Detection Strategy for Exclusive Control

Technique Detected:  Exclusive Control | T1668

ID: DET0015
Domains: Enterprise
Analytics: AN0045, AN0046, AN0047
Version: 1.0
Created: 21 October 2025
Last Modified: 21 October 2025

Analytics

AN0045

Detects unusual command executions and service modifications that indicate self-patching or disabling of vulnerable services post-compromise. Defenders should monitor for service stop commands, suspicious process termination, and execution of binaries or scripts aligned with known patching or service management tools outside of expected admin contexts.

Log Sources
Data Component Name Channel
Process Creation (DC0032) WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4688
Process Termination (DC0033) WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=5
Mutable Elements
Field Description
ServiceList Tunable list of critical or vulnerable services that defenders want to monitor for unexpected disabling.
TimeWindow Defines correlation window (e.g., 5–15 minutes) between suspicious command execution and subsequent process termination.

AN0046

Detects adversary attempts to monopolize control of compromised systems by issuing service stop commands, unloading vulnerable modules, or forcefully killing competing processes. Defenders should monitor audit logs and syslog for administrative utilities (systemctl, service, kill) being invoked outside of normal change management.

Log Sources
Data Component Name Channel
Command Execution (DC0064) auditd:SYSCALL execve: Commands like systemctl stop , service stop, or kill -9
Process Termination (DC0033) linux:syslog Unexpected termination of daemons or critical services not aligned with admin change tickets
Mutable Elements
Field Description
CriticalProcessList Defines specific Linux daemons and processes that should not be terminated outside maintenance windows.
AdminUserContext Defines expected accounts permitted to execute service stop commands; deviations may be suspicious.

AN0047

Detects unauthorized termination of system daemons or commands issued through launchctl or kill to stop competing services or malware processes. Defenders should monitor unified logs and EDR telemetry for unusual service modifications or terminations.

Log Sources
Data Component Name Channel
Command Execution (DC0064) macos:unifiedlog launchctl unload, kill, or pkill commands affecting daemons or background services
Process Termination (DC0033) macos:osquery process_termination: Unexpected termination of processes tied to vulnerable or high-value services
Mutable Elements
Field Description
ProtectedServiceList Defines macOS services (e.g., securityd, keychain-related daemons) that should never be disabled.