An analyst observes an AI-associated process access data outside $AuthorizedAIDataScope$, followed within $EndpointExfilWindow$ by transfer-capable execution and an outbound connection to a destination outside $AuthorizedAIEndpoints$ from the same process lineage.
| Data Component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| File Access (DC0055) | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4663, 4670, 4656 |
| Script Execution (DC0029) | WinEventLog:PowerShell | EventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106 |
| Process Creation (DC0032) | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 |
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| AuthorizedAIDataScope | data paths/classes the AI application/service identity is permitted to access; derive from application design, IAM and data policy |
| ExpectedAIProcessTree | approved AI parent/child relationships from clean executions |
| AuthorizedAIEndpoints | legitimate service/repository/API destinations |
| EndpointExfilWindow | access→execution→egress timing derived from clean workflows |
An analyst observes an AI agent access $ProtectedDataScope$, invoke a tool/API using that information or a derived payload, and the destination service record a successful transfer to a recipient, repository, tenant, domain, or service outside $AuthorizedAIDataFlows$.
| Data Component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Application Log Content (DC0038) | saas:audit | Actual send/share/upload/write operation |
| AWS:bedrock | AgentTrace.actionGroupInvocationInput | |
| AWS:bedrock | AgentTrace.knowledgeBaseLookupInput |
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| ProtectedDataScope | protected information |
| AuthorizedAgentActions | tools/functions legitimately available for workflow |
| AuthorizedAIDataFlows | allowed source→tool→destination relationships |
| AuthorizedAIOutputDestinations | permitted recipients/domains/tenants/repos/connectors |
| AIExfiltrationWindow | normal access→transfer interval |
An analyst observes an AI-associated process access data outside $AuthorizedAIDataScope$, followed within $EndpointExfilWindow$ by transfer-capable execution and an outbound connection from the same lineage to a destination outside $AuthorizedAIEndpoints$.
| Data Component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| File Access (DC0055) | auditd:SYSCALL | open/read |
| Process Creation (DC0032) | auditd:SYSCALL | EXECVE |
| Network Connection Creation (DC0082) | auditd:SYSCALL | connect |
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| AuthorizedAIDataScope | data paths/classes the AI application/service identity is permitted to access; derive from application design, IAM and data policy |
| ExpectedAIProcessTree | approved AI parent/child relationships from clean executions |
| AuthorizedAIEndpoints | legitimate service/repository/API destinations |
| EndpointExfilWindow | access→execution→egress timing derived from clean workflows |