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as SDelete.
Monitor for unexpected deletion of files.
Monitor for changes made to a large quantity of files for unexpected modifications in both user directories and directories used to store programs and OS components (e.g., C:\Windows\System32).
Monitor for newly executed processes of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as SDelete.