A process explicitly forges its parent using EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO + PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS (UpdateProcThreadAttribute → CreateProcess[A/W]/CreateProcessAsUserW) or other Native API paths, resulting in mismatched/implausible lineage across ETW EventHeader ProcessId, Security 4688 Creator Process ID/Name, and sysmon ParentProcessGuid. Often paired with privilege escalation when the chosen parent runs as SYSTEM.
| Data Component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process Creation (DC0032) | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4688 |
| OS API Execution (DC0021) | etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process | api_call: UpdateProcThreadAttribute (PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS) and CreateProcess* with EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT / StartupInfoEx |
| Process Metadata (DC0034) | etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process | process_start: EventHeader.ProcessId true parent vs reported PPID mismatch |
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| TimeWindow | Correlation window between UpdateProcThreadAttribute/CreateProcess* and the resulting process (default 5–10 minutes). |
| AllowedSpoofers | Legitimate binaries that commonly use StartupInfoEx/PPID assignment (e.g., consent.exe, svchost.exe during UAC). |
| ParentPrivilegeDeltaThreshold | Minimum privilege/integrity gap between chosen parent and real caller to raise severity. |
| LineageMismatchTolerance | Number of mismatched sources (0–3) before alerting to reduce noise. |
| SensitiveParents | List of SYSTEM parents that, if spoofed, auto‑escalate severity (e.g., lsass.exe, services.exe, wininit.exe). |