|Tactic||Command and Control|
|Platform||Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X|
|Data Sources||Packet capture, Process use of network, Process Monitoring, Network protocol analysis|
|Contributors||Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach|
Command and control (C2) information is encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may be to adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, UTF-8, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.12 Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.
- Patchwork used Base64 to encode C2 traffic.3
- C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding.4
- AutoIt has sent a C2 response that was base64-encoded.5
- BADNEWS encodes C2 traffic with base64.5
- BS2005 uses Base64 encoding for communication in the message body of an HTTP request.6
- CORESHELL C2 messages are Base64-encoded.7
- Elise exfiltrates data using cookie values that are Base64-encoded.8
- Mis-Type uses Base64 encoding for C2 traffic.9
- Misdat network traffic is Base64-encoded plaintext.9
- Responses from the Pisloader C2 server are base32-encoded.10
- Prikormka encodes C2 traffic with Base64.11
- S-Type uses Base64 encoding for C2 traffic.9
- SeaDuke C2 traffic is base64-encoded.12
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.13
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.13
- Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
- Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
- Cymmetria. (2016). Unveiling Patchwork - The Copy-Paste APT. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
- Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016.
- Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
- FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.
- Falcone, R., et al.. (2015, June 16). Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
- Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017.
- Grunzweig, J., et al. (2016, May 24). New Wekby Attacks Use DNS Requests As Command and Control Mechanism. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
- Cherepanov, A.. (2016, May 17). Operation Groundbait: Analysis of a surveillance toolkit. Retrieved May 18, 2016.
- Grunzweig, J.. (2015, July 14). Unit 42 Technical Analysis: Seaduke. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
- Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.