Real-time monitoring identifies a command-line interpreter (cmd.exe, PowerShell.exe) spawned as a child of an Industrial Control System (ICS) vendor application process, where this parent-child relationship is not part of the documented normal operation of that vendor software or directly spawned processes with a command line parameters containing ICS protocol/Application Programming Interface (API) interaction keywords, from a context not associated with documented automation scripts. Operational Technology (OT) operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.
| Data Component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process Creation (DC0032) | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 |
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| HighRiskCLICommands | List of CLI command patterns considered high-risk warranting elevated scrutiny. |
| LOLBinAbusePatterns | Documented command-line argument patterns for living-off-the-land binary abuse. |
Real-time monitoring identifies a command and scripting interpreter process spawned by an Industrial Control System (ICS) service process, or interactive shell sessions from unexpected Secure Shell (SSH) source Internet Protocol (IP) addresses or an unexpected User Identifier (UID) not associated with recognized ICS automation scripts, deviating from the expected execution baseline. Operational Technology (OT) operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.
| Data Component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process Creation (DC0032) | auditd:SYSCALL | syscall=execve; command or executable associated with the technique runs outside the approved ICS administrative/application baseline |
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| HighRiskCLICommands | List of CLI command patterns considered high-risk warranting elevated scrutiny. |
| LOLBinAbusePatterns | Documented command-line argument patterns for living-off-the-land binary abuse. |
Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) network-device command-line interface (CLI) commands (e.g., interface shutdown, access control list modification, network address translation changes, etc.) from a source or account outside the approved network-management baseline or network traffic patterns consistent with scripted command execution -- regular-interval connections with consistent payload sizes -- to field device Internet Protocol (IP) addresses from a host not normally exhibiting such regularity. Operational Technology (OT) operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.
| Data Component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Command Execution (DC0064) | networkdevice:cli | shell command |
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| HighRiskCLICommands | List of CLI command patterns considered high-risk warranting elevated scrutiny. |
| LOLBinAbusePatterns | Documented command-line argument patterns for living-off-the-land binary abuse. |
Real-time monitoring identifies a session (Telnet, SSH, proprietary, etc.) opened to an embedded field device from a source not in the approved administrative CIDR, immediately followed by configuration-mode entry or high-risk commands (firmware operations, config write/erase, reload) or identifies sequences of Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol commands arriving at field devices that follow a scripted, deterministic pattern -- identical inter-command timing, systematic address iteration -- rather than the variable, operator-driven timing of legitimate engineering sessions. Operational Technology (OT) operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.
| Data Component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Command Execution (DC0064) | device:cli | Shell command |
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| HighRiskCLICommands | List of CLI command patterns considered high-risk warranting elevated scrutiny. |
| LOLBinAbusePatterns | Documented command-line argument patterns for living-off-the-land binary abuse. |