Screen Capture

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Screen Capture
Technique
ID T1113
Tactic Collection
Platform Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring

Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations.

Mac

On OSX, the native command screencapture is used to capture screenshots.

Linux

On Linux, there is the native command xwd.1

Examples

  • APT28 regularly deploys a custom tool to take regular screenshots of victims.23
  • Malware used by Group5 is capable of watching the victim's screen.4
  • BADNEWS has a command to take a screenshot and send it to the C2 server.5
  • BlackEnergy is capable of taking screenshots.6
  • Cobalt Strike's "beacon" payload is capable of capturing screen shots.7
  • CosmicDuke takes periodic screenshots and exfiltrates them.8
  • Crimson contains a command to perform screen captures.9
  • EvilGrab has the capability to capture screenshots.10
  • Flame can take regular screenshots when certain applications are open that are sent to the command and control server.11
  • HALFBAKED can obtain screenshots from the victim.12
  • Janicab captured screenshots and sent them out to a C2 server 13.
  • Kasidet has the ability to initiate keylogging and screen captures.14
  • Prikormka contains a module that captures screenshots of the victim's desktop.15
  • Pteranodon can capture screenshots at a configurable interval.16
  • RTM can capture screenshots.17
  • RedLeaves can capture screenshots.18
  • Rover takes screenshots of the compromised system's desktop and saves them to C:\system\screenshot.bmp for exfiltration every 60 minutes.19
  • T9000 can take screenshots of the desktop and target application windows, saving them to user directories as one byte XOR encrypted .dat files.20
  • TinyZBot contains screen capture functionality.21
  • Trojan.Karagany can take a desktop screenshot and save the file into \ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\shot.png.22
  • XAgentOSX contains the takeScreenShot (along with startTakeScreenShot and stopTakeScreenShot) functions to take screenshots using the CGGetActiveDisplayList, CGDisplayCreateImage, and NSImage:initWithCGImage methods.3
  • ZLib has the ability to obtain screenshots of the compromised system.23

Mitigation

Blocking software based on screen capture functionality may be difficult, and there may be legitimate software that performs those actions. Instead, identify potentially malicious software that may have functionality to acquire screen captures, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting24 tools, like AppLocker,2526 or Software Restriction Policies27 where appropriate.28

Detection

Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.

References

  1. ^  Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
  2. ^  ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.
  3. a b  Robert Falcone. (2017, February 14). XAgentOSX: Sofacy's Xagent macOS Tool. Retrieved July 12, 2017.
  4. ^  Scott-Railton, J., et al. (2016, August 2). Group5: Syria and the Iranian Connection. Retrieved September 26, 2016.
  5. ^  Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016.
  6. ^  Baumgartner, K. and Garnaeva, M.. (2014, November 3). BE2 custom plugins, router abuse, and target profiles. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
  7. ^  Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
  8. ^  F-Secure Labs. (2014, July). COSMICDUKE Cosmu with a twist of MiniDuke. Retrieved July 3, 2014.
  9. ^  Huss, D.. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
  10. ^  PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.
  11. ^  Gostev, A. (2012, May 28). The Flame: Questions and Answers. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
  12. ^  Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
  13. ^  Brod. (2013, July 15). Signed Mac Malware Using Right-to-Left Override Trick. Retrieved July 17, 2017.
  14. ^  Yadav, A., et al. (2016, January 29). Malicious Office files dropping Kasidet and Dridex. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
  1. ^  Cherepanov, A.. (2016, May 17). Operation Groundbait: Analysis of a surveillance toolkit. Retrieved May 18, 2016.
  2. ^  Kasza, A. and Reichel, D.. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
  3. ^  Faou, M. and Boutin, J.. (2017, February). Read The Manual: A Guide to the RTM Banking Trojan. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
  4. ^  FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.
  5. ^  Ray, V., Hayashi, K. (2016, February 29). New Malware ‘Rover’ Targets Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. Retrieved February 29, 2016.
  6. ^  Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J.. (2016, February 4). T9000: Advanced Modular Backdoor Uses Complex Anti-Analysis Techniques. Retrieved April 15, 2016.
  7. ^  Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved December 4, 2014.
  8. ^  Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.
  9. ^  Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved February 25, 2016.
  10. ^  Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  11. ^  Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
  12. ^  NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
  13. ^  Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  14. ^  Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.