Detection Strategy for Hidden File System Abuse

Technique Detected:  Hidden File System | T1564.005

ID: DET0461
Domains: Enterprise
Analytics: AN1271, AN1272, AN1273
Version: 1.0
Created: 21 October 2025
Last Modified: 21 October 2025

Analytics

AN1271

Anomalous creation or mounting of hidden partitions or virtual file systems. Defender view: detection of registry modifications linked to non-standard file systems, suspicious disk I/O patterns, or bootkit-like behavior where hidden volumes are accessed outside normal file system APIs.

Log Sources
Data Component Name Channel
File Modification (DC0061) WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4663
Windows Registry Key Modification (DC0063) WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=13
Firmware Modification (DC0004) etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Storage Raw disk I/O operations bypassing NTFS APIs
Mutable Elements
Field Description
MonitoredRegistryKeys Specify registry paths for mount points and hidden partition configs.
DiskIOThreshold Tune thresholds for raw disk access outside expected drivers.
TimeWindow Correlate boot-time anomalies with hidden file system mounting activity.

AN1272

Unusual mounting of loopback or pseudo file systems not aligned with legitimate administrative activity. Defender view: monitoring auditd and syslog for mount commands involving suspicious mount points, reserved blocks, or device mappings indicative of hidden partitions.

Log Sources
Data Component Name Channel
File Modification (DC0061) auditd:SYSCALL mount or losetup commands creating hidden or encrypted FS
Command Execution (DC0064) linux:syslog Sudo or root escalation followed by filesystem mount commands
Mutable Elements
Field Description
AllowedMountPoints Whitelist standard mount points to reduce false positives.
UserContext Flag root escalation during mount operations.

AN1273

Hidden file system use through APFS containers or custom plist configuration. Defender view: anomalous use of hdiutil or diskutil to attach hidden partitions, modification of plist entries tied to system volumes, or suspicious raw disk access.

Log Sources
Data Component Name Channel
Process Creation (DC0032) macos:unifiedlog Execution of diskutil or hdiutil attaching hidden partitions
File Modification (DC0061) macos:unifiedlog Hidden volume attachment or modification events
Mutable Elements
Field Description
MonitoredPlistPaths Adjust to target only relevant plist files linked to volume mounting.
ProcessScope Restrict monitoring to sensitive processes like diskutil and hdiutil.